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zABSTRACT
This study examines the administration of the Ottoman army 
during the series of military campaigns which were conducted 
annually against the Hapsburgs in Hungary between 1593 and 
1606. In 1526 the Ottoman army under Siileyman the 
Magnificent beat the Hungarian army at the battle of Mohacs, 
resulting in a power struggle between the Ottomans and the 
Hapsburgs in Hungary. Between 15^1 and 1566 the Ottomans 
established full control over the central part of the 
country through measures which included the taxation of the 
inhabitants and the garrisoning of strongholds. A peace 
treaty between Ottoman and Hapsburg was concluded in 1568, 
and a state of official peace existed until the renewed 
outbreak of war in 1593; after the treaty of Zsitvatorok in 
1606, peace was again maintained until the 1660s.
The introduction is followed by a short chapter outlining 
the events of the Ottoman presence in Hungary between 1526 
and 1606; the main body of the study discusses how the 
Ottomans mobilised an army to fight on the northwest border 
of the Empire, kept this army fed, and attempted to ensure 
that sufficient money was available to fund it. The admin­
istration of the provision of three of the elements which 
comprise the logistic bases of warfare are therefore 
discussed in three Parts: in Part I, manpower; in Part II, 
food; and In Part III, finance.
This study is based on contemporary Ottoman documents and 
chronicles. By asking of the contemporary Ottoman data the 
same sorts of questions as are asked of their material by 
historians of western Europe, it Is hoped that those aspects 
of the Ottoman Empire with which we are here concerned may 
be better understood. It should thus become possible to 
escape from the broad generalisations which often 
characterise the views of those unfamiliar with the primary 
sources for Ottoman history. This is a study of a 
particular epoch in the history of Central Europe; it is. an 
attempt to demonstrate the valuable contribution which 
Ottoman source material can make to European history.
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7INTRODUCTION
This study concerns the Ottoman administration of warfare 
during the thirteen years from 1593 to 1606 in which the 
army conducted annual campaigns against the Hapsburgs in 
Hungary. Essentially, it is a study of how the Ottomans 
used the resources at their disposal in order to enable them 
to fight over a long period in a border area far distant 
from the centre of government in Istanbul.
In terms of military history, the administration of war is 
the study of the logistic branch of military endeavour:
"In its broadest definition the term logistics signifies the total 
process by which the resources of a nation - material and human - 
are mobilised and directed toward the accomplishment of military 
ends... It can be understood only in its relation on the one hand to 
the end which it serves, and on the other to the sources from which 
it springs”.
This twentieth-century definition of logistics, drawn from a 
work on the United States navy in the Second World War, 
applies equally to the operation of a land army 400 years 
ago, for, despite the obvious technological improvements in 
transport and communications over the intervening period, 
the underlying problems facing those resppnsible for the 
conduct of war have not changed. Logistics deals with what 
may be termed the ’nuts and bolts’ of war, the fundamental 
problems of mobilising, moving and supplying the large and 
disparate body which constitutes an army. The successful 
administration of such a body was perhaps the most demanding 
task confronting those in power within the early modern
1. Ballantine (1947) p.l
8state. The Ottoman Empire was frequently at war, and the 
administration of warfare was central to the life of the 
Empire: a detailed study of how the demands of warfare were 
met provides an opportunity to see how the state operated in 
pursuit of a definite goal.
The impetus for the present study comes, in particular, from 
the article Harb which Vernon Parry contributed to the 
Encyclopedia of Islam.^ In this article Parry describes in 
general terms how the Ottomans organised for war and how a 
military campaign was conducted. He stresses the challenges 
facing the Ottoman army on campaign: the distances to be 
travelled, the supply of war material and of food for the 
troops, the assembling of transport animals, carts and 
wagons. His short study is inevitably no more than a 
sketch, based on sources/are, almost without exception, 
non-Ottoman. The present study is based primarily on 
Ottoman source material, and attempts to give substance to 
some of the areas defined by Parry by examining the 
functioning of the army in a particular series of campaigns.
The end of the sixteenth century is generally recognised as 
a period of far-reaching structural change in the Ottoman 
polity. A recent article by Inalcik has further served to 
define the direction of the present study. In this article 
he discusses the changes in military manpower and in methods 
of taxation which came to be adopted during the seventeenth 
century. The two significant developments which he notes 
were the widening of the scope of military recruitment to 
include mercenary companies of reaya (subject population) 
origin, and the introduction of new taxes - as well as the 
regularisation of existing ones - to meet the central
2. Parry, art. Harb (El)
9government’s ever-growing demand for c a s h . 3
The matters dealt with in this thesis, then, are the 
provision of three of the elements which comprise the 
logistic bases of warfare: manpower, food and finance. A 
short introductory narrative of the main events of these 
campaigns in Hungary is followed by three long chapters, 
each of which has its own introductory section. Part I is a 
discussion of how the troops of the army were recruited, 
mobilised and paid. Part II looks at the administrative 
measures taken by the state to ensure their food supply, as 
well as diet. Part III is based on the accounts of the 
Campaign Treasury, and the management of the financial 
resources necessary for the the support of the war effort.
In examining the logistics of these campaigns, I have not 
chosen to place emphasis on how the various components of 
logistic support were calculated and administered during the 
course of each individual campaign, as has been done, for 
instance, for the campaigns of Alexander the Great by Donald 
Engels,** or by Martin van Creveld for a number of modern 
campaigns. This Is partly on account of limitations imposed 
by the archival data at my disposal, which have chrono­
logical lacunae, and partly because it is necessary to treat 
with scepticism the figures given in the accounts of 
contemporary h i s t o r i a n s .  ^ A further reason why the treat­
ment adopted here Is more synoptic is that analysis of the 
ways in which particular logistic problems were solved is 
more telling of the general approach to such problems which 
the Ottomans adopted. So, too, the similarities and differ­
ences between the Ottomans and their western contemporaries
3. Inalcik (1980) esp. pp.286,311-13
4. Engels (1978)
5. An interesting and salutary discussion of the reliability of the 
Ottoman historians is to be found in Schmidt (1985), in which he 
compares contemporary accounts of the E§ri (Eger) campaign of 1596.
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become clearer through such an overview. So far as I am 
aware, the only other study which takes such a comparative 
approach is a short article by Majer, in which he raises 
some of the general issues to be considered in a comparison
of Ottoman and Hapsburg logistics at the end of the seven-
£
teenth century.
Both modern military historians and those of earlier times 
have tended to ignore the logistic aspect of military 
campaigning in favour -of analysis of strategy and tactics. 
Yet, whatever the military objectives envisaged, without an 
effective logistic system, there can be no strategy: simply, 
if men and materials are not where they should be, any pre­
determined plan of battle must fail. Matters of a 
logistical nature limit and define the operating 
possibilities for an army and therefore circumscribe the
strategy that may be proposed.
This raises the question of how far, in the early modern 
age, the authorities were capable of taking account of the 
multiplicity of factors which were involved in arriving at 
any informed decision in military planning. The fact that 
the Ottoman Empire was able to expand from its obscure 
beginnings in Anatolia to occupy a large part of Europe and 
threaten even the Hapsburg Empire has led European
historians to assume that the Ottoman army, and thus the
state, must have been able to plan and define its logistic 
requirements with some precision. Writing particularly of 
the Ottoman campaigns in Hungary, the Hungarian military 
historian Geza Perjes, has suggested in a recent article 
that Turkish military policy was rational:
6. Majer (1981): this paper, which was contributed to a symposium on 
Austrian-Turkish relations, is a preliminary to the longer, detailed 
study of the subject which he is currently preparing.
11
MIt is quite inconceivable that an empire as large as Turkey could 
have been built and maintained for centuries without planning that 
reasonably took into account the objectives and the means 
available”.
His incorporation of these objectives and means into a model 
of the Hungarian-Turkish wars rests on the assumption that 
the Turkish authorities were capable of executing their 
policy in the light of an accurate assessment of logistic 
factors:
"The investigator encounters no difficulty in reckoning the daily, 
monthly and yearly quantities of provisions and fodder needed by an 
army of a given number of men or in pinpointing the amount of 
transportation and the number of depots required for shifting and 
concentrating supplies"J
Although he admits of the current state of ignorance of the 
Ottoman side of the equation, Perjes' discussion of the 
issue is intended to show that the Ottomans did not annex 
the whole of Hungary after the battle of Mohag because they 
were keenly aware of the limits of their logistic 
capability, and realised that they were not able to wage, in 
Clausewitz's terms, a war of annihilation against the
Q
Hungarians, but could only envisage one of limited alms.
A counter to this view that logistic options are subject to 
calculationis that of van Creveld, who, in his excellent 
study of several campaigns in the modern period, concludes 
that even in campaigns during this century, with 
immeasureably more sophisticated tools at the disposal of
7. Perjes (1981) pp.155-56
8. For the Prussian writer and soldier, these were the two possible 
types of war: see Howard (1983) pp.47-58. A full text of Clausewitz's 
classic work, On War, is Clausewitz (1976).
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those responsible for determining the course of war, there 
is little evidence to suggest that a thorough-going attempt 
was made to take into account all the possible factors which 
might have a bearing on the conduct of campaign. In the 
light of his research on campaigns between 1805-19^4, he 
observes that:
"...most armies seem to have prepared their campaigns as best they 
could on an ad hoc basis, making great, if uncoordinated, efforts to 
gather together the largest possible number of tactical vehicles, 
trucks of all descriptions, railway troops etc., while giving 
little, if any, thought to the ’ideal* combination which, in theory, 
would have carried them the furthest."9
van Creveld’s conclusion as to the apparent impossibility of 
co-ordinating provision and supply does not bring us full 
circle to a point where we can say that logistic matters 
received scant attention, simply because there was no chance 
of all possible aspects being considered; rather, this very 
uncertainty does allow us to assess how flexible the 
logistic apparatus could be and how it could respond to the 
unquantifiable and incalculable.
One important issue is that of assessing the extent to which 
state agencies controlled, and were responsible for, 
logistic planning. Writing of Tudor England, Davies has 
described military provisioning as "the prime test of 
governmental efficiency", ^  and this could doubtless be 
extended to the logistic effort as a whole. The present 
study of the logistics of the Ottoman campaigns in Hungary 
at the end of the sixteenth century attempts to discover how 
the government of that Empire harnessed the resources 
available to it in the pursuit of a military goal.
9. Creveld (1980) p.236
10. Davies (1963) p.3
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THE OTTOMAN PRESENCE IN HUNGARY, AND THE EVENTS OP 
THE 1593-1606 WAR.1
The Hapsburg - Ottoman war of 1593-1606 in Hungary was 
fought during the middle years of what was to be a one and a 
half centuries long period of Ottoman administration of the 
central part of the country. Although it was not until 1541 
that the vilayet of Buda was constituted and direct Ottoman 
rule imposed there, Sttleyman's successful siege of Belgrade 
in 1521, the third attempt on the city by the Ottoman 
military forces,2 had already removed the final barrier to 
an expansion of Ottoman power northwards into the Hungarian 
plain.
Hopes of a common Hungarian defensive front against the 
Ottoman threat fell victim to internal struggles between the 
royal house and the nobility, and in 1526 the Hungarian army 
under King Lajos II was smashed by SUleyman’s army at Mohag 
(Mohacs); this resulted in de facto partition of the country 
between the candidates of the two foreign powers contending 
for control in Hungary, the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans. 
Further Ottoman advances to Vienna in 1529, and to Gtins 
(Koszeg) in 1531, served as a reminder to the Hapsburgs that 
they could not treat with impunity the power which the 
Ottomans exercised in Hungary through their vassal, John 
Zapolya. The impetus for the full application of Ottoman 
power came with the death of Zapolya in 1540, and the sub­
1. The purpose of this chapter is to recount briefly the major events 
of the period with the aim of providing a background narrative to the 
main part of the study; the broad chronology of events is not in 
contention.
2. The two earlier Ottoman assaults on Belgrade had been those of Murad 
II in 1440, and of Mehmed II in 1456.
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sequent attack on Buda by the Emperor Ferdinand I.
Zapolya’s Infant son John-Slgismund was confirmed as Ottoman 
vassal In Transylvania, while SUleyman retained control of 
the central part of the country.
Between 1521 and 1566, the year of SUleyman's death at the 
siege of Sigetvar (Szlgetvar), the Ottomans consolidated 
their rule in Hungary, constituting as sancaks the area 
north of the Drava and lower Danube.3 The vilayet of 
Terae^var (Timisoara) was established in 1552, in response to 
Ferdinandfs attempt to gain control of Transylvania. 
SUleyman’s death signalled the end of this expansive period, 
his successor Selim II concluding a peace treaty with the 
Hapsburgs at Edirne in 1568, and leaving the Hapsburgs free 
to pursue the Counter Reformation. This treaty was renewed 
in 1576, 1584 and lSSl.4
Although the years between 1568 and the outbreak of full war 
In 1593 were disturbed by the Klelnkrleg. a state of inter­
mittent raid and counter-raid along the length of the 
extensive and ill-defined border demarcating the Ottoman and 
Hapsburg spheres of Influence, both sides lacked the will 
and the strength to open official hostilities. Both were 
keen that the activities of the Uskoks on the one hand and 
the apparently spontaneous and independent actions of the 
Ottoman border troops on the other should not be allowed to 
escalate Into a full-scale confrontation. The Emperor 
Maximilian II, and after him those who formulated policy In 
the name of the reclusive Rudolph II, carefully maintained 
diplomatic relations with the Porte by delivering the annual 
tribute, and thus the 1568 truce was maintained.
3. For the dates of the establishment of the sancaks of the province of 
Buda see Kaldy-Nagy, art. Macaristan (El).
4. Nouradounghian (1897) I pp. 32,34-36.
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In the presentation of contemporary Ottoman historians, war 
begins again in 1593 with the campaign of the grand vezir 
Koca Sinan Pasha to avenge the defeat of the troops of the 
beylerbeyi of Bosnia, Telli Hasan Pasha, by an Austrian 
force. This famous rout took place in June of that year at. 
Siska (Sisak) at the confluence of the rivers Kupa and Sava. 
For the Hungarians, however, 1591 was the crucial date, and 
they accordingly refer to the events of these years as "the 
fifteen years war". Although in that year no particular 
event stands out as decisive in strictly Ottoman - Hungarian 
relations, 1591 saw a Turkish offensive by Hasan Pasha on 
the Croatian border between Ottoman and Hapsburg, in which a 
number of forts were taken. In particular, the building of 
the fortress of Yenihisar (Petrinja) on the Kupa in 1592 was 
seen as an aggressive act. The successful Ottoman siege of 
the Hapsburg stronghold of Behke (BIhas) on the R.Una in 
1592 brought realisation of the neglected state of Austrian 
defences against the Turks.^
The contemporary European view of Ottoman designs, culled, 
at least In part, from the reports of agents and diplomats 
in Constantinople, was that, immediately upon the conclusion 
of the twelve-year long war with Persia in 1590, the Porte 
was preparing to go to war again.^ There were said to be 
eight possible targets of its aggressive plans, and the pros 
and cons of each case were apparently carefully considered 
by the vizirs. The options before them were: to renew the 
war with Persia, or to attack either Morocco, Spain, Malta, 
Venice, some part of Italy, Poland or else the Hapsburg 
Emperor and the kingdom of Hungary. The decision to make 
war in Central Europe having been taken, the energies of 
Hasan Pasha of Bosnia, who was, according to Pe$evi, the
5. HAMMER IV pp.216-17: the chronology of the events of the war is found 
in HAMMER IV pp.209-396; Rothenburg (I960) p.56
6. Knolles (1621) pp.1008-14; see also THOU XI pp.605-17.
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especial favourite of the sultan, Murad III,^ were given a 
free rein. In addition to the harrassment of the Austrians* 
Croatian border defences, 1592 saw an unsuccessful Ottoman 
strike at Tokaj, to the north-east of Buda.
To judge from Ottoman documentary sources from the time of 
the peace with Persia - letters passing between the Porte 
and its representatives on the western borders of the 
Empire, and the correspondence of the pashas of Buda with 
the Hapsburg command - European views that such provocative 
actions were receiving covert support from Istanbul appear 
to have had some substance. It is true, too, that it was 
the personal ambition of Koca Sinan Pasha, his star now in 
the ascendant, which was a dominant voice in the shaping of 
policy at this time. Reports of events in Bosnia reached 
the Porte primarily from Hasan Pasha himself, and there was 
no chance for independent assessment of the seriousness of 
the Uskok menace or the threat of an imminent Hapsburg 
attack. If the events at Siska in June 1593 ultimately 
provided the pretext for a full-scale Ottoman campaign, the 
late arrival of the annual tribute from Vienna in the 
previous years had been used by the pashas of Buda to
o
threaten the Hapsburgs with retaliatory action.
Orders issued prior to Hasan Pasha’s offensive of 1591 had 
directed the beys of the vilayet of Buda not to infringe the 
provisions of the peace;^ however, if the Christian forces 
in Bosnia, and the Uskoks in particular, persisted in 
harrassing Ottoman subjects in that area, action would have 
to be taken against t h e m . 10 in August 1591, at the time of 
Hasan Pasha’s Croatian offensive, orders were sent to all
7. PE£EVI II p.124
8. Bayerle (1972)
9. See, for instance, MD 67/43
10. MD 67/295
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be.ylerbeyls and sancakbeyls of the vilayets of Buda, Bosnia 
and Teme^var that they should continue to hold to the peace 
treaty with Austria, but, in its terminology, these orders 
convey a change in the spirit which would thenceforth guide 
the activity of the Ottoman military forces in these border 
provinces. In these documents the term mttdara, used, for 
example, in the phrase fl...5te canlble mildara ediip”, appears 
for the first time.11 Mildara is an aspect of the Islamic 
doctrine of cihad (holy war) which did not have a place in 
the practice of agreeing peace-treaties as this was under­
stood by the Christians; Kissling interprets mildara as a 
state of terminable co-existence ("kundbare Koexistenz"): ^  
it covers the contradiction between cihad as the principle 
of perpetual war against the inhabitants of the dar Ul-harb 
and the obvious impossibility of being actively engaged in 
permanent warfare. Peace-treaties were therefore seen as a 
truce of limited duration. The implication of the use of 
the term mildara in orders addressed to those in command of 
the western borders of the Empire was that there had been a 
change of attitude at the Porte, that there should be 
greater readiness than there had been hitherto to actively 
prepare for war. The spirit of apparent quiescence by the 
Porte can be seen to have masked an intention to fight the 
Hapsburgs when the time was r i p e . 1 ^ Subsequent orders 
continue this policy: in November 1592 Hasan Pasha was told
11. MD 68/124; MD 68/127
12. Kissling (1974) p.10: this difficult and important essay discusses 
cihad in terms of the objective relations existing between Islam and the 
West in particular (I am grateful to Peter Brod for help with 
translation) •
13. As will be mentioned again, the fact that cihad was a principle of 
gerlat law, and "perpetual war1 incumbent upon Muslims, does not justify 
the deterministic analysis which sees the opening of the Ottoman 
campaigns from 1593 as a result of the need to act according to this 
principle.
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to act with restraint, since the tribute was shortly 
expected,1  ^but by early 1593 Sinan Pashafs impatience over 
the matter of the tribute was growing, and the troops of 
Rumeli were ordered to mobilise at the plain of Sirem 
(Srem), between the rivers Danube and S a v a . 15
Sinan Pasha left Istanbul for the mustering ground at Daud 
Pasha, outside the walls of the city, on 19 July 1 5 9 3 > such 
swift response to Hasan Pasha's defeat in the previous month 
could not have been possible unless the imperial 
manufacturies of military equipment had been kept in 
production in the three years since there had been peace 
with Persia. In this first short season of the war, the 
troops of Anatolia could not be mustered, but even with 
those which he had available, Sinan Pasha was able to take 
the fortresses of Vesprem (Veszprem) and Palota (Varpalota), 
although, later in the season the Ottomans were to lose to 
the Christians a number of strongholds to the northeast of 
Buda. In the spring of 1594, the Hapsburgs embarked on a 
two-pronged attack, with Archduke Matthias, brother of 
Emperor Rudolph, besieging Estergon (Esztergom), whose 
commanding position on the Danube made it, at that time, the 
Ottoman-held position closest and most threatening to 
Vienna. Meanwhile, General Teuffenbach attacked Hatvan to 
the northeast. Such an attack was potentially dangerous for 
the Ottomans, but news of the arrival of their relief 
forces, strengthened for the 1594 season by the addition of 
Anatolian cavalry troops and extra troops sent from 
Istanbul, caused Teuffenbach to raise his siege. Indeed, in 
1594, the Ottoman army, having saved Estergon, took the 
smaller fortresses of Tata and Samartin (Szent Marton), 
and most significantly, lying even further west on the
14. MD 69/509
15. MD 70/118
16. KK 253 p.215 (19 Sewal 1001)
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Danube than Estergon, the fortress of Yanik (Gyor) which was 
then made the seat of a new Ottoman vilayet. Arriving late, 
the han of the Crimea, Gazi Giray, took Papa (Papa) from the 
Christian force defending it. Intending to press home his 
advantage, Sinan Pasha’s army laid siege to Komran 
(Komarom), but the lateness of the season and the consequent 
recalcitrance of the troops prevented a successful outcome 
to this endeavour.^
After the Ottomans had consolidated their position in upper 
Hungary in 1594, the thrust of their campaigns in 1595 was 
to be along the lower Danube against their former vassals, 
the principalities of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia. 
Late in 1594 these vassal states had sought Hapsburg 
protection against the Ottomans, seeing in the present 
struggle a chance to free themselves from Ottoman over­
lordship. The history of these territories is one of 
complicated dynastic rivalries, aggravated in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries by their position in the Ottoman- 
Hapsburg struggle for control in eastern Europe, in which 
each was obliged to seek some form of protection from one or 
other of these ’great powers’, and yet hoped to retain its 
independence. The strategic importance to the Ottomans of 
these lands was as providers of raw materials and foodstuffs 
in peace as well as for the war effort, so that their 
defection was considered to be a serious blow to the Ottoman 
cause. In particular, the use of the Danube bank as a route 
for the transport of military equipment, which went by boat 
to Varna from Istanbul and thence by cart into Hungary,1® 
was hindered by this action, which imposed on the Ottomans 
the need to have a permanent and active defensive force 
along this river.
17. For contemporary drawings of the Hungarian castles see, for instance, 
Dilich (1609) esp. pt.I
18. AK ff.l6r,53v
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The difficulties caused to the Ottomans by the opening up of 
two fronts in Europe were apparent in the results of the 
1595 campaign season. As Sinan pursued an attack against 
Wallachia,-*-9 leaving the defence of northwest Hungary to his 
son Mehraed, lately beylerbeyl of Buda, the revitalised 
Hapsburg forces launched a strong attack on Estergon, 
wishing to bring to a satisfactory conclusion the action in 
which they had failed .in the previous year. The Ottomans 
initially had some success in the east, a brief attempt 
being made to bring Wallachia and Moldavia under full 
Ottoman adminstrative control as vilayets. But the second 
part of the summer saw Estergon fall to the Christians, and 
also Vi^egrad (Visegrad), on the Danube Bend between 
Estergon and Buda. The combined actions of the voyvodes of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, Stephen Razvan and Michael Vlteazul, 
and of the prince of Transylvania, Sigismund Bathory, 
culminated in the disastrous rout of Sinan Pashafs forces at 
the YergdgU (Giurgiu) bridge. Although briefly demoted from 
the post of grand vezir - and not surprisingly in view of 
the events of the summer - Sinan Pasha, now in his eighties, 
was soon reinstated following the death of his successor 
Lala Mehmed Pasha who had held the office for only a few 
days. Meanwhile, in Bosnia, where the seeds of the conflict 
had been allowed to germinate, the castles of the border 
continued to change hands. ’.A/Jh c 7
There was, however, one event in 1595 from which the 
Ottomans could draw some solace: Moldavia was prised from 
the Hapsburg embrace through the negotiations of the Polish 
chancellor, Zamoyski, and Gazi Giray, the Tatar han. 
Zamoyski was no lover of the Hapsburgs, and saw a semi-
19. Sinan’s great rival Ferhad Pasha was briefly reappointed grand vezir 
in early 1595, and it was he who initially led the Wallachian campaign 
until he was dismissed in favour of Sinan.
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autonomous Moldavia on his borders as a buffer against the 
Hapsburgs, Zamoyski's appointee as voyvode, Jeremia 
Movila, was recognised by the sultan in place of Stephen 
Razvan who was favoured by the pro-Hapsburg Transylvanian 
prince Sigismond Bathory.^O
On Sinanfs death in April 1596, Damad Ibrahim Pasha was 
appointed grand vezir. The events of this year, in which 
the presence of the Sultan Mehmed III on campaign showed 
that the Ottomans were throwing all their resources into a 
major confrontation, are w e l l - k n o w n . Confrontations at 
Lipova and Temegvar, and at Vag (Vac) and Hatvan earlier in 
the season, were followed in October by the capitulation to 
the Ottomans of the fortress of Egri (Eger), which lay on 
the access route of the Hapsburgs to their ally 
Transylvania. It was against the Hapsburg relief force 
commanded by the Archduke Maximilian, that the Ottomans 
fought the single large field battle of the war at Mezo- 
keresztes. This late-season Ottoman victory was closely- 
contested, the too-early assumption of success by the 
Hapsburg army leaving it victim to a final onslaught by the 
Ottoman forces. The third vezir Cigalazade Sinan Pasha was 
rewarded for his part in the action at Hatvan, Egri and 
Mezokeresztes with the office of grand vezir, but after only 
a month this office was restored to Damad Ibrahim.
The Ottomans were, however, unable to exploit these 
successes in northeast Hungary. In the northwest, they 
maintained their hold on Yanik, which managed to withstand a 
Hapsburg siege in 1597. The grand vezir did not himself 
participate in the fighting of that season, feeling that he
20. Kortepeter (1972) pp.145-46
21. It was the first time since 1566, and the death of Siileyman at the 
siege of Sigetvar, that the Ottoman sultan had personally led his army 
on campaign.
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should stay in Istanbul in order to protect his position in 
the intrigues which were endemic in court circles. Command 
of the army was left to the former beylerbeyl of Anatolia, 
Satirci Mehmed Pasha, who accomplished little more than the 
recovery of Tata, his assault on Va$ having resulted in a 
stalemate. Temegvar, like Yanik, was the object of a siege 
by Bathory, but escaped falling to the prince.
In spite of his presence in Istanbul, Damad Ibrahim was 
replaced as grand vezir in late 1597 by Hadim Hasan Pasha, 
who was himself deposed in favour of Cerrah Mehmed Pasha in 
the following spring. The Christian forces under the 
command of the generals Palffy and Schwarzenburg had a 
notable success in March 1598 when they were able to take 
from the Ottomans the fortress of Yanik, which had been left 
all but unguarded by its garrison. Yanik was never again to 
fall into Ottoman hands. By this time, then, the Christians 
held all the major fortresses commanding the Danube as far 
east as Va$ and Vipegrad. Rather than attempting to push 
back the Hapsburgs with a major siege of one of these 
strongholds, the Ottoman campaign plan for 1598 was to try 
to cripple Transylvania as an ally of the Hapsburgs. Varad 
(Oradea) was to be the target of the combined forces of 
Satirci Mehmed Pasha and Gazi Giray Han. However, such a 
concentration of manpower left Buda and the area to the 
northwest of Lake Balaton open to attack, and the Christians 
followed up their success at Yanik by taking Vesprem, Tata 
and Palota; luckily for the Ottomans, however, they besieged 
Buda too late in the season to achieve any conclusive 
result. The lateness of the season meant, too, that Satirci 
Mehmed had to raise the siege of Varad and struggle back to 
winter quarters in Belgrade with his army in disarray. As 
if to compound the problems which faced the Ottomans,
Michael of Wallachia defeated the troops of the beylerbeyl 
of Bosnia, Hadim Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, at Nigbolu (Nikopol) on 
the lower Danube.
The parlous state of the Ottoman war effort by the end of 
the 1598 season resulted in the dismissal of Satirci Mehmed
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and Cerrah Mehmed. Reinstated as both grand vezir and 
commander-in-chief, Damad Ibrahim Pasha held inconclusive 
peace talks with the Hapsburgs in 1599, and then marched 
against Uyvar (N.Zamky) but returned to Belgrade for the 
winter before an attack could be mounted.
Two unconnected events of 1599 were of major significance 
for the future of Ottoman participation in the war. The 
existing balance of power between the Hapsburgs and the 
Ottomans was altered by the decision of Michael of Wallachia 
to submit to the Sultan in 1599. The somewhat unstable 
Sigismond Bathory had departed from Transylvania for Poland 
for the third time in as many years, leaving, as in 1597, 
his cousin the cardinal Andras in control. This was the 
opportunity for Michael to fulfil his territorial ambition 
of uniting with Wallachia the Vlachs under Transylvanian 
rule; the insecurity of his position between Hapsburgs,
Poles and Ottomans led him to send emissaries to the Porte, 
and he was duly accepted as a vassal by Mehmed III.
Moldavia, too, was to fall to him in 1600. On the negative 
side, 1599 was the first year in which the activities of the 
Celali rebels in Anatolia provoked the Ottoman state into 
taking firm measures against them: this was a portent of 
continuing trouble. 2^
In 1600, Damad Ibrahim was able to more than retrieve his 
reputation, with the successful Ottoman siege of Kanije 
(Nagykanisza), described in a contemporary source as 
"Schlttssel Deutschlands1 and "hohen Trost der deutschen 
Nation11. T h a t  Vienna was assumed by the Hapsburgs to be 
the goal of Ottoman military aspirations is clear from, for 
example, the detailed plan for its defence which was 
prepared in 1598 by Giorgio Basta, the Hapsburg military
22. For a narrative of the events of these years in Anatolia, see 
Griswold (1983).
23. Cerwinka (1968) p.412
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commander of upper Hungary.^ The Danube route to Vienna was 
effectively closed to the Ottomans after 1598, but a more 
southerly thrust at this strategically important fortress 
was undertaken, and, aided by the mutiny of the garrison, 
resulted in victory for the Ottomans after a siege of more 
than a month. A new beylerbeyilik was established with its 
centre at Kanije: beylerbeyiliks had earlier been 
established after the Ottoman capture of the other important 
fortresses of Yanik and E g r i . ^ 5
As the Ottoman army was setting out from Belgrade in July 
1601, Damad Ibrahim Pasha died at Zemun. Yemipci Hasan 
Pasha, was appointed grand vezir and commander-in-chief in 
his place. Leaving Istanbul late, he did not reach Belgrade 
until early in September, by which time the Hapsburgs had 
succeeded in capturing the castle of Istolni Belgrad 
(Szekesfehervar). He was forced to prepare to retire to 
winter quarters, but received news that the Archduke 
Ferdinand was attempting to retake Kanije. After a hard 
battle Kanije was saved for the Ottomans, and was to remain 
in their hands until 1690. In 1601 the political 
manoeuverings of Michael of Wallachia came to an end with 
his murder on the orders of his implacable enemy Basta, 
after which Sigismund Bathory was proclaimed prince of 
Transylvania for the fourth time.^
The next three seasons, from 1602-04, saw only desultory
24. HHStA Kriegsakten 35, January-October 1598: ff.l9-24r
25. There is also evidence that there had been a beylerbeyilik centred 
on Sigetvar for at least some months in 1595 viz: MD 73/289; MD 73/905; 
MD 73/1146. Neither Birken (1976) nor Fekete (1949) make reference to 
such a province, which was presumably reduced in status in 1600 to 
become a sancak of the vilayet of Kanije.
26. For details of events in the Principalities between 1597 and 1601 
see Lefaivre (1902) I pp.231-250
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action. Buda was the target of Hapsburg efforts. In 
October 1602 they succeeded in taking Pest from the 
Ottomans, only to lose it in 1601!, after the Ottoman forces 
had failed to retake it in 1603. Yemipci Hasan Pasha had 
retaken Istolni Belgrad In 1602, after it had been only a 
few months in enemy hands. The military situation of the 
Ottomans in Hungary was not favourable In these years, and 
the activities of the rebels in Anatolia were giving ever- 
increasing cause for concern. More seriously still, in 1603 
Shah Abbas marched northwest to reconquer the Caucasian 
territory which he had signed away to the Ottomans in 1590: 
this war on the Ottomans’ eastern front was to last until 
1612.
Yemipci Hasan Pasha was executed in the autumn of 1603; in 
his place, the beylerbeyl of Egypt, Malkog Ali Pasha was 
appointed, but, having arrived from Egypt by December 1603, 
he was to die of fever at Belgrade before he was able to 
lead his troops into the field. December 1603 also saw the 
death of the Sultan Mehmed III and the accession of Ahmed I. 
The demands of renewed war against Persia led to the 
creation of two separate military commands, that of the 
east, to which was appointed the one-time grand vezlr 
pigalazade Sinan Pasha, while the position briefly occupied 
by Malkog Ali, that of grand vezlr and commander-in-chief of 
the western front, In summer 1604 was given to the former 
beylerbeyl of Rumeli and Buda, Lala Mehmed Pasha. Besides 
the retaking of Pest by the Ottomans in 1604, Vag and Hatvan 
both fell to them. A late-season siege of Estergon, 
although showing that their military strength was not all 
spent, had to be raised in November.
Despite the strains imposed by having to fight enemies in 
both east and west, the Ottomans were better able to sustain 
their efforts In Hungary than were the Hapsburgs. The 
Hapsburgs were plagued by problems of financial admin­
istration and a shifting pattern of alliances both within 
the body of their Empire and without; they suffered fatal 
blow to their hopes of military success in Hungary with the
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realignment of Transylvania on the Ottoman side in 1605.
The tensions created by the Counter Reformation could not 
produce a consistent policy in those caught between Hapsburg 
and Ottoman rivalry in Hungary, and the ferocity of the 
Hapsburg war administration in Transylvania as suffered by 
the Hungarian nobility there culminated in the anti-Hapsburg 
revolt led by Istvan Bocskai. In recognition of his co­
operation with the Ottoman forces, he was crowned king of 
Hungary by the grand vezir Lala Mehmed Pasha. Bocskal’s 
revolt added to the Ottoman war effort a powerful, if 
financially impoverished, body of manpower and r e s o u r c e s . ^  
In 1605, therefore, the Ottomans were able to take VIpegrad, 
Vesprem, and Palota, and most importantly, Estergon.
Thus, the Ottomans were able to enter the peace negotiations 
of 1606 from a position of relative strength, as had not 
been the case in earlier attempts at peace. In June 1606 
the Hapsburgs recognised Bocskai as prince of Transylvania, 
and conceded that they could no more interfere in matters of 
religion in his domain. In November, the Treaty of Zsitva- 
torok concluded the war between the Emperor and the Sultan.
A struggle, the Impetus for whose beginnings may, at least 
in part, have come from Koca Sinan Pasha, was ended thirteen 
years later without substantial territorial gain to either 
side. Although it is true that the Ottomans had only added 
to their Empire the fortresses of Kanije and Egri during 
these years, they retained as defence for Buda the key 
stronghold of Estergon, which they were to hold until 1683. 
In strategic terms this was not such ’’meagre reward” as it 
Is commonly held to be.^®
27. For details of Bocskai’s revolt, see Lefaivre (1902) I pp.268-76. 
Concerning the composition of his army, see Makkai (1982).
28. Parry (1976) p.121
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Part I: MANPOWER AND MOBILISATION
Ii. Introduction
When discussing the nature of the Ottoman Empire, many 
modern scholars accept as valid the importance of the 
ideological substructure on which that state is supposed to 
have been founded. Inalcik, for example, sums up this idea 
and his confidence in its vitality and reality for the 
contemporary bureaucrats who,
”... following the age-old notions of Persian statecraft, thoroughly 
believed that the well-being of the state depended first of all on the 
strict separation of the different estates and on keeping the masses 
in their proper place- an ancient ideal of Near-Eastern statecraft 
which, indeed, was approximated by the Ottoman Empire in its 
classical period.”1
Thus, this so-called "classical” ideology of the Ottoman 
state drew a fundamental distinction between the reaya. who 
were the creators of wealth through their labour, primarily 
agricultural, and the consumers, the askerl or "military”
p
class. In so far as it had relevance for military man­
power, the practical consequence of this dichotomy was that 
reaya should not be permitted to infiltrate the askerl 
class, and thus the cohesion and military effectiveness of 
the latter corps would be preserved and enhanced.
A refinement of the askeri/reaya dichotomy is the 
distinction within the askerl class itself as between kul
1. Inalcik (1980) pp.283-84; see also Inalcik (1975/a) pp.65-69.
2. For a list of those considered as askerl, see, for example, the 
kanunname first published by Arif (KANUNNAME p.39), in which the mutual 
exclusivity of the reaya and askerl classes is stressed.
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troops and tlmarlot (= slpahi) troops. Although the 
askerl/reaya distinction had probably never existed in a 
pure form in practice, it is easier to pinpoint the salient 
characteristics of each of these two groups than it is to 
define precisely the kul/timariot dichotomy on which 
analysis of the forces of the Ottoman army is traditionally 
based. There is no definition of the word kul which 
captures the full complexity of the meaning of this term 
within the Ottoman system: in the context of discussion of 
the Ottoman army it is used to refer to the primarily ^ash- 
based’ troops of the sultan, the kapukulu, in distinction to 
the ’land-based’ provincial sipahis.^  It is not easy to 
devise a framework of analysis of the Ottoman military 
forces which avoids treating as the most significant 
variable the difference between the kapukulu troops and the 
sipahls. Although the distinction between these two 
sections of military manpower was not strictly observed in 
terms of their rights and duties, the registers which record 
the composition of the military forces do rely on such a 
distinction. These registers were drawn up with a financial 
Intent, their main interest for their compilers being 
whether those listed therein were paid directly from the 
state coffers, receiving a trimensal salary, or whether, in 
the case of the sipahis, they were rewarded from revenue 
sources which had been alienated by the state. This second 
type of remuneration was outside the purview of the annual 
state accounts of the Central Treasury.
So much more flexible was the military organisation of the 
Ottoman Empire in practice than in theory, that none of the 
models of analysis proposed to date is adequate to explain 
the functioning of the army within the contemporary 
historical context. In place of the traditional categories
3 • For a discussion of the meaning of the term kul see Menage (1966) 
esp. pp.66-69.
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of kul and sipahi, which overtly rely on the method of 
remuneration as one of the factors distinguishing one class 
from the other, we may suggest as being more significant the 
functional dichotomy between garrison and mobile troops, or 
that between combat and auxiliary troops. But such 
categories were not sharply-enough distinguished in the 
Ottoman army at this time; although such terms will be used 
in the discussion which follows, they do not pretend to have 
any significance beyond the purely descriptive.
In attempting to escape from the straitjacket imposed by 
most surveys of the Ottoman army at this period, the present 
chapter on manpower and mobilisation will look instead for 
answers to rather more general questions, and the discussion 
will be ordered accordingly. These questions are: (a) Who 
were the troops of the Ottoman army fighting in the 1593- 
1606 Hungarian campaigns? (b) How were they mobilised, and 
what was the pattern of their attendance over the years of 
the war? and (c) What were the levels of remuneration of the 
cash-paid troops, and what was the pattern of the payment of 
their wages? Additional sections describe those ’foreign' 
troops who fought as part of the Ottoman army, and finally, 
and briefly, the auxiliary forces whose duty it was to 
ensure logistic support for the combat army.
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111. Army Recruitment and Composition
The first question, then, is how the Ottoman army in Hungary 
at this time was recruited, and what was the identity of the 
troops who participated in the campaigns. Our concern is 
less with the social and ethnic origins of the soldiers, but 
rather with their identity as defined in terms of their 
military status. It was true of the Ottoman Empire, as of 
the contemporary European powers, that with the introduction 
of new techniques of war its military manpower had seen a 
steady growth in numbers and a change in the balance between 
the various components of the army.** For the Ottomans, 
certain changes in the structure and size of the army were 
imposed by the gradual transition from the early days, when 
expansion into, and then control over, a territory could be 
effected by the raids and field battles of a mobile army of 
predominantly cavalry troops (often serving for no longer 
than one campaigning season), to an Empire with more or less 
stable borders protected by garrison troops.5 Once the 
nature of warfare had changed so radically, continuing reli­
ance on an army which had a preponderance of cavalry who 
functioned as cavalry troops had traditionally functioned, 
was inappropriate. Among other factors, the relative cheap­
ness of equipping musketeer infantry allowed a concomitant 
increase in numbers, which in turn made military service an 
option available to a much wider group.
A provincial sipahi was a horseman who was obliged to appear 
as required on military campaigns, in return for which he 
had the power of collection and appropriation of certain
4. Parker (1976) discusses the changes which took place in contemporary 
European armies.
5. For a study of the administrative measures used by the Ottomans to 
consolidate their hold over conquered territories, see Inalcik (1954).
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agricultural and other state dues. Depending on the size of 
his benefice (dlrlik), he was further obliged to bring with 
him to campaign a certain number of armed men (cebelU) and 
retainers. Provisions regarding the number of such 
followers were laid down in kanun,^ and for sipahis with 
smaller benefices of up to 10,000 akge yield p.a., did not 
exceed three or four. These stipulations were the legal 
minimum, and Kogi Bey is probably correct when he says that 
”in former times” the better-off sipahis used to take with 
them large numbers of men, although his suggestion that they 
did so purely from the desire to please God is less easy to
credit.7
The broad outlines of the recruitment of the provincial 
cavalry are known, but it is not immediately apparent who 
their cebelU were. In the secondary literature they are 
usually described as horsemen, but there appears to be no 
conclusive evidence that they were all mounted: mobilisation 
orders, as preserved in the Muhlmme registers, give no
6. Ayn-i Ali (AYN-I ALI/a p.10) indicates as much, under the heading 
kanun-1 mirmiran, and (ibid. pp.11-36) gives a list of the numbers of 
cebelu to be expected from each sancak. The date to which his list 
applies is not clear; (having no indications to the contrary, it appears 
that the ratio between the number of cebelu whom a timarlot was obliged 
to bring to campaign, and the size of his benefice, did not change over 
time, at least officially, even as the structure of the tlmar system 
changed.
7. K0£E BEY p.26. In MIETETAB (pp.15-16) the numbers of cebeltt 
attending campaign with beylerbeyls and sancakbeyis are given: while the 
beylerbeyis used to campaign with at least 200-300 ”yarar cebeluleri” 
and ”now” bring only 40-50 at most, the number brought by sancakbeyis 
had similarly shown a decline from 100-150 to 10-15 each.
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indication that they were required to be on horseback.^ It 
is likely that these cebelti were members of the sipahis 
household with askerl rather than reaya status.9 For the 
beneficiaries of the smaller dirllks this distinction is not 
particularly significant, but in the case of the beylerbeyis 
and sancakbeyis who did have large personal retinues, 
members of their households would have had a greater stake 
in the success of the military enterprise, which would have 
accordingly swollen the numbers of those willing to go on 
campaign.^ There are indications in the terminology 
employed in the mobilisation orders, that the kul of beys 
did campaign freely with their masters, the designations 
"adam”, and "tabi..." being equivalent with kul in this 
context,H where kul merely indicates 'retainer1.
In the early stages of the 1593-1606 war, as we shall see, 
there was flexibility as to which of the provincial sipahi 
forces would be called-up in any year and which would stay 
at home as a local security force. As manpower demands
8. Concerning the cebelU accompanying the timariots, typical 
descriptions, of which there were many variations in wording but not in 
content, are: "...ve sen dahi kanun ttzere cebe ve cevgen ve 
cebeliilerinle milheyya ve hazir olasin" (MD 71/81), or M...kanun iizere 
cebe Idle rin ile muretteb ve mukemmel dugman yaraglyle..." (MD 77/74).
9. Cvetkova (1978) p.10 considers it probable that it was the 
nservlteursM of the beys who fought with them as cebelU in the early 
days.
10. Our knowledge of the composition and nature of the households of the 
provincial beys is almost negligible, almost the sole efforts at under­
standing them being those of Abou-el-Haj (1974) & Kunt (198l;1983).
11. Rohrbom (1973) pp.65,66. For examples, see MD 73/470: n...sen yarar 
ve tuvana musellah ve mukemmel adamlar besleyiip"; MD 77/432: "...yaninda 
olan yarar adamlarinla muaccelen kalkup1. ^
12. Menage (1966) p.66 notes that the terms kulluk and hizmet were often 
interchangeable, and denoted Tservice! without implication of ’servitude1.
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became more pressing, the purview of the orders for the 
mobilisation of the provincial sipahis came to include also 
those who were at the time out of office (mazul) or were 
awaiting confirmation of their appointment to a dirllk 
(known as ell e m r l u ).1 ^ Also considered as ell emrlii may 
have been those described as "iptidadan ve siilttsan iizere 
zeamet ve timara ellerinde ahkam-i serife olanlar ve havadan 
berat edenler”, whose claims would be implemented if they 
performed well on camp.aign.-  ^ There could never be a 
perfect equilibrium between the number of killg tlmaris 
available and the number of potential sipahis, so there were 
always some of the sipahi class unable to be accomodated. 5^ 
Although they must have been locally registered, these two 
groups, and those described as mUtekaid (retired members of 
the sipahi class who were no longer competing for dirliks), 
fall outside the scope of estimates of the number of sipahis 
in the Empire, since such surveys are based on the number of 
killc tlmaris, that is the number of sipahis who were
13. Rohrborn (1973) p.91.
14. MD 71/59. An lptlda tlmar was the first timar held by a new entrant 
to the provincial sipahi class (Rbhrbom, 1973 p.91). A sillilsan timar 
was conferred on someone who had formerly been receiving cash remun­
eration from the state: if his pay had been y_ akge p.d., he was entitled 
to a timar yielding two-thirds of £ x 1000 akge p.a. (Rohrborn, 1973 
pp.33-34; Akdag, 1975 p.375). The description "havadan berat edenler11 is 
not well-attested, but may refer to those who held worthless timar 
deeds, and may perhaps be equated with those whose timars had been 
abolished: in 1595, all the zuama and timarlots whose zeamets and timars 
had been abolished ("mensuhattan zeamet ve timara mutasarrif plan...1') 
were ordered to go on campaign with the imperial fleet (MD 73/182).
15. The kllig tlmar! was the basic core-unit of timar land, always assigned 
intact, and to which additional land-parcels were added to create tlmar 
holdings of varying size. The number of killg tlmaris in the Einpire set a 
maximum to the number of sipahis registered in possession of tlmar lands.
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actually In receipt of alienated revenues at any t i m e . 1 ^
Outstanding service on campaign, often assessed by the tally 
of heads brought in, had always been rewarded with timars,^ 
and this incentive was offered as an encouragement to those 
who fell outside a more restricted application of the rules 
for eligibility for consideration as a timar-holder.^ Such 
men initially went on campaign without compensation, except 
that of booty,^ and in the hope that they would be upgraded 
in status to the ranks of the timarlots.^Q They were 
referred to as gbnilllil and garip ylgltler.^ In late 1605 an 
order was sent to the beylerbeyls of the vilayets of Egri, 
Buda, Kanije and Bosnia that a differential rate of pay was 
to be applied to those who volunteered on foot and on horse­
back;^ not long after, however, to be mounted was set as a 
condition of entry into the gontilltl corps, those who did not
16. MD 77 contains many orders to these categories of soldier; see also 
Pekete A.DVN.1011.11.15 n.3827.
17. For some earlier examples, see Barkan, art. Tlmar (IA) pp.313-14.
18. Rohrborn (1973) p.29: into the second half of the sixteenth century, 
it was the sons of tlmarlots who monopolised the vacancies which 
occurred.
19. MD 77/202; MD 77/204; MD 77/539
20. AK f.l31v; AK f.l6lv, while the troops were at £Lklop (Siklos) on the 
way to besiege Kanije in 1600: "...gonullii garip ylgltler dirllk tlmldl 
lie defter olunup"; MD 75/385: "...ve salr dlrlige taleb olan yarar 
ylgltlern.
21. The term gontlllti was widely used to describe any who volunteered to 
serve; see, for instance, MD 75/492: "...ve gazadan safasl olan goniillU 
yarar ylgltler". Inalcik, art. Goniillii (El) notes that it could also be 
applied to a specific class of garrison troops. Rohrborn (1973) p.31 
shows how, in the sixteenth century, those who were sons of timariots 
without an automatic right to a dirllk could win that right by merit­
orious military service as gonullii.
22. MD 77/230
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| have horses and the correct arms and equipment being demoted
| to the rank of foot soldiers (yaya, yayak).^ 3
A practice inconsistent with the distinction between a 
'land-based1 provincial force and a 'cash-based' central 
force was that of awarding timars to officials of the 
central administration* Miiteferrlkas and gavuges. and 
i clerks (katib) and apprentices (gaglrd) of the bureaucracy
were awarded tlmar revenues, and, in consequence, like the
sipahi forces, were often required to mobilise in event of a
campaign. On the Hotin campaign in 1621, the number of such 
men present was over 4,000, within a total of c.14,000 
tlmariots from the same provinces,^ but it is also apparent 
that there were many such on the Estergon campaign of 1605.^ 
Despite being government officials (ehl-1 kalem) in origin,
! they took part in the fighting along with other combat
troops.^ Instructions regarding the call-up of these troops 
were contained in the same orders as those for the 
provincial sipahis. However, it seems that after such an 
initial order had been sent, usually to the beylerbeyl of a 
province, their departure to campaign was separately 
organised. It was counted a great affliction for them that 
they should have to go together with the sipahis. and they 
went separately, as had always been the case ("kadlmden 
olageldilgii u z _ e r e " ) . 2 7  The tension between these ehl-1 kalem 
and the sipahi troops is illustrated in a letter sent to the 
Porte by the sipahis of Bosnia, in which they complained
23. MD 77/513
24. Barkan, art. Tlmar (IA) p.327
25. Mutafcieva (1968) pp.22-23.
26. MD 77/375: "...when Estergon castle was conquered, they served in the 
trenches and in the assaults many times, and participated in the repair
of the castles of Estergon and Tepedelen". (Tepedelen was a castle 
within the town of Estergon).
27. MD 77/375
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that the best timars were being conferred on these officers 
of the central administration and few kilic timans were
? ftavailable for the traditional provincial class. °
The age at which the son of a provincial sipahi who 
graduated to his deceased father's timar was obliged to go 
to war in person, was.raised in 1536 from 10 years old to 16 
years old.2  ^ Whether the same age limit was common to all 
categories of troops is not clear: there certainly was a 
limit of some sort, since those considered as juveniles 
(sabl) served under special conditions. The underage sons 
of cavuges and katlbs of the Porte who had timars and who 
had served in the capture of Estergon were subsequently not 
to be considered eligible for campaign, but ordered to serve 
instead in the d i v a n . 3 0  Juveniles who volunteered to serve 
as gonUHU on campaign were not to be admitted into the 
regular army.31
The units of the altl bdliik, the six regiments of the 
sultan's household cavalry, were the slpahlyan, the 
sllahdaran, the ulufeclyan-1 yemin and -yesar, and the 
gurebayan-1 yemin and -yesar. They were part of the 
kapukulu ocaklant the standing army of the Porte, whose 
other principal units, besides the janissaries, were the 
armourers (cebecl), cannoneers (topgu), and those in charge 
of the gun carriages (top a r a b a c i s l ). 3 2  At any time there 
were kapukulu troops scattered throughout the Empire as well 
as in Istanbul, policing and garrisoning its towns and 
fortresses. Kapukulu troops serving in the provinces were
28. MD 72/536
29. Gokbilgin (1968) p.44.
30. MD 77/511
31. MD 77/230: they were not be given a gedlk, a permanent place in one 
of the corps.
32. The standard work on the kapukulu ocaklarl is Uzungarpili (19^ 3).
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designated as such by the epithet ...-i dergah-i ali. There 
were also men serving outside Istanbul who bore the same 
designation as their kapukulu counterparts, but who were not 
directly associated with the Porte. These latter are 
referred to by Uzungar^lli as ,tyerli1t (’’local11) janissaries, 
cebecis etc,33 and the distinction between them and the Porte 
troops is drawn in the separate categories according to 
which their wages were paid: for the wages of the troops in 
the account of the vilayet of Buda in 1008 AH (1599-1600), 
for instance, separate items of expenditure record:
a) be-cihet-1 mevaclb-i cemaat-1 mtlstahfizan ve topguyan ve 
arabaclyan ve cebeciyan...ve farisan...ve azeban ve martolosan...,
and
b) be-cihet-1 mevacib-i...cebeclyan ve topguyan ve arabaclyan-i 
dergah-i all der muhafaza-yl Buduru...3 ^
The former were locally-recruited men who served permanently 
on the borders, rather than merely doing so on a rotational 
basis (be-n3bet), as did, in principle, the dergah-1 all
troops.35
The departure on campaign of the kapukulu, and especially of 
the j a n i s s a r i e s , 3^ created a gap in the local security 
forces. Those who were not ehl-i sefer (eligible for
33. Uzungar^ ili (1943) I pp.3-4
34. Mxt.638 f.2v
35. Georgieva (1970) describes exactly this distinction with reference to 
the janissaries of Bulgaria. Although much of her material is from the 
eighteenth century, her conclusions square well with the information we 
have for Hungary during this war.
36. Mobilisation orders suggest that all janissaries were obliged to go on 
campaign, e.g. MD 72/827; MD 73/135; MD 73/141; MD 73/874.
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campaign), the korucus and oturaks (janissaries no longer 
capable of campaign duty on account of age or incapacity)^ 
were sent back to Istanbul to their barracks,from where 
they could maintain public order in that city. Hence, with 
the korucus and oturaks in Istanbul, and the yasakcis^^ 
(janissary police officials) summoned from the towns and 
sent on campaign,^ others had to be found to keep the peace. 
How far the security responsibility of the sipahis who 
stayed at home to guard the provinces extended to fill the 
gaps left in the security forces in time of war is not 
clear. In the summer of 1605, solak Ahmed was appointed to 
take on the duties of the yasakcls of the 6 kazas of Ahyoli, 
Misivri, Rusi-kasri, Karinabad, Hatun-ili and Aydos,1*-*- a 
major task which he clearly could not have fulfilled without 
local assistance.
The janissary corps in Damascus was the subject of special 
orders, and 5-600 of its members were summoned to come to 
campaign in Hungary.1*2 In the opinion of a contemporary 
Italian consul, these Syrian musket-men were the best in the 
sultan's a r m y . ^3 Greater care was paid to filling vacancies 
in their ranks than was the case elsewhere. It was from the 
ranks of the rum beylerl that new recruits were to be 
selected, and then only with the consent of the Porte, since 
those described as arab, tat and gepni were not considered
37. KAVANIN ff.40r,49r,63v.
38. MD 74/37; MD 74/211; MD 75/44; MD 75/82; MD 75/451
39. Georgieva (1970) pp.327-30
40. MD 75/44; MD 75/451
41. MD 75/86: "...zikr olunan kazalarda olan yasakcllar ref olunup 
yerlerlne solak Ahmed...tayin olunup”.
42. MD 72/184; MD 72/343; MD 72/437; MD 72/438
43. Griswold (1983) p.246: the consul observed that 500 went to the war in 
Hungary every year.
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of high enough calibre.^ The special status of this group 
of janissaries derived from their role as guardians of the 
sacred standard of the Prophet, which was taken on campaign 
in Hungary for the first time in 1593.^ When they arrived 
at Osek (Osijek) in July 1600 for the Kanije campaign, they were 
described by Abdillkadir as being armed with muskets, which 
was usual for janissaries at this time, and also as being 
mounted,^ which was not.^7
The kapukulu were particularly assiduous in their attempts 
to evade campaign duty, a practice common in the army at 
this time. Some obtained orders to the effect that they had 
official employment in Egypt, and therefore contrived to be 
put on the pay-roll of the Egyptian Treasury. When their 
subterfuge was discovered, and they were ordered to mobilise 
for campaign, the authorities in Egypt were told not to pay 
them any longer, in the hope that they would be forced to 
return to their proper duties.^®
It is abundantly clear that whatever validity the earlier 
principle of distinguishing askeri and reaya may have had, 
the military authorities were in no way exclusive about 
recruitment into the army by the 1590s. Nor could they
44. MD 72/271. A similar order was made in 1577: the term rum in this 
context is explained by Heyd as referring to the provinces of Anatolia 
and Rumeli; tat refers to those of non-Turkish origin, while gepnl was a 
widespread tribe of Anatolia centred around Trabzon (Heyd, I960
pp.57,68).
45. Uzungar^ili (1945) pp.248-50.
46. AK f.l29v; further references to their presence on campaign during
this war may be found at AK ff.4r,32r,52r,6lv.
47. MD 72/834 also makes reference to the many mounted janissaries with
the janissary agha ("hayli atlu!t).
48. MD 73/644; MD 75/199
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afford to be. The demand for manpower overrode all other 
considerations regarding the preservation of a 'pure1 askerl 
class, regret at the demise of which is exemplified in the 
writings of authors such as Ko$i Bey. Just as there was 
competition for recruits from central Europe between the 
two parts of the Hapsburg army, the one fighting in Flanders 
and the other in Hungary,so it is evident that the 
services of the populations on their common border were 
competed for by Hapsburg and Ottoman. The Ottoman policy of 
encouraging reaya settlement in the borderlands by means of 
tax exemptions was aimed as much at increasing the pool of 
available fighters as at future treasury gains. It was 
particularly toward the close of the war, after admeasure of 
peace had been achieved in eastern Hungary with the success­
ful anti-Hapsburg rebellion of Bocskai, that there was a 
movement of people from Hapsburg-held into Ottoman-held 
territory.50
When a border was left insufficiently protected, as happened 
in Bosnia in 1595 when the soldiers of Bosnia were deployed 
in Buda, the reaya had no alternative but to take up arms in 
self-defence.51 In the same year, the attack by Michael of 
Wallachia on the briefly Ottoman-held Tergovipte 
(Tirgovipte) led Sinan Pasha to call up everyone he c o u l d . 52 
By the end of the war, when demands on the Persian front 
tied up a large part of the Anatolian troops, all able- 
bodied men were enlisted. The main recruiting ground was 
Bosnia, which previously had been a prime source for the 
devgirme levies, and whose fighting men had a reputation for 
b r a v e r y . 53 Those with horses were preferred ("ata ve dona
49. Parker (1981) p.42
50. MD 77/210; MD 77/270; MD 77/563; MD 77/600; MD 77/650
51. MD 73/188
52. AK f.44r: "...ve her canlbden Eflak ve Bogdan reayalarm siirup".
53. Majer (1984) pp.105-6.
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k a d i r " ) , 5 4  b u t  any f i t  reaya was a c c e p t a b l e . 5 5
Indeed, the formal and widescale recruitment of reaya into 
the Ottoman army was perhaps the single most significant 
feature of its composition in this war. The permanent 
garrisoning of the border did not begin with the 1593-1606 
war: describing the Hungarian army of the sixteenth century, 
Maksay notes that in the first half of the century the 
number of its infantry troops was much smaller than the 
number of cavalry, while by the end of the century this gap 
was considerably narrowed, and the ratio perhaps even 
reversed. He attributes the impetus for this trend to the 
development of the fortress system from about 1550.56 it is 
no surprise that the composition of the Ottoman army in 
Hungary followed a similar path. Warfare in Europe had 
become static by this time, with sieges rather than field- 
battles being the usual form of military engagement. The 
Hungarian plain, where much of the activity of this war took 
place, was dominated by a few large towns and a network of 
fortresses: the struggle for control was thus a struggle for 
control over these garrisoned strongholds. Braudel aptly 
? describes such an environment as a "continental island".
The demand for extra manpower was primarily a demand for 
musketeers (tUfenkendaz) to fight the Hapsburgs on their own 
terms. This demand could be met quickly and cheaply through
54. MD 77/202; MD 77/213: "ata ve dona kadir olan kasabat ve kura halki1*; 
MD 77/221.
55. MD 77/194: "...zuama ve erbab-1 tlmar ve dahl reaya ve goniillU talfe- 
slnden vaflr asker tedarlk edUp"; MD 77/214: "...cenk ve harba kadir 
ralyyet talfeslyle...". A general mobilisation (nefir-i am) was ordered 
in the province of Buda in 1597: "...yarar ve kllic erl blr ferd 
kalmayup gonul birllgin edtip hemen milbageret edelim" (AK f.95r).
56. Maksay (1982) p.262
57. Quoted in Parker (1976) p.204
i
i
i
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the recruitment of reaya. Although the state had to pay the 
salaries of some,of these troops (others were furnished on 
a rotation basis from among their peers),5® the necessary 
skills were quickly learnt, and the units became operation­
ally effective within a short time. There were many names 
used for the various units, some of which are attested from 
the earliest times of Ottoman conquest in the Balkans. Some 
of the terms adopted had originally denoted the specific 
tasks performed by the«•men comprising these units, but were 
by now more a matter of taxonomical rather than functional 
differentiation. Among these units, which we shall denote 
by the generic name l e v e n d ,  ^  9 were martolos, farls, azeb, 
mttstahfiz, hisar erl, etc.^O In terms of their capacity to 
meet the manpower needs of the Ottoman army on this border, 
they filled a vital gap, and their recruitment in large 
numbers marked the final demise of any pretence that the 
Ottoman army consisted in the efficient balance between kul
58. A description of this arrangement is found at Inalcik, art. Eshkind.jl 
(El): it did not only apply to auxiliary forces.
59. Cezar (1965) pp.3-29 discusses the changing historical usages of the 
term levend and its sometime equivalent sekban. In Inalclk’s usage, 
levend denotes a landless vagrant peasant, while sekbans were the armed 
bands into which such individuals were formed (Inalcik, 1980 
pp.285,290). My usage is thus compatible with Cezar's mirl levend 
(Cezar, 1965 pp.343-67), that is, soldiers conscripted by the government 
when it had need of extra manpower, and who were paid by the state, in 
contrast to the companies of levend-sekbans of Inalcik, whose character 
and role is discussed at length below.
60. Cvetkova (1978) pp.32-39. There is a wide, and to me inaccessible, 
literature in serbo-croat on these border troops. Of particular 
interest to present-day Yugoslav historians are the groups with non- 
muslim, and therefore pre-ottoman, antecedents, for instance, premktlr, 
knez, martolos, voynuk and pandor. On one example of such incorporation 
into the Ottoman military structure, see Vasig (1977) pp.30-4l. See 
also MD 77/456; 77/544; MD 77/545; MD 77/568; MD 77/643; MD 77/659.
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and sipahi.
We will here turn to an analysis of the substance of 
Inalclk’s recent perspective on the recruitment of troops 
into the Ottoman army during the Hungarian war. He has 
proposed that the Ottoman army’s increasing demand for 
military manpower, a demand which it was unable to fill from 
traditional sources, had a wider importance than the purely 
military. He cites it.as the critical factor drawing men 
away from the land, and thus as being a cause of the Celali 
revolts of the turn of the seventeenth century. He contends 
that once demobilised, and retaining their firearms, men who 
had been recruited to make up for a shortage of manpower 
were able to sell their services to the highest bidder and 
so constitute a disruptive force in the provinces. In 
favour of this new interpretation, he gives less importance 
to previous theories that the Celali unrest was either due 
to a general economic deterioration, or to population 
pressure as manifested in an imbalance between population 
growth and production output.^
In so far as it concerns our attempt to determine who were 
the troops of reaya origin fighting in this war, the main 
thrust of Inalcik’s argument is that the Ottomans hired 
companies of men armed with muskets and known as sekban, who 
owed allegiance only to their immediate commanders:
”What distinguished the sixteenth-century practice...was that this 
time the recruitment was, in Anatolia, from among the vagrant 
levends armed with muskets, and that the new recruits were grouped
61. InalciK (1975/b) esp. pp.l96-201; Inalcik (1980) esp. pp.285-86.
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into special companies called sekban bdliikleri”.^ ^
He also contends that Anatolia was the most important area 
for the hiring of such troops. 3^ Thus, in our present 
examination of the composition of the Ottoman forces in 
Hungary we should expect to find evidence of the significant 
role played by companies of musketmen, recruited in 
Anatolia, and bearing the name sekban.
Close attention to the contemporary evidence shows, however, 
that there is room for some modification to Inalclk’s 
assessment of army composition in the 1593-1606 war.^ It is 
clear that the Ottomans did recruit large numbers of extra 
men during the course of the war, both through expanding the 
established kapukulu corps such as the janissaries,^5 and 
also by the employment of reaya musketmen, designated as 
tiifenkendaz. What is not clear, however, is the extent to 
which such tilfenkendaz troops of reaya origin were demob­
ilised after the Hungarian campaigns. While it is still a
62. Inalcik (1980) p.292; Griswold (1983) pp.12,25,47,63 draws a strict, 
but, as Cezar shows, unwarranted distinction between sekban as Infantry, 
and levend as mounted musketmen. The word sekban is thought to derive 
from the Persian sag: dog, and ban: guardian. The sekban were the 
keepers of the sultan’s dogs in early Ottoman times, and a division of 
the janissary corps. How the term came to be used for the provincial 
soldiers whose role is under discussion here, is not clear: see Joel, 
art. Sekban (IA).
63. Inalcik (1975/b) p.200.
64. A further elaboration to the hypothesis concerning these ’irregular’ 
troops, which does not yet appear well-substantiated, is that the 
musketmen discharged at the end of the Persian wars in 1590 started to 
cause trouble in Anatolia, and that official concern that such 
potentially disruptive elements be controlled and usefully employed gave 
impetus to a policy of warfare in Hungary (Griswold, 1983 p.10).
65. Inalcik (1980) pp.288-91.
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matter of debate whether the men who deserted the field of 
battle at Mez<3keresztes in 1596 were an important injection 
of expertise and discontent into the ranks of the Celali 
forces,^ so there is no convincing evidence of the mass 
demobilisation of tilfenkendaz troops at the end of the war.
In reassessing Inalcik's hypothesis on the basis of the 
primary source material for this Hungarian war, three 
conclusions may be drawn. First, it is hard to get any idea 
of the numbers of men demobilised from the Hungarian front 
at the end of the war; it seems, rather, that the numbers of 
reaya who enlisted in the army more permanently, as garrison 
troops, were greater than those men only temporarily 
recruited. Since the border had to be effectively 
garrisoned in peace too, there was a continuingly high 
demand by the Ottomans for military manpower In Hungary; the 
Persian wars had started again, and the laying-off of such
66. Compare Akdag (1975) pp.374-76, the essence of whose argument is that 
it was not the sipahis who fled at Mezokeresztes who played a major role 
in the Celali revolts, and Griswold (1983) p.19-21,26. Those of the 
alti bolilk who had fled and consequently been stripped of their 
commissions were reinstated after campaign service in the following year 
(KK 254 p.90).
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troops only to recruit anew would be s u r p r i s i n g . ^
Secondly, the idea that Anatolia was the most important 
region for the hiring of ttlfenkendaz appears to have no 
relevance for the Hungarian war. As Inalcik agrees, Bosnia 
and Albania were the areas from which the Ottomans drew 
their best troops, and references to the hiring of men from
C  Q
these regions are common in the sources of the period.00 
Inalcik supports his insistence on Asia Minor as "the most 
important region of ttlf enkendaz s o l d i e r s " ^  for the Hungarian 
war of 1593-1606 with only one document, in which, in 1605, 
the grand vezir asks that the sancakbeyi of Mentepe be 
ordered to come quickly to the Hungarian campaign >!...ktllll
67. Inalcik does not seem to be certain about the extent to which the 
reaya were demobilised viz. Inalcik (1980) p.292: "While before the 
reaya used to return home to resume their regular way of living after a 
campaign, they now (i.e. in the sixteenth century) stayed on as 
professional soldiers”; compare Inalcik (1975/b) p.200-01 in which he 
describes the enrollment of sekban, observing how each company was given 
a standard by the sultan which was taken back when the company was 
dissolved; he notes that "After their contract of service had expired, 
the sekban...looked for new employment in the service of the pashas of 
the beys." The references on which Inalcik bases this later passage do 
not, however, give proof that such sekban companies were important in 
the Hungarian war of 1593-1606 viz.: Cezar (1965) p.383 describes the 
formation of a siivari (cavalry) levend company in 1008 AH (1599-1600), 
in Anatolia, and for the assistance of the beylerbeyl of Baghdad at 
Hamadan, and does not use the term sekban; Cezar (1965) p.399 refers to 
a campaign in 1102 AH (1690-91). I have been unable to consult Ulugay, 
p. Saruhan'da Egklyalik ve Halk Hareketlerl pp.464-47 (Istanbul, 1944).
68. The campaign account for 1007-09 AH (1599-1601) has an entry showing 
that there were also musketeers from Tunis and Algiers: "Inam-i bazl
tiif enkendaz an ki an Cezayir ve Turns ve BoSna amedend" (KK 1879 p.15).
69. Inalcik (1975/b) p.200
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tiifenkendaz sekban ve cebelti The importance of
Anatolia as a recruiting ground thus appears to be more 
relevant for events in that area, rather than on the 
Hungarian front. The numbers of demobilised tiif enkendaz in 
Bosnia and Albania was clearly not so great as to cause a 
Celali-type revolt in those provinces, which alone suggests 
that conditions on the two sides of the Empire should not be 
equated.
A third point is that it does not seem that the numbers of 
sekbans participating in this war were very considerable. 
Cezar quotes several references from Naima’s History 
regarding their presence in Hungary at the end of the 
sixteenth c e n t u r y ; ^ 1 however, Naima’s History is, as Lewis 
Thomas has shown, a compilation and not a primary s o u r c e , 7 2  
and we cannot therefore be certain that the first-hand 
accounts which he used had employed the term sekban. One 
example chosen by Cezar to prove his thesis particularly 
catches our attention: he cites Naima quoting the passage in 
Peqevi's History in which Pegevi guesses at the numbers of 
troops going to campaign in 1594.73 Naima says:
70. Orhonlu (1970) p.98 quoted by Inalcik (1980) p.288.
71. Cezar (1965) pp.364-67. In addition to Naima’s use of the term 
sekban. Cezar (ibid. p.18) notes that it is the later writers Silahdar 
and Ra^ ld who use the term frequently; this must reflect the greater 
significance of the sekban in the second half of the seventeenth 
century.
72. See Thomas (1972) for discussion of the sources of Naima’s History.
73. Cezar (1965) p.366.
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"...Sultan Suleyman merhumdan sonra EngQrus seferl vakl olmamagla, 
halk ganimet umidlyle tegie ldl; Rumell askerl kadar dlrllkslz asker 
gelmlgti."^ ^
Cezar proposes that these troops who did not have benefices 
(dlrllkslz), who were equal in number to the sipahis of 
Rumell, were levend and sekban. Looking at the original 
text of Peqevi, we find:
"...Sultan Suleyman Han*dan sonra EngQruse sefer olmama&la dQnya 
Engurus seferlne arzumend olma&La belkl gelen mazulleri ve ganimet 
umidln eden bahadirlar ba^ ca Rumell askerl kadar le^ cer ldl”J 5
Leaving aside criticism of Cezar for failing to compare the 
Naima passage with that of Pegevi, Naima’s declared source, 
on the basis of the Naima passage alone, by equating 
dlrllkslz with levend and sekban, Cezar is using the most 
general definition of these terms, which is surprising in 
view of the well-documented attempt to understand the 
meaning of the terms which his book for the most part 
embodies. Pe^evi’s passage suggests, rather, that Naima’s 
dlrllkslz troops are those whom we have earlier referred to 
as mazul, gQnQHQ and garip ylRltler, rather than sekban in 
the somewhat pejorative sense in which Inalcik uses the 
term.
Turning to AbdQlkadir’s account of the Hungarian wars, we 
find that he rarely makes reference to sekban companies:
7*L NAIMA I pp.167-68: "Because there had been no Hungarian campaign 
since the (time of the) late Sultan SQleyman, the people were yearning 
for booty; as many soldiers 'without benefices’ (dlrllkslz) came as 
there were Rumeli troops".
75. PE£EVX II p.156: "Because there had been no Hungarian campaign 
after (the time of) Sultan SQleyman Han, (and) because everyone wished 
for a campaign in Hungary, perhaps as many troops came of those ’out of 
office’ (mazul) and of heroes hoping for booty, as there were Rumeli 
troops".
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those which he does mention appear to be a force attached to 
the person of the grand vezir Damad Ibrahim Pasha, under the 
command of his kethilda, M e h m e d . 76 In Abdiilkadir's account, 
these sekbans are first encountered as Ibrahim Pasha leaves 
Istanbul for Hungary In 1599, and they number 500;77 at the 
loss of Istolni Belgrad in 1601, Pegevi refers to the same 
sekban force of Mehmed kethiida, putting their number at 
600,78 while Abdulkadi'r says that they numbered 1,000 at this 
time.79 In November of the same year, Mehmed kethuda’s 
sekbans were appointed to Buda, to garrison the city through 
the winter.^0 Pew of the available sultanic orders for the 
Hungarian war mention sekbans, and of these, fewer still are 
relevant to the composition of the Ottoman forces in 
Hungary. Three documents date from March 1594: two of these 
require that the sancakbeyis of Kars, Aintab and IqII should 
recruit "otuz nefer yarar tilfenkendaz sekbanlar”, in 
addition to the timariot forces with whom they were to come 
to the Hungarian campaign,81 while the third orders 30 
tilfenkendaz sekbans from each of the sancaks of the vilayet 
of R u m . For the 1605 campaign season, when the Persian war 
limited the numbers of Anatolian troops available to fight 
in Hungary, orders were sent that something over 1,300 
tilfenkendaz sekbans should be raised from fifteen of the
76. AK f.l42v
77. AKf.ll3v
78. PEgEVI II p.237
79. AK ff.l42v,l46v
80. AK ff.l49v
81. MD 72/221; MD 72/222: since these orders were copied to the 
beylerbeyl of Aleppo, the hakims of Adana and Uzeyr, and the beys of 
Tripoli and Sis, it is probable that they too each had to bring 30 
sekbans; see also MD 72/774.
82. MD 72/886
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Balkan sancaks, In addition to the cebelUs of the a r e a . ® 3  in 
the context of the great numbers of men fighting in this 
war, sekban contingents of this size can hardly be 
considered significant.
To sum up then, Inalcik’s hypothesis that the increased 
numbers of men who had access to handguns was a factor of 
great significance in the ensuing decades of decentral­
isation is not contested here. But the details of the 
dynamics of such an arming of the reaya in the 1593-1606 war 
do need clarification. First of all, evidence suggests that 
the so-called sekban units, organised under local auspices, 
and recruited rather in the manner of the military 
contractors of contemporary Europe,®1* were not of tremendous 
importance in Hungary in 1593-1606; the evidence available 
for sekban participation shows that rather small numbers 
were involved.
Secondly, musketeers for the Hungarian wars were, for the 
most part, locally recruited. Without entering into further 
discussion of the meaning of the term sekban at this time, 
the significance of this is that the recruitment for these 
Hungarian wars differed from the later pattern of recruit­
ment in which such companies of musketmen acted as 
mercenaries in the true sense of the word: when not employed 
in government service, they sold their services to the 
highest bidder, a fact which, as Inalclk says, had far- 
reaching consequences in the establishment of local power 
bases able to oppose the monopoly of power by the central
83. MD 77/69: from Iskenderiye 500 sekbans were to be sent to campaign; 
from Yanya, 300; from Avlonya, 100; from Kostendil, 60; from Mora, 
Tirbala and Ohri, 50 each; from Selanik and Vulqitrin, 40 each; from 
Delvine and Alacahisar, 30 each; from Uskiib and Elbasan, 20 each; and 
from Hersek and KLis, an unspecified number.
84. Inalclk (1980) p.296
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state.
Looting and raiding in the vanguard of the army during the 
early days of the Ottoman presence in the Balkans, on the 
margins.pf the expanding state, were the irregular cavalry 
(akinci). They were a force used mainly in Europe rather 
than Anatolia.®^ They were a highly mobile force who 
benefited from tax exemptions and the hope of booty in 
exchange for performing this task.^ Akinci status passed 
from father to s o n , and all those registered as such had to 
appear on campaign, an obligation which overrode any other 
identity which the individual may have acquired. The 
excuses of those akinci and their sons who had managed to 
become servants of the state in another capacity, as 
garrison troops for instance, and for which service they had 
managed to obtain remuneration from the state in the form of 
dlrllk, were warned that they were first of all akinci, and 
therefore their presence was required on c a m p a i g n . To 
escape their obligations they sought refuge with provincial 
office-holders, who were clearly content to protect t h e m . **9
Although the numbers of akinci had undoubtedly declined 
since the days when they had a well-defined role to play in 
warfare, it appears that the authorities were concerned that 
they should keep their traditional status. This was for 
financial reasons: it was more desirable that they should 
not lose their identity and have to be paid by the state.
The opportunities for raiding were considerably reduced by 
the time of these campaigns, and the akinci had to compete
85. Decei, art. Akinci (El)
86. MD 77/542
87. MD 77/540
88. MD 77/98; MD 77/506
89. MD 75/388; MD 77/98
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with the Tatars for a declining share in the spoils of war. 
Shortly after the war, KoqI Bey remarked ruefully that if 
the numbers of akinci had not declined so, it would have 
been unnecessary to call on Tatar assistance in campaigns.9° 
As we will see later, the participation of the Tatars on 
campaign was considered to be a necessary evil. During this 
war, the akinci were employed both in auxiliary tasks such 
as clearing trees which obstructed the way, and bridge- 
building, as well as in the work performed by the mass of 
the undifferentiated troops who served in the trenches 
during sieges.91
90. KOgi BEY p.26.
91. AK ff.l8v,36v,131r,131v,191v
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Iiii. Mobilisation
The pattern of mobilisation of the provincial cavalry 
remained basically unchanged over a long period. Orders 
sent out in the winter gave details of which sections of the 
sipahi forces were expected to be present on campaign the 
following spring, where they were to muster in the theatre 
of war, and the date by which they were to have arrived.92 
The troops gathered first in small groups, at district 
(nahlye) level, these nahiye groups combining at kaza level. 
The troops of the kazas of each sancak joined together, and 
then the sancaks of each vilayet under the overall command 
of the beylerbeyi. The mustering of the troops of each 
sancak were the responsibility of the alaybeyl, chosen from 
among the sipahis of each sancak. The assembled troops of 
the Anatolian provinces were usually ferried across from 
Asia at Gelibolu, well away from the capital where their 
presence would undoubtedly have caused some disruption. In 
an attempt to avoid disturbance at the crossing points, it 
was strictly ordered that wine should not be sold, with the 
threat of severe penalty for those vendors who ignored the
warning.93
Once across at Gelibolu, the Asian sipahis made for 
Belgrade. If, as frequently happened, the serdar had 
wintered there, the Asian troops were required to muster in 
Sirera, the area between the rivers Sava and Danube to the 
west of Belgrade. The European sipahis joined the main body 
of the army along the way, as they emerged from winter 
quarters. The official start of campaign was on Ruz-i Hizr,
92. Parry, art. Harb (El) refers to primarily western sources describing 
Ottoman mobilisation. For the mobilisation of SUleyman’s forces for the 
campaign of 1566, see Kaldy-Nagy (1977) pp.17^ -83.
93. MD 72/103
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St. Georges Day, which fell on 3 May N.S., and orders 
typically required that the sipahis should leave their homes 
on Nevruz (21 March N.S.), to arrive at the mustering point 
on Ruz-i Hizr.91* Here a full roll-call (yoklama) was taken 
of those present, interim roll-calls having been made during 
the time that the troops were gathering in the provinces.
In reality, there were always circumstances which distorted 
this neat picture of the mobilisation of the army. The 
numbers of those available in any year were dependent on the 
demands of local security, both internally, to counter 
possible bandit activity, and also, later in the war, to 
meet the external threat posed by renewed hostilities on the 
Persian border. Early in the war, in 1594, when it was 
clearly not expected that it would last for so many years, 
the framers of the mobilisation orders were able to adopt a 
rather relaxed attitude. The Persian war was recently over, 
and the Persians were in no position to create disturbance 
in Anatolia. There appears to have been[no] significant 
internal unrest in Anatolia at this time, and so in the east 
Anatolian provinces a security force composed of tlmarlots 
with benefices yielding less than 6,000 akce annually was 
directed to remain at home, while tlmarlots with larger 
benefices went to c a m p a i g n . 95 p0r the vilayet of Anadolu, 
the cut-off point was set lower, and the sancaks of 
Hiidavendigar, Hamid, Kastamonu, Kangri, Bolu and Teke were 
each to be guarded by 40 tlmarlots with benefices yielding
94. The official end of campaign fell on Ruz-i Kasim, 5 November N.S., 
which was St. Demetrius’ Day; before the change from the Julian to the 
Gregorian calendar in 1582, Ruz-i Hizr fell on 23 April O.S. and Ruz-i 
Kasim on 26 October O.S. Nevruz was formerly on 11 March O.S.
95* MD 71/266 (re. vilayet of Sivas); MD 72/283 (Rum); MD 72/330 
(Zulkadriye); MD 72/342 (Rum, Zulkadriye, Aleppo); MD 72/347, MD 72/359 
(Rum, Zulkadriye); MD 72/774 (Marap). Rum was an alternative name for 
the vilayet of Sivas in this period (Birken, 1976 p.142).
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less than 3,000 akce p.a., under the command of a retired 
slpahi who held a benefice of more than 6,000 akge.^
The sending of mobilisation orders was of course no 
guarantee that the recipients would appear on campaign, 
despite the threat of losing their timars, or, indeed, of 
execution, if they failed to do so. The problem of dating 
many of these orders is of especial significance in this 
connection. The reiteration of mobilisation orders late in 
the season attests to the difficulty of raising the 
Anatolian sipahis in particular, as they did not exert 
themselves to be on time, and the frequency of a succession 
of conflicting orders being sent out, makes it impossible to 
say with certainty who did appear.97 The start of the war in 
1593 came only three years after peace had been concluded 
with Persia, and the sipahi troops were both physically and 
financially exhausted from their participation in a conflict 
which had lasted for the same length of time as the 
Hungarian war was to. 98 Just as cavalry from as far away as 
south-eastern Anatolia was called upon to fight in the 
Hungarian war, so there had been men from Bosnia and 
Ethiopia fighting against Persia in the east up to 1590.99
96. MD 71/273: this stipulation was subsequently modified, with the 
sancak of Ankara being left to the care of 30 tlmarlots with benefices 
of less than 3,000 akge p.a., under the command of a cavus (MD 72/775).
97. Kaldy-Nagy (1977) pp.174-183 points out a similar conflict in 
instructions in charting the sequence of orders issued in the mobilis­
ation for the final campaign of Suleyman in 1566.
98. PEfEVI II p.133 records the use of this argument by the historian 
Hoca Saadiiddin in his attempt to dissuade Sinan Pasha from opening 
hostilities with the Hapsburgs, although Pepevi himself says elsewhere 
(ibid. p.156) that the troops were keen to go on campaign in Hungary, 
because there had not been a campaign in that area since the death of 
SUleyman (this passage is quoted above at p.^ ).
99. B.KiitUkoglu (1962) p.203
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Only a month elapsed between the defeat of Hasan Pasha at 
Siska In June 1593 and the departure of Sinan Pasha from 
Istanbul for the front. The amount of military equipment 
which had been stockpiled was sufficient to allow Sinan to 
score some successes in this first season of the war, but 
the haste with which an official state of war was declared 
did not allow for full mobilisation in 1593. Although 
Abdtilkadir notes that prders were sent out for the troops of 
Anadolu, Karaman, Sivas, Marap, Aleppo, Diyarbakir and Rakka 
to reach Sirem by mid-October,-^^ it is probable that Sinan 
had in reality more limited support. For some time before 
the start of the war, the European troops had been kept in a 
state of readiness for military action against the 
H a p s b u r g s , ^ l  but it seems that Sinan, whether from hubris 
or due to his failure to understand that a single retal­
iatory strike would not exhaust Hapsburg energies, did not 
initially take with him a large force. 102 AbdUlkadir 
further adds that the troops of ten sancaks of Anadolu 
joined the army at Belgrade,103 and those of Karaman did not 
reach the army until after the Ottoman capture of Vesprem in 
October. 104
100. AK f.4r: in fact, he mistakenly gives the date by which they were 
expected to arrive as Muharrem 1001, which is October 1592.
101. e.g. MD 69/111; MD 69/142; MD 69/160; MD 69/171, all dating from late 
in 1592.
102. MD 71/241 is an order apparently dating from late in the season 
which calls for the mobilisation of all the sancakbeyls and tlmarlots of 
Rumeli, since the force with Sinan was not sufficient to resist 
Christian attack: "kiiffar-i haksarin zlyade hareketl olup...vezir-l azam 
serdar Sinan Pasa...fnin yaninda mukavemete kadir asker olmamagla...”.
The Rumeli sipahis were not to be allowed to use the excuse of their 
unpreparedness and the lateness of the season in an attempt to avoid 
campaign duty.
103. AK f .10r
104. AK f.l3r
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On 29 May 1594, Sinan Pasha replied to a letter which he had 
received from the Sultan, saying that, despite the repeated 
orders which he had sent out since the previous autumn, his 
threats, and the despatch of officials,to supervise the 
crossing of the troops at Gelibolu and Uskiidar, it had been 
impossible to get the troops to mobilise q u i c k l y . However, 
while the army was camped at Mohag shortly after this date, 
the beylerbeyls of Diyarbakir, Aleppo and Erzurum arrived, 
the sipahis of some of the sancaks of Sivas and the soldiers 
of Mara^ having done so shortly b e f o r e . 106 The cavalry of 
the vilayets of Rumeli, Bosnia and Buda had not the excuse 
of distance in their efforts to avoid campaign duty, and 
were prominent in every campaign season.
From the mobilisation orders preserved in the Mdhimme series 
it is not usually possible to tell the whereabouts of the 
addressee. Thus, it is not clear whether the recipient of 
an order was in winter quarters in the European provinces, 
or whether he had returned to his home province. There is a 
contradiction between the sources used by Hammer, which say 
that the troops of Sivas, Rakka, Diyarbakir, Aleppo and 
Damascus returned home to spend the winter of 1594/5, and 
Abdlilkadir, who reports only that those of Sivas were 
assigned to Buda together with those of Anadolu, while the 
beylerbeyl of Karaman was sent to winter in Istolni Belgrad. 
There is agreement, however, that the European troops were 
assigned winter quarters in the theatre of war in that 
year.1^7
In 1595 there was less scope for latitude in the extent of 
the mobilisation than had been possible in 1594. The urgent
105. MD 72/604
106. AK ff.l6v,17r
107. HAMMER IV p.224; AK ff.27v,28r
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need for manpower as the army fought on two fronts, having 
to meet a challenge to Estergon while simultaneously 
campaigning against Wallachia in the later part of the 
season, demanded a general mobilisation of timar troops, 
with little regard able to be given to the internal security 
of the Asian provinces. The qualification that those with 
small tlmars should remain at home is rarely met with in the 
surviving orders for this seasonfs mobilisation: in Rum, the 
conditions were similar to those imposed in 1594, with only 
men with timars of over 6,000 akge being called up;1(^  from 
Aleppo, whose troops had been present in Hungary as stip­
ulated in 1594, with only those having tlmars of over 6,000 
akge having to report for duty, the initial order that all 
should appear on the 1595 campaign was altered on account of 
fears that Arab bandits would harrass the pilgrims going to 
Mecca. The decision was therefore taken that those with 
tlmars of less than 3,000 akge should stay at home after 
all, to maintain local security. 1^9 Christian military 
activity on the north-west frontier of the Empire injected 
an unmistakeable note of desperation into orders concerning 
the deployment of sipahi troops in that area. Military 
conditions which had required the main concentration of 
troops to deal with Michael of Wallachia early in the 
season, and which had had to take account (mistakenly as it 
turned out) of a possible threat to Sigetvar in mid-season, 
finally had to respond to the attack in which the fortress 
of Estergon was lost in early September 1595 while Sinan 
Pasha was still deeply committed in Wallachia.
In June of 1595. before the threat to Estergon had become
108. MD 73/288; MD 73/1067
109. MD 73/457: "egklya-yl arabtf, these were probably Bedouin.
110. MD 73/905: the fear of the possibility of an attack on Sigetvar was 
based on information given by prisoners taken from the Christians. They 
reported that the Christian forces were assembled only 3 or 4 days away.
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apparent, the troops of Anadolu, Rumeli and Karaman were 
ordered to support Sinan Pasha in Wallachia.111 News of the 
need for manpower on the Buda border in July sent Anadolu 
and Rumeli troops to the northwest of Hungary, however.112 
The unexpected severity of the Christian attack led to a 
belated demand for strenuous efforts on the part of those 
who so far had neglected to turn up for the campaign, and 
for the mobilisation of greater numbers of men than had 
earlier been required, including those who had returned to 
Istanbul upon the dismissal of Perhad Pasha from command of 
the Wallachian campaign. The kapucu bapi Veil Agha was 
ordered to mobilise them, with the assistance of a team of 
Savu^es. Those who did not comply with the mobilisation 
order were to be executed on the spot ("...bulundugun yerde 
salb ve siyaset eyleyesin"). These reinforcements from the 
Istanbul area were to be commanded by the vezir Hadim Cafer 
Pasha.11  ^ By August, Estergon was under siege, and vezir 
Mehmed Pasha, son of Koca Sinan, was ordered to join with 
the reinforcements and take whatever action was necessary to 
repulse the enemy.1 ^  The sancakbeyls of Bosnia were put on 
the alert.11  ^ The beylerbeyi of Karaman received a special 
admonitory order since he was still some distance away from 
Estergon, the punishment for continuing procrastination 
being the loss of his head.11^
111. MD 73/330
112. MD 73/130; MD 73/877
113. MD 73/1107; MD 73/1146. On corporal punishment, see Heyd (1973) 
pp.259-71. KK 1874 is the campaign account covering Cafer Pasha's 
progress to Hungary.
114. MD 73/1
115. MD 73/58
116. MD 73/653
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After 1595, our Information as to the annual deployment of 
the provincial sipahis is more sporadic, owing to lacunae in 
the main source for mobilisation orders, the Miihlmme 
registers. Aside from chronicle sources, we have inform­
ation that in 1597, for instance, certain of the timariots 
of the eastern provinces were exempted from campaign duty on 
account of the distance which they had to travel, and their 
weakness. Prom Aleppo, Marap, Sivas, Karaman and Diyarbakir 
only those with tlmars of over 5,000 akge were required, 
from Damascus only the' zuama, and from Erzurum only zuama 
and muteferrikas. The tlmarlots of Trabzon and Tripoli were 
all exempted.11  ^ Those sipahis with smaller holdings were 
clearly suffering greatly from the constant campaigning.
In 1605 the fortress of Estergon was successfully wrested 
back from Hapsburg control. For that action we possess what 
is apparently the sole surviving yoklama register of the 
1593-1606 war, which records the names of the sipahis who 
had turned up to take part in that campaign. Such a 
document should be the most promising source from which to 
ascertain the actual numbers of sipahis mobilised. However, 
the main concern of the publisher of this register was to 
use the rather small numbers of sipahis registered therein 
as an indictment of the timar s y s t e m . I n  consequence, some 
very important aspects of the register have been neglected, 
aspects which would more nearly enable us to establish its
117. MM 7336 p.74:w...mesafe-yl baidede” and "...adem-l kudretlerl oldugu 
ecelden”.
118. Mutafcieva (1968): the reference number of this register, which is 
in the Bulgarian archives, is not given and the material is presented in 
a confusing fashion: "En premier lieu, ces yoklama-defteris nous 
foumissent la reponse a une question primordiale concemant le systeme 
des timars - celle de l'effectif numerique des sipahis en campagne"
(p.10).
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value as an Indication of the strength of these cavalry 
troops at the siege of Estergon.
On the basis of the figures given in this yoklama list, 
Mutafcieva concludes that of the Rumelian sipahis eligible 
for campaign, not more than 7055 took part in the Estergon 
campaign, and of this number, only 5^% were confirmed as 
present at a second I n s p e c t i o n . ! ! ^  The method employed to 
arrive at this conclusion is to compare the figures in the 
1605-6 yoklama registe'r with the global figures of Ayn-i 
All. Whenever attempts are made to determine how many 
sipahis there were in the Empire, that is, how many core 
units of land grant (kilip timaris) existed at any time from 
the mid-sixteenth century until the time of Mehmed IV, it is 
frequently the data of Ayn-i All that are taken as the 
standard. However, his Kavanln-1 al-1 osman der hulasa-yl 
mezamln-1 defter-1 divan has to be used with care since it 
is not certain to which date his details of the timar system 
apply, and he himself admits that they were compiled from 
registers of various dates.!^ Nevertheless, the tendency has 
usually been for modern historians to use them as strictly 
representative of the situation in 1608-09 regardless, after 
(sometimes) expressing their misgivings. Kaldy-Nagy has 
pointed out that part of Ayn-i All's Kavanin... is copied 
from an order of SUleyman's of 1531.!^!
There has not yet been a serious attempt to date the comp­
onents of Ayn-i All's sancak lists. Comparison with those 
published by Kunt gives an indication of the constant flux
119* Mutafcieva (1968) pp.13-14.
120. AYN-I ALI/a p.4:n...defatlr-l atlke ve cedldeden ve kanunnamelerden 
bu muhtasari ketb ve tahrir eyleytip".
121. Kaldy-Nagy (1977) pp.154-55.
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within the system. 1^2 Ayn-I All shows Cyprus as an eyalet,123 
and it may therefore be assumed that this part of the work 
may be dated to after 1571; and since Egri and Kanije do not 
feature as independent eyalets, they, together with the 
sancaks of Filek, Hatvan, Segedin and Solnok still being 
entered as part of the eyalet of B u d a , 124 that it dates from 
before 1596. In the absence of a study devoted to the 
intricacies of its compilation, it should be disregarded as 
a source which can provide reliable information for any 
particular date.
An assessment of the total number of timars in the Empire at 
this time is not of present concern. The vital point which 
Mutafcieva omits to consider is that in 1605 there were 
military encounters against the Hapsburgs on two other 
fronts besides the siege at Estergon. For the latter 
engagement the yoklama register shows a total of 4,596 
tljnar-holders mobilised in the eyalet of Rumeli, of whom 
only 3,464 were indicated as being present when a second 
roll-call of the same names was taken. There were a further 
396 from Semendre (in Buda eyaletl), 725 from Bosnia and 327 
from KUtahya, Kastamonu and Saruhan (in the eyalet of 
Anadolu).125 Ottoman troops had, however, been supporting 
the revolt of the Transylvanian leader, Istvan Bocskai, 
since the previous year, and were raiding into Slavonia and 
further with the Hungarian commander Nemeti from the south­
western border of Ottoman Hungary. 126
Mobilisation orders for the 1605 season state clearly where 
the troops of each sancak were to serve, although it should
122. Kunt (1978) pp.125-198
123. AYN-I ALI/a p.7
124. AYN-I ALI/a pp.17-18
125. Mutafcieva (1968) pp.13-14
126. FEQEVI II pp.308-9
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be reiterated that an order to mobilise was certainly no 
guarantee that it was obeyed, nor that it was not later 
changed. The orders available to us show that the Kanije 
border was under the command of the beylerbeyi of Kanije, 
Ibrahim Pasha, with 20,000 soldiers from the eyalets of 
Bosnia and Kanije.12? These latter included those of the 
sancaks of Peguy and Sigetvar.^2® Orders had been sent out 
demanding the participation of the sipahis of Hersek,^2  ^
Pozega, Kills, and all the (provincial cavalry) soldiers of 
Bosnia,^30 as Well as those of the Buda sancaks of Mohag,
Sirem, Semendre,^! and Kopan.^32
To the assistance of Bocskai himself, fighting the Hapsburg 
troops under the command of Giorgio Basta in upper Hungary, 
were ordered the cavalry of the Rumeli sancaks of Kirk- 
kilise. Cirmen, Vize, Nigbolu, Vidin and Silistre,1^  and 
those of the eyalet of Egri.1^  Yet, troops from Kirkkilise, 
Pirmen, Vize and Nigbolu appear also in the Estergon yoklama 
list. Three possible reasons may be adduced in attempting 
to explain this apparent incongruence. First of all, it is 
not certain where this roll-call was taken; the troops of 
these sancaks could have fought first with Bocskai and then 
been sent to the.siege of Estergon; secondly, it is possible
127. PECEVI II p.308; MD 77/518: "...Izvomlk ve Bosna sancaklannda 
zeamet ve tlmarlari olanlardan ylrmi bin nefer kimesne", which suggests 
that the 20,000 men came from only these two sancaks. and, by 
implication, that the total on that border must have been still greater, 
cf. HAMMER IV p.375.
128. MD 77/197
129. MD 77/206
130. MD 77/208
131. MD 77/198
132. MD 77/201
133. MD 77/88; see also MD 77/70; MD 77/154; MD 77/474; MD 77/537.
134. MD 77/207
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that the mobilisation orders of which copies are available 
could have been subsequently altered; and thirdly, all the 
timariot troops of any sancak were not Invariably deployed 
in one place. Some of those of Nigbolu were explicitly 
stated to have been at Estergon in 1605, and others in 
Transylvania.^ 5  Of the troops of Silistre too, some were 
employed at the R.Sava bridge in Belgrade, some were helping 
in the storehouses, others were defending the castle of 
Irpova and still others were on campaign with the beylerbe.vl 
of Kanije.1^
The Estergon yoklama shows the presence of the troops of 
only three sancaks of Anadolu. since the war on the eastern 
frontier claimed the services of the sipahis of all the 
provinces of Anatolia excepting some of those of Anadolu and 
Karaman.^37 Mobilisation was hard, since these men had served 
in the east in 1604, and were undoubtedly reluctant to make 
the journey to Hungary in the next year. 138 AbdUlkadir notes 
that some Anadolu troops joined the main army at Cankurtaran 
(Adony) while a decision was being taken as to the most 
effective course of action that season, but he makes no 
further reference to them, nor to the presence of any from 
Karaman.-*-39
We have, then, three sources which may be compared In trying 
to see which Rumeli sancaks actually took part In the 
Estergon siege of 1605; these are the yoklama lists as given 
by Mutafcieva, the mobilisation orders found in the Miihimme 
registers, and the account of AbdUlkadir who, although he
135. MD 77/537
136. MD 77/512
137. MD 77/83; MD 77/84; MD 77/85; MD 77/86; MD 77/87; MD 77/99; MD 77/100
138. MD 77/99
139. AK f .206v
does not specifically say so, was probably present.
Despite a comparison of these three sources, it is still not 
possible to deduce where the yoklama was made. Taking this 
document as our starting point, we can see how it differs 
from information available in the other two sources. There 
are several sancaks of Rumeli which appear on the Estergon 
yoklama, but whose troops are not mentioned by AbdUlkadir as 
having arrived at the menzil of Hisarcik (Grocka), outside 
Belgrade, in June 1605,^  nor as having been in Belgrade 
immediately a f t e r . T h e s e  are Vize, Kirkkilise, Nigbolu, 
£irmen, Vulgitrin, Yanya and Iskenderiye. We have seen that 
all but the last three were ordered to go to help Bocskai, 
and have evidence that the troops of Nigbolu at least were 
present both at Estergon and with B o c s k a i . T h e  timar- 
holders of Iskenderiye and Yanya were called upon to serve 
in the Hungarian campaign in May 1605 in common with those 
of many other Rumeli sancaks. without any details as to 
their eventual d e p l o y m e n t . 1 * ^  Not mentioned in the yoklama 
are the soldiers of the sancaks of Alacahisar, UskUb,
Delvine and Selanik, but they were present on campaign too: 
those of Alacahisar and UskUb joined the army at Hisarcik, 
while those of Delvine and Selanik reached Belgrade in July 
1605.145
Even if available sources did give enough information for us 
to be able to discern how the troops of each sancak were 
deployed at any time, we would still have to make an
140. Pegevi was certainly present at the siege, but does not have 
anything to say about the provincial sipahi forces taking part (PE£EVT 
II pp.302-08).
141. AKf.205v
142. MD 77/537
143. MD 77/74: the sancak of Vulgitrin is not mentioned here.
144. MD 77/74; AK f.205v
145. MD 77/74; AK f.206r
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estimate of the number of cebeltt present with each slpahl.
If we accept without further analysis the figures in the 
Estergon yoklama, a total of 6,044 killg tlmaris would give 
us a provincial force of, say, 24,000 men,^^ to be added to 
the 20,000 who were fighting under the command of Ibrahim 
Pasha, the beylerbeyi, of Kanije, and to the forces in 
Transylvania under the command of the beylerbeyi of 
Silistre, Ali Pasha. Thus, whatever estimate may be made of 
provincial cavalry participation in 1605, it should be 
recognised that the actual figure was undoubtedly lower than 
in some earlier years of the war, owing to the demand for 
troops to campaign in the east again.
The foregoing shows that there is little hope of discovering 
the numbers of troops taking part in the combats of this 
war. The problems involved in giving any meaningful measure 
of the size of the Ottoman army are insurmountable. The 
Ottoman army did not move in one body: just as the total 
number of sipahis in the Empire is not of relevance to an 
understanding of how many sipahis actually mobilised for any 
campaign, so the total number of kapukulu troops on the 
state pay-roll contributes nothing to our knowledge of how 
many men, and with what expertise, were deployed in any 
engagement, nor how the various corps acted in co-ordination 
with one another. To know that in 1574 the number of 
janissaries was probably around 13,500, while by 1595 the 
number was more than 26,000 and by 1609 over 37,500, is 
more relevant as an indication of how the standing army was
146. Mutafcieva (1968) pp.13-14: 4956+396+725+327 = 6044. KOgL BEY p.69 
says that, ideally, 100,000 timariots could mean a total force of 4- 
500,000, an average of 3 or 4 cebelU with each timarlot; thus 6044x4 = 
24,176.
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increasing and therefore costing the state ever more.^^ 
Unfortunately such figures tell us little of the true 
effects of the changing methods of recruitment into the 
army over the turn of the seventeenth century, and the 
changing balance of the different types of troops.
If it is hard to be satisfied with the numbers of troops 
given in the Ottoman sources as an expression of how many 
men there were in any place at any time, still less help If 
to be gained from the patently exaggerated estimates of 
European observers of the Ottoman army in action. In 1605 
the French ambassador Savary de Breves wrote of the 
provincial forces at the sultan’s disposal that ”le nombre 
passe huict cent mil hommes”.^® More modestly, Tarducci 
said that the Ottomans could put an army of 300,000 in the 
f i e l d , a n d  Soranzo comes up with a similar figure for the 
number of Ottoman troops at Egri in 1596,^50 while Knolles1 
sources give only half this figure for the number of men
1 ri Kl O
besieging Egri.1-3-1- There is/ way of proving that any one 
figure was closer to the truth than another, and this Is 
also true of the estimates of observers on the Ottoman side.
Perhaps the most easily ascertainable of all the profusion 
of troop figures are those which give information of a more 
specific nature, the statistics regarding the size and 
composition of the garrisons on the Ottoman borders. From a 
series of such statistics over the course of the war, as
147. Rohrbom (1973) p.78 gives a summary list of the numbers of
janissaries and alti bolilk cavalry between 1514 and 1632 from con­
temporary Ottoman sources: alti boltlk numbers are not so frequently 
mentioned in the sources as those of the janissaries.
148. Savary de Breves (1628) p.16
149. Tarducci (1597) p.60
150. Soranzo (1603) p.69
151. Knolles (1621) p.1094
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well as In peacetime, we could learn the relative importance 
attached to each section of the border by the Ottoman 
command, and how great was the perceived threat to any area. 
Partial lists of the numbers of garrison troops abound, but 
since calculation of the size of the Ottoman army in its 
combat and ga^risjDn components is of marginal interest in 
the present study, the matter cannot be pursued here.
A final aspect of the mobilisation of the Ottoman troops, 
and one which must await fuller treatment elsewhere, is that 
of the military road, the route by which the troops reached 
the front in Hungary and the Balkans. This route was of 
ancient origin. Of the three main branches (kol) leading 
from Istanbul, that running west (sol kol) followed the Via 
Egnatia; the central branch (orta kol), also for the most 
part having a Roman foundation, ran to Belgrade; the north­
ernmost route (saR kol) led to the Crimea.^52
Geographical circumstances dictated the direction of these 
routes and their various offshoots: the orta kol, which was 
the artery along which troops moved to reach the main 
theatre of war in Hungary during these years, crossed the 
rolling hills of Thrace to Edirne, whence it followed the 
valley of the Maritza through Filibe (Plovdiv) towards 
Sofya. Prom midway between Sofya and Nig the valley of the 
Nigava was followed, and then, from Nig onwards, the Morava 
to Semendre and the Danube to Belgrade. The river valleys 
provided the vital link through the Balkan ranges, and at 
only a few points did awkward passes have to be negotiated.^53
152. The history of these routes from earliest times is discussed in 
Jirecik (1877)*
153. HACI HALIFE pp.l 89-90 gives information regarding 7 difficult passes 
between Belgrade and Istanbul. For those between Nig and Edime, see map 
in Hynkova (1973) pp.100-01.
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Once at Belgrade, the north-south alignment of the Hungarian 
rivers, particularly the Danube and the Tisza, was of 
tremendous logistic value in promoting ease of communication 
for both men and equipment between Belgrade and the forward 
military centre of Buda.1^  Most importantly, water was 
always available to men and beasts.
Only part of the army was actually concentrated on the road 
at any one time, since, as we have seen, the different 
sections mobilised and travelled at various dates. The 
condition of roads in the pre-modern period was generally 
poor, though, given the obvious solidity of Ottoman public 
works in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it should 
not come as a surprise to discover that wagon (and mule) 
were the predominant means of transport in the Balkans at 
this time.1^  A major military route would obviously have 
been given priority over all others, and would have been as 
serviceable as was possible with the available technology. 
This military road passed through territory securely in 
Ottoman hands, unlike the other great contemporary military 
road, that followed by Spanish troops going to the Nether­
lands. Sensitivity to the kind of international political 
pressures which influenced the use of this latter road was 
not a consideration for the Ottoman army travelling towards 
its battlegrounds.-*-56 The total Ottoman control of the road 
may therefore have encouraged an investment of resources 
which would not have been an attractive proposition to their 
Spanish Hapsburg counterparts.
154. The north-south alignment of the Hungarian rivers to the north of 
the Drava-Sava line assisted Ottoman incursion into central Hungary, for 
there was no natural defensive line which was fortifiable to the south 
of the mountains of northern Hungary (Szakaly, 1982 p.15^ ).
155. Faroqhi (1982) p.535
156. Parker (1981) pp.50-79
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Before the army moved along the military road, men were sent 
ahead to ensure that it was well-signed. They chopped down 
trees blocking the way, and made the marshy areas passable. 
Such duties were performed even by members of the alti 
bdlUk: as the contemporary chronicler possessing the most 
intimate knowledge of such matters, AbdUlkadir describes how 
the route was prepared before the troops set out from Istan­
bul at the start of the war saying that silahdars were sent 
ahead to check that bridges were passable and swamps clear. 
The road was also signed by heaps of earth being piled up on 
the right hand s i d e . ^ 7  Although some bridges were permanent, 
such as the Cisr-i Mustafa Pasha which took the road over 
the Maritza to the west of Edirne, and which can still be 
seen today, most were constructed as needed, thrown across 
rivers and marshes on pontoons.
The section of the army about whose journey through the 
Balkans we have most information was that part which 
travelled from Istanbul, since it was together with this 
body that the bureaucracy, the record-keepers, went.
Several records survive to give information about the prog­
ress of the troops on various campaigns. Various sources 
survive to tell us of the menzlls and konaks (way-statlons) 
at which the troops stopped for the night on their way to
157. AK f.6v
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the front.^58 While the same general route was used on each 
campaign, there was some variation in the precise way- 
stations used on different campaigns. All troops starting 
from Istanbul followed the same route except the janissaries 
who, to avoid overcrowding, went by a more northerly branch 
of the orta kol, via Saray, Vize, Kirkkilise (Kirklareli), 
Yeni Zagora (Nova Zagora) and Kazanlik (Kazanlak), rejoining 
the main force at Sofya. The daily stage on the march was 
between 12 and 20 miles p.d. Thus, with rest-days, it took 
about 6 weeks to cover the more than 600 miles from Istanbul 
to Belgrade, a road along which lay about 40 way-stations.-*-^ 
Details of the routes and progress of the provincial sipahis 
only emerge where they acted so as to give the local popul­
ations cause for complaint to the central bureaucracy: 
having crossed from Anatolia at Gelibolu, the Asian sipahis 
must have followed either the orta kol, or else the sol kol 
via Selanik and UskUb.
158. Lists of the places at which the army stopped for the night, and 
those at which a few days rest were ordered, are found at various points 
in the accounts of AbdUlkadir and Hasanbeyzade in particular. In 
addition, the following archival sources also list way-stations for 
particular campaigns: MD 77/76; MD 77/109; KK 1874; KK 1876. More 
comprehensive data for earlier campaigns are the following: for 
SUleyman’s Hungarian campaigns of 1521 and 1526, see Schaendlinger 
(1978); for SUleymanTs Estergon campaign of 1543, see Yurdaydin (1976) - 
the manuscript source for this article is IKS Hazine 1608, Tarlh-1 feth- 
i ffiklog ve Estergon ve Istunl Belgrad. Jirecik (1877) pp.122-33 gives 
a general list of the stops along the route from Belgrade to Istanbul, 
while Nehring (1984) is a concordance of Ottoman and European place- 
names for the way-stations along the route from Vienna to Istanbul, 
drawn from sixteenth-century European accounts.
159. AK f.ll6v: "...asaklre izdiham olmasin,f.
160. The average speed of the Spanish army along its military road in the 
second half of the sixteenth century was almost identical: Parker (1981)
p.280.
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Iiv. Remuneration and Reward
For the Ottoman state, the burden of paying its troops was 
the single greatest drain on funds. Although it is 
impossible to gauge accurately what proportion of total 
campaign expenditure is represented by the campaign account 
books analysed in the final part of this study, it can be 
said that troop wages consumed at least 70% of the campaign 
running costs documented in these accounts.^1 The critical 
point Is that the enormous amounts of money needed to pay 
the troops whose remuneration is recorded in these accounts 
had to be found in cash. Despite the assertion that the 
influx of bullion into the Mediterranean was the most 
salient phenomenon of the period - a phenomenon which 
apparently does not square with the hypothesis that money 
was tight1^  - the sources make it very clear that it was 
hard to find ready cash. Thus, there is a strong case to be 
made that the essential crisis of this period was a cash 
crisis as military demand increased, and with it, the need 
for liquid funds to pay the troops.
For the soldier in the pay of the Ottoman state, the 
military life clearly had potential rewards which outweighed 
the Inconveniences of having to fight when called upon to do 
so. The peasant life to which the majority of Ottoman 
subjects were born was a precarious existence at the best of
161. KK 1879: 86.855; KK 1885: 71.7%; KK 1887: 81.855; KK 1889: 78.9%;
KK 1890: 81.3%
162. Citing the "influx of bullion" argument, Cook (1972) p.31 questions 
Akdag’s insistence on an increasingly inadequate money supply as causal 
in the Celali revolts (in: Akdag, M. Celali Isyanlan. Ankara 1963). 
Analysis of the economic history of this period is far from resolution, 
and needs an understanding, which we do not yet possess, of the 
intricacies of the circulation of money at the time.
times. At the mercy of all, from taxman to timariot, from 
exigencies of natural disaster to those of warfare, the 
peasant was at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid, and 
held no power . M i l i t a r y  life was one of the few avenues 
of upward mobility in Ottoman society, since entry into the 
askeri class provided the incumbent with the lifetime of 
financial support which accompanied the change in status 
from 'producer1 to 'consumer'.
Large fortunes were amassed by those at the top of the 
military hierarchy. Two sources which illustrate this 
clearly are, first, the campaign account books in which are 
recorded the size of the loans made by such individuals in 
order to meet temporary shortages of cash while on campaign 
and, secondly, the registers which record the estates of 
deceased janissaries and o t h e r s . T h e  conditions enabling 
the process of accumulation to begin seem to have existed 
even for those in the lowest reaches of the corps hierarchy: 
the discovery of promissory notes between one janissary and 
another at the Egyptian fortress of Ibrim in the seventeenth 
century indicates that a well-established system of personal 
loans was in operation t h e r e . ^
The opportunities for commerce afforded by the permanent 
garrison life to which many soldiers were consigned did not
163. It is of course true that it was open to all alike to make 
representations to the sultan, and the Miihimme series contains many 
orders indicating that even the most humble availed themselves of this 
right, but for every wrong righted, there must have been many infringe­
ments that went unremedied. It did not require an event of the magnitude 
of the Celali revolt to underline the powerlessness of the peasant 
community.
16U. A detailed study of the second of these sources is that of Barkan 
(1966). Both this and the war loans are discussed in Part III below.
165. This material is shortly to be published by Menage and Hinds (198.).
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go unnoticed by contemporary writers, who saw janissary 
intervention in urban life as a factor destroying the moral 
fibre of the corp s . T u r n i n g to trade they neglected their 
military duties, and marriage was similarly considered 
detrimental, and as having serious consequences: the re­
taking of the fortress of Yanik in 1598 by the Hapsburgs was 
accomplished with little resistance from the garrison 
because most of the janissaries and armourers (cebeci) were 
married and living in Kopan (Tdrokkoppany), Peguy (Pecs) and 
Istolni Belgrad, and the fortress was therefore empty of its 
defensive force.
Members of the janissary corps operated as money-lenders to 
the hard-pressed peasantry on their own account, charging 
high rates of interest.1^  Before the janissaries serving in 
Wallachia were sent off for the campaign of 1591*, orders 
were sent to the voyvode that their business affairs should 
first be settled: the janissaries had lent money to the 
local people, and the Porte was concerned that they should 
be repaid in accordance with the promissory notes (temessUk) 
which they held. They had also stood surety on behalf of 
others to whom money was owed ("...aharm akceslne vekll 
olmuslar”). Reliable men were to be sent out to collect 
this money, and, presumably to avoid conflict, the 
janissaries were not to be sent to the re ay a to do so them­
selves. ^ 9  'Regimental' funds were also lent out (undoubtedly 
for interest) to those short of cash: in 1605, the sancak- 
beyi of Vize was ordered to repay the 22,000 akge which he
166. See, for instance, SELANIKI ff.51v-52r; KAVANIN f.53v.
167. PE£EVI II p.211
168. Faroqhi (1979) p.139 refers to a case in Tokat in the 1590s when 
janissaries and acemi ogLanl were lending at a rate of 30% per month. 
Jennings (1973) pp.l97-78, in his work on early seventeenth-century 
Kayseri, shows that janissaries (and provincial slpahls too) were 
frequent borrowers and lenders at interest.
169. MD 71/729; MD 72/86; see also MD 70/120.
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had borrowed 5 years earlier from the 26th janissary bdltik.^^
By virtue of their monopoly of the instruments of force in 
Ottoman society, the janissaries, and an ever-widening group 
of other troops, were held in considerable awe both by those 
whom they were supposed to serve and by the re ay a. The 
simple fact of their possession of firearms gave them trem­
endous strength: the truism that a loyal army is the first 
essential for a ruler could be profitably exploited by the 
men of the army as they influenced the pattern of power in 
the state. Shortly after this war, palace struggles were to 
result in the death of the Sultan Osman II in 1622. The 
pragmatic resolution of the many janissary and other 
kapukulu revolts of the period is eloquent testimony of the 
leverage they held, and the Celali rebellions are an indic­
ation of the close central supervision to which large groups 
of armed men had to be subjected in order to avoid decent­
ralisation of power. Given the serious cash shortage and 
the need to placate the troops on whom the preservation of 
the internal structure and the securing of the external 
defence of the Empire relied, efforts were made to use most 
efficiently the resources available. In this connection the 
timing of the payment of the wages and incentives suggest 
that troop remuneration was used as an instrument of state 
policy.
The variety of ways in which the troops of the Ottoman army 
could be remunerated should be made clear. It should be 
noted that no one method of remuneration applied to all 
troops of any particular type: such absolute congruence was 
not found in reality. First of all, there was cash payment 
from the treasury, which is normally associated with the 
troops of the standing army. Secondly, there was 
remuneration in the form of the right of revenue collection
170. MD 75/166
| - 77
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such as was enjoyed by the provincial slpahls. Timar lands 
| were assigned also to certain garrison troops in Hungary, a
t practice which the Hungarians themselves adopted as a means
| of paying their border garrisons.This relieved Istanbul
of the need to find the cash, but put the rea.ya working 
these timar-lands at the mercy of the garrison troops whom 
they were supporting. In order to save the re ay a from 
hardship through the war, the government asked that local 
surveys be carried out to ascertain which lands were cont­
inuing to produce and which were unproductive; thus could 
the burdens on the reaya be reassigned as necessary.*72 
Garrison troops could also be paid from mukataa (tax-farm) 
revenue, either on a permanent or one-off basis, or from the 
provincial treasuries. As mentioned earlier, some garrison 
troops were supported from among their peers on a rotational 
basis, and therefore received no direct remuneration from 
the state. Another option was the exemption from certain 
taxes in exchange for military service of one kind or 
another. Many alternatives, therefore, lay along the 
spectrum between the two extremes of cash payment from 
central funds, and the largely 'in-kind1 income collected by 
the provincial cavalryman from his timar.
Before considering the amounts of money needed to pay the 
army, and how the state performed the balancing act of 
staving-off potential revolt, we will look at the remun­
eration of the individual soldier. Several terms are used 
to indicate the components of his pay: mevacib and ulufe are
171. Kaldy-Nagy (1968) p.183. A tapu register from the time of Selim II 
shows that the 96 officers and men in the fortress of Novigrad received 
a total annual income from timar-lands of 169,300 akpe, while 84 of the 
garrison of Diregel were entitled to 150,200 akge (Bayerle, 1973 p.26).
172. MD 77/283
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synonymous in the present context;173 nafaka refers to an 
expense allowance, harclik to an interim advance, while 
Ucret is used to describe the pay of those hired to perform 
incidental jobs, such as transport services. Pay-registers 
(mevacib defterleri) record the regular salaries of the 
kapukulu troops and those of the locally-hired troops who 
were paid in c a s h . 174 For the former, the name and identity 
of each man is recorded, together with his daily rate of 
pay. Payment was made on a three-monthly basis, with, at 
least for the kapukulu ocaklarl. each tranche being reckoned 
at 88.5 days. The three-monthly tranches were identified by 
acronyms based on the first or last letters of the months of 
the Hicri calendar viz. Masar (Muharrem, Safer, Rebi I), 
Recec (Rebi II, Cumada I, Cumada II), Re sen (Receb, paban, 
Ramazan) and Lezez (§>evval, Zilkade, Zilhicce). The 88.5 
day period of each tranche is the average of the number of 
days in each of the three-month periods viz. the number of 
days in Masar (89) plus Recec (88) is 177, which, divided by 
2, equals 88.5. So too for Resen plus Lezez. Even to those 
familiar with the details of the pay registers, 
understanding them presented problems: as the author of the 
Kavanln-i Yenicerlyan tells us w...yeniceri yoldaslarm
173- The distinction made in the following passage, where ulufe denotes 
the 3-monthly tranche, and mevacib denotes pay in general, is not, 
however, sustained throughout the work, nor in other contexts: 
"...muharrem’den masar ve recec ve resen ve lezez mevacibine varinca 
yllda d5rt ulufe olur,f (KAVANIN f.lOlr).
174. t Fekete (1955) I pp.94-98, II doctsXV-LVI,LXXV-LXXX gives some 
information on this type of register. A detailed study devoted to the 
mevacib defterleri is much needed.
ahvali bey an olunmasi mttskildir zlra bu blr deryadir".1^
In order to lend some substance to the contention that the 
Ottoman soldier was not poorly paid, and could indeed 
accumulate wealth, the first measure to be ascertained is 
his daily pay. Only rarely do the extant registers for the 
kapukulu troops give sub-totals for the pay of the thousands 
of men who are recorded therein, and consequently the 
calculation of an average based on so many individual 
entries has not been attempted here. For the 1593-1606 war, 
registers which record all janissaries are rarer than those 
recording the names of those garrisoned in particular 
castles. Where such registers of complete corps do exist, 
the names are annotated according to the whereabouts of the 
Individual concerned, information which was essential in 
keeping track of when and where he was to be paid.-^^ In 
1602-03, for instance, annotations indicate that janissaries 
were on duty in Belgrade, Kanije, Egri, Rhodes, Bender, 
Salonika, Aleppo and with the Black Sea fleet, inter alla.-^T 
For the particular locations to which they were assigned, 
the registers on which their pay was based shows the status 
of each of the men at the time when they were to be paid.
The presence of janissaries to receive their pay could be 
Indicated by the letter mim, for mevcud (present), while 
there were many reasons for being absent (na-mevcud). this
175. KAVANIN f.49r; the author of this work was clearly much exercised by 
his attempt to explain the organisation of the registers since he makes 
the similar observation, that it was hard to explain the organisation of 
the janissary corps because it was like a sea, on two other occasions 
(KAVANIN ff.l03r,107v).
176. On such more or less complete lists of janissarries, for instance, 
are seen annotations in red ink, to show those on campaign; cf. KAVANIN 
f.l03v: "...ve eger seferlerde yazlll lken ilzerlerinde siirh olup,f.
177. MM 5772: Defter-i mevaclb-i yenlgeriyan-i dergah-1 all der vaclb-1 
masar. recec. resen, lezez 1011.
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designation being further differentiated according to 
whether the individual had deserted (firar kerde), retired 
(mtitekaid), died (miiteveff a gUd if the deceased was Muslim, 
and milrde if of Christian, that is devgirme or prisoner of
war, o r i g i n ) . ^ 8
Given that registers listing the full janissary corps are 
unwieldy for the calculation of average janissary pay, we 
have to turn to the registers which, on a castle-by-castle 
basis, list the smaller numbers of Janissaries forming part 
of the border garrison force. Two further problems in the 
organisation of the janissary pay-registers are first, that 
there is no overt indication of their length of service of 
each individual and second, that not all members of each 
bflltik were necessarily deployed at the same location; at 
least some part of the variation in bdlilk numbers to be 
found in the registers could be due to war losses, 
however. 9
The anonymous author of Kitab-1 Milstetab, writing in the 
reign of Osman II, note3 that janissaries newly graduated 
from the acemloglanis used to earn a starting wage of 3 akge
178. A register of janissaries garrisoning Kanije from Lezez 1011 to 
Masar 1014 AH (March 1603-August 1605) shows the further explanations: 
sipahl gild (promoted into the slpahi corps); mande (remained behind ?in 
Istanbul); merd-i kale (disciplined by being posted to a fortress); 
merd-i timar gild (disciplined by being sent to the provinces); sefere 
na-amed (did not appear on campaign); solak gild (became a solak); the 
meanings of the remaining annotations are less clear, viz. tesllm-1 
hallfe-yl aPfe; baz acemi gild; ba-tedblr gild (MM 3731). In some 
instances, the term gehid is used to indicate death in action, rather 
than from other causes such as disease.
179. MM 5339 pp.486-511: of the bdldks of the Janissaries of the 65th 
cemaat who were present on the campaign against Wallachia and Moldavia 
in the winter of 1594-95, the numbers of men in each bolilk varied from 
59 in the 61st, to only 7 in the 6th.
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per day: by the time he wrote his work, however, he was 
complaining that this had risen to 5, 6 or even 7 akge p.d.1**® 
The Kavanln-1 Yenlgeriyan tells us, more specifically, that 
new janissaries had customarily been paid 2 akge p.d. until 
the accession of Ahmed I (in 1603), when the starting wage 
was raised to 3 akge p.d.1**1 When we look at the pay 
registers themselves, however, we find 3 akge p.d. to have 
been the starting rate of pay for janissaries garrisoning 
the border castles of Hungary even before Ahmed's accession: 
this may indicate that* special conditions applied to those 
serving on the front, while the information found in the 
Kavanln-1 Yenlgeriyan may have reflected the situation in 
peacetime.' As an example of pay conditions on the Hungarian 
border during this war, we may cite the garrison of Egri in 
Masar 1005 AH (August-November 1596), into which newly- 
formed force many men were recruited, since the fortress had 
fallen into Ottoman hands only in October 1596. These new 
recruits, who had a starting wage of 3 akge p.d., Joined 
those brought from other duties to man this f o r t r e s s . T h e  
pay lists for janissaries serving in the fortress of Kanije 
in 1012 AH (July 1603-May 1604) likewise shows the presence 
of many new recruits at a rate of 3 akge p.d.: new recruits 
were indicated by the gloss ”ba-tezkere-yi efendi", but it 
is not possible for us to ascertain whether new recruits 
were former acemioglanis. or came directly from the reaya.
By checking the names of the individual janissaries at 
Kanije, it can be seen that this starting-pay figure of 3 
akge p.d. was soon, in the second half of the year, 
increased to 7 akge p.d.1**^
180. MUSTETAB p.13
181. KAVANIN f.40r
182. MM 5241
183. MM 3731 pp.25-44,49-70: the register contains data from Lezez 1011-
Masar 1014 AH (March 1603-August 1605).
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The accompanying table shows the average daily pay of 
janissaries garrisoning Egri and some other Hungarian 
castles and serving on campaign in 1005 AH (August 1596- 
August 1597). Prom this limited sample, it can be seen that 
the average per diem, where calculable, lay between 5.5 and 
7 akge per day. The averages for each castle obviously 
reflect the numbers of new recruits who joined the corps in 
this period: thus if we compare the average daily pay of 
janissaries serving in, Buda with that of those in Temepvar, 
we find that Buda has a higher average. Tentatively, then, 
we may say that 7 akge p.d. was the average daily pay of a 
janissary serving in the castles of the Hungarian borders at 
this time.1^1*
There is less information for the average pay of the alti 
bolttk at this time. In Re gen 1008 AH (January-April 1600)
395 members of the gureba-yi yemln, of whom 20 were retired 
(mdtekaid), received an average daily wage of 23 akge.^^ The 
starting rate of pay for a janissary who was promoted into 
the alti bdlttk on account of valorous action on campaign 
("dllaverllk edenler”), was 13 akge per day.-*-^
After the janissaries and the alti bdlttk cavalry, the next 
most important of the kapukulu corps were the armourers 
(cebeci), cannoneers (topgu) and those who attended to the 
gun carriages (top arabacisi). The average daily pay of 
the topgus assigned to campaign duty in Resen 1003 AH
184. See following page.
185. MM 6983 p.178
186. KAVANIN f.67r
3 3
MM 5241: Defter-1 yenlQerlyan-1 dergah-1 all der muhafaza 
-yl kale-yl... 1005 AH (1596-97 AD7
(Register of janissaries of the Porte who were defending the 
castle of•. .)
Masar Recec Re$en Lezez
Buda a) 2 676 2 475 2 403 2 298
b) 18 629 17 178 16 537
c) 6.96 6.94 6.88
Yanik a) 370 293 286 288
b) 2 400 2 344
c) 6.49 8
Teme^var a) 1 414 1 307 1 264
b) 8 000 7 516
c) 5.66 5.75
Egri a) 3 121 2 536
b) 17 055
c) 5.46
Eflak a) 1 429
(Transylvanian b) 9 606
theatre) c) 6.72
Sefer-i huraayun a) 9 202
(on campaign) b) 61 415
c) 6.67
key:
a) is no. of Janissaries
b) is total daily pay
c) is average daily pay in akge
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(March-June 1595) was 4.78 akge.***7 The average dally pay of 
the topgus at Buda in Lezez 1012 AH (March-May 1604) was 
5.85 akge. at Kanije it was 6.23 akge.* ^  and for those at 
Istolni Belgrad the pay rate for the three preceeding 
months was 5*56 akge p.d.*®9 Figures for Lezez 1006 AH (May- 
August 1598) show an interesting discrepancy as between the 
dally pay rates of topgus remaining in Istanbul and those 
on campaign and in the garrisons, with the latter having a 
significantly lower pay rate.*90 This disparity may be due to 
the enrollment of many new recruits on campaign and in the 
border castles.
Average daily pay rates for the cebecls were comparable to 
those for the topgus. The starting wage for those who 
joined the corps as part of the garrison of Yanik after it
was taken by the Ottomans in 1594, was 4 akge p.d.*91 The
cebecls at Hatvan in Masar 1013 AH (May-August 1604) 
averaged 4.1 akge p.d. and those at Istolni Belgrad in the
same period, the low rate of 3.55 akge p.d., while they had
averaged 5.42 akge in the preceding three months.*92 As has 
been noted above, the average at any period depended on the 
composition of the garrison at any time. The higher rates
187. MM 5524 p.42: of the 660 men assigned, only 469 were present at the
time the wages were paid (nmlnha cemaat-1 topguyan-1 dergah-1 all der
vaclb-1 regen 1003: mevcud, neferan...469M). The title of this register 
(p.26) is Defter-1 mevaclb-1 cemaat-1 topguyarnl dergah-1 all kl beray-1 
sefen-1 humayun flristade budend der vaclb-1 regen 1003. this being the 
campaign led by Ferhad Pasha against Wallachia in 1595.
188. MM 7540 p.373
189. MM 7540 p.327
190. MM 136 f.25v: the average rate for those in Istanbul was 7.43 akge
p.d., while the average rate for the whole corps was 4.81 akge.
191. MM 6151 pp.148-9: ’’cebeciler ki der muhafaza-yl Yanik mande 
end...lptlda yazilanlarln ulufeleri dorder akgedir11.
192. MM 7540 p.l63
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of pay which the arabacis appear to have had at Istolni 
Belgrad and other fortresses at the same period may thus be 
nothing more than a reflection of the fact that there were 
longer-serving arabacis than there were members of 
the cebecl corps in that particular fortress.^93
The official pay rates, of the kapukulu troops may not seem, 
from the foregoing, to have been sufficiently high to offer 
an irresistible incentive for military service. However, 
there were a range of regular and irregular supplements to 
these wages which made military service a more attractive 
way of life. The janissaries were awarded the small sum of 
30 akpe p.a., together with their Lezez wages: this was 
known as kemanbaha or tirkegbaha, probably because it had 
originally been intended that it should be put toward the 
cost of furnishing them with a bow.^94 Cebecls garrisoning 
the castles and those on active campaign also received 
kemanbaha. as did, posssibly, topcus and arabacis.^ 95 Those 
on garrison duty also received the subsistence allowance 
known as nafaka, at the rate of 1 akge p.d., although at 
this time the full allowance was not sent to the border, for
193. MM 7540 p.511
194. AYN-I ALI/b p.88; KAVANIN f.49r: yav akgesl. There are numerous 
documentary references to this pay supplement. MIHALOVip p.159 notes 
that in his time, in the 1450s, it was paid at the rate of 1 gold piece 
p.a. The term tirkegbaha has a second usage, to denote the 5 gold pieces 
given to those who joined the alti boliik (Barkan, 1954/b p.316).
195. MM 7540 records the pay of cebecls. topgus and arabacis on campaign 
in Hungary and serving as garrison troops in Hungary from Masar 1012 to 
Masar 1013 AH (June 1603-August 1605): although not all cebecl are 
recorded as having had kemanbaha paid with their Lezez wage payment, 
probably due to the lags in the system, there is no mention of topgus or 
arabacis having had it at all. Similarly, AYN-I ALI/b (p.90) notes that 
cebecl received kemanbaha. but makes no mention of this allowance in 
relation to topgus and arabacis.
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fear of embezzlement by their officers.^6  Nafaka was paid 
in 3-monthly tranches of 90 akge each.197
Although, as we have seen, janissaries had the opportunity 
to make money, there were also those within the corps whose 
pay was insufficient, and who needed to borrow. The 
inability of the exchequer to ensure the availability of 
funds to pay wages when they fell due, and abuses by those 
responsible for ensuring that wages were distributed 
equitably, were presumably the major causes of the 
borrowing. Such borrowings could be made from the richer 
janissaries on an individual basis, as was the case in 
seventeenth-century Ibrim,198 or else the needy were helped in 
the short-term by the state, through being given provisions 
in kind, for which they would reimburse the treasury when 
they eventually received their wages. A campaign account 
entry for 24 Cumada I 1015 (27 September 1606), shortly 
before the end of the war, shows how the cost of provisions 
given to some of the Janissaries on campaign in Hungary was 
repaid to the treasury within a month of them receiving 
their wages, the payment of which was, in any case, in
196. KAVANIN ff.52v,83v
197. e.g. MM 75^ 0 p.373; MM 7029 p.64; MM 3731 p.69; MM 6322 p.1088; 
Mxt.638 f.2v
198. Menage and Hinds (198.)
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arrears.*99 The evidence suggests that such a system 
pertained only to the kapukulu troops.
Members of the alti bbltik were able to supplement their pay 
through the fees they earned in the performance of 
government business, and in particular by acting as agents 
in the collection of certain taxes on behalf of the 
treasury. The fee paid for the collection of the clzye 
(poll tax), for instance, was called gulamiye; Abdiilkadir 
describes how the distribution of the gulamiye used to be an 
annual event, given to the alti bblttk who collected the 
clzye at the rate of 10 akge per tax-payer. Two men were 
responsible for each tax register, one acting in the
Y
capacity of steward (emin) and the other as clerk (katlb). 
The performance of this service was rotated among the corps, 
and every year 700-800 benefited from the opportunity to 
earn gulamiye. However, the alti bdlttk members stationed
199. KK 1890 p.115 (24 Cum.1 1015): "an tahvll-1 All Efendl emin-1 nttztil-l 
humayun an paha-yl zahlre-yl yenlgerlyan-1 ordu-yl humavun an akge-yl 
paha-yl pekslmad ve gair ve rugan-i sade ve erz kL der vakt-1 akin be 
sefer-1 humayun tevzl gilde bud ve hala klymetes bl-hazlne-yl amlre 
averde an yed-i Mehmed gavus-l yenlgeriyan"...416,693 akge 
The entry is completed by showing how this total is arrived at on the 
basis of the following prices charged for the provisions:
$air (barley) 29,645 keyl at 9 akge 266,805
erz (rice) 705 keyl at 63 akge 44,415
pekslmad (biscuit) 2157-5 kantar at 45 akge 97,087.5
rugan-1 sade (plain oil) 599 klyye at 14 akge 8,386
416,693.5
See also the entries for 26 Cumada I (p.115) and 5 Cumada II (p.120) for 
cebecls and topgus respectively. That these transactions coincided with 
the payment of wages to the troops Is clear from account entries to this 
effect viz. pp.112,114,120. See also MM 16320 p.54.
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outside Istanbul complained that they did not have the 
opportunity to share in these rewards, and in 1012 AH (1603- 
04) it was widened so that all members of the alti bdlilk 
were eligible.200
The governments need to keep the loyalty of its troops, and 
to ensure that they performed their required duties also 
demanded that very substantial cash incentives be handed out 
periodically, either in the form of pay rises, or else on a 
one-off basis. Abdiilkadir gives countless examples of money 
being handed out at the start of campaigns in the 1593-1606 
war, before specific engagements, or in recognition of out­
standing service. Such largesse makes the official rates of 
pay irrelevant as a measure of the extent of the remun­
eration which a soldier could earn. A few examples may be 
cited: after the capture of Yanik in 1594, a (? permanent) 
rise of 2 akge was made to all mounted kapukulu troops and 1 
akce to each infantryman.201 A further 500 akge was given 
as a gift to encourage an immediately subsequent attack on 
Komran, which did not, incidentally, succeed.202 To those 
bringing the head of a dead Christian at Nigbolu, 2 or 4 
gold pieces were given, and 8 for a prisoner.2 °3 After 
regaining Estergon in 1605, the kapukulu cavalry were 
awarded a pay rise of 2 akge each, and foot soldiers 1 akge 
each.20** These rewards made in the field were regarded as 
irregular - indeed as rtlgvet (bribery) - by some, who saw in 
such unauthorised distribution of money another cause of the 
weakening of the treasury.20  ^ The dispensation of such 
frequent and sizeable rewards cannot but have contributed to
200. AK ff,179v-l80r; cf. Uzungar^ ili (1943) II pp.158-60
201. AK f.26r
202. AK f.27r
203. AK f.35r
204. AK ff.211r,211v
205. MUSTETAB pp.3-4
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the financial problems of the Empire, but it is doubtful 
that the troops would have performed at all without such 
hand-outs. The accession of a new sultan called for the 
giving of bahglg to his kul: the generosity with which this 
was done gave a chance to purchase their loyalty. At the 
accession of Mehmed III in 1595, 100 purses of gold were 
withdrawn from the Inner Treasury, and part of this was sent 
to Belgrade to cover the back-pay due to the troops 
t h e r e . M e m b e r s  of the kapukulu ocaklari received a 
substantial present at this tirae.^^
We have seen that the reaya were able to take the first step 
toward an improvement in their status by answering the 
general call to serve. For those who were not promised a 
timar for valorous conduct, promotion within the array 
depended on an initial period of service in a border 
garrison, after which the individual had earned the chance 
of being awarded the position to which he aspired. This 
incentive of future reward was used to dissuade disenchanted 
troops from mutiny. The practice of garrison service for 
new recruits was not peculiar to the Ottoman system, and the 
situation was remarkably similar for the troops of the 
Hapsburg army in the Netherlands at this time. The prac­
tical thinking behind this period of garrison service was 
that the inexperienced recruit could learn the discipline of 
military duty away from the thick of campaign; a second 
advantage was that garrison troops could be more 
conveniently left unpaid than those 'in a c t i o n ' . ^08 The 
usual period of such apprentice garrison duty was three
206. AK f.30v
207. AYN-I ALI/b p.109: he gives a list of the gifts made under the 
rubric Sultan Mehmed Han ibn Sultan Murad Han tahtlna cUlus ettlkte 
kadlmden olageldtigftt iizere erkan-1 devlete verilen bahsigdlr (pp.108-12); 
see also HAMMER IV p.645.
208. Parker (1981) p.34; Orhonlu (1970) p.62
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years, and the conditions under which it was performed were 
termed ”b51Uk gartlyle”, indicating that the individual 
would proceed to full membership of one of the permanent 
regiments thereafter. A position in the janissary corps may 
have been desirable, but it was membership of the sultan’s 
cavalry regiments that conferred most s t a t u s . It was the 
group known as kuloglu who were the main candidates for such 
promotion.^1*1 After the three year tour of duty was 
complete, such garrison troops were called onto the field of 
battle: while Pest was being defended against the Christians 
in 1600, 700 kuloglu who had fulfilled their obligations and 
were ready for combat (’’...vadeleri ve gartlari tekmil 
olur”) were summoned from Egri, but they fled from fright at 
the sound of gunfire before they reached their 
destination.^11 By volunteering for fortress service full 
members of the janissaries, cebecls and topcus could be 
promoted into the alti bolilk.^ 1  ^ Agreeing to undertake 
garrison duty was also a way in which those who needed 
disciplining could ingratiate themselves again: for 
instance, the kapukulu troops who had earlier escaped from 
Yanik castle (presumably when it was taken by the Christians
209. Georgieva (1970) p.322. In January 1602, the promotion of 27 indiv­
iduals into the alti bdlOk was recorded thus: "mukaddema vezir Mahmud 
Paga hazretlerl Tuna yalisinda muhafazada Iken boliflc viriip sUdde— yi 
saadette makbul olmayin rlca ettikte tig yil Hatvan kalesinde muhafazada 
olmak gartlyle boltik buyurulmustur fi 18 Receb 1010” (MM 6423 p.110).
210. In its strict usage this terra does describe those who were the sons 
of kul. and therefore eligible to be kul themselves, but may have gained 
wider currency as military recruitment expanded. Kogi Bey recognised a 
wider meaning of the term in the passage in which he tells how it was 
Koca Sinan Pasha who stationed various men at the newly-captured 
fortress of Yanik in 1595 with the status of kul oglu and the promise of 
entry into the alti bdlUk after 3 years service (K0£L BEY p.42).
211. AKf.l34v
212. AK ff,125v,l4lv
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in 1598) were promised that they would be confirmed in their 
positions if they agreed to serve for three years in the 
castle of Buda.
Register MM 5158 contains details of the local troops 
garrisoning 51 castles of the vilayet of Buda from 1012-16 
AH (1603—07).21  ^ The types of troops comprising each garrison 
are listed, as well as their p.d. pay, totals for each 3- 
month period being calculated on the basis of 85.5 days, in 
contrast to the 88.5 days used for the kapukulu troops. The 
reason why the period of reckoning is shorter is not 
apparent. Also unclear is the reason why some groups of men 
in some months received only exactly 70>6 of the figure shown 
as their official entitlement. From this 70% figure, 
further items were then subtracted, such as the fees for the 
renewal of their letters of appointment on the accession of 
Ahmed I (rUsum-1 berevat-i cUlus), an amount to cover prov­
isions received in kind (bedel-i mevacib) and an amount
213. AK f,123r
214. This register is entitled Erkam-i mevaclb-1 neferat-1 kila ve 
palankaha tabl-yl eyalet-1 Budun.
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which had been advanced to them on two occasions (harclik).^ ^^
It can thus be seen how the conditions of service of these 
border troops were different from those of the kapukulu 
troops. While the kapukulu had to repay the treasury on a 
pro rata basis for the provisions which were given to them 
when they were, for whatever reason, short of money to buy 
their own, provisions were an integral part of the remuner­
ation of the border troops, and the value of the provisions 
given them was subsequently deducted from their wages. This
215. To illustrate how the pay was calculated we may look in detail at a 
typical example, the second farlsan (cavalry) corps of the castle of 
Segedin:
Mevaclb-1 farlsan-1 sanl-yl kale-yl Segedin vaclb fi al-tarlh al-mezbur; 
Masar. Recec 1012:
39 men at 411 p.d. * 411x85.5x2 = 70,280x70$ = 49,196 
Resen. Lezez 1012:
39 men at 411 p.d. = 411x85.5x2 = 70,280x70$ = 49,196 
Masar, Recec 1013:
32 men at 341 p.d. = 341x85.5x2 = 58,310x70$ = 40,817 
Resen. Lezez 1013: no data 
Masar. Recec 1014:
39 men at 411 p.d. = 411x85.5x2 = 70,280 
A note is appended to the effect that a further 35,490 akge was to 
be deducted from the first of these six-monthly tranches viz: 
be-cihet-i rtisuro-1 berevat-i cillus-1 humayun 12,330
be-cihet-i bedel-1 mevacib: zahlre dade 3,000
ber vech-1 harcllk dade 9,360
defa harclik dade 10,800
35,490
It may easily be calculated that it cost each of these men more than 1 
month’s wages to renew their letters of appointment on the accession of 
the new sultan.
(source: MM 5158 p.10)
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evidence contributes to the clarification of a point which 
puzzled Fekete: entries in a wage register for the castle of 
Lipova in 1591-92 suggested to him that provisions were an 
integral part of the remuneration paid to at least certain 
groups of troops, for the gloss "dahll-l galle” ("inclusive 
of grain) is to be seen beside entries recording the pay of 
the individual azebs garrisoning that castle. He considered 
that this probably indicated that there was a nominal amount 
to cover provisions included in the pay entitlement of each 
man:^^ for the Hungarian border troops whom we are 
considering, provisions were actually given in kind to the 
value of this nominal amount.
Average daily wage rates may be calculated for each of the 
types of troops manning these 51 castles during the period 
to which these accounts pertain. It has already been 
pointed out that the distinctive names by which they were 
known probably do not indicate any great specialisation of 
function by the end of the sixteenth century. As an example 
we will take the castle of K o p a n : ^ 1 7
Miistahf lzan-i enderun
akce p.d. 
7.1
Mttstahfizan-i birun 8.4
Farisan-i evvel 10.54
Farisan-i sani 10.34
Azeban-i atik 7.4
Azeban-i cedid 2.0
Azeban-i sails 7.37
Topcuyan 8.37
Martolosan 5.45
216. Fekete (1955) I pp.504-5
217. MM 5158 pp.64-72: these rates apply to the six months of Regen and 
Lezez 1013 AH (November 1604-May 1605); there is no 30% deduction, nor 
any other deductions indicated, and so we are able to give an average 
pay figure based on the full cash wage. Kopan is adequately represent­
ative of the level of average pay over the sample of 51 castles.
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These average daily rates compare favourably with those for 
the kapukulu troops. The bonuses which these local troops 
received were smaller and less regular than those given to 
the kapukulu, however, although there is note in the cam­
paign accounts of cash gifts being made to garrisons whose
p -i Q
members had served well, or performed particular services.
Register MM 5158 shows-that the local border troops received 
their wages in 6-monthly tranches. In the quieter cond­
itions before the outbreak of the war, the tranches were 
annual: a gloss to a summary account of the Buda Treasury 
for 1578-79 AD tells us that this was the case at least for 
the garrisons of that vilayet. It also confirms that 
harclik was, in this context, an interim advance which had 
to be repaid, and was not considered as a supplement to the 
wage, as was the nafaka of the kapukulu.^^
The idea that anyone whose home was in the dar Ul-islam 
should be forced to stay In infidel hands was unacceptable 
to the Ottomans, and the efforts made to secure the release 
of prisoners are further evidence of concern for the welfare 
and well-being of the soldiery. The price paid to ransom 
prisoners must have been in accordance with their rank, but
218. e.g. KK 1885 p.14: "lnaifr-1 neferat-1 klla ve agayan"; Mlnam-1 bazi 
neferat-1 kale-yi Kopan". KK 1887 p.14: ninam-l Mahmud ve Receb an 
Konillltiyan-1 ERrl kl ba-ahbar amedend".
219. MM 498 p.5 (account for 21 £ewal 986-20 £ewal 987 AH)
The entry is: "der zlmmet-i neferat-i kila-yl vilayet-i Budun ki an 
hazlne-yi ami re bl-tarlk-1 harclik sitadend"...3.291,301. with the 
gloss: "ulufelerl senevi olmagin blrer mlkdar harclik tarlkiyle karz 
vlrllOp sonra yillik ulufelerl virlldlkte mahsub olurmus".
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we do not possess details of such a scale. Before the start 
of the war, horses were being used to ransom Ottoman 
captives in Christian hands - an activity which, in view of 
the strategic value which the Ottomans placed on horses, was 
ordered to be stopped.22  ^ Prisoners taken by the enemy could 
be ransomed against a cash payment: in 1605 a request for 
help was made to the Porte by a certain Omer, whose relative 
Mehmed, a janissary of the 79th cemaat, had been taken 
prisoner near the Iron Gates as he was going on the Danube 
by boat. This led to the sending of an order to the voyvode 
of Wallachia, by this time again an ally of the Ottomans, 
that the sum of 500 gold pieces (flori) should be paid in
o  p  i
order to secure Mehmed’s release.
In 1605 there was an exchange of prisoners with the 
Hungarians who were by this time themselves struggling 
against Hapsburg domination: the beylerbeyi of Kanije was 
ordered to arrange that Hungarian prisoners (esir) held by 
the Ottomans were to be set free without money changing 
hands, while those muslim prisoners (tutsak) held by the 
Hungarians were to be ransomed against payment of the price 
at which the Hungarians had bought them from the Hapsburgs.222 
Despite the realignment of Wallachia and Moldavia with the 
Ottomans, over-zealous troops from Silistre were still, in 
1605, taking prisoners from these principalities: it was 
ordered that this practice be stopped.223
The archives of the Hungarian Batthyany family, whose seat 
was at Kdrmend, some 100 km north-west of Kanije, show the 
account which was kept by the Hungarians of the value of
220. MD 70/61
221. MD 75/279; cf. MD 77/277: the ransom for a certain martolos held as 
prisoner was, by contrast, only 120 gums.
222. MD 77/286
223. KK 70 p.82
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goods lost by their villagers to Turkish raiders.
Similarly, they kept careful records of the Turkish 
prisoners whom they took, such men being sent in person to 
collect their ransom, with their compatriots being held to 
guarantee their return with the money.22* Care was also 
taken of captives taken by the Ottomans:22  ^there was always 
a chance that information could be extracted from them, or 
that they could be sold as slaves.
Efforts were also made to give competent medical attention 
to the Ottoman wounded, and to equitable execution of the 
wills of the many who fell in battle or succumbed to plague 
or fever on campaign.22® Among these latter, the most eminent 
were the grand vezirs Ibrahim Pasha and Malkog Ali Pasha, 
both of whom died of fever (humma-yl muharrlke) in 
Belgrade.22  ^ To attend to the medical care of the troops, 
doctors, surgeons (cerrah) and eye-doctors (kahhal) 
accompanied the array on campaign.22® In 1597, the appointment 
of a frenk doctor named Bartolomeo to serve on campaign is 
recorded; he had been in Belgrade for a long time, and, 
because he was known to be experienced, was called upon to 
replace another doctor who was considered incapable of this 
duty. He was to be paid 40 akge p.d.22  ^ Another call for a 
highly-regarded individual called Martino went out in 1605,
224. Sugar (1971) pp.82-91
225. MD 77/242; MD 77/281
226. The circumstances governing the distribution of the estates of dead 
soldiers are discussed in Part III below.
227. AK ff.l43r,197v-198r; Parker (1981) p.100 refers to an article by 
Hrabak (1957), which makes reference to the Ottoman army's part in the 
spread of plague in the Balkans: working principally from the Dubrovnik 
archives, Hrabak has established a chronology of plague epidemics in the 
Balkans between 1450 and 1600.
228. AK ff.5r,157r,191v
229. KK 254 p.10
i
i
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when It was especially asked that he be sent back from 
D u b r o v n i k . ^30 While those wounded by gunshot at the attack 
on Kanije in 1600 received the attentions of the surgeons 
free, those wounded in other ways were given 10 gold 
pieces.231 Wounded janissaries were sent back to Istanbul 
on camels, the money for the mahaffe. the wooden frame which 
allowed two people to be carried on one animal, being 
provided by the s t a t e . ^ 3 2
Except where revenues were collected in the Balkans and 
Hungary and despatched directly to the front, cash to pay 
the troops fighting in Hungary had to be physically trans­
ported from Istanbul. This required a reliable escort, able 
to fend off the bandits (egkiya, haramlzade) who lay in wait 
along the route. Transportation was by m u l e , ^33 ox cart, pack 
horse or camel. The Ottoman exchequer did not have access 
to the sophisticated financial instruments which to some 
extent relieved their European contemporaries of this 
arduous undertaking: bills of exchange were considered 
indispensable as a means of effecting cash transfer for the 
payment of Hapsburg troops fighting in the Netherlands at 
the end of the sixteenth century. Paper credit had the 
added advantage that the cash required for its redemption 
did not have all to be found at one time. The system of 
merchant credit broke down, however, when Spanish government
230. MD 77/167
231. AK f.l32r. Abdiilkadir also records that those wounded at Estergon 
in 1605 were given 4 or 10 gold pieces (AK f.209v).
232. MM 5145 p.9: under the heading MHhlmmat-1 yenlcerlyan-1 slkestegan 
we find that 10 pairs of mahaffe were taken on the campaign against the 
Celali rebels in 1602, at a total cost of 1,200 akce. together with 
lengths of rope to secure them. See also KAVANIN f.84v; MD 77/310.
233. AK f.30v
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demands for loans became so enormous that a cash shortage 
ensued.2 4^ if conditions in Europe had not allowed for the 
modification of the system in response to its overloading, 
the Hapsburg exchequer would have been confronted with 
logistic demands such as those with which the Ottomans had 
to contend: in 1605, for instance, there was an urgent need 
to send the enormous amount of 700 ytik of akge (70m.) to the 
Hungarian front for the pay of kapukulu and border troops 
until the end of the season’s campaign. Such money had to 
be found immediately, and in toto, and transported by the 
long land r o u t e . T h i s  is a telling illustration of how 
acute was the cash crisis central to Ottoman troubles at 
this time.
The transportation problem could be eased by sending the 
bullion in a higher denomination coin than the silver akge, 
particularly in gold.236 But gold coin was harder to find, 
and the loss of one camel-load of gold coin was a greater 
disaster than the loss of a load of silver akge. Admin­
istrative arrangements for the sending of bullion appear to 
have been of two types. Transport was either organised on 
a kaza basis, with the cadi through whose area of juris­
diction the convoy passed being required to provide strong 
carts and well-nourished horses to replace the by now tired 
oxen and inadequate carts which had carried the bullion 
h i t h e r t o . 2 7^ Alternatively, camels were rented by the state 
to carry the wages to the b o r d e r s . 2 ^  The rental of camels to
234. Parker (1981) pp.146-47
235. MD 77/493: there are numerous other examples of orders concerning the 
transport of cash.
236. MD 72/864
237. MD 72/582
238. For instance, MM 4435 p.47: ITbe-clhet-i kiraye-yl list (Iran beray-1
btirden-1 akge-.yl mevacib-i yenlgeriyan-1 dergah-l ali kL n5betciyan-i
kilaha..
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carry the wages of the janissaries to 22 castles, mostly in 
Rumeli, as recorded in an account for 1007 AH (1598-99) 
shows the number of camel-loads of akge required per 3-month 
period to pay the janissaries garrisoning the castle in 
question. Five camel-loads of coin were required every 3 
months for the wages of the janissaries in Buda, but this 
figure would have included the wages of the janissaries in 
all the castles of the vilayet. Also given is the transport 
cost per load, which depended on the distance from Istanbul: 
to carry to Buda the 25 loads of akge which were due to the 
border troops in 1598-99 cost the exchequer 580 akge per 
load, or a total of 11,600 akge.239
The difficulties of getting coin to the troops in wartime, 
coupled with the apparent shortage of money, meant that some 
units did not get paid for many months, and had several 
tranches owing them. The government wa3, by default and by 
design, pragmatic in its pattern of wage payments. Those 
troops least able to cause trouble were neglected as long as 
was feasible, with signs of unrest being met with the pay­
ment of the outstanding wages.2*40 Those from whom there was 
most to fear, those with the greatest bargaining power, 
received their pay most regularly. That there was a danger 
of unpaid troops mutinying unless their back-pay was
239. KK 7102 f.35v (a/c for 9 Safar-20 $ewal 1007). Comparable accounts 
for the transportation of wages are found at MM 3903 p.59 (1 Receb 1004- 
29 Cum.1 1005 AH/March 1596-January 1597); MM 4435 p.47 (12 Zilkade 
1005-29 Safar 1006 AH/June-October 1597): the latter refers to expenses 
incurred in 1003.
240. Among the annotations to be found beside the names of soldiers in the 
mevacib defterleri are, on occasion, numbers in red ink. It seems to me 
that the most plausible explanation for these numbers is that they 
record the amount of back-pay due to the individual: the highest number
I found in the registers for this period was 25, indicating 25 tranches, 
that is, that the individual had not been paid for over 6 years.
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forthcoming, was naturally recognised by the authorities.
In a letter which he wrote to Sultan Mehmed III In
August/September 1597, Satirci Mehmed Pasha reveals his
fears that the troops would not fight unless they were given
their back-pay: he writes that wages had not been paid for 2
years, that 30 m. akge were due, but that there was a chance
of being able to stand,against the Christians if this amount
p inwas sent to the front.
By the summer of 1595, the kul troops garrisoning the 
fortress at Sigetvar had not been paid for a year or a year 
and a half. The kapucu bagl AbdUlkerim was sent from
Istanbul to inspect: the responsibility for the delay in
payment was deemed to lie with the defterdar of Buda, who 
was told to find the outstanding money from the Buda 
Treasury or wherever else he could. Such an order is 
typical of the passing of the onus of responsibility from 
those at the centre to those on the s p o t , "^2 although money 
should have earlier been made available to the Buda Treasury 
from the Central or Campaign Treasury for the very purpose 
of paying the wages of this g a r r i s o n . 2^3 At the same time, 
the defterdar of Bosnia was warned that he should take pains 
to Increase the amount of revenue In the province, so that
wages could be paid on tirae.^ 1^
Just as the timing of raises and the giving of bonuses were
241. SELANIKI f.383r
242. MD 73/223; MD 73/927
243. In the telhls surviving from the reign of Ahmed I (Orhonlu, 1970) 
may be discerned a disregard for the problems with which those in the 
field had to contend. Whether such an attitude was peculiar to this 
ruler, or whether It was shared by previous sultans cannot be said in 
the absence of detailed study of the personalities of the sultans and 
their relationship with their military commanders.
244. MD 73/57
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used as special encouragements to the troops, so outstanding 
wages were paid immediately before an engagement. For 
garrison troops, another tactic was to postpone payment of 
wages until those due to receive them had moved to their new 
posting. In 1014 AH (1605), troops were to be sent to 
Palota from the castles of Osek and Erdevik, but refused to 
move saying that they .had not been paid. The solution was 
for them to be given a small interim allowance (harcllk), 
and to be told that they would receive their full pay 
(ulufe) once they arrived at their destination.Such a 
technique did not always work, especially with the more 
powerful kapukulu troops. Those reluctant to leave for 
campaign in 1598 were told that three tranches of pay would 
await them In Edirne. However, the sipahis prevented the 
departure of this money from Istanbul, with the result that 
they were paid one tranche on the spot.^*^
On the basis of the Information given by AbdUlkadir, the pay 
of the kul on active campaign, in contrast to the garrison 
troops, was, as we would anticipate, never subject to 
appreciable delay.^ 7  These men travelled in close proximity 
to those who controlled military operations and were the 
backbone of the army. Fear of mutiny meant that they came
245. MD 77/280; MD 77/249: the garrison troops at Igri in 1605 were so 
keen to remain there, rather than be posted to Estergon, that they were 
willing to renounce the pay increases which they had been awarded since 
the capture of the fortress by the Ottomans in 1596. Such reluctance is 
surely indication that they were well-entrenched in the life of the 
wider community at Egri, and profiting, no doubt, from local business 
opportunities.
246. SELANIKI f.392r
247. AbdtOkadir’s mentions of wage distribution to the kapukulu ocaklari 
are frequent e.g. Lezez 1003 wages paid in Muharrem 1004 (f.43r); Masar 
1006 wages paid in Rebi II 1006 (f.96r); Masar 1009 wages paid in Cumada 
I 1009 (f.l40v); Recec 1011 wages paid in Cumada II 1011 (f.l64r); Re gen 
1014 wages paid in Ramazan 1014 (f.213v).
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first in the pay queue. In comparison with the immediate 
danger posed by insubordination amongst these troops, the 
threat represented by those in the garrisons was inconsid­
erable. The authorities had to husband their resources 
carefully in order to avoid mutiny, by balancing the 
competing demands of the various corps of the array within 
the limits of feasibility at any time.
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Iv. The foreign1 Troops: Tatars, French and Others
There was a substantial body of troops fighting in this war
who did not live under direct Ottoman rule, but came from
vassal states of the Ottoman sultan. Of these, the most
numerous were the Tatar troops of the Crimea. On account
of the fluid and mobile character of their warfare, and of
the reputation as feared adversaries which stemmed from
this, the Tatar forces had an important part to play in the
campaigns of this war.' Large numbers of their men could be
put into the field at short notice: the Tatar army could
2 48mobilise on home ground in less than a month, and then 
after crossing the R.Bug (Aksu) at OzU (Ochakov), and the 
R.Dneister at Akkerman (Belgorod) in boats provided by 
courtesy of the P o r t e , h a d  the choice of two main routes 
for entry to the plains of Hungary, a northerly one through 
southern Poland and across Transylvania, or a southerly one 
across Moldavia and Wallachia and from thence westwards 
along the right bank of the D a n u b e . T h e  route followed 
from year to year depended upon the political circumstances 
of the time, as indeed did the han's decision whether to 
participate at all.^*
In the major engagements of this war, the Tatars appeared 
only irregularly as a contingent of the full army. In 1594 
they played an Important part In the action at Yanik; In 
1596 Gazl Giray Han, who was otherwise han throughout the
248. Collins (1975) p.259
249. MD 72/604; MD 73/389; MD 73/514; SELANIKI ff.386r-386v
250. Esprinchard (1609) p.232r gives details of six variants of these two 
main routes.
251. Kortepeter (1972) pp.123-210 describes in detail the shifting 
position of the Tatars between the Christian and Ottoman powers, as well 
as the political intriguing amongst the han’s family at home.
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years of the war, was briefly deposed in favour of his 
brother Feth Giray who had distinguished himself at the 
battle of Mez3keresztes.252 Gazi Giray!s personal partic­
ipation in the campaigns was limited: in 1598 he supported 
Satircl Mehmed Pasha in the reduction of the fortress of 
Varad, but although he did not leave for the Crimea until 
October 1599, his contribution In that year was negligible. 
His son Toktami^ was present at the Ottoman capture of 
Kanije in 1600, and In, 1601 Gazi Giray sent his nephew In 
his stead.253 Despite making the effort to come in person 
in 1602, he reached Belgrade only in October,254 after which
he spent the famous winter In Pe^uy with the historian
Pe$evi, and then returned home. During the last three 
seasons of the war, Toktamip was again sent to represent 
him.^55 Gazi Giray Han presented a convenient scapegoat on 
whom to pin blame for some of the failures of the Turkish 
effort. His friend Pegevi noted that although the Tatars
assisted the war effort in some capacity in every year of
the war until the 1605 season, Gazi Giray had led his troops 
in person on only three or four occasions, and he did not 
forbear from pointing out that the Tatars had arrived too 
late for the 1602 campaign, and left before the start of 
that of 1603.256 His other friend of many years, Satirci 
Mehmed Pasha, tried to suggest that his own lacklustre 
performance in the 1597 campaign was due to the Han’s
252. PE5EVI II p.205
253. PEgEVI II p.250-52
254. Orhonlu (1970) p.53
255. Kortepeter (1972) p.179* See KK 1889 (lcmal) for evidence of 
Toktamip’ presence In the 1604 season.
256. PEgEVi 11 pp.269,292,309
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failure to a p p e a r . 257
In a despatch of 9 August 1593, some two weeks after Sinan 
Pasha had set out from Istanbul for Belgrade, an order was 
sent to Gazi Giray that he should mobilise his forces, under 
his own command or that of Feth Giray, and come to join up 
with Sinan, keeping Sinan informed of when he set out, and 
what progress he was making. He was apparently not expected 
to come for the campaign of 1593, but his services were 
required for that of 1594.258 A despatch of October of the 
same year reiterated the order, with the additional details 
that the Tatars should set out before Nevruz and reach the 
Belgrade-Buda area on Ruz-i Hizr, some one and a half months 
later.259 The awe in which the Tatars were held as 
adversaries is made plain in a letter sent in July 1593 by 
the beylerbeyl of Buda, Hasan Pasha, to the Hapsburg 
commander, the Archduke Matthias. Even though Tatar troops 
did not, by all accounts, appear on campaign in the few 
months of that season which remained, he stated that among 
the forces moving toward Belgrade with Sinan Pasha were 
100,000 Tatars and slpahis.2^0 Gazi Giray was aware of the
257. PEpEVI II p.213; Pegevi supposed that the friendship between Gazi 
Giray and Satire! Mehmed went back to their time together in Istanbul, 
where Gazi Giray was after the death of Ozdemiroglu Osman Pasha (ibid.
p.222).
258. MD 71/571: "...evvel bahar-i huceste-yl asarda"; Uzungar^ lll (1977) 
p.30 quotes part of this letter. Abdttdlkadir reports that Yemi^ ci Hasan 
Agha, at that time still a kapucu bagi, was sent from Sinan1 s camp at 
Filibe with letters from the Sultan, a robe and a sura of money (harclik) 
to encourage Gazi Giray to come (AK ff.8v-9r). Yemipci Hasan returned 
from the Crimea in the summer of 1594 with the news that the Han would 
be coming, and was awarded the office of janissary agha (AK ff.l9r-19v).
259. MD 71/649
260. Bayerle (1972) p.l8l: "...100,000 tatars and slpahls from five ovei>- 
seas provinces”
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reputation of his men, and used this as a bargaining counter
in trying to extract concessions from the Porte: later in
the war, he reported to Mehmed III that the Christian forces
which had been coming against Buda had retreated on hearing
? 6lthat the Tatars were to spend the winter in Hungary.
The Porte demanded that more than 50-60,000 Tatars be sent 
for the 1594 campaign: this was the same number as had been 
sent in Stileyman’s time.262 in his estimation of the 
numbers of men in the Ottoman army for the 1594 campaign, 
Pegevi puts the Tatar force at 30-40.000, although he had 
been told by the Han himself that there were 150,000.263 
AbdGlkadir’s dependability as an observer appears to be 
called into question when he tells us that the number of 
Tatars at the siege of Yanik was 150,000, but he does not 
say that he was there in person, and it is probable that he 
accepted the exaggerated claims of the H a n . 2 6 4  The figure 
of 50-60,000 is also credible in. view of the consensus which 
emerges from the researches of present-day scholars who 
suggest that the han could put more than 80,000 men Into the 
field.265 According to Knolles, of the 85,000 Tatars who 
had gone to serve In Hungary, plague and famine had so 
thinned their ranks that a mere 8,000 remained by 1595.^66
As well as the Tatars of the Crimea, Gazi Giray brought with 
him a number of Circassian troops. More than 10,000 
(according to Abdiilkadir), with the status of han kullarl
261. Orhonlu (1970) p.53
262. MD 71/571: "...Sultan SUleyman Han...zamanlnda gonderlldiigil 
tlzere..
263. PEgEVI II p.156
264. AK f.22v
265. Collins (1975) p.260
266. Knolles (1621) p.l06l
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were with him In 1594.267 of the 100,000 men whom Gazi Giray 
proposed to bring with him for the 1598 campaign, a certain 
number were CIrcassian;268 there were 7,000 at Kanije In 
1600,289 and Toktamip, Gazi GIray’s son, included them in the 
force of 50,000 which was reported to be on its way for the 
1605 Estergon campaign.270
Gazi Giray was caught between Ottoman summonses to appear 
with the army in Hungary and dynastic problems at home, but 
he did not disguise his expectations that he and his family 
would be rewarded for their loyalty with governorships 
within Ottoman borders.2?1 Apart from the historic 
obligations between the Ottomans and the Crimean T a t a r s , 272 we 
may ask exactly what were the advantages and disadvantages 
to the Ottomans of Tatar participation in these campaigns.
In military terras, they benefited from the presence of a 
large fighting force which, even In this period of 
predominantly siege warfare, retained its value as a highly 
mobile raiding body. The principal importance of the 
Tatars, even in the sieges of Yanik and Kanije, was as a 
diversionary force, drawing off part of the enemy from the
267. AK f.l9v; the defterdar Etmekcizade Ahmed referred to "...hanin 
kapusu kullarlndan 300 nefer gerkes yiffi-tler" (Orhonlu, 1970 p.56).
268. AK f,98v
269. AK f.l31r
270. AK f.206r
271. Kortepeter (1972) p.169: after Satirci Mehmed Pasha had taken Varad 
in 1598, he awarded the revenues of Silistre to the Han who had assisted 
him in the siege. Kortepeter (p.145) also describes how Gazi Giray 
intended to install his relative Ahmed Bey, who was sancakbeyl of 
Bender, as voyvode of Moldavia in 1595. Later in the war, Yemipci Hasan 
Pasha wrote to the Sultan saying that Gazi Giray had requested that 
Dervip Pasha, at that time beylerbeyl of Bosnia, be made a vezir 
(Orhonlu, 1970 p.76).
272. Inalcik, art. Giray (El); Benningsen et al (1978) pp.4-5
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central action. On their route between their homeland and 
Hungary, and during the winters, they were also of consid­
erable importance in raiding Into the principalities and the 
Hapsburg territories to the west of Ottoman H u n g a r y . 273
The rewards to be gained in raiding were clearly a major 
consideration in encouraging the Tatars to come to these 
campaigns: after the taking of Yanlk, Gazi Giray let his men 
raid to Papa castle, which was surrendered to them, and as 
far as Vienna, after which they sold in the Ottoman camp the 
captives they had taken.274 As a condition of his coming to 
the 1598 campaign, Gazi Giray wrote saying that he wanted 
his men to be allowed to raid "...Alman daglarlna varinca”, 
to Prague and Vienna.275 Undoubtedly such assurances also had 
the function of harnessing the energies of a group which 
could otherwise have been used against Gazi Giray by other 
members of his family. It was a matter of concern to the 
Ottomans that the Hapsburgs should not be encouraged by Gazi 
GIray’s failure to appear on campaign in H u n g a r y , 276 b u t  
against the advantages of the extra and vital manpower 
provided by the Tatars In these campaigns has to be set 
their uncontrollability, and Gazi Giray, understanding the 
Ottoman need for manpower, did not hesitate to draw 
attention to this as a means of putting pressure on the
273. The wide extent of Tatar raids in the spring of 1603 is detailed in a 
letter of Gazi Giray (Orhonlu, 1970 pp.58-59); see also pp.26,60-61,92- 
93,101-02.
274. AK ff.26r,26v
275. AK f.99r
276. Orhonlu (1970) pp.52-53: in 1603, Yemipci Hasan Pasha expressed such
fears to the sultan in writing of the delicate matter of the amount of
money needed to secure the han’s co-operation, especially since he had 
not fought in the 1602 campaign.
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O t t o m a n s . 277 one concession in particular caused friction 
with the Ottoman troops. This was the entry of Tatars into 
the kapukulu ocaklari, an animosity which, in February 1606, 
resulted in a revolt by the cavalry of the Porte.278
Although their laying waste to Hapsburg lands which the 
Ottomans could not realistically envisage controlling them­
selves was permissible, unrestrained plundering by the 
Tatars did not accord with the broader Intentions of the 
Ottomans, as will be discussed in Part II. It was against 
policy that the lands which they held In Hungary should be 
pillaged in the short-term interests of appeasing this 
element of their military support. After Wallachia 
temporarily became an Ottoman vilayet In 1594, it was 
forbidden for raids to be made Into M o l d a v i a , 279 which too, 
after it had gone over to the Hapsburg cause, had been 
subdued by the Tatar H a n . 280  ^warning to the same effect
was issued in September 1604,231 and in June 1605 a former 
beylerbeyi of Silistre was ordered to protect the Danube 
region from rampaging Tatars.282
Discipline amongst the Tatar soldiers seems to have become 
slacker as the war dragged on, presumably as the opportunities 
for booty were diminished, and also as the strong figure of 
Gazi Giray played a smaller part in the campaigns as he left 
the command to his son. That the Principalities were back 
within the Ottoman fold, and not open to plunder as they had
277. Orhonlu (1970) p.54: "...tatar askerl blr vahgl taifediir lltifat 
olmaylcak blr vechile zabt olunmasi mUgcildttr".
278. HAMMER IV p.383. MM 6423 p.110 lists the names of 40 Tatars who 
joined the altl bdltik regiments in 1601-02.
279. AK f.43r
280. FE£EVI II p.174
281. MD 75/357
282. MD 77/323
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been when they had constituted part of the dar iil-harb, made 
little difference to the energetic Tatars. They attacked 
the peasants whom the Ottomans were trying to encourage to 
settle, stealing their animals and taking the people 
themselves to sell as slaves.
The relationship between the Ottoman sultan and the Tatars 
was expressed by the acute French agent Deshayes in 1621 as 
being parallel to that existing between the French king and 
his Swiss troops: the French maintained these mercenaries in
p O h
peace as well as war, providing both money and clothing; H 
The Ottoman treasury had to make substantial financial 
contributions to the han in the effort to persuade him to 
come to Hungary. Inalcik’s statement that the sultan sent 
to the han a gift of 40,000 gold pieces known as gizme baha^ ^  
when he was expected to appear on campaign, was only the tip 
of the iceberg of the quite considerable monetary induce­
ments which he demanded in return for his services. On top 
of the annual retainer (salyane) which the han received, and 
in addition to the usual gifts of robes, jewelled saddles 
and the like, expense money (harcllk) was given to him at 
the start of the campaign, and feasts were held to greet him 
on his arrival in the Ottoman camp.286
The unsuccessful personal attempts made by Pegevi and Etmek- 
cizade Ahmed to encourage Gazi Giray Han to stay in Hungary
283. MD 75/643; MD 77/252; MD 77/507
284. Deshayes (1645) p.206: Deshayes was sent by the French king to
investigate the position of Christians in the Holy Land.
285. Inalcik, art. Giray (IA): his source for this is not made clear, and
I have not found the term clzme baha (literally ’boot money*) in sources 
for the 1593-1606 campaigns. Uzungar^ lli (1977) p.30 puts the rate of 
this cizme baha at only 5-15,000 gold pieces.
286. AK ff.22v,101v
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for the 1603 campaign season^®? were affirmed with substantial 
grants from the treasury. Of the 3,483,300 akge which were 
expended on the costs of the Tatar presence between July 
1602 and February 1603, a gift of 2,880,180 akge was made to 
Gazi Giray himself, as well as smaller amounts for his 
mirzas.^ 88 Between June 1599 and May 1601, over 1.5 million 
akge had been spent on.him and his men,^®9 and figures of 
similar magnitude could be quoted for other years. There 
were, apparently, certain notional limits on the amount of 
money and equipment which the Porte was prepared to set 
aside in order to buy the services of the Tatars. When 
Yemigci Hasan Pasha passed the Han’s demands onto Mehmed 
III, probably In 1603, the reply came back that the standard 
had been set In the time of previous sultans, and this was 
not to be overstepped.^90 Fifteen kantars of gunpowder and 35 
kantars of raw lead were among the war materials sent to the 
Han from Istanbul in 1597-8 at the time of his departure for 
the Varad campaign.^91 These were presumably to be used In 
part for the manufacture of b u l l e t s . ^ 9 2
Pegevi concluded, most uncharitably for a friend, that the 
Han and his Tatar troops were more trouble than they were
287. PEGEVI II pp.267-70
288. KK 1885 p.14: this was in addition to his salyane payment; the total 
of nearly 3.5 million akge is obtained by adding up all the expenditures 
relating to the Tatars on pp.12-16 of this register.
289. KK 1879 pp.12,14,15,17. Around the same time, the Han received a 
loan approaching 200,000 gold pieces (Orhonlu, 1970 p.30).
290. Orhonlu (1970) p.57: ”Babalarumuz ve cedlerimUz nige eyledller lse 
biz de ana gdre eylerdz kanundan tagra blr is olmasun”.
291. MM 4435 p.65
292. Collins (1975) pp.262-3: the Tatars manufactured much of their 
campaign equipment themselves; by the eighteenth century, gunpowder was 
travelling in the opposite direction, from the works at Kaffa.
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worth to the Ottoman war e f f o r t . ^93 However, although we 
cannot quantify precisely their usefulness as a fighting 
force, nor whether their presence was decisive to Ottoman 
success at any time, it is certain that their peculiar 
military skills were still of value at a time when the bow 
and arrow were giving way to the musket.^9^ Conditions of 
siege warfare did not favour their traditional methods of 
fighting, but there was room within this predominant mode of 
combat for the Tatars to make a vital contribution in their
own s t y l e . ^95
In terms of numbers and fighting power, the Tatars were the 
most important of the ’foreign* troops participating in 
these campaigns. The vassal status of the Ottoman tributary 
states of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania also imposed 
on them the obligation to provide manpower as it was 
demanded by the Ottoman army. During those years of the war 
in which these principalities deserted the Ottomans for the 
protection of the Hapsburgs, such obligation naturally went 
unfulfilled, but was reimposed at least from 1605.^96 From 
the time of the anti-Hapsburg revolt of the Transylvanians, 
first led unsuccessfully by Moses Szekely who was killed by 
Basta*s troops in 1603, the campaign accounts show the 
payment of wages to non-muslim troops from Poland and
293. PE9EVI II pp.269
294. The weapons and techniques of the Tatars continued to worry Basta, 
especially when they were employed against massed arquebusiers (Parry, 
1975 p.231), even though, on Gazi Giray*s own admission, the Tatars did 
not stand up well against firepower (Orhonlu, 1970 p.54).
295. Collins* statement that the northern raids of the Tatars were of 
greater significance than their participation in the Danubian wars 
should perhaps be modified (Collins, 1975 p.257).
296. MD 71/108; MD 71/369; MD 77/67; MD 77/91; MD 77/92; MD 
77/93; MD 77/103; KK 1887 pp.9,12
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T r a n s y l v a n i a , 2 9 7  as well as gifts to Szekely and to Gabor 
B e t h l e n , 2 9 8  an(j iater to Istvan B o c s k a i . 2 9 9
Troops from the vassal states of the Ottoman Empire were 
required to serve in the campaigns, and it was their 
changing allegiances during this war which dictated whether 
they did so or not. There Is, on the other hand, one 
example during this war of a Hapsburg garrison deserting to 
the Ottoman side. In 1 5 9 7 ,  France had sent 3 , 0 0 0  men to 
Hungary at the request of the Hapsburgs. By early 1 6 0 0 ,  
there were less than half this number remaining,and they 
were garrisoning the castle of Papa together with 4 0 0  
Austrians (nemge frengi). It was not usual for garrisons to 
be composed of troops from different 'nations' as Abdvilkadir 
tells us, and, a fight between French and Austrians resulted 
In a French victory.3^1
On hearing that the Hapsburg forces were preparing to come 
against them to avenge this massacre, the French sent word 
to the Ottomans that they were ready to go over to the 
Ottoman side, especially since they had not been paid for 
some time either. When the Hapsburgs discovered that the 
Ottoman response to this proposal was favourable, they 
attacked Papa, those who remained of the French troops
297. KK 1889 (lcmal): "mevaclb-l bazi gebran an canib-1 Leh / an canib-1 
Erdel amedend...".
298. KK 1887 p.13
299. KK 1890 (icmal)
300. Gontaut-BIron (1888) p.398-99
301. AK ff.l27r-127v; see also H3Z f.337v. Keeping the troops of the 
various 'nations' apart was presumably a commonplace of warfare with a 
multinational army; Parker (1981, p.29) notes that the troops of the 
different fnations! were kept as separate administrative units to avoid 
friction.
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fleeing to safety in Ottoman-held Istolni Belgrad. ^ 2
The services of these renegades were well-valued by the 
Ottomans. They were experienced musketeers, and this was a 
commodity of which, as we have seen, the Ottoman army was 
short. Soon after their defection, they participated in the 
siege of Kanije, taking the small fort (palanka) of 
Bulundvar on the w a y . 3^3 in winter 1600-01 some of their 
number became muslims, one of their officers being made 
sancakbey 1 of Semendre.^^ The season of 1601 saw them 
defending Istolni Belgrad against the Hapsburgs,305 while in 
1602, they served at the re-taking of that c a s t l e .
The French renegades were remunerated directly from the 
Ottoman Central Treasury, or from the Campaign Treasury when 
a campaign was under way. Thus, they were treated as though 
they had kul status. In the first year of their conversion 
to the Ottoman cause, a minimum of 12 million akce was spent 
on supporting them, in wages, as presents in cash and in 
kind, and in s u b s i s t e n c e . 3^7 F0r the eight-month period
302. PEGEVI II pp.228-29
303. AKff.l35r,135v
304. AK ff.l40v,l4lv
305. AK f.l47r
306. AK f.l55v
307. KK 1879 (campaign account for 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009/2 June 
1599-10 May 1601) viz:
a) mevaclb-1 efrencan-1 fransa ki an kale-yi Papa amedend ve itaat 
kerdend...!1.830.820 akge (icmal)
b) lnam be-kapudanan-1 fransa be ray-1 hodgan ve paha-yl /.../-yl 
mezburln..398.000 akge (p.15)
c) al-mubayaat: an yed-1 bazl kesan ki paha-yl esb ve zeyn-i slm ve raht 
ve gayrlhl beray-1 kapudanan-1 efrenc ma1 goka ve /.../...131.160 akge
(p.16)
d) al-lhracat: be-cihet-1 nafaka-yi me'kulat-1 efrencan ma' harc-i /.../ 
... 17,960 akce (p.17)
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between July 1602-February 1603, the amount was over 3.5 
million akge. including 12,000 akge for care of their 
wounded.30® Although it seems that some of them may have 
returned home, it Is certain that others did not, for their 
remuneration continues to figure in the Ottoman account 
books:3^9 finding themselves unemployed after the war, these 
troops continued to embarrass the French ambassador with 
their disorderly behaviour.310
308. KK 1885 (campaign account for 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011/ 1 July 
1602-21 February 1603) viz:
a) mevaclb-i talfe-yl efrencan-1 fransa ki an kale-yl Papa amedend ve 
itaat kerdend...3.78l.920 akge (icmal)
b) inam be-efrencan-1 fransa..39.960 akge (p.14)
c) al-lhracat be-cihet-1 harc-1 mecruhan-1 efrencan...l2,0Q0 akge (p.15)
309. See entries in the income and expenditure accounts (icmal) of KK 
1887; KK 1889; KK 1890
310. Gontaut-Biron (1888) pp.398-99
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Ivi. Auxiliary Troops
Both for the social historian and in a study of military 
logistics, an understanding of the identity and 
responsibility of the troops who performed the many 
auxiliary tasks essential to the success of the campaign is 
of prime importance. However, a fine understanding can only 
be acquired on the basis of local documents, for the 
auxiliary groups were largely conscripted, some in exchange 
for certain tax-exemptions. In particular, and this is what 
makes it hard to generalise about these troops, the role of 
each corps altered significantly over the centuries: thus, 
in this brief section we will lay emphasis on documents 
pertaining to the 1593-1606 war, rather than attempting a 
more thorough treatment of the changing character of each 
corps which performed auxiliary duties for the Ottoman army 
at war.
There are many possible criteria according to which the 
auxiliary troops of the army could be categorised. If micro 
concerns regarding the (often) pre-Ottoman origin and 
community-based character of the terms of service of the 
corps are Ignored, then auxiliary troops may be divided into 
four major categories: first there were the officials of the 
Chancery and Finance departments who accompanied the army on 
campaign in order to perform the normal bureaucratic 
functions of government. Secondly, there was the 
commissariat, which ensured the provision of food and 
supplies for the army: the title emln was accorded to the 
commissioners who were responsible for such provision, grain 
supply being the responsibility of the ntlztll emini. mutton 
supply, that of the koyun eminl etc.3-^ The intermediaries 
between commissioner and soldier were known as orducu:
311. Ihese cormissioners are discussed further in Part II.
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the corps of orducuyan is of particular Interest. Thirdly, 
there were those who undertook building and repair work, and 
fourthly, the various corps responsible for the transport of 
food and equipment. Additionally, we may recall groups such 
as those of the medical corps, cerrah (surgeons) and kahhal 
(eye-doctors) for instance.
As has been pointed out before, it is hard to draw a line 
between the corabattant' and non-combattant/auxlliary troops 
of the Ottoman army at this time. An added dimension of 
this problem is that while In peacetime their duties could 
be essentially auxiliary, such as keeping public order or 
guarding the roads, in war, the same group could be called 
upon to fight as part of a garrison. The martolos corps may 
be mentioned as an example.
One group which functioned only in wartime, though, was the 
orducus. Descriptions of the army setting off on campaign 
make vivid mention of how the members of the guilds came to 
sell their goods to the troops at the first halt outside the 
city walls: if the campaign was to be in Asia, this was 
I5sk(ldar, and Daud Pasha if the campaign was to be in Europe. 
Some of their number also went on campaign with the troops 
(as orducus) to meet the continuing need for goods and 
services throughout the length of the campaign. For the 
campaigns of 1594 and 1606 lists are available of some of 
the orducus who were conscripted. They Include, in 
connection with the commissariat: butchers (kasap), bakers 
(etmekcl). cooks (asci). grocers (bakkal) and bozacis. 
makers of the fermented millet drink much favoured in cold 
conditions. Dealing with the provision of certain items of 
clothing were bootmakers (clzmecl), cobblers (pabuccu), 
trouser-makers (cakgirci). tailors (terzi), silk-makers 
(gazzaz) and cotton fluffers (hallag). To ensure a measure
312. Vasig (1977)
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of hygiene went perfumers (attar) and barbers (berber). 
Making and repairing equipment were sword makers (kilioci). 
bow-makers (yayci) and gunsmiths (tdfenkcl).^^
A new ordu corps was raised for each c a m p a i g n , a n d  the 
right of drafting its members was reserved to the kapucus. 
in return for which they would have received a fee.^^ 
Various sections of the army had their own ordu. that of the 
janissaries traditionally coming from Bursa.^1  ^ That for 
the soldiers of Rumeli on the 1594 campaign numbered 41, and 
came from the towns of Sofya, UskUb and Filibe,^? while the 
needs of the troops going on campaign in Hungary from the 
vilayet of Anadolu were taken care of by guild members from 
that r e g i o n . E d i r n e was another source of recruit­
ment, 3^ -9 as was I s t a n b u l . T h e  guilds had to pay the 
government a sum of money known as ordu akcesi for the 
privilege of selling their goods to the army, or, perhaps,
In order for them to be able to purchase the materials 
necessary to the performance of their task:^2* this Is one
313. Full details may be found in MD 72/80 and MD 77/529. For lists of 
those required to serve as orducu on earlier campaigns, see, inter alia, 
VELIYUDDIN 1970: ff.77v,95v (949 AH/1542-43); f.98v (978 AH/1570-71); 
f.l52r (982 AH/1574-75); f.99r (988 AH/1580-81). Veinstein (198.) 
pp.39-42 lists those serving in SQley man’s campaigns of 1545 and 1552. 
Uzungargili (1943) I pp.685-86 gives the texts of two orders relating 
to the Persian campaign of 985 AH/1578, to be found in MD 32.
314. See, for instance, AK ff.l5v,32r,l68r.
315. MD 75/470; MD 77/528
316. AK ff.7r,128v; cf. KK 70 p.80; RKS 1541 p.71r
317. MD 72/80: those for whom they were responsible are described merely
as ’Rumeli askeri”.
318. MD 72/696: ’Anadolu askeri”.
319. AK ff.58r,88v,98v, 113v
320. MD 72/240
321. MD 75/406
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example of the mobilisation of capital which lay In the 
hands of extra-governmental groups, or in the hands of 
private Individuals, which was practiced by the Ottoman 
government. It is doubtful that the guilds made profits 
from their campaign service, but rather that, like the 
celepkegan (sheep drovers) whose role as providers of mutton 
to the army is discussed at length in Part II, they suffered 
financially.322
Just how the orducu corps functioned while the army was on 
active campaign is harder to ascertain. In particular, It 
Is difficult to discover how they fitted into the day-to-day 
administrative organisation. Isolated references In 
Abdillkadir’s chronicle show them selling supplies In the 
trenches before the Ottoman attack on Kanije In 1600,323 and 
cooking food for the troops in the trenches before the siege
322. It was sometimes necessary for the orducus to borrow from the 
treasury, presumably to meet the cash shortfall between the purchase of 
raw materials and their sale to the troops, but we cannot say, on such 
limited evidence, whether this was 'normal’ practice or sign of 
hardship; see, for example, KK 1887 p.60: "an tahvll-1 Hizr ve Mehmed 
ser orducuyan an akge ki pis ezin an hlzane-yl amlre blddefaat ber vech-
i karz dade bud ve hala averdend an yed-1 hodgan an paha-yl daklk ve 
nemek ve rugan-1 sade...’’.
323. AK f.l36r: ’’ordudan blr mlkdar ordu meterisde haymeler kurup, 
levazimlar furuht olurdu’’ (’a part of the ordu corps set up tents (and) 
sold supplies.")
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of Istolni Belgrad in June 1602.32  ^ Thus, it seems that 
orducus connected with the supply of food to the troops 
both performed the mundane duty of cooking as well as the 
supply of their necessities. However, it is impossible to 
say for which types of troops they performed such services.
Services parallel to those exercised in relation to the army 
by the men designated as orducu were also performed by 
certain members of the,kapukulu ocaklan; this is clearly 
the case for the manufacture and repair of equipment which 
was carried out by the sword-makers, bow-makers and gun­
smiths of the ordu. Within the corps of the armourers of 
the Porte (cemaat-i cebeciyan-1 dergah-1 all) were also 
groups described as gunsmiths (tdfengeran), makers of armour 
for the protection of the arm (koloakciyan). sawyers 
(erreciyan) and silk manufacturers (gazzaz) etc.325 Thus it 
is perhaps mistaken to look for a well-defined adminstrative 
niche for the orducus during the 1593-1606 war: we have seen 
already how far the duties of the combat troops diverged 
from their original mould.
A further close parallel to the work of the orducus was that
324. AK f.l56v: "...ve blr mikdar ordu meterlslere tayin ldl; taam haceti 
olan ordu karlb masalihlerln icra ederdl; yenloeri agasi meterl3lerde 
sadrazam bazretleri bagka gergeler kurdular; ve matbahlar muayyen 
nlmetler bazir meterls halki blminnet taamlar alurlardi"; ("...and
some of the ordu corps were appointed to the trenches; those of the ordu 
corps responsible for food requirements carried out their business 
nearby; the janissary agha was In the trenches (and) the grand vezir set 
up another tent; and the kitchens preparing various food, those serving In 
the trenches ate").
325. MM 7539 esp. pp.52,57; Uzungargili (1943) II p.40 has drawn 
attention to such specialisation in the case of the corps of cannoneers 
(topgu).
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of the expert craftsmen sent on campaign from Istanbul. The 
status of the master builders among them as being employees 
of the state is Indicated by the epithet hassa (cf. hassa 
mimar), while the carpenters (neccar), blacksmiths 
(demirci), miners (lagimci), builders (benna) etc. with them 
were presumably guild members, although they are not 
explicitly described as such. Nor are these craftsmen 
described as orducu. Where the orducu had to take with them 
their own equipment,326 that of the 250 craftsmen appointed 
to serve on the Egri campaign of 1596 was transported by the 
cebecl corps.32? The travelling expenses (harc-i rah) of 
the craftsmen on this campaign were to be given from the 
kaza of Galata, and, specifically, from the palaces 
x■» there;^2  ^their provisions were to be bought in the billets 
along the military road.329 it cannot be said whether these 
stipulations were peculiar to the Egri campaign, since the 
sultan was present In that year, but, as in the case of the 
status of the orducus. the information at our disposal 
leaves us unsure as to the status of the other craftsmen in 
question, whether they were Palace employees or were guild 
members.330 Palace employees could hardly have been 
required to contribute to the expenses of campaigning.331
326. MD 72/80; MD 72/696; MD 77/529
327. MD 74/589: they were 10 master builders, 3 su yolcus (those
responsible for water conduits), 40 blacksmiths, 87 builders and 
carpenters, 100 miners and 10 sawyers.
328. MD 74/183
329. MD 74/24
330. In addition to ^the documents cited, see also MD 71/585; MD 72/239; 
MD 77/536; cf. Refik (1931)' ppJ.4,21.
331. MD 75/217: in 1605, an outstanding sum of 50,000 akce which should 
have been collected for the previous year's campaign as the 'service- 
substitute1 of the miners and carpenters ("lagjmci ve neccar akcesl"). 
was ordered to be collected forthwith and sent to the treasury for the 
1605 campaign.
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Of the many different corps concerned with the transport of 
food and equipment for the army, only one, in the view of 
r Majer, was well-organised: this was the top arabacilan.332 
Certainly this was a section of the kapukulu ocaklari. and 
therefore of special concern to the authorities; the 
major part of the transport requirements of the army in war, 
however, was undertaken by groups recruited for particular 
tasks, and much of the burden was borne by those whose 
beasts were hired for the transport of specified materials 
and equipment from one point to another.
Even if only the top arabacilar were fully constitued as a 
permanent corps, the orders for service by other groups 
involved in transport were sent out by the central 
authorities. The most prominent of such groups was the 
yttrtlks. a nomadic people of Anatolia resettled In Rumeli in 
the earliest days of Ottoman e x p a n s i o n . 3 3 3  They performed 
various tasks: as well as those related to transport, such 
as driving the oxen which pulled the cannon and military 
equipment ( c e b e h a n e ) t 3 3 ^  they also worked in the mines making 
cannon b a l l s . 3 3 5  Like other corps who had earlier had a 
defined role to perform, the ytirttk were, by this time, 
involved with many of the day-to-day auxiliary operations of 
the army, Including the clearing of trees and the building
of bridges.336
332. Majer (1981) p.193
333. The classic work on the yUrdk Is Gdkbilgin (1957).
334. See e.g. AK ff.26v,44v,53v.
335. MD 75/145: the yttrUk had to provide their own tools and were ordered 
to bring with them 6 months' supply of provisions; the sizes of the 
cannon balls required were notifed to them by the chief cannoneer 
(topcu bagi). cf. MD 77/586; AK f.54r.
336. AK ff.l8v,36v-37r
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As In the case of the akinci the state made half-hearted 
attempts to force the yilriik to execute their traditional 
legal duties by forbidding them from entering the provincial 
slpahl class or becoming a janissary or c a n n o n n e e r . 3 3 7  The 
fiction regarding their special status was preserved in 
order that the state be able to exercise tighter control 
over them, and in particular, so that those who did not come 
on campaign could be traced, and a ’service-substitute* paid
t o  t h e  t r e a s u r y . 3 3 8
Orders concerning the war-service of the yUrilk often also 
contain details of the duties incumbent upon other auxiliary 
corps, especially the milsellem and the yaya. The changing 
status of these two corps, mounted and foot respectively, 
has been documented by Kaldy-Nagy: the milsellem had had the 
task of riding a few days ahead of the army, mending roads 
and bridges, while the yaya were a transport corps. By the 
time of Siileyman's reign, these corps were in disarray, and 
were disbanded in 1582, only to be resurrected the following 
y e a r . 339 Although still the subject of mobilisation orders 
in the 1593-1606 campaigns, and although there is evidence 
of state concern that yilrilks should not pose as milsellem. 3^0 
the work done by these corps did not distinguish them from 
the mass of troops performing auxiliary tasks.341
Other examples could be quoted to illustrate the change in 
character of those corps whose auxiliary tasks had formerly 
been more or less clearly d e f i n e d . 3^2 The broadening of army
337. MD 77/391 (cf. Gokbilgin, 1957 p.170); MD 77/635
338. MD 77/608
339. Kaldy-Nagy (1976)
340. MD 77/391
341. MD 72/766; MD 72/776; MD 77/431
342. See, for instance, Podor’s detailed study of the cerehor corps 
(Fodor, 1984).
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recruitment in general was accompanied by a diminution in 
the importance of the auxiliary corps which had been founded 
early in the life of the Empire; this would seem to run 
counter to the view that technological change, and 
particularly the widespread use of muskets, forced greater 
functional specialisation upon the organisation of the 
Ottoman army.
PART II:
PROVISIONING
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PART II: PROVISIONING
III. Introduction
We have seen in Part I how changes in the nature of warfare 
in the sixteenth century altered the composition and size of 
the Ottoman army. In the context of western Europe, the 
widening of the military franchise has been viewed as one 
aspect of the so-called "military revolution” of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.* As the size of armies 
increased, and random foraging ceased to be efficient as a 
means of feeding the larger numbers of troops, the logistics 
of provisioning became the foremost concern of military 
command. The Hungarian historian Perjes succinctly 
describes this, when he suggests that the logistic primacy 
today accorded to the large amounts of munitions and fuel of 
modern (conventional) warfare was formerly attached to 
ensuring supplies for the troops.^ On the basis of a 
hypothetical number of soldiers, non-combatants and animals 
which comprised part of the total force of a west European 
army of the seventeenth century, he arrives at figures for 
the enormous amounts of food and fodder essential to the 
pursuit of a campaign, and his results hint at the sophis­
ticated administrative arrangements which were necessary in 
order to try to ensure that all demands were adequately met 
for the duration of a campaign.3 When we look at the 
provisioning of the Ottoman army, one of the most important 
Issues Is the extent of government control over this aspect 
of the administration of war during the years 1593-1606.
1. Pa ricer (1976): the other aspects of this "military revolution" were 
changes in strategy and tactics, and the increased impact of the army on 
society as a whole.
2. Perjes (1972) pp.47-48
3. Perjes (1970) pp.5-11
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There are two aspects to the adminstration of provisioning, 
the organisational and the financial. The former concerns 
the means by which victuals were physically transferred from 
’civilian’ producer to ’military* consumer. The latter 
concerns the question of whether the producers were paid for 
the supplies which they delivered to the army, and the 
circumstances under which the troops received supplies free, 
or, alternatively, had* to pay for them. The analysis of the 
provisioning of the Ottoman army presented here does not 
always maintain this distinction overtly, but it underlies 
the discussion that follows.
So far as organisation is concerned, it is appropriate to 
divide campaign activity into three seasonal phases. The 
provisioning of the Ottoman army In Hungary at this period 
was not uniform in character, and one of the factors which 
dictated the means by which the army was provisioned was the 
time of the campaign year. First, when the troops were 
marching between Istanbul and Hungary at the start and 
finish of the campaign, provisions were prepared in advance 
at specified billets along the route of the march. During 
the summer months, when the Ottoman troops were actively 
engaged in fighting, provisions were supplied from the 
depots of the castles and strongholds located in the border 
zone of Ottoman Hungary: these depots were stocked with 
supplies brought up from the vast hinterland upon which the 
commissioners for provisions could call. The third season 
of the campaign year was the winter, when the army was 
quartered for some months In Hungary: as in the months of 
the summer campaign, this season also saw reliance on depots 
for provisions, but without the logistic uncertainties 
attendant on provisioning during the active period of 
engagement with the enemy. This framework Is elaborated l^i 
the section on grainstuffs below.
Military provisioning is a subject which deals with 
potentially quantifiable items; the amounts of food and 
fodder for a given number of soldiers should, theoretically,
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be readily calculable, as should, one might imagine, the 
costs Involved. Perjes’ "war-gaming” approach to logistics** 
is certainly, in the Ottoman case, a poor approximation to 
conditions on the ground: the parameters within which the 
army operated were constantly shifting in ways which were 
not altogether predictable. It was not a question of move 
and counter-move, for, apart from the information which 
could be gleaned from spies and informants, decisions on 
provisioning had to be'taken In Ignorance of the intentions 
of the Hapsburg array.
Much of the material concerning the supply of the Ottoman 
troops during this war comes from the records of the maliye 
(financial) department. And yet it is surprisingly 
difficult to arrive at any reliable quantitative results 
with regard to even very basic factors. Inconsistencies in 
the data are pervasive, and attempts to arrive at global 
figures are invariably thwarted. A related caveat is that 
the most abundant and detailed information on provisioning 
concerns the standing army, the kapukulu ocaklan, a body 
which by no means constituted even a near-majority of those 
participating in the Ottoman war-effort in Hungary. Given 
the nature of the sources at our disposal, there is no way 
in which this imbalance in the available data can be over­
come. This very concentration of the sources on the 
provisioning of only a small section of the total army gives 
a first indication of the extent to which central government 
exercised control over the provisioning of the Ottoman army 
at this time. This chapter is not primarily concerned with 
detailed examination of/the impact of the presence of 
Ottoman troops in Hungary, but examines the subject from the 
Ottoman viewpoint. ! ^  [aM.cX
4. Perjes (1981)
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Ilii. European Methods of Provisioning
As an introduction to a detailed consideration of the means 
by which the Ottoman army was able to provision its troops 
in Hungary, a broad look at the methods employed in contem­
porary Europe will put the workings of the Ottoman system 
into perspective. Differentiation of the organisation of 
the supply of the European troops according to the three 
seasons of the campaign year, the march, the period of 
engagement with the enemy in the theatre of war, and the 
period of winter-quartering, which are of particular 
relevance to the Ottoman case, is a less useful framework 
here. Rather, the basic dichotomy to emphasise Is that 
between military activity on home territory, and that on 
hostile territory.
The traditional method of provisioning for European armies 
was on-the-spot requisitioning of supplies, often without 
compensation to the producers. Even when this system did 
work well, a few additional mouths could cause havoc in a 
rural community where there was no control over the amount 
of supplies which could reasonably be demanded by those 
passing through. At its worst, the result was no less than 
officially-sanctioned plunder.
Where troops were stationed in a permanent base, regular 
markets could be organised from which they could purchase 
their requirements. Such markets could also be set up on 
frequently-used routes,  ^or the army might be accompanied by
5. Parker (1981) p.87: in the 1590s magazines were established in Milan 
to supply the Spanish troops in Lombardy who were fighting the French.
It was not considered necessary, however, to establish permanent markets 
on the Spanish Road to the Netherlands, a route which was used only 
every year or two.
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sutlers who made their living by selling to the troops the
£
supplies which they needed.
The billeting of armies on the move in nominally friendly 
territory acquired a theoretically more benevolent character 
as the scale of military activity increased during the 
sixteenth century. This was achieved by the etape system, 
whereby responsibility for supporting the soldiers devolved 
on the military authorities, with the cost of provisions 
being deducted from the mens’ pay. A commissioner was sent 
ahead to arrange that the necessary supplies should be 
collected at the designated billets. The local communities 
were required to provide these supplies, for which they 
would be re-imbursed on presentation to the tax collector of 
chits demonstrating that they had fulfilled their 
obligation.  ^ The etape system allowed a more orderly 
passage of troops, even if payment to their hosts was not
o
always as prompt as the latter might have hoped.0
Rather than being a distinct means of supplying provisions 
to the troops, the ’contributions’ system, most closely 
associated with Wallenstein in the Thirty Years War but 
anticipated by the Spanish in the Netherlands in the 1570s,^ 
concerns financial administration at the macro level. As 
applied in its fully developed character by Wallenstein, the 
’contributions' system relied on the exaction of irregular 
cash taxes from the population, rather than of provisions in 
kind. These sums were paid into the army’s coffers, and the 
individual soldier was thus relieved of the need to shift
6. Creveld (1980) p.7
7. Parker (1981) p.89
8. Parker (1981) p.92 notes that it was eight years later that some 
villagers of Lorraine were reimbursed for providing for Spanish troops 
passing through in 1587.
9. Parker (1981) p.142
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for himself, and could take advantage of the etapes which 
had been set up. Arbitrary in nature and subject to gross 
abuse, the demands for ’contributions' fell unevenly on 
those liable. The awful efficiency of Wallenstein's levies 
finds a parallel on the Ottoman side, in the commutation of 
former 'in-kind' wartime taxes (avanz) to 'in-cash' 
substitutes (bedel), a measure which is discussed at length 
below.
If the provisioning of European armies even on friendly 
territory was certainly not a trouble-free matter, the 
problems associated with the provisioning of troops passing 
through enemy territory were much greater. It was 
frequently impossible to coerce the hostile population into 
parting with their produce in an orderly fashion. The 
alternative was, in the first instance, plunder and robbery, 
which led to devastation of the sources of provision, crops 
and animals, and the secondary factors needed to make these 
functional, ovens and barns. Plunder allowed freedom from 
lines of communication, but was a short-sighted policy if 
the occupying force intended to make permanent its presence 
in the currently hostile environment. By the seventeenth 
century the size of European armies had so increased that 
even by such destructive requisitioning they could not be 
sustained.10
A subsequent development in provisioning methods was the 
introduction of magazine supply on a wide scale In the 1640s 
by the Frenchman Le Tellier, and its refinement by his son 
Louvois. In western Europe the latter elaborated a system 
which had, in the Hapsburg-Ottoman war of 1593-1606, been an 
important aspect of Ottoman practice during the summer 
campaign period, as well as for the garrisons established on 
their border with the Hapsburgs: one of Louvois' innovations
10. Creveld (1980) p.7
132
was to keep a ring of frontier strongholds permanently 
stocked, so that they could withstand a siege. In the 
transportation of supplies from stocked fortress to military 
camp, however, there were no novelties - carts and water­
craft were requisitioned where needed, and the habitual 
vulnerability to enemy attack remained.^
In the war of attrition which was that of 1593-1606, the 
offensive incursions by the Hapsburgs into land nominally 
held by the Ottomans, and against specific Ottoman 
strongholds, was an undertaking of serious difficulty. 
Problems dogged the enterprise, from the acquisition of the 
grain to keep the troops fed, to the logistic demands of 
supplying an army on enemy territory.
The very limited degree of compulsion which could be exerted 
by the Hapsburgs over the Estates on which they depended for 
support in their defence against the Ottomans, prevented an 
efficient and planned mobilisation of resources for the 
forthcoming campaign. It was far from certain that the 
necessary financial backing would be forthcoming, and the 
resulting delays In the purchase of grain meant that the 
authorities missed the opportunity to take advantage of 
seasonally favourable prices.
Within Austria, billets were prepared for the march of the 
Hapsburg troops,^ a precaution designed to minimise the 
damage which would inevitably result from the passage of 
foreign mercenary soldiers, lured to war by the hope of 
booty. Similarly, for the annual withdrawal from campaign, 
efforts were made to designate billets. Particular areas 
were required to supply particular corps, while transport of 
food and fodder was a duty incumbent on the local
11. Creveld (1980) pp.17-18; Kiss (1975) p. 157
12. Winter (1958) pp.134-35
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population. 3^
Within Hapsburg-held Hungary, available grain-stocks were 
recorded, baking facilities inspected, and fodder delivered 
to where it might be needed. The ’granary’ from which the 
Hapsburg authorities hoped to be able to draw most of their 
needs during this war was Bavaria, Moravia and Bohemia. 
Merchants were given patents empowering them to purchase 
grain for military purposes, the sight of private capital 
being more effective at encouraging sale than the vague 
promises of a high command which was continually in 
financial straits. The passage of this grain was exempted 
from tolls.^
Later in the seventeenth century, in autumn 1683, the recal­
citrant nobles of the Carinthian Estates effectively formed 
a cartel when orders went out for grain purchase in the 
aftermath of the failed Ottoman siege of Vienna. They 
foresaw an imminent price rise due to the great demand for 
grain, and, wishing to profit therefrom, withheld their 
stocks. The merchants purchasing grain for the army 
therefore had no alternative but to buy at the high prices 
set by the sellers, but the Imperial authorities in Graz 
refused to reimburse them fully.^ In the 1593-1606 war, the 
results of such a lack of co-operation by the Estates was 
already manifest by 1600, by which time the farmlands of 
Bohemia, Moravia and Bavaria were exhausted, and the burden 
of supply fell on Upper Hungary and Austria. So little 
grain was there available that all stocks were carefully 
guarded. The peasants were forced to sell their produce to 
their lords at a compulsory (low) price, so that the latter 
could wait until prices rose in May or June when their
13. Winter (1958) p.137
14. Winter (1958) p.136
15. Pickl (1977) pp.17-18
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controlled release of grain onto the market left no alter­
native than for those responsible for military purchases to
1 6fall victim to the seller’s market thereby created.
The many competing interests with which the Hapsburgs had to 
contend in their efforts to provision their troops was 
symptomatic of the attitude of those who saw in the extent 
of their willingness to participate in the defence against 
the Ottomans, a bargaining piece which could be used to 
their own political or economic advantage.The degree of 
central control which the Hapsburgs were able to exercise 
was so much more circumscribed than that available to the 
Ottoman ruling house; the tortuous negotiations which the 
military authorities had to conduct, let alone the more 
limited resources potentially available, suggest that the 
advantage in this field lay decidedly with the Ottomans.
The Hapsburg logistic position was further complicated by 
the limited options which they could exploit in order to 
restrain the Ottomans. In the 1593-1606 war, the main 
thrust of the Austrian offensive lay along the line of the 
Danube toward Buda, rather than, as in the 1680s, along the 
R.Drava. As at the later period, if supply along the river 
was difficult, attempts to operate away from this line posed 
logistic problems which did not allow the sustained or 
successful undertaking of a strategic design. Pickl well 
describes the vulnerability of the Hapsburg forces moving 
toward Osek in 1684, having to equip each stronghold along 
the Drava as a base of operations as they advanced, and yet 
unable to organise sufficiently even to be able to bake 
enough bread in their new forward position for the troops 
deployed there. Thus, at each further advance, the Hapsburg
16. Bog (1971) pp.22-25
17. On the history of the border, see Rothenburg (I960); on the 
attitude of the Estates, see Schulze (1978).
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troops were more vulnerable to Ottoman counter-offensive, 
and provisions had to be transported an ever greater 
distance from base. Away from the river, where an enemy 
ambush could have occurred at any time, dependence on the 
riverside magazines continued, since adequate facilities for 
transporting sufficient grain, and milling and baking it in 
enemy land did not e x i s t . I t  is calculated that an 
Austrian column could move forward a maximum of only 80-100 
kilometres from base before provisioning became impossible, 
indication of its dependence on well-stocked m a g a z i n e s . ^
The essential difficulties attending the Hapsburg thrusts 
into the Ottoman heartland in Hungary in 1593-1606 were not 
dissimilar from those which they faced at a later period.
At each further approach along the Danube, they became more 
vulnerable to Ottoman retaliation through their greater 
proximity to the Ottoman base at Buda. It is perhaps 
surprising that they managed to hold Estergon for as long as 
they did, from 1595-1605, and that they could consolidate 
this position by seizing Vipegrad, which they held between 
1595 and 1605 and Pest, which they held from 1602 to 1604.
The Hapsburgs were slow to stock depots during the years of
this war. Unlike the Ottomans, they did not have an ’in-
kind1 irregular tax system, which could ensure at least part
of their military requirement. In the Hapsburg endeavours
against Bocskai in the final two years of the war, and
against Gabor Bethlen in 1621-22, the advantages which the
Hungarians opposing them could derive from having
grainstocks levied as tithes again underlined how valuable
p nsuch depots could be.
18. Plckl (1977) pp.130-33
19. Kiss (1980) p.H9
20. Kiss (1975) pp.155-56, 158
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Iliii. Irregular Taxation and Provisioning
In administrative terms, there were three formal methods by 
which provisions for the Ottoman army were obtained from the 
producers; in Turkish these are known as nUziil, silrsat. and 
istira. The precise legal status of these terms, and even 
their precise meanings, are a matter of some dispute: in the 
contemporary sources they are not clearly explained, while 
the secondary authors of today disagree as to the scope of 
each term. In part, the confusion of secondary authors is 
due to their search for a universal formulation, whereby 
each of these methods of provisioning, and the irregular 
taxation system of which they were a part, should be applied 
in the same way across the Empire, any changes in applic­
ation which are detected, being considered to relate to 
chronological development rather than regional variation.
In the analysis offered here we look first at what other 
historians have to say about the application of niizill, 
stirsat and Istira; our problem, however, is to try to under­
stand how the different methods of provisioning open to the 
Ottomans were applied in the specific logistic circumstances 
of the 1593-1606 war in Hungary.
It is generally accepted that levies on the Ottoman subject 
population for the purpose of provisioning the army in war 
had the status of extraordinary or irregular taxes. This 
was in contradistinction to the regularly-levied ser’l and 
drfi taxes which had, respectively, a religious and a 
secular legal basis, and were detailed in the kanunnames. 
Such irregular wartime taxes had the generic name of avanz- 
i divaniye, which appears to be synonymous with tekallf-i
21. On the relationship between orf. which originally meant ’common 
usage’, and the various meanings of kanun, see Heyd (1973) pp.167-70: in 
many cases Qrf may be synonymous with kanun.
137
drfiye. It is from this point in the discussion that there 
is disagreement among recent historians writing on the 
subject, since the available sources are frequently lacking 
in the details which enable definitive conclusions as to the 
nature and application of the irregular taxes.
The most diligent, if sometimes confusing, attempt to 
analyse how the Ottoman army was provisioned in the six­
teenth and seventeenth- centuries is that of LUtfi GUger in 
his Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan 
Alinan Vergiler.^ GUger draws a distinction between nUzUl, 
an ’in-kind’ tax on agricultural producers whereby it was 
incumbent on them to provide provisions for the troops 
without any compensation, and silrsat. whose essential 
characteristic was that provisions levied under this rubric 
were bought from the producers. Both nUzUl and silrsat were 
levies of specified quantities of supplies. GHger also 
considers that lgtlra. a word which merely means ’purchase*, 
could be considered an extraordinary tax where the author­
ities specified the price as well as the amounts of goods 
they wished to buy.^3 He also notes two other types of 
lgtlra, which he does not consider as taxes, but which he 
calls serbest istira: in these Instances, either goods were 
bought and sold free of constraint on quantity, and at the 
ruling price (narh-1 ruz1, narh-1 carl) in the locality 
where the transaction took places, or, alternatively, 
conditions which GUger denotes as serbest lgtlra applied 
when there was no constraint on quantity, but the government 
fixed the price at which the transaction took place.^
Barkan sees the term avariz as synonymous with avanz-1 
divanlye, and the obligation to supply provisions as only
22. Gager (1964) pp.67-145
23. GUger (1964) pp.124-25
24. GHger (1964) pp.121-22
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one of a number of ways in which the reaya were enlisted to 
assist in the war effort.Suceska, too, describes how the 
extraordinary obligations of war, the avarlz-1 dlvanlye, 
also extended to the performance of specific duties such as 
transport of equipment or the building of bridges: in 
contrast to Barkan, he uses the term avanz only in a narrow 
sense, as one type of avariz-1 dlvanlye levy, not as being 
synonymous with it. Suceska, like GUger, also considers 
lgtlra to be an avanz-*! dlvanlye levy, because such 
purchase of provisions was made at fixed prices. But he 
differentiates this from sUrsat by stressing that the latter 
was the purchase of specified amounts of provisions at fixed 
prices, while the amounts purchased as istira were, 
(presumably) not previously specified. °
More recent attempts to define the irregular levies under 
discussion here have added little to our understanding of how 
they were applied at specific times a^nd in specific places. 
Inalcik recognises nUzUl as a levy of provisions, and sUrsat 
as the obligation on the reaya to bring and sell their goods 
at a specific location. He also subsumes the levy of 
oarsmen for the fleet, kUrekgl, under the heading of avanz- 
1 dlvanlye, and fourthly, like Barkan, he notes that such 
auxiliary military duties and services could be requested as 
cash under the rubric avanz akgesl.^  ^ McGowan deals in 
greater depth with irregular taxation in the sixteenth- 
seventeenth century, his analysis being more securely tied 
to how such taxation was applied in a particular area, that 
of the western half of the Ottoman Empire. His interpret-
25. Barkan, art. Avariz (IA): he makes specific reference only to sUrsat 
here, and not to nUzUl.
26. Suceska (1968) pp.91-92
27. Inalcik (1980) p.314: much of this article is a discussion of changes 
in the demand for irregular wartime levies, a subject which is discussed 
further below.
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ation differs slightly from that of Barkan and Inalcik, in 
that he uses the term avanz (rather than avariz akgesi) to 
denote the irregular cash tax of the sixteenth century, 
while he sees nilzill as its ’in-kind* surrogate, and vice 
versa. It was by reason of their surrogate relationship 
that nilzill and avariz were not levied on the same district 
in the same year, a fact which GUger had earlier noted. ° 
McGowan suggests that the sUrsat levy was introduced later 
in the sixteenth century since nUzUl was, by that time 
largely collected in cash, and a need still existed for 
irregular levies in kind.^9
Although they are not in agreement on some of the basic 
points concerned with the definition of the irregular tax 
structure of the Ottoman Empire at this time, the studies of 
the authors quoted here are relevant to the discussion of 
the relationship between irregular avarlz-1 dlvanlye taxes 
and the provisioning of the troops of the Ottoman army 
during the 1593-1606 war in Hungary: it is primarily to 
documents which allow an understanding of the specific 
conditions in this war that we shall turn, since our aim is 
not to seek to detect a pattern of irregular taxation which 
had universal applicability. As already stated, the two 
most fundamental purposes in our discussion of provisioning 
during this series of campaigns are first, to try to define 
more rigorously how the provisions were obtained from the
28. McGowan (198l/a) pp.106-07; see also McGowan (1976). Giiger (1964) 
p.91: he uses the term avariz akgesi here, rather than simply avariz. 
McGowan quotes only one document in support of his claim for the surro­
gacy of nilzill and avariz, addressed to the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, the 
same or a closely-related document being one of those used by Giiger in 
support of his conclusion.
29. McGowan (198l/a) p.108; Veinstein (198.) p.11 does not record the 
use of the term silrsat in documents relating to Siileyman’s campaigns of 
1544-45, 1552, although he says that the practice existed.
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producers, and, secondly, to discover how they were dis­
tributed to the troops, that Is, whether they were sold or 
given. The interpretation offered here, like those of the 
historians quoted, relies on analysis of documents which are 
frequently not specific in their stipulations.
Based on the avanzhanesl system, nilzill was an ’in-kind’ 
tax incumbent on those of the reaya who were not exempted 
from payment by reason of their performance of other 
essential wartime services.3° Giiger maintains that silrsat. 
by contrast, was not tied to the avanzhanesl system, but 
fell also on those who, for other purposes, had a privileged 
tax status.31 As Giiger points out, and as is clear from the 
many orders for nilzill provisions during the 1593-1606 war, 
this tax covered the supply of flour and barley. Silrsat 
covered a wider range of supplies, including flour, bread, 
sheep (for mutton), oil, fodder (hay and straw), firewood
and honey.32
Most of the evidence which Giiger adduces in his analysis of 
irregular levies relates to the Persian wars before and 
after the period of the Hungarian campaigns, while Veinstein 
deals with Siileyman’s period: it should not come as a 
surprise that, in so far as it is possible to fathom the 
subtleties of Gilger's exposition, the characteristics which 
he assigns to the irregular taxes being discussed here
30. For a description of the avanzhanesl system, whereby tax collection 
was based on the amalgamation of a number of household units whose 
number depended on the wealth of the households concerned, see Faroqhi 
(1979) p.124; McGowan (198l/a) p.106, following Barkan, tries to 
establish the precise number of household units which comprised one 
avanzhanesl tax unit through his researches in the sicils of Manastir
in Yugoslavia.
31. Giiger (1964) pp.94-95
32. Giiger (1964) pp,67,93
141
appear to differ from Veinstein’s Interpretation. Giiger 
recognises lgtlra In three guises, only one of which he 
calls a tax: the other two were, more or less, part of 
normal commercial trading. For Velnstein, lgtlra means that 
the quantity of goods to be bought was fixed, but that the 
prices paid to the producers were Mles prix locaux en 
vigeur".33 This is presumably the narh-i ruzi, and not the 
government-determined price of Giiger's lgtlra tax; if this 
was the case, then it is hard to see how Veinstein differ­
entiates lgtlra from silrsat. for he sees the latter as the 
sale of specified (or sometimes merely ”sufficient”) 
quantities of goods !fau prix fixe du jour en vigeur (carl 
plan narh-1 ruzi iizere)”. One significant distinction 
between silrsat and lgtlra which Veinstein notes, however, Is 
that the state was not party to silrsat transactions.31*
t
When we look at the sources for the 1593-1606 war, the 
problem is to decide which of the orders for provisions 
apply to silrsat and which to lgtlra. for it is thus that it 
Is possible to discover how each was applied at this time. 
Nilzill orders, by contrast, are clearly stated. The only 
feature which both Veinstein and Giiger agree to have been a 
distinguishing feature of silrsat is that orders relating to 
this levy include the stipulation ”...askere sa'at-i malset 
ve eshabina bais-1 ticaret ola”. or some variation thereon.35
33. Veinstein (198.) p.9
34. Veinstein (198.) pp.11,12: Mles ventes sont faites cette fois 
directement par les producteurs ou marchands particuliers a la troupe, 
sans passer par l'etape intermediaire d’un achat de lTltat”.
35. Veinstein (198.) p.12; Giiger (1964) p.93. This may be construed to 
mean ”... that it be a means of subsistence for the soldiers, and a 
cause of trade for the producers”: e.g. RKS 1542 f.94r; MD 73/955. See 
also AK f.54v: ”...Rumell eyaletlnde vakl kazalarda zahlre igiln nilzilller 
ve her menazlllerde reaya ve ticaret ecellgiln silrsat zahlre getirdp 
akceleri lie asaklr-1 is lama satilmak hususunda ferman olunmagLn...”.
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This Indicates indisputably that sUrsat provisions were sold 
to the troops. Secondary sources agree that such provisions 
were sold to the troops at artificially-fixed (low) prices, 
but it has not been not possible to ascertain by how much 
the prices at which the producers sold their goods to the 
troops fell below those available on the open market. Many 
orders, however, while containing this phrase, do not refer 
to sUrsat as the method of procurement of the provisions in 
question, but use terras such as ihrac etmek or tedarik 
etmek. literally, ”to obtain” and ”to prepare”. There is, 
in such cases, no specific mention of istira as the 
alternative to sUrsat. but it should perhaps be assumed that 
they related to sUrsat supplies, as Veinstein and GUger 
assume to have been the case during the periods which they 
examined.^
For the time and place of our interest we are not in 
possession of registers of the series which enabled GUger to 
arrive at his conclusions. These are primarily the mevkufat 
defterleri. which stipulate the amounts of nUzUl and sUrsat 
supplies required from designated kazas to be at specified 
menzlls; nor are there avanzhanesl defterleri which list 
the composition and numbers of avanzhanesl tax-units across 
the Empire.Orders relating to nUzUl in the MUhlmme series 
are vague, rarely specifying the destination of the 
provisions. The amounts to be levied are usually not 
mentioned, reference being made merely to an order sent
36. Compare, for instance, MD 72/140; MD 72/824; MD 72/883; MD 73/65; MD 
77/106.
37. GUger (1964) pp.73,186-. The only relevant mevkufat register for the 
1593-1606 war is KK 2557 (1014 AHA605 AD) which lists levies of barley 
for the Imperial stables. According to McGowan (198l/a) pp.115-20 the 
series of avanzhanesl registers in the BBA runs from 1029-1249 AH 
(1619-1834).
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earlier, In which such information must have been given.^8 
GUper provides us, however, with examples of the terms in 
which nilzill orders could be couched: a certain amount of 
grain was demanded from each avanzhanesl. and often in a 
given proportion, for instance 25% flour and 75% barley from 
each of the avanzhanesl of some Anatolian vilayets in 987 
AH (1579-80),39 presumably for the Persian wars of that time. 
So too, in 1003 AH (159*1-95), 2.5 keyl of flour and barley 
in the proportion 1:3 were demanded as nUzUl from each of 
the 604 avanzhanesl of Peline kaza in the sancak of 
Izvornik;1*^  such an arrangement may be considered typical.
The responsibility for ensuring that the stipulated 
quantities of provisions were ready at the menzlls where the 
soldiers were to be billeted rested with the cadis, as 
perhaps did the responsibility to call forth provisions "in 
sufficient quantity". Where more than one kaza was required 
to provide provisions for a certain menzll. such local 
decision-making is again witnessed.1** The requirement for 
the cadi to fulfil this duty, on pain of severe reprimand,**2 
had to be judiciously balanced against the central 
government instructions that those without provisions to 
sell should not be harrassed,1*^  and that payment should be 
made in full for the goods brought for sale to the troops.1*1* 
Violations of these warnings there must have been, but they 
do demonstrate the stateTs concern to husband the resources 
at its disposal. So too, districts which, for whatever 
reason, were unable to provide sUrsat were exempted from
38. e.g. MD 73/329; MD 73/955; MD 77/448
39. GUger (1964) p.76
40. MM 7348 p.64
41. RKS 1540 f.84r; MD 74/489; MD 77/76; MD 77/109
42. MD 72/824; MD 77/316
43. MD 72/140; MD 72/883
44. e.g. AE Murad 111/358
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doing so for* the needs of the current campaign.
The nilzill and silrsat levies do not seem to have been applied 
inside the war zone of Hungary.^ Orders relating to such 
demands extend only to kazas as far as Belgrade, as well as 
northwards from Istanbul to the kazas on the lower D a n u b e .  
Bosnia was not customarily a source of such provisions 
either, being a frontier area and therefore vulnerable to 
enemy attack,^ although by 1605, the nilzill levy was being 
demanded in cash form, as bedel-1 nilzill, together with other 
campaign burdens.
Istira played a significant part in Ottoman military 
provisioning during these campaigns. The primary function 
of istira was to ensure sufficiency of provisions where 
demand could not be satisfied through the channels of nilzill 
and silrsat, where the obligation to produce supplies could 
not, for reason of distance or unavailability, realistically 
be met by these methods. Such an area was the theatre of 
war: here all depots had to be kept stocked in case 
provisions were unexpectedly required owing to the unfore­
seen troop movements characteristic of a state of war. The 
Inevitable reduction of the stock of available resources in 
war also rendered lgtlra a more practicable means of 
provisioning, since foodstuffs could be acquired from where­
ver there was a surplus over local needs on a pragmatic
45. RKS 1539 f.l46v; MD 75/288
46. McGowan (198l/a) p.112 independently arrives at the same conclusion 
through his survey of the avariz defterlerl from the mid-seventeenth 
century onwards.
47. MM 7426 p.5; MD 73/65] MD 73/955
48. MD 73/188; MD 77/373: the proposal of a new land survey (tahrlr) for 
the sancak of Hersek was quashed when it was learnt how much the area 
had suffered in the previous years of campaigning.
49. MD 77/146
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basis.
We have seen above that silrsat supplies were bought from the 
producers and sold to the troops: Giiger states that this 
transaction was not conducted as a market between producers 
and troops, but that supplies were handed over to an 
official known as the nilzill emlnl, the commissioner for 
supplies (of whose role we shall have more to say shortly), 
who then paid those who had brought the supplies.This 
conflicts with Veinstein’s view that there was no state 
intermediary between producer and consumer, but the campaign 
account books for 1593-1606 would seem to confirm that 
Veinsteinfs observation applied to these campaigns. The 
accounts do not have debit entries relating to the role of a 
government agent in silrsat transactions even In those 
accounts which cover the long weeks of the march from 
Istanbul to Belgrade. It seems that silrsat is, on the 
contrary, only mentioned in the accounts when provisions 
levied as silrsat had not been consumed, but were later sold 
off and the money thus earned was paid into the Campaign 
Treasury.51 we may therefore wonder from which source of 
finance were drawn the moneys with which the producers of 
silrsat supplies were compensated.
The accounting procedure adopted in the case of istira 
provisions, however, clearly shows how money was paid out of 
the Campaign Treasury into the hands of those acting in the
50. Giiger (1964) p.103: "...menzlllerde ordunun iagesi lgin getlrllen 
erzakin askerlere devrinde zahire sahiplerl He askerlerl blr araya 
get Iren blr pazar kurulmuyor...11.
51. e.g. KK 1876 p.5: "an tahvil-1 kazl-yl Babaeskl an paha-yl daklk ve 
galr kl pig ezln der sefer-1 Egrl an kazar-yi mezbur bl-tarlk-1 silrsat 
cem kerdend ve hala fiiruht gilden fermude...11; KK 1890 p.73: "an tahvil-1 
Mevlana Hasan kadi-yl Rudnlk an akge-yl paha-yl zahlre-yl silrsat kl be- 
clhet-i asaklr-1 Islam cem kerdend ve bakl mande tevzl gilde...M.
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capacity of agents charged with the task of effecting the 
purchases of provisions. Besides those officially desig­
nated as commissioner (emin), there were also defterdars, 
sancakbeyis. gavuges and others acting as agents.52 On the 
distribution of the purchased provisions to those for whom 
they were intended, the money received in exchange was 
repaid into the treasury, as a credit on the account 
balance.53 We must therefore conclude that istira provisions 
were sold to the troops, as were those levied as sUrsat.
Since there is no reference to nUzUl provisions in the 
campaign accounts, though, it remains unclear whether, and 
by exactly which route, they were sold to the troops.
The relative importance of of nUzUl, sUrsat and istira as 
provisioning methods during these campaigns cannot be 
measured; this is due in part to our ignorance of the 
accounting procedures involved in recording the financial 
arrangements attending the procurement of provisions, but is 
also due to the lack of detail in the items which are 
recorded. The amounts of provisions distributed are rarely 
detailed, the unit-prlces paid to the producers show wide
variation, while those for whom they are intended are all
*> utoo often described simply as asaklr-1 mansure, which means
Victorious troops1 and is used generally to describe the
army. What can be said, though, is that the documentary
evidence suggests that istira was most frequently conducted
in conditions which fall into the category of GUger's
 ^ serbest istira, with no sign that the price to be paid to
the producers was other than the local^narh-1 ruzi. This
observation takes istira out of the ambit of irregular
taxation. It can also be reiterated that istira was the
52. See, for instance, the entries in KK 1879 p.9 and KK 1885 pp.11-12.
53. e.g. KK 1885 p.8: "an akge-yi paha-yl gagt-i ganem kl bl-asaklr-1 
mansure tevzl gUde..."; "an paha-yl rugan-1 sade ki be-yenlgeriyan-i 
dergah-1 all dade...".
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predominant mode of provisioning for the troops for whom the 
govenment took direct responsibility during these campaigns, 
since nUzUl and sUrsat supplies were not drawn from the 
theatre of war itself.
An integral part of the discussion of the nature of Ottoman 
provisioning methods concerns the circumstances under which 
levies of nUzUl and sUrsat were commuted into cash payments, 
termed bedel-1 nUzUl and bedel-1 sUrsat. By the mid­
seventeenth century these irregular levies had apparently 
been established as regular, and onerous, cash taxes.
Inalcik assumes that it was during this 1593-1606 war that 
the state's demand for extra cash sources necessitated these 
avariz taxes becoming monetary levies rather than 
impositions in kind for the specific purpose of feeding the 
troops. 5^  Thus, the details of the supply system are closely 
related to the financing of the war effort, a matter we will 
turn to in more detail in Part III. The issue is complex: 
from the account-books it is clear that the bedel-i nUzUl 
was well-entrenched as a cash tax existing side by side with 
the nUzUl obligation in kind.55 Bedel-1 sUrsat is less 
frequent, the years from Zilkade 1007-Zilkade 1009 AH (June 
1599-May 1601) and from £evval 1014-Muharrera 1016 AH 
(February 1606-May 1607) apparently being the only periods 
during which this levy was demanded in cash. In both 
periods it was a small amount, in 1599-1601, slightly over
54. Inalcik (1980) p.315
55. See section B.iii of campaign account transcripts in Appendix I.
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A determining criterion as to whether nilziil was to be levied 
in cash or kind was the distance from the point of 
production of the provisions to the place where they were to 
be c o n s u m e d . 57 Costs of transportation were high, and thus 
distance was a factor to be carefully considered, whether 
this cost was to be bbrne by the reaya whose responsibility 
it was to take the provisions which they were required to 
furnish to the designated menzll, or by the state, which 
alternatively had to hire transport services such as camels 
and mules. Where nilzill or silrsat was given in cash, as 
bedel, this money was then used to purchase provisions at a 
more suitable location; effectively it was transferred to 
the funds available for lgtlra procurement.
The commutation of nilziil and silrsat into cash taxes Is 
generally viewed in the context of the "decline” of the 
Ottoman Empire. Portents of the Increasing weight of nilzill 
and silrsat, or rather of their cash surrogates, are 
certainly apparent during these campaigns, and earlier 
examples are mentioned by Giiger.5^ In spring 1594, for
56. KK 1879 p.5: bedel-1 nilzill 23,479,180 akge
bedel-1 silrsat 169,194 akge
(bedel-1 ganem ma* silrsat 4,276,469 akge)
KK 1890 p .4:
bedel-1 silrsat 16,000 akge
(bedel-1 nilzill ve ganem (ve) navlun -1 sefine
ve ilcret-1 mekkarlyan 3,907,187 akge)
(bedel-1 nilzill ve ganem ve tiifenkendazan
ve gayrlhi 278,600 akge)
57. RKS 1536 f.l09v; RKS 1540 f.85v
58. Giiger (1964) pp.89-90
149
instance, the previously-ordered nilziil levy of an average 
2.5 keyl of grain (tereke) from each avanzhanesl of the 
kaza of Roduscuk was subsequently altered to a cash 
substitute of 300 akge per avanzhanesl. This was 
effectively a tripling of the burden, if it is assumed that 
one keyl of grain had an average value of 30-40 a k g e .59
The increases in taxation on the reaya which became apparent 
during the seventeenth century are not to be dismissed as 
unimportant, but nor should they be Interpreted as symptoms 
of "decline". There were sound logistic reasons for the 
commutation of the 'in-kind' levies of nilziil and silrsat into 
their 'in-cash' substitutes: cash payment of formerly 'in- 
kind' levies gave enormous flexibility to the operation of 
the array in Hungary, the transfer of cash sums from Rumeli, 
where the relatively small numbers of troops passing through 
could be quantified, and where the available agricultural 
surplus must have been more than sufficient to meet demand, 
to Hungary, where the constantly-shlfting pattern of 
military activity did not allow for precise calculations of 
the sort required in the assessment of the nilzill and silrsat 
burdens, enabled the Ottomans to purchase provisions from 
wherever they were available. For this reason we find 
lgtlra as the prevalent form of provisions procurement In 
the theatre of war beyond Belgrade. A further advantage was 
the fact that the money from these taxes came Into the 
Campaign Treasury throughout the year since, unlike 
provisions in kind, there was not so intimate a link to the
59. RKS 1536 f.109. McGowan (198l/a) p.110 states that the rate at which 
nilzill was collected in cash stabilized at the rate of 600 akge per 
avanzhanesl by the mid-seventeenth century.
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60. This is clear from a survey of entries in the Campaign Treasury 
account books of the KK series. What is not clear is the effect which 
the need to realise irregular levies in cash must have had on the local 
markets.
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Iliv. Gralnstuffs
It is the supply of grain, the staple of the military diet, 
that we will consider first. The contemporary generic terms 
for grain were Arabic in origin, hububat and tereke.^
These are rarely met with in the sources however, the usual 
designation being zahire: this may mean provisions in 
general, but, unless otherwise specified, may be understood 
to signify gralnstuffs in particular.^ A variety of terms 
of Arabic, Persian or Turkish derivation are used for 
specific types of grain: gendilm (P.) or bugday (T.) for 
wheat;^ arpa (T.), cev (P.) or galr (A.) for barley; erzen 
(P.) or d a n  (T.) for millet;^ and erz (P.) for r i c e .
-The aggregate supply of provisions
In his study of campaigns of the modern period, van Creveld 
has observed that, in the final analysis, the most that 
those charged with operating a logistic system could hope to 
do was to gather as much of the required goods as was
61. The term hlnta (A.) for wheat has not been found, in contrast to its 
wide contemporary usage in the tahrlr registers.
62. Meninski (1680) II p.1722 : hububat = !granif, 'legumi1; the 1680 
edition of this lexicon does not give a meaning for ter eke, but Meninski 
(1780) II p.91 gives 'granal
63. Meninski (1680) II p.2231 gives the synonyms ’vittovaglie1, 
'proviande1, ’viveri1, inter alia, for zahire: the Ottoman archival 
sources provide the context for the narrower definition of fgrainf.
64. Dan may also mean maize, but since this cereal did not arrive in the 
Balkans until the seventeenth century, the word may be understood to 
mean billet1 in the present context: Stoianovich & Haupt (1962).
65. The Turkish word pi ring has not been found in documents relating to 
the provisioning of the army at this time; it is used, however, in 
relation to the provisioning of Istanbul.
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possible: to aim for more accurate planning was unrealistic, 
owing to the large number of unknowns.The first measure 
which the Ottoman state took in order to try to ensure that 
as much grain as possible was available within the bounds of 
the Empire, was to impose a ban on its export, as well as 
that of other strategically vital goods. Such bans were 
incorporated into kanunnames and were periodically renewed.1^  
Anticipation of the higher prices to be gained by selling 
outside the boundaries* of the Empire caused such 
prohibitions on export to be frequently infringed by the 
merchants. Although the grain trade within the Empire was 
subject to a number of central government controls, efforts 
to regulate the prices at which grain was sold on the 
internal market were often thwarted, while illegal export of 
grain and other goods was especially hard to prevent.The 
high cost of transportation of gralnstuffs by land meant 
that government control of this illicit trade (through its 
provincial officers) was easier in land-locked kazas: it was 
in those within easy reach of the sea that especial 
vigilance was necessary. The Aegean coast was hard to 
control,^9 as was that of Bosnia, to which the markets of 
Italy, easily accessible through Dubrovnik, were temptingly 
close.^ While Hasan Pasha of Bosnia had earlier permitted 
surplus grain to be sold to the Christians, conditions in 
September 1593, soon after the start of the war, required 
that action be taken to prevent this trade, which was 
leaving insufficient available on the market for purchase by
66. Creveld (1980) p.236
67. MD 69/92; MD 71/338; MD 77/3; VELIYBDDIN 1970 f.2v
68. MD 71/31; MD 71/601; MD 71/753; MD 7V287. For a study of the
organisation of grain trade within the Ottoman Empire, and government 
attempts to control it, see GUger (19^ 9). Cook (1972) pp.2-6 gives some 
bibliographical references to the contraband trade of this period.
69. e.g. MD 73/220; MD 75/82
70. MD 71/338
ithe inhabitants of Bosnia.
The counterpart of this illegal diversion of resources by 
sea, was grain speculation by those with enough money to be 
able to afford to buy up stocks, which they stored and 
subsequently sold at high prices when there was a demand.
Such activity caused concern at Edirne in 1605, the more so 
since that town was on the military road and the 
availability of provisions at specific times and at the 
lowest possible price was essential.7^
The promulgation of prohibitions on the export of grains and 
other goods were taken by the European states as a sign of 
impending military or naval activity by the Ottomans.
Although the sale of naval biscuit stores in Istanbul in 
January 1592 Indicated that a serious campaign on the sea 
was not to be expected in that year, the concomitant ban on 
grain export left the Eugger agent in Venice bemused as to 
Turkish intentions.73 The Hapsburgs, for their part, forbade 
the unauthorised export of grain and bread even to Hungary 
(apart from the needs of the troops there), a move 
presumably designed, as was the case in 1684, to hinder the
resale of grain to the Turks by the villagers of the
Hungarian border. The scarcity of supplies after 1600
provoked increased restrictions on the export of grain from
Austria.7^
71. MD 71/173
72. MD 75/342
73. FUGGER p.235: ,rThey say that the Turk has sold most of his stores of 
biscuit again. This is a token that no powerful fleet will sail. But
at the same time he seems to have put a veto on further export of grain 
from his dominions.”
74. Winter (1958) p.136; Bog (1971) p.22; Pickl (1977) p.119 refers to 
the ban on grain export in 1684.
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The Ottoman government thus took certain basic admin­
istrative measures to keep its enemies from augmenting their 
own supplies of grain.75 it was more for this reason, rather 
than because of any global shortage of grain that bans on 
export were enforced: the resources potentially available to 
the Ottomans within the Empire were enormous, and it was 
Hungary which was one of the most abundant areas. Both 
western and Ottoman contemporary writers are eloquent 
concerning the plenty which existed here; Knolles cites it 
as one of the reasons that war against the Hapsburgs was 
decided upon in 1593, in preference to any other possible 
adversary.7^ The ambassadors of west European states who 
passed through Hungary on their journey to Istanbul were 
similarly struck by its fertility,77 while Abdiilkadir makes 
particular mention of the lands along the Danube to the 
south of Belgrade which had lush orchards, and says that the 
areas around Egri and Segedin were especially fertile.78
References to winter retreats owing to bad weather are a 
commonplace in the chronicles of Ottoman military campaigns, 
and should not be taken as an Index of bad weather In any 
absolute sense. There are indications, however, that the 
cool climatic conditions experienced in western Europe 
during the decade of the 1590s79 had a parallel in conditions 
in Hungary and the east of the continent since contemporary 
European accounts refer to famine there in some years of the
75. It was apparently the case that Sultan SUleyman had taken the 
additional precaution of paying the Hungarian reaya to sow grain for the 
army (TALIKIZADE f.l9v): evidence that this practice had been continued 
during the 1593-1606 war has not been found.
76. Knolles (1621) p.1013. See also Johnson (1603) pp.90,94
77. e.g. Deshayes (1645) p.54-55
78. AK ff.llr,69v,71v,92v,102v,122r
79. Ladurie (1971) p.67
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1593-1606 war.^ Such adverse conditions do not, by all 
accounts, seem to have been severe enough to interfere 
seriously with the provisioning of the army generally, 
although there were, of course, temporary shortages on 
account of unforeseen circumstances and administrative 
miscalculations.
Until recently, the assumption of historians has been that 
Ottoman domination of Hungary brought with it total devast­
ation to the resources which existed there.^ This picture 
has been modified, and we can see both that the effects of 
the Turkish presence were not felt equally in all areas, and 
also that it was partly a shift in agricultural and habit­
ation patterns that was the outcome of the presence, rather 
than a blanket destruction. Around Buda, and along the line 
of march for instance, the negative aspects of the Turkish 
occupation were especially evident.^ This differentiated 
pressure is evidenced by the ability of particular areas to 
provide for the demands of the army. The sources of grain 
purchase are frequently not mentioned in the available 
documents, but of those which are, Segedin, Moha$, Pesuy, 
Sigetvar, Kopan and Sirem occur most often.®^ Pekete and 
Kaldy-NagyTs study of the account books of the customs post 
at Buda earlier in the sixteenth century confirm that it was 
the surplus gralnstuffs of southern Hungary which were 
shipped upstream for sale in Buda,®** and these areas of 
rolling hills are still, today, a major producer of
80. THOU XIV p.284; Knolles (1621) pp.1060; Lefaivre (1902) I p.219
81. See, for instance, the introduction to Maksay (1967).
82. David (1974) pp.64-65. Kovacsics & David (1973) pp.432-34 shows, for 
instance, that population of Hungary did not decline over the period of 
the Turkish occupation.
83. e.g. MM 5717 p.112; KK 1876 pp.17,94,97
84. Pekete & Kaldy-Nagy (1962) p.7l6
i*>r.
Hungary’s w h e a t .
The Ottoman army campaigning in Hungary and along the lower 
Danube against the Wallachians, had, therefore, an abundance 
of grain supplies on which to draw. The western part of the 
Empire was able to meet the demands of the troops in this 
war, with only rare recourse to the grain stocks of 
Anatolia. High transport costs discouraged the sending of 
supplies from Anatolia, to Rumeli. The allocation and 
availability of grain for the army in Hungary was also 
determined by events in Anatolia itself; in 1596 the Celali 
revolts broke out, to be followed in 1603 by Shah Abbas’ 
attack on Ottoman-held positions in the Caucasus. Ottoman 
response to these events required the existence of 
sufficient stocks of grain for the troops of the expeditions 
mounted to try to quell this disorder, a further competing 
demand for provisions. The most decisive factor, however, 
was that the Rumelian half of the Ottoman domain was well- 
able to produce sufficient grain within its own borders, and 
particularly within Hungary itself. In 1605, the Danubian 
sancaks of Nigbolu and Silistre were sending wheat and 
barley by sea to Trabzon for the soldiers fighting on the 
eastern front.
The loss to the army for some years after 1594 of provisions 
which had formerly been supplied by Moldavia and Wallachia 
in particular, does not seem to have caused any great 
shortages. One occasion when grain was transferred from 
some sancaks of Anatolia via the Black Sea ports to the army 
in Rumeli was, however, during the campaign of 1595, the 
first after the defection of the principalities to the 
Hapsburg cause. This transfer of grain was a substitute for 
the campaign service which was otherwise incumbent upon the
85. Enyedi (1976) p.182
86. MM 7426 p.5
holders of tlmars. The slpahls of Kastamonu, Kangn and 
Bolu who held dlrllks of 3,000 akces and below were to send 
shipments of wheat to the serdar In Ibrail, on the Danube 
delta, at the rate of 10 klle for every 1,000 akce-worth of 
their benefice.The amount of grain to be levied on the 
slpahls of the vilayet of Rum, in recognition of their 
failure to appear at the Hungarian campaigns in the same 
year, was the subject of conflicting orders. At the end of 
June they were asked for 15 kile of wheat per every 1,000 
akces of their benefice; in mid-July, this was lowered to 5 
kile. and two weeks later, an order was sent demanding that 
they should give 2 kile barley and 2 klle f l o u r . S u c h  
demands for the physical transfer of bulky grain to the 
western theatre of war are not typical, and did not serve to 
meet a defined need. They were, rather, the expression of 
the fulfilment of a traditional obligation which was soon 
to be turned into a cash tax levied as bedel-1 tlmar.
Details of the administration of this tax in 1603 show that 
the burdens were rated in a similar fashion as earlier, but 
that the levy, which was nominally in grain, was further 
assigned a cash value which was paid by those liable, and 
the money thus collected was then used for the purchase of 
grain nearer to the war zone.®^ This transfer of taxes in 
cash rather than in kind allowed the flexibility which did 
the commutation of the nilztll and silrsat taxes to their cash 
equivalents.
87. MD 73/325
88. MD 73/288: this order concerns those with tlmars of over 6,000 akce; 
MD 73/64; MD 73/1067.
89. MM 7727 p.20; AE Mehmed III/181 contains details of how this money 
was spent on the purchase of grain in the sancak of Semendre and various 
kazas.
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-The aggregate demand for provisions
As was noted earlier, the campaign year falls into three 
seasons: (a) the march; (b) the period of active campaign; (c) 
the period of winter-quartering. The demand for provisions 
by the troops will be discussed on this basis.
(a) the march
During the march, which from Istanbul to the Hungarian front 
lasted two or three months, provisions were gathered in 
previously appointed billets (menzll, konak), whose 
locations, although lying along the same military corridor 
(kol), varied from year to year. Supplies were made ready 
at the billets before the arrival of the soldiers, an 
operation which required some precision In planning; it was 
frequently the case that the local authorities were 
responsible for such planning, orders from the Porte some­
times demanding only that ’sufficient1 supplies be made 
available. The meadow of Daud Pasha, outside the walls to 
the west of Istanbul was the traditional starting-point, the 
f irst billet on the road to war in the western part of the 
Empire, and here the guilds demonstrated their skills and 
sold their wares to the troops at the current price. Stops 
were longer than one night at certain points along the way, 
at Edirne, for instance, or Fllibe. Here feasts (zlyafet) 
would be provided for the troops. On arrival at Belgrade, 
the march phase ended, and the operation of the army moved 
into a different mode, the celebrations and feasts held here 
having the secondary purpose of galvanising the troops for 
the action of the months ahead, as well as permitting a 
much-needed rest.90
The demand for the grain to stock billets to be used on the
90. AK ff.6r,6v,7v,32v,115r
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march was met from the neighbouring kazas.9^  The troops of 
the Ottoman army marching to fight in Hungary had the 
tremendous logistic advantage that they passed through 
territory which lay within the borders of the Empire. Thus, 
those responsible for meeting the demands of the troops did 
not have to rely on the co-operation of other states, and 
there was, brigands apart, little likelihood of supplies not 
reaching their appointed destination. In contrast, the 
situation of the troops of the Spanish Hapsburg army 
marching to fight in the Netherlands at this period was a 
constant concern to the military authorities. The Spanish 
Road to the Netherlands ran through territories at times 
hostile to Hapsburg military intentions, and careful 
diplomatic negotiations were necessary to ensure the safe 
passage of troops and that they would be fed en route to 
their destination.^ For the Ottomans, the annual pattern of 
grain demands on the march was fairly stable, supply being 
altered only in response to changes in local circumstances 
such as the inability of a particular area to furnish the 
provisions demanded In a particular year. The cadis were 
easily kept informed of such circumstances. In 1605 the 
cadi of Edirne wrote to the Porte to say that, while the 
kaza of Edirne had been ordered to provide for the 
janissaries at two billets on their march, the serdar was 
staying in Edirne for several days, and the kaza of Edirne 
was therefore unable to support such a burden. In response, 
the provisioning of the billet of £>eyh Pinan was reassigned 
to the kaza of Cisr-I Mustafa Pasha, as is shown by 
amendment to the copy of the original order.93
The knowledge that those of the troops who would return to
91. MD 77/76; MD 77/109
92. Parker (1981) esp. pp.62,92
93. MD 77/68; MD 77/76: !,...sonradan clsr-i Mustafa Paga'ya nakl 
olumnustur”.
Istanbul at the end of the campaign season would have to 
pass along the same military corridor as on the outward 
journey required an awareness of the need to ensure the 
availability of grain and other foodstuffs at the start of 
winter too. Such an occasion was the return of Sultan 
Mehmed III from the Mez<5keresztes campaign in the autumn of 
1596. Orders were sent to certain of the cadis along the 
route back to Istanbul that they should ensure the avail­
ability of 300 keyl barley and 200 key 1 flour from the 
supplies that had previously been collected for the Sultan’s 
progress to the front earlier in the year and not utilised, 
and that they should make a forced levy (sttrsat) in their 
kazas to procure whatever eatables were to be found in order 
to make up the shortfall.9^
Quick response to demand Implied a certain degree of 
flexibility in the provisioning system even on the march, 
however. In June 1605 the troops were held up for 5 or 6 
days at £>ehirk5y (Pirot) on the way to Belgrade. They could 
not cross the R.Morava since the bridge had been destroyed, 
and so the kazas of Sire^nik and Izenbol were charged with 
meeting the demand caused by this unforeseen delay. They 
had earlier been ordered to contribute to the provisioning 
of the billet of San Brod (DImitrovgrad) but had neglected 
to do so in time.95
The archival and other documents available to us are 
primarily concerned with the demand for provisions by the 
kapukulu ocaklan, the regiments of the . Porte, and the 
bureaucrats and retainers who went with them along the 
military road from Istanbul to Hungary: thus we have details 
of the supply of only a relatively small section of the 
total army. This Is important, and should be borne in mind
94. MD 74/489; MD 74/490
95. MD 77/76; MD 77/109; MD 77/316
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throughout the present discussion. Clausewitz pointed out 
the ease with which the demands of an army on the march 
could be met, and the supply of grain to the relatively 
small numbers of men and animals using the corridor to 
Belgrade cannot have presented any serious problems: he 
observed that in an area in which the average population 
density was 2,000 to 3,000 per 25 square miles, a force of 
150,000 fighting men could live off the local inhabitants 
and communities within a small area for a day or t w o . T h e  
size of the Ottoman army marching through the Balkans at any 
time was smaller than this, and specific adminstrative 
measures were adopted to ensure that demand was met in an 
equitable fashion.^?
(b) the period of active campaign
The second and third seasons of the campaign year relied on 
provisioning from depots, what may be termed 'magazine 
supply1. These two periods, that of confrontation in the 
theatre of war and of winter inactivity in the field, may be 
differentiated from one another though: during the former, 
the array was on the move, and depots had to be kept supplied 
accordingly, while in the winter, after the season's 
hostilities had ceased, the various units of the army were 
stationed in specific locations, and more or less precise 
estimates could be made of their requirements.
Preparations made during the previous winter were essential 
as a contribution to the success of the summer's campaign. 
Grain was taken to Belgrade where it was put into the depots
96. Clausewitz (1976) pp.332-33
97. We have noted earlier that the janissaries were sent by a separate 
northerly route.
until the season began.9$ Belgrade's strategic importance on 
the Sava-Danube line, at the junction of the eyalet of 
Rumeli and the Hungarian lands, made it the secure base from 
which campaign supplies for the forward operation were 
prepared, safe as it was from enemy threat. Prom Belgrade, 
supplies were sent on to Buda by river, from thence to be 
distributed as needed to the Ottoman-held positions closer 
to the Hapsburg front.99 All the depots of the castles of 
the area had to be kept supplied, but garrisoned positions 
which were not threatened, and lay away from active military 
confrontation, could be provided for from the surrounding 
agricultural districts. It was the strategically more 
important positions, exposed to enemy operations, such as 
Estergon, Yanik, Kanije and Egri that had to be maintained 
by the organised distribution of foodstuffs.
Magazine provisioning for the Ottomans in Hungary meant 
stocking fortresses for the start of the season with as much 
provisions as was possible, and continuing to send convoys 
of supplies as they were needed. The nature of warfare on 
the Hungarian front was such that this could be achieved 
without overmuch difficulty. The Ottomans were not trying 
to set up a chain of magazines in enemy territory as were 
some European armies of the period after the Thirty Years 
War. The logistic problems which attended the operation of 
seventeenth century armies who were unable to form defensive 
lines, unable to dominate large areas and thus always 
vulnerable to cavalry raid from their enemy, were not so 
great a concern for the Ottoman army campaigning in Hungary
98. As an example, see MD 77/80, MD 77/81: in 1605, Osman, the sancakbeyl 
of Izvomik, was ordered to purchase 70,000 keyl of grain, and All, the 
commissioner for grain (nuzill emini), 100,000 keyl. which was to be sent 
to Belgrade to await the arrival of the military commander (serdar).
99. MD 77/476; MD 77/478; MM 7730 pp.2-14; AK ff.8r,57r,197v; HBZ f.344r
at the turn of the seventeenth c e n t u r y . 100 The phain of 
fortresses forming the 'border1 between Ottoman and Hapsburg 
in Hungary was breached by several attempts to take the 
castles of the opposing forces. Actual successes by the 
Christians were few, and of rather little lasting importance 
in their effects on the Ottoman logistic network which 
radiated from Belgrade' and Buda. The capture of Estergon 
by the Hapsburgs in 1595 was a strategic defeat and a blow 
to Ottoman morale, which perhaps made the eventual 
reconquest of Yanik inevitable, and put the Hapsburg army 
within striking distance of the heart of Ottoman Hungary, 
the Belgrade-Buda axis: it also hampered the functioning of 
Ottoman supply lines. Convoys were given guards to protect 
them on both land and water,101 and depots which were 
exposed had their garrison increased. 102
When the Ottoman army was fighting against Michael the Brave 
in Wallachia, securing supply lines was more difficult 
than was the case on its northwestern border. Michael's 
army was a more fluid force than the Imperial troops and the 
promising Ottoman conquest of Bucharest in September 1595 
was soon followed by the Ignominious retreat and defeat of 
Sinan Pasha and his men at the YergSgU bridge. In 
Wallachia, foraging was the only feasible solution to 
provisioning problems.103
Within the theatre of war itself, there were, as on the
100. Creveld (1980) p.18
101. HBZ f.319r: 200 fighting men (cerikgi) were assigned to protect 
provisions' boats on the R.Danube at the time of the Egri campaign in 
1596.
102. MD 71/394 refers to the vulnerability of the fort of Balcik, on the 
R.Danube in the province of Temepvar, which was a provisions depot.
103. AK f.43v: after the capture of Bucharest, the Ottoman troops were 
allowed 15 days' rest. This they used to go and gather supplies.
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march from Istanbul, billets where the night was spent. On 
the frequently-used routes, such as that from Belgrade to 
Buda via Osek, a march of about 2 weeks, castles and forts 
were stocked as a matter of course. On other routes there 
was no choice than for the troops to carry their provisions 
with them, a load which made them more vulnerable to the 
possibility of hostile attack. The distribution of seven or 
eight days' supply of provisions to the cavalry regiments of 
the Porte in Belgrade -in July 159910i* makes Perjes' estimate 
that four days' bread ration was the maximum which could be 
carried seem low.-^^
Reports from both the Ottoman and the Imperialist side tell 
of plentiful provisions. When the castle of Yanik was taken 
by the Hapsburg commander Schwartzenburg in 1598, he wrote:
"It was also well-furnished with victuals and other 
provisions, and in almost every house was great store 
found". Despite this, the garrison had gone to bring 
provender from Istolni Belgrade, leaving the castle 
unguarded and open to Schwarzenburg's victory.Portresses 
could not, however, hold out against prolonged siege such as 
the 60-day beleaguering of Estergon by the Hapsburg forces 
in 1595, which left it without water or grain.107
Ottoman sieges of Christian positions were subject to the 
greatest logistic strain when the Ottomans did not have
___________________________
104. AK f,120v
105. Perjes (1970) p.8: his estimate may, however, rely on certain 
implicit assumptions as to the extent of baggage-train support available 
to the armies of seventeenth century Europe and the Ottoman army.
Troops of the Austrian army carried up to 10 days' provisions with them 
in their struggle against the Ottomans in 1683-86 (Pickl, 1977 p.137).
106. IRUE NEWS pp.6,8. Knolles (1621) p.1101 says that Yanik had, at this 
time, sufficient stocks of meal to feed 4,000 men for 18 months.
107. AK f.48r
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control of a water-route to allow reinforcements to be 
brought in to supply the besieging force. When Satirei 
Mehmed Pasha was attacking Varad in 1598, rain started early 
and the siege had to be raised in early November. Every­
thing was soaked including the provisions. Eating some of 
the horses was the only solution, until the Tatars brought 
and sold wheat and barley in the camp, the former mixed with 
salt sufficing as a meal.10® Shortage of provisions was 
experienced when the Ottomans tried to take Pest from the 
Hapsburgs in 1602: the Ottomans were unable to secure their 
supply lines from the south without enemy interference and 
could not easily bring provisions from Buda across the 
river. Prices escalated wildly, and horses were made into 
kebab; provisions ran out until small boats were eventually 
able to cross the river at night to bring supplies.10^
The Ottoman re-conquest of Estergon in August 1605 was 
possible because there was a clear passage to this 
stronghold along the Danube from Buda. This unimpeded route 
enabled boats to supply the Ottoman army besieging Estergon, 
with the result that provisions could be sold to the troops 
at low prices. Tatar raiding over the Danube to Uyvar was 
again a means of procuring extra supplies.110
108. AK f.lOUv
109. According to PE£EVT II p.247, the price of flour rose to 20-22 
hasene per keyl. and that of barley to 15 hasene per ke.yl, while Abdtil- 
kadir puts the increases even higher, at 30 hasene for a keyl of flour, 
and 20 hasene for a keyl of barley. At an exchange rate of 120 akge to 
the hasene. this would have represented a staggering increase over the 
average price of grain: the average price paid for one keyl of barley by 
officials of the Buda Treasury in 1011 AH (1602-03) lay between 12 and 
65 akce per ke.yl (MM 6770 P«31)»
110. AK f.209v
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From the orders requesting provisions for the march, it is 
clear that it was from Belgrade onwards that the army was 
considered to have entered the theatre of war; apart from 
those orders for the stocking of depots which were addressed 
to officials in Belgrade at the start of the season, control 
over the provisioning of the troops during the campaign 
season itself was not centrally-directed from Istanbul. 
Whereas it had been the cadis who had practical 
responsibility for ensuring that the billets along the 
military corridor were supplied, the administration of 
supply in the theatre of war passed into the hands of a 
commissioner specifically appointed for the task of ensuring 
grain supplies, the niizill emini.111 Certainly, the niizill 
emlnl had an overall administrative role to play on the 
march too, but from Belgrade onwards it was he who directed 
the purchase of grain within the financial constraints set 
by the campaign defterdar. This shift in organisation Is 
mirrored in the archival material at our disposal, and is 
another index of the extent of central control over the 
provisioning of the troops. It has been stated already that 
the campaign account books have many entries relating to the 
purchase of provisions (lgtira): it was this method of 
procuring provisions, rather than the levies of niizill or 
siirsat, which was used during the campaign season in the 
theatre of war, perhaps to the exclusion of niizill and 
silrsat: It does not appear to be the case, either, that 
grain supplies levied under the rubric of these two 
extraordinary taxes were transported beyond Belgrade for use
111. There were also commissioners in charge of the procurement of 
supplies other than grain: they will be referred to as we discuss the 
supplies for which they were responsible.
16?
iipwithin Hungary. ^
(c) the period of winter quartering (kiglak)
The demand for provisions in winter was of more quantifiable 
dimensions than was the case during the active campaigning 
season. In this respect there is similarity to provisioning 
on the march. Winter provisioning required the stocking of 
depots with sufficient for 3 or 4 months, and so the 
allocation of winter quarters to the troops had to be 
accomplished In an orderly manner. The serdar. when he did 
not return to Istanbul, stayed in Belgrade for these months. 
Here the depots were always kept stocked, and he could 
oversee preparations for the following year’s military 
activity. The winter months were not a time of Idleness, as 
we have seen from description of the measures which had to 
be taken to ensure that provisions for the year ahead were 
plentiful.
The garrisoning of all strongholds was important, the main 
consideration as to the winter deployment of cavalry troops 
of all corps being that they should have access to dry 
fodder. The lesson of the loss of Yanik in 1598 was a 
salutary one, Schwartzenburg’s forces taking, early in the 
season, a tenuously-held Ottoman position which lay exposed 
to attack. Buda was kept well-protected, the 
janissaries usually being assigned here for the winter,
112. The situation in Hungary in 1593-1606 may be contrasted with that 
which pertained on the Persian border: Giiger (1964) pp.69,78-79,81 notes 
that niizill provisions were used to stock the castles of the eastern 
border in the war of 1578-90; Veinstein (198.) pp.11,13 finds that the 
same had been true in SQleyman’s time, with nOzill being used for the 
stocking of strategic depots, and silrsat supplies being reserved for the 
stocking of the billets (etape).
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together with cebecis, arabacis and topQus.11  ^ By the winter 
of 1598-99, the Christians held Yanik, Komran, Estergon and 
VIpegrad, and had thus tightened their grip on the Danube to 
the west of Buda, leaving that city in a position of great 
vulnerability. They could thus effectively harrass the 
supply lines of the garrison at Buda, seizing food convoys 
coming to the town and leaving the Ottomans short of 
provisions. While there was no global shortage of food in 
the theatre of war, the existence of such ah unfavourable 
logistic situation well illustrates the importance to the 
Ottomans of holding these castles along the Danube, and of 
keeping substantial forces in Hungary during the winters.
In an area where rivers were the preferred means of
transport, the importance of logistics Is underlined.
The selling-off of surplus grain stocks at the end of the 
campaign season, as was done by the Ottomans in their 
eastern campaigns of the raid-seventeenth century,111* seems to 
have been rare In Hungary at the end of the sixteenth. In
view of the large numbers of troops who wintered In Hungary
during these campaigns, it is unlikely that stocks would 
have been available for the post-campaign recirculation of 
grain, for this would have necessitated re-purchase In order 
to provide for the quartered troops. There is evidence that 
the type of wheat and barley grown in Hungary at this time 
was, surprisingly, able to survive some years without 
spoiling. An inventory of the grainstocks in an area near 
to Varad (Nagyvarad) in 1589 shows reserves remaining from 
1577, which were, since they were considered available at
113. For the winter deployment of the troops during this war, see, in 
particular, the many references in Abdtilkadir’s chronicle viz. AK 
ff.l3v- for 1593-94, ff.27v- for 1594-95, ff.48v- for 1595-96 etc.
114. Murphey (1979) pp.124,373.
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the later date, still edible.
-The allocation of grain to the individual soldier
The grains in greatest demand were wheat and barley. 
References to zahire in the sources may be understood to 
indicate those two cereals, and such specification is some­
times made. A salient .point is that wherever there are 
details given of the purchase of specific quantities of 
wheat and barley, the amount of barley is invariably sub­
stantially greater than that of wheat. In such a context, 
both were the responsibility of the niizill emlni and his 
agents. The subsumption of barley as part of the troops* 
provisions points up an administrative and financial 
arrangement whereby the fodder for the animals which were 
the support of the corps In question was accounted for In a 
different manner than that which was for the beasts whose 
role was other than personal in nature, those which pulled 
the gun carriages and carried munitions, for instance. The 
supply of grain for these latter beasts was looked after by 
an official known as the sergi emlni.
Dietary information for contemporary western Europe 
Indicates that barley bread w l^s consumed as a poor sub­
stitute for wheat, or that it could be mixed with wheat.
The possibility cannot thus be excluded that some of the 
barley described as, for Instance, "be-clhet-1 zahlre-yl 
yenlgerlyan" was for human consumption. Sansovino
115. Kiss (1975) p. 159. Grainstocks remaining from the SIgetvar campaign 
of 1566 were being sold off up to 6 years later: "an paha-yi zahire ki
an sefer-1 SIgetvar bakl mande..." (MM 1561 pp.54,76,88).
116. Minchinton (1979) p.118-19; Braudel (1973) p.92; Braudel (1978) I 
p.241
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describes the bread usually eaten by the Turks as 
"tristissimo e nero...e vi mettono dentro seme di cimino"; 
the sultan’s bread, by contrast, was w h i t e . B a r l e y  bread 
was black in colour whereas that made from wheat was white, 
and Sansovino's description may be proposed as evidence that 
the former could have been eaten by the troops.
Whatever may have been its constituents, bread came in
I I Q
several qualities, at various prices. The term nan 
referred to a bread that was more expensive than that 
described as ekmek, the commonest type, and Abdiilkadir 
mentions "uzun cakil pldelerl" on one occasion.1 ^
Although It cannot be stated categorically that no part of 
the grain supply of these troops was given gratis, we have 
seen that individual rations were sold to the troops whose 
supply was a concern of the central bureaucracy, while a 
subsistence allowance (nafaka) was given to certain of them 
to assist with the costs of keeping themselves fed. The 
janissaries who were stationed in barracks In Istanbul 
during peacetime were the beneficiaries of a number of vakfs 
set up with the aim of providing food and other requisites 
at affordable prices.120 During peacetime an amount of 10 
akge was cut from the wages of each janissary and paid Into 
a fund known as kumaniye.121 This principal was put out to 
earn interest at a rate of 10-11^, which was then available
117. Sansovino (1582) p.60
118. For narh lists showing the prices of the different types of bread 
available in Istanbul, see M.Kiitiikoglu (1978) p.22 and M.Ktttukoglu 
(1983) p.53.
119. AK f.209v: this flat bread was made on an occasion when there were 
no ovens available, which could imply that the bread of the troops was 
normally of a superior quality.
120. KAVANIN f.38v
121. This derives from the Italian ’compagna*: 'ship's provisions'; 
'storeroom in a galley' (Kahane & Tietze, 1958 pp.76-77).
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to assist those unable to afford sufficient provisions.
When there was to be a campaign, each man had to contribute
i p p
2 gold pieces into the kumanlye fund.lcc
If we take the average price of flour at this period to be 
30 akce per keyl,12  ^and posit a baking ratio of 3:4 (i.e. 3 
kg flour could produce 4 kg bread),12** then the daily sub­
sistence of 1 akce which was given to the infantry regiments 
of the Porte could purchase 1.14 kg of bread. This com­
pares well with the contemporary European military bread 
ration, which averaged one kg per man per day.1^  The 
Ottoman state was still, by 1600, providing a true subsist­
ence ration for Its soldiers. Over the preceding century, 
however, the amount of bread which could be bought for 1 
akce had more than halved. °
Since the Ottoman bureaucracy was more concerned with the 
financial aspects of provisioning than ensuring that each
122. KAVANIN f.39v; cf. Deshayes (1645) p.199
123. This figure is based on the average price of flour (not 
statistically-derived) over the years of these campaigns, as given in 
the registers of the MM and KK series: see bibliography.
124. Perjes (1970) p.5: this Is nothing more than a rough estimate and 
should not be accepted without qualification; Perjes assumes a 100% 
extraction rate of flour from grain, while Engels (1978) p.123 says the 
extraction rate of grain:flour to be 10:9, and (ibid. p.124) that 3.9 
grain produces 3.5 bread, a ratio which is the obverse of Perjes*. 
Information on Ottoman milling and baking ratios is scanty: a list of 
market regulations (ihtisab kanunnamesi) for Istanbul around 1500 gives 
a grain: flour extraction ratio close to that of Engels' (Barkan, 1942 
p.330).
125. Perjes (1970) p.5. See also Dilich (1608) p.2l6 who gives the daily 
bread ration of the (German?) troops of the time as the equivalent of 3 lb.
126. Inalclk (1982/a) p.127: around 1500, 1 akce bought 2.3 kg of flour; 
at a baking ratio of 3:4, this would produce over 3 kg of bread.
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man received a constant bread ration every day, the size of 
such a ration is hard to ascertain. The history of food­
stuffs is a fairly recent concern of European social and 
economic history - Ottoman studies on this subject are in 
their infancy.12*^
127. Aymard (1973) discusses some of the problems of the sources for a 
study of diet in the west European context.
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IIv. Rice
Rice cultivation was introduced into Hungary as a legacy of 
the Ottoman occupation.120 The supposition that rice formed 
a significant item in the diet of the Turkish troops is not 
borne out by the quantitative evidence available to us for 
the 1593-1606 war; pllav may have been an essential 
constituent of the Turkish meal, but evaluating its real 
Importance is a more complex matter. When compared to 
wheat, the quantities of rice reaching Buda were insub­
stantial; in 1571, only about 1% as much rice as wheat (In 
kg) passed through the Buda customs. In 1573, rice taxed at 
this point was nearly triple the amount of rice taxed here 
In 1571, but by 1580, it had fallen back to little more than 
half its 1571 level. 129
Although the military road passed through one of the most 
productive of the rice-growing areas of the Empire, the 
Morava valley, the troops on their way to war were not 
supplied with rice. It Is a notable omission from the list 
of foodstuffs to be prepared at the nightly billets. From 
this area, rice was sent to Istanbul for the sultan's 
kitchen, and the extent of its importance for this purpose 
may be illustrated by an undated sixteenth-century document 
which lists the foodstuffs to be taken on campaign for the 
delectation of the sultan and his entourage. Here, the 
supply of wheat is completely overshadowed by that of rice, 
the former constituting only one fifth as many camel-loads 
as the latter.1-^0 Each day, more than one camel-load of rice
128. I have been unable to establish the date when rice began to be 
cultivated in, as opposed to imported into, Hungary.
129. Fekete & Kaldy-Nagy (1962) pp.722-23
130. TKS D8702 p.2: birlnc 50 yOk
bugday 10 yijk
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was consumed.^1 It Is clear from a document relating to the 
return of Mehmed III to Istanbul after the Egri campaign of 
1596 that grain was supplied through the silrsat levy even to 
the sultan’s suite:thus, the relative importance of grain 
and rice may be distorted if sole reliance is placed on a 
list of provisions taken from Istanbul, and no allowance Is 
made for the acquisition of supplies en route. For a more 
accurate assessment of the Importance of rice in the diet of 
the average soldier, it may be noted that during the Revan 
campaign of 1635, less than 40,000 kg was calculated as 
sufficient rice for the troops on an 8-month expedition.^33
Inalcik states that the geltik mukataalan system of state 
control over rice-growing was organised with the aim of 
ensuring supplies for the military.^ 4  While this may have 
been true at a time when the Ottoman state was establishing 
itself in Anatolia and Rumeli, it no longer appears to have 
been the case by the 1593-1606 Hungarian campaigns. Rice, 
Inalcik suggests, was generally four or six times more 
expensive than w h e a t . T h i s  needs to be qualified by 
adding that, while this may be true on the basis of weight,
131. A gloss to the entry referring to rice in TKS D8702 p.2 notes: 
"gUnde blr yilkden zlyade hare olunur". The weight which a camel was 
expected to carry was not standardised: Engels (1978) p.14 states that 
the average camel can carry 300 lb (net weight) for extended distances, 
while Faroqhl (1982) p.537 says that loads of up to 200 kg are attested 
from the seventeenth century; cf. Hinz (1955) p.13: 1 Kamelslast = 243 
kg.
132. MD 74/489
133. Murphey (1979) pp.127,380: 2,928 (klle) x 12.82 = 37,537 kg.
134. Inalcik, art. Filaha (El)
135. Inalcik (1982/a) p.128: the source which he cites for this 
information is a graph by Barkan in Braudel (1978) I p.518, which, 
however, does not yield such a result. It must therefore be assumed 
that he had other more convincing evidence for such a statement. (
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in terras of use-value, of calorific content, rice is richer 
than wheat, and so a comparison in terras of price per dry- 
weight becomes less valuable. Given the higher food-value 
per unit of weight of rice than wheat, and the consequently 
lower transport costs which rice incurred, it is perhaps 
surprising that it did not figure more prominently in the 
military diet.
The prices at which the small amounts of rice were sold to 
the troops in Hungary are higher than those which were 
current on the Istanbul market. This must reflect, in part 
at least, the cost of transport over the long distance from 
the river valleys of the Balkans. The price at which rice 
was sold to the janissaries, the cebecls and topgus in 
Hungary in the final year of the war averaged 75 akge per 
klle.*36 This compares with an Istanbul market price of 37 
akge per klle in 1600.137 in the year from autumn 1603 to 
autumn 1604, 100 akge per klle was a more usual price for 
rice distributed from Buda.1^
As with biscuit, it appears that it was the Janissaries who 
were the consumers of most of the rice that was sent up­
stream to Buda during these campaigns. Of the provisions 
reaching Buda by river from Belgrade during the twelve-month 
period from October 1603 until October 1604, rice comprised 
54,793 kg compared with 359,883 kg of flour, 705,100 kg of 
wheat, and 6,064 kg of biscuit. 139 This was not, presumably, 
the total of grain supplies that came to Buda during that 
year: we would expect all rice, however, to have been 
transported by river since it reached Buda from the south.
136. KK 1890 pp. 109,113,115,181
137. MJCiltOkoglu (1978) p.24: prior to the revaluation of the akge in 
1600, the Istanbul price was 54-56 akge per klle.
138. MM 7730 (Cum.1 1012-Cura.I 1013 AH)
139. MM 7730 p.2
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Such a supposition would serve further to diminish the 
relative place of rice in the military diet for the other 
grains must have been available in the immediate hinterland 
of Buda, and the quantities given for these were doubtless 
supplemented by supplies not carried on the river. Nearly 
one-third of this rice was allocated to the janissary force 
in Egri by order of the vezlr Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the 
beylerbeyl of Rumeli.l^
140. MM 7730 p.ll
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Ilvi. Biscuit
Biscuit is known as the cornerstone of the naval diet. It 
did not spoil easily, and could therefore keep for long 
periods at sea when there was no chance of being able to 
stock up with more palatable fare.1111 For the Ottoman troops 
fighting in Hungary it was also an important source of 
nourishment, as well as for those of the Hapsburgs, being 
considered indispensable by Montecuccoli.^^ Marsigli's 
estimate of 160 grams as the daily ration of the Ottoman 
troops-^3 again demonstrates the caution with which detailed 
quantitative information should be regarded, since this 
diverges substantially from the ration of Murad lVfs men in 
the mid-seventeenth century, who, in the emptiness of the 
eastern front, were allowed 700 grams per day.^1*
On the way to campaign, biscuit was not generally needed, 
fresh bread being made available at every halt.^5 its value
141. See the following studies of the naval diet: Lane (1970); Davies 
(1970); Hemardinquer (1970). Biscuit emerges as the provider of bulk, 
being the foodstuff consumed in the greatest quantity, and having a high 
calorie content.
142. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59
143. Marsigli (1732) II p.67 (50 dirhems). It must be pointed out that 
Marsiglifs observations do not apply specifically to conditions of war, 
and relate to a later period than that under consideration in the 
present study: he says that the treasury provided provisions for the 
troops, which is at variance with the evidence in contemporary Ottoman 
documents.
144. Murphey (1979) p.125
145. An exception was the unseasonal march to Wallachia of the forces of 
the serdar Cafer Pasha, which set out from Istanbul in October 1595.
They had to rely on biscuit purchased in Sofya for their sustenance on 
the way (KK 1874 p.9).
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as a source of food lay In Its convenience when bread was 
not available, when uncertain conditions similar to those 
faced by the sailor pertained, such as in the instability of 
the war zone. Where bread was plentiful, biscuit was not in
■I U£
demand, and its price was consequently low. °
During the winters, substantial stocks of biscuit were baked 
for the forthcoming season. Belgrade was the centre of 
operations for this activity,but the baking also took 
place elsewhere.1^® Prom Belgrade, or the ovens where 
it was baked, the biscuit was transported in sacks,-^9 by 
buffalo cart where shipping was impracticable.
Biscuit was made of w h e a t . T h e  accounts show military 
purchase both of this raw material specifically for the 
manufacture of biscuit, and of !biscuitf itself, the latter 
presumably ready to eat. The purchase of biscuit by the 
military authorities suggests that its manufacture was
146. At the Ottoman siege to retake Estergon in 1605, for instance: "nan 
ve nemek feravan...blr ferd pekslmad taleb etmezlerdl” (AK f.209v).
147. AK ff.l4r,50v,107v,120v; KK 1876 p.115
148. KK 1876 p.148: "an tahvll-1 All subagi-yl yenlgerlyan-1 dergah-1 all 
an paha-yl pekslmad-1 mirl kl der liva-yl Slrem ve Semendre tabh gilde ve 
bl- cemaat-i yenlgerlyan-1 dergah-1 all tevzl kerde...11; KK 1887 p.12: 
"teslim bl-ahall-yl kura-yl kaza-yi Plllbe be-cihet-i harc-1 tabh-i 
peksimad...7.080 akge". The Venetian ambassador in Constantinople,
Zane, reported a bread shortage in August 1593 caused by the baking of 
biscuit for the army (CSP p.98).
149. KK 1874 p.10 (Sofya, Rebi I 1004 AH/Dec.1595): the sacks (garar) 
cost 70 akge each; the simultaneous purchase of goatskin covers to 
protect the biscuit is also registered ("kece be ray-1 balapiis-l 
peksimad").
150. For instance, for the Egri campaign in 1596, which took place away 
from navigeable waterways (AK f.68v).
151. KK 1876 p.100; KK 1890 pp.44,49
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undertaken by private concerns, presumably on a contractual 
basis.^2 Accounting details serve to illustrate the 
distinction between manufacture which was contracted out and 
that which was internal, the accounting designation 
'biscuit1 presumably signifying purchase from a private 
bakery. In June 1597, an amount of 34,000 akge was debited 
to the campaign account. This was the cooking cost of 1700 
kantar of biscuit (95,880 kg) which had been cooked in 
Belgrade over the previous months at a unit-cost of 20 akge 
per kantar.-*-53 if We assume an average 7 akge per okka as the 
purchase price of ready biscuit by the state at this time,^^ 
then it can be calculated that of the 308 akge per kantar 
purchase price, 15% went towards the cooking cost.
Prepared biscuit was also imported from Egypt. Much of this 
went to Istanbul for the victualling of the fleets which 
were based there, but some was also sent to Salonika where 
it was stored until needed for the Hungarian c a m p a i g n s . -^5 
Those in charge of provisioning clearly could not make 
precise estimates of demand for biscuit, especially with 
respect to that from Egypt, and so stocks remaining after 
the season’s end were sold off and the money thus earned was 
repaid into the Campaign Treasury.^56
As was the case with bread, there may have been more than 
one grade of biscuit, but the only evidence for this is 
AbdUlkadir's allusion to pekslmad-1 beyaz. In July 1597, he
152. KK 1885 p.12; MM 6766 p.13; IBE Askeri 184
153. KK 1876 p.115: "...be-clhet-1 tabh kerden-1 pekslmad...lt700 kantar.
beher kantar fi 20".
154. This is the price at which biscuit was purchased for the soldiers a
few months later (KK 1876 p.192).
155. MDZ 7 p.39. See also Shaw (1968) pp.62,174.
156. KK 1879 p.399; KK 1892 p.65
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says, the price of this was low, at 5  akge per o k k a . * 5 7  
Prices certainly fluctuated, but we may be justified in 
looking with circumspection at Abdiilkadir's assertion that 
shortage at the siege of Pest by the Ottomans in 1602 caused 
a rise to 120 or even 240 akge per okka, that is 240 akge 
per 1.2 kg.158
It appears that it was the janissaries who consumed most of 
the biscuit. Almost without exception, AbdUlkadir's 
references to this food are qualified to make clear that it 
was for this c o r p s . -^9 The campaign accounts bear this out, 
with only rare references to biscuit for other classes of 
troops: for the arabaciyan-1 top in September 1604,^^ f0P the 
cebecis in September 1606,^1 and for others such as camel- 
eteers*^ and miners.^3 Reliable external evidence is not 
available to elucidate whether this preponderance of sources 
describing biscuit for the janissaries reflects the reality 
of its consumption pattern.
Biscuit being a grain product, it came under the auspices of 
the nttzttl emlnl and his agents. Although the nvlzUl emlnl 
continued to have an overall responsibility for grain 
provision until the end of the war, by 1603 the office of
157. AK f.lOOv. The price of biscuit in Istanbul in 1600 was fixed at
150 akge per kantar. which is 3.4 akge per okka; there appears to be
only one type (MJCUtiikoglu, 1978 p.22).
158. AK f.l60v
159. e.g. AK ff.67r,98r,100v,120v,l46r
160. KK 1889 (unpag.: entry dated 2 Cum.1 1013)
161. KK 1890 p.115
162. MM 6770 p.39; KK 1887 p.2
163. MM 6770 p.39
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emln-1 pekslmad had been created.1°i* This aspect of the work 
of the nUziil emlnl could conveniently be separated off and 
entrusted to another official, who still remained under the 
wing of this superior commissioner.
164. The first mention of the emln-1 pekslmad in the sources for the 1593- 
1606 war is to be found at KK 1884 (unpag.: entry dated 29 Ramazan 1011 
AH/March 1603) and this office existed until the end of the war, viz. KK 
1887 p.29 (Aug.1603); KK 1887 p.183 (May 1604); KK 1889 (unpag.: entry 
dated 2 Cum.I 1013 AH/Sept.l604); KK 1890 p.46 (May 1606); KK 1890 p.113 
(Sept.1606).
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Ilvii: Meat
The ability of the Ottoman troops on the Hungarian front to 
survive on minimal rations was a source of amazement to 
contemporary western commentators.In the seventeenth 
century Montecuccoli remarked that his troops (for the most 
part mercenaries), were accustomed to good food, and 
unprepared for the rigours of warfare without. They were 
liable to desert if they considered themselves 
insufficiently provided for. The rations of the forces 
under Montecuccoli's command included 1 lb (.56 kg) of meat 
per man per day, an amount that was constant throughout the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the Hapsburg armies, 
and equivalent to that of Rakoczi’s army in the early 
eighteenth century.1*^  Marsigli's observations of Ottoman 
troops, on the other hand, put their daily meat ration at 
less than 200 grams.
The more immediate access of the Ottoman army than the 
Hapsburg to grain supplies for feeding the troops was 
paralled in the sufficiency of meat at their disposal. 
Livestock-farming in Austria and in that part of Hungary 
under Hapsburg control was less developed than was that of 
the areas on which the Ottomans were able to draw. Hungary 
was the source of a thriving cattle export trade to the west 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the Ottoman 
Balkans and the Black Sea principalities of Wallachia and 
Moldavia were the home of productive sheep-raising, as was, 
to a lesser extent, Hungary itself.
165. e.g. Tarducci (1597) p.90; Botero, G. Relation! universal! II 
p.124 (Brescia, 1599): quoted in Braudel (1978) I p.242.
166. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59; Kiss (1978) pp.83,89
167. Marsigli (1732) II pp.67-8
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-Beef as a part of the Ottoman military diet
Agricultural patterns during the Turkish presence in Hungary 
may eventually be revealed by analysis of the Ottoman land 
and taxation surveys, the tahrlr defterlerl, but no details 
regarding the extent of cattle-rearing are to be found in 
their pages. Cattle were not directly taxed by the Ottoman 
treasury; they are not mentioned in the provincial 
kanunnames, and thus are absent from the tahrlr registers.
It Is not clear why this should have been so.-^^ They were, 
however, taxed as they passed through the customs posts at 
their point of export from Hungary, and registers recording 
the dues paid on them still s u r v i v e . W h e n  the surviving 
Ottoman customs registers are used in conjunction with 
contemporary non-Turkish sources it becomes clear that, 
despite the tripartite division of Hungary, the sixteenth 
century saw an expansion of cattle-rearing and Increased 
export to the markets of Germany, Austria and Venice.-^0 Much
168. Kaldy-Nagy (1961) p.44: ’’Although cattle-breeding began to develop, 
this tendency did not Increase the revenue of the treasury, since, as it 
is known, cattle-breeding was free of both tithe and tax.” Kaldy-Nagy 
(1968) pp.207-9 notes a dispute in the mid-sixteenth century over 
whether the reaya of Segedin should pay pasture tax or not. The reasons 
for the exemption of cattle from the system of Ottoman agricultural 
taxation have not been discussed by historians, nor given the Importance 
which the subject deserves: although McGowan (1969) p.174 is aware that 
cattle and oxen are left out of the tahrirs, the results of his study of 
food supply and taxation on the Danube are distorted by his neglect of 
sources which would have enabled him to give cattle-rearing sufficient 
weight in the local economy; see also McGowan (1983) p.lxiv.
169. For studies of the export of beef animals as recorded in the customs 
registers of Vag, see Vass (1971) pp.487,490 & Kaldy-Nagy (1971) pp.245- 
56; for the customs post at Solnok (Szolnok), see Horvath (1969).
170. There is an extensive literature on the export of cattle from Eastern 
Europe to the West; a useful account is Pickl (1973).
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of the export beef was raised in the Turkish sector of the 
country.^ l
Livestock-breeding may be considered a typical response to 
the unsettled conditions of borderland life. Accumulation 
in the form of goods that are not stationary, as are crops, 
was a safer investment in an area of ever-present 
uncertainty. ^ 2  Hungarian historians have tended not to see 
the success of cattle-raising as a positive aspect, but as a 
regression to the reimposition of the conditions of serfdom 
from which the peasants were beginning to free themselves by 
the time of the Turkish conquest of the early sixteenth 
century.-^3 Land left by its owners, perhaps because It was 
close to the passage of troops, or was unsafe from 
marauders, was incorporated into the domains of the market 
towns as pasture. Towns which had started to develop as 
centres of diverse trades were delayed in this development, 
and former market towns stagnated.
Although Szakaly maintains that most of the cattle were 
exported,175 it is the success of cattle-raising as an 
agricultural activity which is of interest to us here. 
Hungary apparently functioned as a single economic unit from 
the point of view of export: on the basis of sixteenth 
century export figures, it has been calculated that the
171. Kiss (1979) pp.105-06
172. Hollander (I960) p.82
173. For example, Kaldy-Nagy (1971); Szakaly (1971)
174. Szakaly (1971) pp.269-70
175. Szakaly (1971) p.237: the benefits of cattle-raising thus fell to 
middlemen and not to the peasant producers. According to Glamann (1977) 
p.219 there was a ban on the export of cattle from Ottoman Hungary from 
1568. No evidence is given in support of this assertion, nor has any 
reference to such a ban been found in the material consulted: the 
evidence suggests, rather, that this could not have been the case.
185
total number of beef animals In the whole country was around 
three million. 17^ This leaves us in no doubt that the troops 
of the Ottoman army had, at least at the start of the war, 
the possibility of obtaining beef in quantity. Pickl has 
proposed that the main effect of the Ottoman presence In 
Hungary and of the 1593-1606 war on the country’s cattle 
export was to cause a shift in the customary routes by which 
the animals travelled westwards;177 not surprisingly, there is 
also evidence that the. war had the additional consequence of 
cutting production and export. 1^8
The Ottoman array thus had access to fresh beef supplies in 
the Hungarian theatre of war, and there would appear to be 
no reason for salt beef to have been a staple of the Turkish 
soldier’s diet as some contemporary European writers 
claimed.179 in circumstances where it was impractical for 
fresh meat to be supplied, at time of military engagement 
perhaps, salt beef may have been substituted through 
necessity. Our chief contemporary Ottoman source,
Abdiilkadir, makes no mention of this in his descriptions of 
campaign preparations. Such a keen observer would surely 
have done so.
Beef cattle were referred to as gav, the term camus usually
176. Kiss (1979) pp.105-06
177. Pickl (1973) pp.150-53
178. Prickler (1971) pp.135-36 considers the 1593-1606 war to have been 
the main cause of the fall in the volume of Hungarian exports, of which 
cattle was the major one, which he detects after 1618.
179. e.g. Tarducci (1597) p.91: ’’...haura il Turco per delitie...un 
pizzicotto di came salata, ridotta in polvere, e temperata con acqua 
calda”; Soranzo (1603) p.27. There is not any mention of pastirma in 
the Ottoman sources consulted.
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being reserved for draught b e a s t s . T h e  available 
evidence suggests that they were purchased in southern 
Hungary for the most part, from Segedin, 0sek, Mohag, 
£iraontorna, Sonbor, Uzice and Bagka.*^ Money from the 
Campaign Treasury was given to a commissioner, the emln-1 
ganem or koyun emlnl (the terms are interchangeable) for the 
procurement of beef as for s h e e p . O n c e  bought, the 
distribution of beef to the troops was the responsibility of 
the butcher attached to the corps for which it was intended. 
Thus, for example, we find as a credit in the accounts the 
entry:
"an tahvil-i Mehmed kasap-1 ebna-yi sipahiyan an akge-yl paha-yl 
gugt-1 ganem ve gav kl bl-cemaat-1 mezbur tevzl giide ve klymetes 
hala bi-hazlne averde...9.150 akge.-^
This indicates that Mehmed, butcher of the slpahls of the 
Porte, had repaid 9,150 akge to the treasury when he 
distributed (=sold) a certain amount of mutton and beef to 
members of this corps.
Beef was not a commodity that fell within the siirsat levy, 
but was purchased on the market In Hungary, and eaten by the 
troops once they were on campaign, rather than on the march
180. The word gav (P.) could be used also for draught animals, e.g. KK 
1879 p.ll: "...gav be ray-1 arabaha-yl top”; MM 16788 p.3: "...beray-1 
igtlra-yl gavan be-clhet-1 muhlmmat-1 cebehane ve topha”. Meninski 
(1680) II p.2959, III p.3856 equates gav with siglr (T. ox), in contrast 
to camus (A.), which he equates with su slgiri (water buffalo) (ibid. II 
p.1563).
181. KK 1876 pp.24,28,87; also mentioned as a source of cattle is the 
island of /.../ Qcezire-yi oj3 ’). Pickl (1973) p.162 says that the 
Hungarian plain to the east of these districts was the major source of 
export beasts.
182. e.g. KK 1876 pp.87,90,159
183. KK 1876 p.155; see other entries on same page, which show 
that each kapukulu corps had its own butcher.
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to the theatre of war. Throughout the early years of the 
war, the purchase of cattle as a source of meat was more 
frequent than that of sheep. From the autumn of 1598, In 
which the Ottoman army unsuccessfully besieged Varad, there
i 8 iiwas apparently a change in the military diet. OH The absence 
of cattle-meat purchases in the campaign accounts subsequent 
to 1598 could mean that this responsibility was transferred 
to another administrative authority, but there Is no 
evidence for such a supposition. A more likely explanation 
Is that beef supplies were no longer available due to the 
impact of the war; if this was the case, it is additional 
evidence in support of the conclusions reached by those 
working from non-Turkish sources.
-Mutton as part of the Ottoman military diet
Mutton was the most important of the commodities falling 
within the bounds of the sttrsat levy, one of the extra­
ordinary taxes imposed in times of war. Sheep were also, as 
we have seen, bought in the market. Overall responsibility 
for the supply of sheep, as for cattle, lay with the koyun 
eminl; the sheep demanded for the needs of the troops were 
to be delivered to him. The various financial and admin­
istrative transactions involved In the free market purchase 
of sheep are not altogether clear. We have seen above how 
the money which the troops paid for their meat supplies was 
paid into the treasury. Each of the kapukulu corps 
had its own butcher or butchers, who were responsible for 
supplying that corps with meat. These butchers (meydan 
kasaplan) were ordered to purchase sheep for the forth­
coming campaign with their own money, and at the ruling 
price. In January 1606, for instance, the butchers attached
184. Unfortunately, we only have details of the meat supply of the 
kapukulu ocaklan.
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to the Janissary corps, Hasan, Cafer and Yako, were ordered 
to purchase sheep for the array in the kazas of Rumeli from 
those who wished to sell.1®** On occasion the butchers could 
not afford to purchase the number of sheep required of them,
1 or
and therefore had to borrow from the Campaign Treasury.
The relationship between the koyun emini and the kasaps as 
procurer of sheep is not clear; certainly money from the 
Campaign Treasury was.given to the koyun emini (who 
generally held the rank of cavug) for the purchase of sheep, 
but whether this was for the purchase of meat for the troops 
which did not have their own butchers (i.e. those other than 
the kapukulu ocaklari), or whether it was a parallel admin­
istrative arrangement cannot be sald.1^
The ways in which the array supplied its troops with sheep 
during wartime has only been given passing mention to date. 
Attention has been focused, rather, on the supply of sheep 
to the population of Istanbul, and to the Janissaries and 
Palace in particular. Under conditions of peace, the meat 
supply of Istanbul was administered through the celepkegan 
system, whereby wealthy individuals were ordered to supply 
live sheep to the city, which would be sold at below the* 
market price in order to ensure that the Janissaries, in
185. MD 77/628
186. KK 1876 p.129: "tesllm be-Mehmed ve Mustafa ve dlger Mehmed ve Ahmed 
an kasapan-1 ordu-yl humayun beray-i /.../-yl ganem be-clhet-1 zahlre-yl 
asaklp-1 mansure ber vech-1 karz dade end".
187. e.g. KK 1879 p.10: "tesllm be-All cavus an cavugan-i dergah-1 all 
emln-1 ganem-i ordu-yl humayun be-clhet-1 lstlra-yl ganem...315.830 
akge'1; on the same page is found reference to another cavus, Sabr, who 
is also titled emln-1 ganem which suggests that there may have been 
more than one such officer at any time. Alternatively, it could 
indicate that the post changed hands during the period covered by the 
register in question. KK 1885 p.12: "teslira be-Hablb cavus emln-1 ganem 
be cihet-1 lstlra-yi ganem be ray-1 ordu-yl humayun...11.
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particular, were able to afford to buy raeat.-*-^
On the basis of the information given by Cvetkova, we may 
summarise the essentials of the administrative structure: 
those registered as celepkesan had to provide, either from 
their own farms or by buying in the market, a certain number 
of sheep as demanded by the state, which would be sold at 
prices lower than those they could expect to obtain on the 
free market. A miibaglr (agent) was sent from Istanbul to 
oversee this operation, at the kaza level. The sheep were 
handed over to drovers (sUrUcU) who were responsible for 
delivering them to their destination, into the hands of the 
koyun emini. or the chief butcher (kasap basi) if they were 
intended for non-military consumption.-*-^ The celepkesan 
system may thus be seen as having characteristics akin to 
silrsat. since the sale of sheep for the feeding of state 
dependents (or the Istanbul population in general?) was 
effected at prices determined by the government; it was also 
an onerous government service which brought exemption from 
other extraordinary taxation.1^0
The financial relationship which existed between the celeps 
and the kasaps (butchers) has not been explored; we have no 
knowledge of the transactions by which the ownership of the 
sheep was transferred from one to the other. The celep
188. The most frequently cited studies of the celepkesan system are 
Cvetkova (1966; 1970). The more penetrating inquiry of Greenwood (q.v.) 
should soon appear, and will encourage re-evaluation of Cvetkova’s work, 
as well as adding to our knowledge of how Istanbul was supplied with 
meat. Paroqhi (1984) pp.221-41 has further details of the system: where 
Greenwood confines his analysis to the supply of mutton to the 
janissaries and the palace, Paroqhi writes in more general terms of the 
supply of mutton to the population of Istanbul.
189. Cvetkova (1966) p.l6l
190. Greenwood p.2
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bought sheep from the producers, the sheep were driven to 
Istanbul by sdrilcUs (drovers); but It was the kasaps who had 
the obligation to supply the palaces and the janissaries 
with cheap mutton. Like the celeps, they were wealthy 
individuals recruited from the provinces, and like the 
celeps. they frequently went bankrupt, with the result that 
the state took certain financial measures to subsidise their 
operations. The sometimes quite substantial fortunes of 
those recruited as kasap were soon eroded by their oblig­
ation to sell meat at prices far below the market price.
The unhappy fate of many of those conscripted into state 
service on account of their wealth meant that others who were 
eligible tried to avoid attempts by the state to harness the 
substantial amounts of capital which they had accumulated.-*-91
The measures taken by the state to assist the Istanbul 
butchers with their financial problems, of which the most 
Important was a cash levy on urban populations (sermaye-yl 
kasap). were seen to be Insufficient by the last decade of 
the sixteenth century.-*-92 This led to the introduction of a 
general customs levy of 1%, the zarar-i kasap. which was, by 
1597, sent separately to the Porte and distributed to the 
butchers twice a year. This provided sufficient sums to 
allow the scrapping of previous measures aimed at providing 
meat to state dependents. In particular, the celepkesan
191. Greenwood; Faroqhi (1984) pp.228-39
192. Greenwood pp.8-12 notes two funds which were in operation by this 
time (a) a . cash vakf set up in 1565, whose interest was distributed for 
the assistance of hard-pressed butchers; (b) a regular cash levy on 
urban populations, the sermaye-yl kasap. which was to assist butchers on 
an individual basis, through particular communities providing for the 
support of a particular butcher. Faroqhi (1984) pp.233-38 treats these 
funds as being the same, and adds that the capital of this subvention 
fund was put out to interest, which moneys could then be granted to the 
butchers.
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system was In disarray, and butchers went to the provinces 
to collect the celepkesan sheep themselves.^93
In the light of what has recently been learnt about the 
supply of sheep to Istanbul, we are now in a position to 
discuss further the role of the butchers in the supply of 
sheep to the army on campaign in the 1593-1606 war. The 
question of whether the supply of sheep to the army had its 
own administration, parallel to that which ensured supply 
for Istanbul, remains open: a loan from the Campaign 
Treasury such as that made to the butchers Mustafa, Ahmed 
and the two Mehraeds, referred to above, may have been the 
usual source of additional finance for army butchers If, 
indeed, the supply of sheep for the army had its own 
administrative structure. Alternatively, such a loan may 
have been an exception, with the shortfall in the money at 
the butchers1 disposal being made up from same funds which 
supported the Istanbul butchers.
Whether the butchers under discussion were those same men 
who were conscripted as butchers for the orducu corps Is not 
clear. Like those supplying the janissaries and palaces in 
Istanbul, the butchers under discussion here had to be well- 
off, and had the responsibility to fund the supply of sheep 
to the army. As was the case with the Istanbul butchers, 
they could be supported in time of hardship from moneys
193. Greenwood pp.13-14
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known as the kasap akgesi.191* The butchers called up as 
part of the orducu corps, on the other hand, were supported 
by members of their guild, and there is no hint in the 
documents that the butchers1 guild, rather than individuals, 
could have recourse to subvention moneys.
The demise of the celepkesan system at the end of the 
sixteenth century which Greenwood has noted with regard to 
the supply of sheep to Istanbul, provides an explanation for 
the striking absence of documents ordering celeps to supply 
the army with sheep in the 1593-1606 campaigns. During 
Sttleyman’s campaigns in Hungary the system was intact, and 
the celeps of Bulgaria were responsible for supplying huge 
numbers of sheep to the troops both while they were on the 
march to Belgrade and once they had reached that city.*95 
When the celepkegan system ceased to function satisfactorily 
and the ’In-cash’ substitute for this service, the bedel-i 
celepkesan, began to be accepted in lieu, certainly by 1591,
194. MD 74/443: the kasap akgesl vakfi referred to in this document was 
funded, in part at least, from money levied on ”Istanbul shops” viz: 
’’...kasap akgesi igiin Istanbul dekakininden cem ve tahsis olunan 
akgeden...kasap akgesl vakfina zabt edilp olageldiigd tizere istlrbah 
etdiresln”. Greenwood (p.13) says that kasap akgesi could be the term 
for moneys raised from the \% customs levy, the zarar-1 kasablye; it 
could also, however, refer to moneys raised by other levy or from the 
vakf. Faroqhi (1984) p.344 defines kasap akgesi as a payment made in 
lieu of service as a butcher in Istanbul. A further mention which adds 
to the confusion surrounding the meaning of this term is that the kasap 
akgesl fund, or part of it, was a mukataa by 1593-94 (MM 5294/69).
195. Refik (1933) pp.8-11. See, in particular, Veinstein (198.) pp.20- 
25, who gives a breakdown of the minimum of 175,000 (or 135,000?) sheep 
demanded for the Teme^ var campaign of 1552: of these, 30,000 each were 
to be given by the voyvodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, 40,000 by those 
registered as celep, and the remainder by other (unspecified) producers 
who wished to sell.
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this cash levy was not used to finance provisions for the 
troops as were the fin-cashT substitutes for the other 
services of nilzdl and silrsat.-^6
With the celepkesan system no longer functioning as 
formerly, alternative methods of procuring sheep for the 
army had to be sought. The silrsat levy was able to cope 
with the relatively small numbers required to feed those 
troops passing along the military road to Belgrade or north 
through Bulgaria to the Danube. In April 1605, an average 
of 100 sheep were provided each night for the troops 
marching between Istanbul and Belgrade with the Grand Vezir 
Lala Mehmed Pasha. These did not include sheep for the 
janissaries, for whom a separate order required 300 sheep 
per night on their march, which was by a northerly branch of 
the orta kol.1^  If the 1605 march is typical, the silrsat 
sheep mostly came from kazas bordering the military road in 
Thrace and present-day Bulgaria, but conditions did not 
always permit this, and some of the beasts were brought from 
kaz as up to 150 km distant from the line o£ march. The 
celepkesan system for supplying Istanbul, by contrast, 
operated within a 600 km radius of Istanbul; ^ 98 the 
provision of silrsat sheep for the march was, like that of 
grain supplies, easily coped with.
Towards Belgrade, it was from the mountainous kazas on 
either side of the orta kol that the silrsat sheep were
196. See the campaign account summaries in Appendix 1. The reason that 
the bedel-i celepkesan was not paid into the Campaign Treasury may be 
that it was not considered an extraordinary obligation, being performed 
in peacetime and wartime alike during the sixteenth century; this could 
give us added insight into the nature of avanz taxation (Part III of 
this study deals with war financing).
197. MD 77/76; MD 77A09
198. Greenwood p.3
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drawn, and from M a c e d o n i a . F o r  those which were to be' 
consumed during the campaign itself, orders were sent for 
them to be ready at Belgrade for the start of the season, 
often by Ruz-i Hizr, or at any rate before the arrival of 
the serdar if he had not been wintering in Belgrade.
From there they moved with the army as strategy dictated, 
and as logistic conditions permitted; they were cheap to 
transport and sometimes were even conveyed by boat.
Although silrsat was not levied as a means of securing sheep 
once the season’s campaigning had started, incursions from 
Rumeli into enemy-held territory could be thus supplied. 
Sinan Pasha’s ill-fated action against Michael of Wallachia 
in 1595 required sheep from Silistre.2^2 Many sancaks of 
Rumeli, from Nigbolu on the Danube to Agriboz in southern 
Greece also contributed to the general needs of the campaign 
in that year.2(^
The purchase of sheep, in distinction to their acquisition 
as a stlrsat levy, took place throughout the months of the 
campaign. Conditions of warfare rendered igtira a slightly 
uncertain business once the season’s hostilities had begun 
in earnest. In the years 1602, 1605 and 1606, therefore, 
pre-campaign purchases were made from the fertile Kossovo 
plain of Macedonia. In 1605, 10,000 head were to be bought 
and sent to Belgrade, in addition to those obtained by
199. MD 77/76; MD 77/109
200. e.g. MD 77/43^ ; MD 75/582: sheep were apparently available around 
Belgrade, since moneys from the bedel-i ganem levy of the kazas of 
Kostendil and Usktib were earmarked for the purchase of three-year old 
sheep in the Belgrade area in spring 1605.
201. KK 1876 p.24: ’’teslim be-Hacl Mehmed Aga...be-cihet-l mevacib-i 
azeban ve martolosan-1 Budun ki ba-gaykaha be-Belgrad ganem amedend ve 
ba-seflneha zahlre-yl ganem reften fermude glide...'1.
202. MD 73/955
203. MD 73/329
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silrsat; in the same year the sancakbey 1 of Iskenderlye had 
also undertaken to provide 8,000 head.*^1* In 1602 and 1605 
the Porte stipulated that a price of 1 gold piece each 
(equal to 120 akge) was to be paid for the sheep bought.
The pressures on the border vilayet of Bosnia may have led 
to its exemption from irregular impositions, but early in 
the war, in spring 1597, 9,000 head of sheep were available 
for purchase by the koyun emlnl.
Within Hungary itself, sheep-raising was a traditional 
activity which, as can be seen from the Ottoman land and 
taxation surveys (tahrlr defterlerl), continued to be 
important In the rural economy. Figures for the relative 
consumption of beef and sheep in some towns of Hungary show 
that, at least in an urban context, beef was decidedly more 
important in the sixteenth century.^07 This is not however 
a reliable guide, since rural consumption is not recorded, 
nor are rural sheep production statistics easily available. 
The results of Kaldy-Nagy’s study of two hass estates in the 
vilayet of Buda may serve as indication of a general trend 
in Ottoman Hungary: over the period from the mid-sixteenth 
to the raid-seventeenth century, although total agricultural 
production declined, the number of sheep increased.^08 In 
the 1560s, an average of 25,000 sheep were annually exported 
via the customs post at Vag for sale in Vienna, some in 
transit from Transylvania, it is true, but many also from 
Ottoman Hungary.^09 The customs registers for Solnok, a
204. AE Ahmed 1/815; MD 77/463; MD 77/439: 10,000 sheep were sent from
UskUb to Ni§ as well, presumably to continue thence with the army into
Hungary.
205. AE Mehmed III/174; AE Ahmed 1/815
206. KK 1876 p.123
207. Kiss (1978) pp.85-86
208. Kaldy-Nagy (1961) p.53
209. Kaldy-Nagy (1974) pp.34-35
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second important customs post, show an increase in the 
numbers of sheep crossing during the second half of the 
sixteenth century.210 High export figures alone, for sheep 
as for cattle, are not a sufficient indicator of total 
numbers of beasts raised, but their value lies in showing 
that such an industry existed and was a potential source on 
which the army could draw.
The effect of the defection of the Danubian principalities 
in 1594 was felt in the following year, when few sheep were 
able to be sent from Wallachia and Moldavia to provision 
Istanbul. Most of the available sheep in Rumeli had been 
driven to the army and the cadis of the vilayets of Anadolu, 
Rum, Zulkadriye and Karaman were, for this reason, ordered 
to send sheep from those distant areas to meet the shortage 
in Istanbul.211 There had been more than 200,000 sheep in 
the Akkerman/Ozii plain before 1593, clearly a productive 
region.212 The blocking of the direct route to Hungary 
would have prevented the use of these sheep for military 
provisioning in Hungary, if not for that of Istanbul.
The sheep of Wallachia were not altogether lost to the 
Ottoman army as a source of meat though. Opportunities for 
raiding presented themselves, and were used to advantage at 
the time of the brief period of success against Michael of 
Wallachia (the Brave) in 1595, where the peasants were
210. Horvath (1969) p.60
211. MD 73/74. Faroqhi (1984) pp.223-28 perhaps gives undue space to 
sheep brought from Anatolia to Istanbul, since her book is concerned 
with this area rather than with Rumeli; having studied the celepkesan 
registers in detail, Greenwood observes that sheep were only brought 
from east and central Anatolia to Istanbul in times of scarcity 
(Greenwood p.3). Abdiilkadir refers to sheep being sent by the Turkoman 
for the Egri campaign, presumably from eastern Anatolia (AK f.52r).
212. MD 71/332
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robbed and their beasts sold in the army.21^ The Tatars 
were especially proficient at this, crossing into 
Transylvania at the time of the siege of Varad in 1598, and 
returning with wheat, sheep, oxen and other provisions which 
they sold in the camp.21* The high prices charged by the 
Tatars for the supplies which they obtained in this manner 
was a further irritant to their already uneasy relations 
with the Ottoman troops.
The weight of beef animals available to the Ottoman army 
varied widely,21  ^and the terms used in the Ottoman sources 
do not distinguish rigorously enough to allow understanding 
of which particular type of ox or cow is being alluded to.
So it was with sheep. Sheep are described only as ganem 
(A.) and koyun (T.) in the Ottoman sources consulted with 
specific reference to these campaigns, unlike those in the 
celepkesan registers, which were described according to the 
season when they would arrive in Istanbul; sheep from 
particular areas arrived in Istanbul at particular times of 
year.21  ^ The average amount of meat which a Hungarian sheep 
yielded was apparently 10-15 kg, but there is no agreement 
on this critical point.21  ^ Ottoman sources give varied 
prices for sheep, but whether this is indicative of 
particular local market conditions, or of differences in 
sheep size, we cannot tell. With such confusing internal
213. AK ff.4lv,43r
214. AK f.l02v
215. Kiss (1979) pp.88-89
216. Greenwood p.4; see also KAVANIN f.60r
217. Maksay (1967) p.24. Dilich (1608) p.217 knew two sizes of sheep 
in contemporary Germany, Hamel at 30 lb and Schaff at 20 lb, which, 
given Maksay's figure, must have been meat- or deadweight. By contrast, 
McGowan (1969) p.168 puts Hungarian mature sheep at 12 kg liveweight, 
while Sugar (1977) p.126 assumes a small sheep yielded 50 okka of meat, 
which he equates with 45 lb.
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evidence, attempts to give a daily meat consumption figure 
for the typical Ottoman soldier are in vain. Conversely, 
the use of western observations as a means of assessing 
troop numbers, such as Marsigli's of 60 dirhem (nearly 200 
grams) per day for the janissaries, is doomed to failure: 
Abdulkadir repeatedly describes how food was distributed 
from army supplies to the poor of the areas through which 
the army passed. So too, sheep were needed for ritual 
purposes, at kurban bay rami for instance, and also to 
celebrate events such as the start of campaign or victory in 
some military undertaking: such sheep do not always appear 
in the account*.
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Ilviii. Other Provisions
In addition to the several grain products and meat, the 
other essentials of the Ottoman military diet were oil and
salt, and water to drink.
A list of provisions taken from Belgrade to. Buda by water in 
the year from early October 1603 to late October 1604 
includes these essentials, together with the grains already 
discussed, the full complement being flour, wheat, barley,
millet, mixed grains (mahlut), rice, biscuit, plain oil
(rugan-1 sade) and salt (nemek).21  ^ In a diet in which rather 
tasteless grains held a dominant place, salt was the means 
of imparting some slight flavour. Braudel reminds us that 
20 grams per head per day was consumed in contemporary 
Europe.21  ^ Montecuccoli allowed half a pound per week to make 
more palatable the weekly ration of 7 lb meat and 14 lb 
bread, which is a daily salt ration of more than 30 gm.220 
Oil was used for cooking; olive oil being more expensive, it 
was the oil of other plants which was normally used.
The more diverse diet of the serdar and the troops marching 
to Belgrade for the 1605 campaign seems not to have been the 
norm during campaign itself; the provisions to be ready in 
the billets for the arrival of the troops were silrsat 
provisions, and we have seen that this levy was probably not 
applied within Hungary itself. On this occasion, the serdar 
and those with him had honey and chicken in addition to the 
standard fare of bread, sheepmeat and oil.^21 In 1594, how­
ever, at least in the billets of Halkali, Incegiz, patalca
218. MM 7730 p.2
219. Braudel (1973) p.l4l
220. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59
221. MD 77/76; MD 77/109
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and rations to be made ready by the sttrsat levy for
the janissaries were, in addition to the basics, honey,
???yogurt, cheese, onions and garlic.
Vinegar is not specifically referred to in the Ottoman 
sources, as it is in the European, being considered 
essential by Montecuccoli.22® The properties of vinegar were 
that it helped discourage scurvy and that it sweetened bad 
water.221* Water, the drink of the Ottoman soldier, caused 
illness to European troops, who were unaccustomed to 
drinking water in quantity at home, and so doubly unprepared 
for the local water available on c a m p a i g n . 22  ^ Wine and beer 
were purer and therefore drunk in quantity by the European 
soldiers, a factor which contributed to the ill-discipline 
frequently encountered amongst them. Montecuccoli proposed 
that one reason why it was advantageous to make war against 
the Turks in winter was because, through drinking only 
water, they were less able to withstand the cold than the 
Christian troops.22®
The English soldier of the mid-sixteenth century had 4.5 
gallons (c.20 litres) of beer per week, which was of 
considerable calorific value,22? the sailor on the Tuscan 
galley of the same period, 80 cl of wine.22® The drinking- 
water of the Janissaries was in the charge of the corps of 
water-carriers (sakayan), who were provided with horses 
(saka barglrlerl) on which were transported the waterskins
222. MD 72/883
223. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59
224. Hemardinquer (1970) pp.88-89
225. Braudel (1973) pp.l59-62 remarks on the impurity of European water 
in comparison with that of the springs of Istanbul.
226. Montecuccoli (1735) p.293
227. Davies (1963) p.139
228. Hemardinquer (1970) p.85
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(megk) in which fresh water was carried. Marsigli gives an 
illustration of this corps, together with the waterskins in 
position on the horses, noting that each of the kapukulu 
ocaklan was served by such water-carriers, and that the 
water was used for washing as well as drinking.22  ^ Prom the 
time of the Egri campaign the money to support the saka 
corps and to purchase their equipment was given by the 
state; previously, horses to carry the equipment of the 
janissaries (seyishane. bargirlerl) had been bought at below 
market price from the people of Usktidar, an arrangement 
which had caused financial hardship to the sellers.2®^  It 
is not clear how the sakayan fitted into the seyishane 
organisation, nor whether they were part of the orducu 
corps.
The main equipment associated with the transport of water 
were the waterskins themselves (megk). and an item called 
musluk, which, both then and now, means tap or spigot.2®^- 
Marsigli's illustration of the saka corps, showing the 
operation of the filling of the waterskins and their 
transport on horseback, does not make apparent any special 
device for the pouring of the water. These two items were 
among the most expensive taken on campaign; the word megk 
may be accepted as meaning waterskin, but it has not been 
possible to discover the exact meaning of musluk. nor what
229. Marsigli (1732) I pp.80-8l
230. AK f.l5v. On the seylshane, see also KAVANIN ff.38r,38v.
231. Meninski (1680) II pp.4682-82; ibid. Ill p.4655: he did not know 
this usage in a military context.
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it looked like. That of the aghas, at least, was made of 
leather.2®2
232. e.g. MM 383 pp.84,87; MM 5145 p.3; MM 5530 pp.125,126,127,128: see, 
in particular, p.126: 
be-cihet-1 mtihimmat-l lazlme-yl yenlgerjyan-1 dergah-1 all
megkha 375 pairs at 1,100 akce each 412,500 akge
megkha-yl dlger 21 pairs at 1,050 akge each 26,250 akge
musluk-1 bulgari beray-1 aRa-yi mezbur
(complete) 3 at 2,380 akge each 7,140 akge
musluk-1 gosele beray-1 aRa-yl mezbur
(complete) 3 at 1,410 akge each 4,230 akge
Those of Russian leather (bulgarl) were more expensive than those of 
common leather (gbsele).
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Ilix. Fodder
Clausewitz1 statement that a horse’s ration weighed about 
ten times that of a man2®® indicates the scale of the task 
of feeding an array which comprised not only the horses of 
the Tatar and slpahl forces, totalling tens of thousands of 
head, but relied on large numbers of camels, oxen, draught 
horses and mules as transport animals. We may add to this 
the need to temporarily sustain the sheep and cattle which 
were brought to the camp from sometimes distant kazas for 
consumption by the troops.
Engels1 study of the logistics of Alexander the Great’s 
campaigns provides precise figures for the amounts of 
provisions which animals require:
”0n a military campaign, a horse doing moderate work will need from 
20-24 lb of provisions or a daily ration of 24-32 lb. for hard work. 
Half this ration should be grain and the other half fodder.
Military practice has shown that the cavalry and transport horses 
will require from 5 to 15 gal. of water per day, depending on the 
temperature; the average quantity is 8 gal. Hot weather and hard 
work will almost double ordinary water requirements. Mules require 
about the same rations as a horse. We will estimate that the 
average cavalry horse on Alexander’s expedition consumed 10 lb 
grain, 10 lb of forage, and 8 gal. of water per day: the ration of a 
medium size horse doing moderate work.
The requirements are higher for camels: 10 lb of grain and 25 lb 
of straw per day. If only 8 lb of grain can be given, then 40-50 lb 
of straw; if 4 lb of grain 50-60 lb of straw; and if no grain can be 
given 70 lb of straw will be needed.... Camels ought to be watered 
daily and will need 10 gal. although if the animal has gone three or
233. Clausewitz (1976) p.331
204
four days without water, it may require 20 gal. at a time.”2®1*
Thus, those concerned with the provisioning of the Ottoman 
army in Hungary had to ensure that the animals received 
their supplies regularly, for they could not function 
without.
The eighteenth-century French general Puysegur estimated 
that an acre of green fodder could feed 50 horses for a 
day.2®^ One square mile could therefore keep 32,000 horses 
for the same time. Such statistics do not give us 
information of value in a strictly quantitative sense, one 
deficiency being that we do not know how many head of 
animals accompanied the Ottoman army, but are presented in 
order to show that the demands on fodder resources were not 
so outrageous as a first impression may suggest. The troops 
of the army in Hungary were never all massed in one place, 
and the demands for fodder were thus dispersed.
Several terms are used to describe fodder in the Ottoman 
sources. Barley, the most important, is described as cev 
(P.), arpa (T.) and sair (A.), but others can be confusing, 
and the standard dictionary definition which translates them 
simply as ’fodder1 adds little to our understanding. The 
assumption that the vocabulary employed in the Ottoman army 
to describe fodder was fairly specific is endorsed by 
Meninski’s definitions, which accord most fully with the 
internal evidence, and it Is on these that reliance may be 
placed. Thus, straw Is designated as saman (T.) or kah 
(P.), hay as glyah-i husk (P.), and grass as glyah (P.) or
234. Engels (1978) pp.126-27,129
235. Creveld (1980) p.34 quoting Puysegur Art de la guerre par 
principles et regies II p.64 (Paris, 1743).
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otluk (T.). The terra alef (A.) meant, simply, fodder.2^
The fforaging year1, for horses in particular, can be 
divided on a seasonal basis as were the phases of military 
activity according to which the provisioning of the troops 
has been discussed. A contributory cause to the late start 
of the campaign season.was the requirement that the horses 
be grazed on the new spring grass to revitalise them after 
the winter months. For those coming from Istanbul, this 
entailed pasturing on the meadows at Daud Pasha, and along 
the military road to the theatre of war.^37 The choice of 
Sirem as the assembly point for the troops was in no small 
degree influenced by its well-watered aspect, and consequent 
abundant grass.^ 8  Similarly, the various places along the 
way to Hungary at which the contingents from Anatolia, the 
Crimea and Bosnia joined the main body of the army allowed 
the animals to regain their strength after the long journey 
they had undertaken.2^  Frequent halts of a few days along 
the route ensured that the animals arrived in peak 
condition.
For those animals, cavalry and transport, which 'belonged* 
to the standing troops, and which marched with them from 
Istanbul, foraging on the new grass was supplemented by 
supplies prepared in the billets just as were those for
236. Meninski (1680): 
saman = 'stramen1 (Ibid. II p.1986); kah = 'paglia1 (ibid. Ill p.3857) 
glyah = ot = 'erba1, 'fieno1 (Ibid. Ill p.4108) 
otluk = 'herbe1, 'fieno1 (ibid. I p.485) 
alef - ferbaf, 'fieno', fpabolof (ibid. II p.3314)
237• AK ff.32v,58r,l43v; AK ff.l90v,192r concern the grazing of camels at 
Qatalca.
238. AK f.l29r
239. AK f.l6v: Segedin; AK f.57r: Pangova (Pancevo). Orhonlu (1970) p.42: 
Mohag.
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human consumption. The same orders for, for instance, 
silrsat supplies to be levied in the kazas en route for the 
soldiers, contain demands for the readying of barley, straw 
and grass for the beasts.2110 During the shorter journey of 
the Rumeli sipahis in spring 1594, a warning was given that 
they were to desist from grazing their horses in the grain, 
millet and crops of the peasants; those who had done so were 
to be sent bound to Istanbul and were to lose their 
benefices.2^
After the animals had been grassed in the spring, the method 
of feeding during the campaign phase, from July, say, relied 
on the animals being given the dry feed harvested the 
previous autumn as well as foraging as best they may.
Perjes identifies this period as comprising first, the 6-8 
weeks prior to harvest, which was the time when the ripening 
crop was cut for fresh fodder, and secondly, the time from 
harvest to the start of winter, when the animals were given 
mainly dry fodder, with fresh where it was available.2^2 We 
may assume the applicability of such a practice to the 
conditions of the Ottoman armyfs war effort in Hungary.
When he passed through Hungary in Sttleyman's reign, Busbecq 
particularly remarked upon the abundance of hay there, 
so plentiful as to be valueless and free for the taking: 
!l...as soon as we entered Hungary, the grass was so tall 
that it often hid the carriage in front from the ones that 
followed...”.2^  Straw was also fed to the animals: "no 
barley harvest, no war”, was an apposite phrase to 
underline its vital importance in the Hapsburg-Ottoman
240. e.g. MD 72/883; MD 77/76; MD 77/109; RKS 1540 f.86v.
241. MD 72/621. See AK f.70r.
242. Perjes (1970) pp.15-16
243. Busbecq (1968) p.70
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wars.2**1* During the summer, the animals must have foraged 
where they could, to supplement the dry feed which they were 
given, but details are scarce.
During winter-quartering, on the other hand, the provisions 
given to the animals were entirely dry, and this demand was 
the heaviest burden in the year. Over the years of the war, 
many of the provincial' sipahi cavalry and the Tatars 
remained in Hungary for the winters, and the availability of 
fodder must have influenced their deployment as much as 
strategic considerations. In order to alleviate the pressure 
on the resources available in Hungary itself, camels and 
draught horses (bargir) were withdrawn for the winter.
Camels traditionally retired to Filibe and Hirebolu, where 
the imperial stables were situated,2i*5 while draught horses 
were sent to Edirne and Siroz.2^  In the first winter of the 
war, in 1593-94, oxen were assigned to Sirem in the charge 
of the ytlrtlks.2^  The commissioner known as the sergl emlnl 
arranged the availablity of supplies for the transport 
animals on campaign, as the nilzill emlnl did for the troops 
and their mounts.2**^
244. Braudel (1973) p.71
245. AK ff.5r,106v. AE Mehmed III/l; AE Mehmed III/112. MM 5717 pp.19,124. 
See also Faroqhi (1982).
246. MD 77/538. MM 5717 p.6l
247. AK f.l3v
248. e.g. KK 1876 p.65: "tesllm be-Mehmed Qelebl emln-l sergl-yi humayun 
be-clhet-1 paha-yl cev ve glyah ve kah be ray-1 barglran-1 arabaha-yl top 
ki be-kigla reftend an Belgrad 11a Siroz...".
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IIx. Provisioning of the Provincial Cavalry and the Tatars
Since the registers of the Ottoman bureaucracy were 
primarily concerned with central government activity, it is 
not surprising to discover that they contain little 
information about the provisioning of the provincial 
sipahls and the Tatars. These two groups comprised large 
numbers of men, and, because they were mounted, their 
impact on the local economy must have been correspondingly 
greater than that of/the troops whose provisioning we have 
discussed so far. v^  "
-The provincial sipahls
To suggest without further qualification that the timariot 
forces coming to the Hungarian frontier from as far away as 
eastern Anatolia brought with them the provisions which they 
needed for the duration of the campaign, is to ignore the 
system by which they were able to provide for themselves 
independently of the arrangements made for the standing army 
by the central authorities.2*^  Parry appears to suggest that 
the burden of providing for all contingents of the army fell 
to the central government, and he fails to draw a 
distinction between the provisioning of the standing army 
and that of the rest of the troops.2^  McGowan suggests that
249. Murphey (1979) p.121-22 writes of the campaigns of Murad IV: "While 
the provincial timariot forces were expected to provide their own 
supplies, from horses to weapons to personal provisions, at the outset
of a campaign each eligible soldier was also given a ration of grain or 
cash equivalent.” No reference has been found in the sources for the 
1593-l606 war to suggest that such allowances were made to the sipahls 
at this time.
250. Parry, art. Harb (El)
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sipahls must frequently have been required to bring them to 
war the nilziil levies of their districts, but he does not 
elaborate whether these were to be consumed by the sipahls 
themselves or whether they were for general consumption.2 1^
It is only recently, with the appearance of Veinsteinfs 
study of how the sipahls supported themselves when they were 
quartered during the winters of SUleyman's campaigns, that 
an attempt has been made to understand how they were 
provisioned.2^2 The institution which supported the sipahls 
was called harclik.2 3^ those sipahls who were sent back to 
their sancaks to collect money for the support of their 
peers being designated harclikci. The cadis of the areas to 
which the harclikcis were sent had to ensure that the cash 
taxes due to the sipahls had been collected in time to be 
taken back to their beneficiaries by the start of the 
campaign season. Secondly, the 'in-kind’ tithes due to the 
sipahls had to be realised in cash. In addition to the 
burden which this placed on the cadis and the reaya of the 
areas to which the harclikcis were sent, Veinstein notes two 
particular abuses of the system. The first of these was 
that those sipahls sent as harclikci would tend to sell the 
product of their own timars before that of their peers; 
secondly, harclikcis could embezzle the cash due to their 
peers.
Veinstein presents a document from 1559 which advises the 
beylerbeyl of Rumeli of the measures to be adopted in order
251. McGowan (198l/a) p.107. This may be connected with Soranzo’s (1603 
p.27) observation that each slpahl took one load of com for himself and 
the sancak from which he came sent meal, barley and grain whenever 
possible.
252. This use of the terra harclik is not to be confused with its usage 
to denote part of the remuneration of garrison troops.
253. Veinstein (1983)
210
to expedite the collection of harclik: If the harclikcis 
were likely to be held up because they needed to wait until 
the grain was sold, the beylerbeyl was to borrow from those 
with spare cash, and was responsible for repaying them when 
the grain was eventually sold. So far as the cash taxes due 
to the sipahls were concerned, these were to be collected 
before their usual due date.2^
The changes which took place in the organisation of the 
supply of sheep to the array on campaign between SUleyman’s 
campaigns and the end of the sixteenth century should make 
us wary of extrapolating over the same period with regard to 
the functioning of the harclik institution on the basis of 
only one document from each period. However, the evidence 
available for the years 1593-1606 concerning the 
provisioning of the slpahl troops suggests that the harclik 
Institution continued to function much as it had in the 
earlier period: in November 1605 the zuama and tlmarlots of 
the sancak of Silistre were appointed to defend Buda during 
the coming winter. The beylerbeyl of Buda, All Pasha, wrote 
to the Porte expressing his concern that if it was necessary 
for the harclikcis to wait in Silistre until the produce 
(mahsul) could be sold in the markets, those left to defend 
Buda would be unsupplied, and the harclikcis would 
themselves be delayed in returning to defend Buda. He 
suggested that a solution to this problem was to let the 
cash equivalent of the sipahls’ grain be obtained from the 
reaya at the ruling price and given to the harclikcis who 
could thus return quickly to Buda. The Porte replied, 
however, that the reaya should take the sipahls’ produce, 
and their tithe (5gr) which was stored in the granaries, to 
the nearest market as stipulated in the kanun, and sell it
254. Veinstein (1983) pp.128-29
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at the ruling price, giving the money to the harclikcis to 
take back to Buda.2-^
This raises questions concerning the effect of the 
harclik system on local markets. Unfortunately little is 
known about these. The effect which the need to realise 
cash at short notice must have had may be surmised though. 
Veinstein mentions three ways in which the operation of 
local markets must have been distorted, In part by the 
requirement that price' levels be maintained. First, the 
need to sell quickly would have meant that it was the rich 
who bought the grain which had to be sold for the purpose of 
raising the cash to keep supplied the sipahls on campaign. 
Secondly, the cadi, who was responsible for the sale of the 
produce of the sipahls* tlmars would give priority to the 
grains being sold on behalf of the slpahl. rather than that 
of the peasants, creating a more or less temporary 
monopoly. 2^6
Once the harclik money had been collected and brought to 
Hungary, it must have been spent by the slpahis in Hungary 
to keep themselves fed. Because the central government did 
not have direct responsibility for provisioning them, and 
because surviving documents are often vague, it has been 
impossible to ascertain how the money was spent. The 
effect of the demand for food by the slpahis in Hungary must 
have had a substantial impact on markets there; just as the 
lives of the reaya In their home regions must have been 
upset by the need to realise their goods in cash at short 
notice, so must the presence of thousands of soldiers from 
other areas of the Empire have had a substantial impact on 
the pattern of agricultural production In Hungary. This 
impact has, to the best of my knowledge, never been 
examined. The careful control which the Porte exercised
255. MD 77/260
256. Veinstein (1983) pp.122-23
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over the supply of its kapukulu troops was due as much to an 
understanding of logistics as to a desire to ensure that 
this section of the army did not lack for anything.
Although the sipahls were not supplied by the central 
authorities, it would have run counter to the principles of 
good husbandry if they had been allowed to take from the 
peasants as they wished, and on the occasions when this 
happened, orders were sent for their punishment.
When the provincial cavalry troops were marching to war 
through parts of the Empire which were at peace, they appear 
to have obtained their supplies in the markets along the 
way. Abdttlkadir is imprecise on this point when he 
describes the passage of the former Celali leader, Deli 
Hasan Pasha, and his men from Anatolia to fight in Hungary 
in l603:2-^
"...ve Bosna beylerbeylsl olan Dell Hasan Pasa Gellbolu’dan 
gepttp. ...mahruse-yi Edlme’ye dahil oldukta Edlme’nln kadisi lazim olan 
zahlrelerln gehlrden alivirdller badehu menazll kat ederek Belgrad’a 
dahil olduklannda anbardan zahlrelerln tevzl ettller."2 5 8
On the basis of this passage the most that can be said with 
certainty is that Deli Hasan’s supplies came from the city 
of Edirne as he and his troops passed through, and that they 
received further supplies on arrival in Belgrade; what we 
cannot tell is whether they bought these provisions or 
whether they were given them free. A document relating to 
the passage of troops from Anatolia to Rumeli at the start 
of the war in 1593 is more precise in its terminology and 
shows that troops passing from Anatolia to Rumeli bought 
their supplies when they reached Gelibolu. The cadis of
257. See Griswold (1983) pp.39-46
258. AK f.l32r
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§>arkdy, Evrepe and Kepan were ordered to provide sufficient 
provisions (l,klfayefc mikdan zahire”) and send them to 
Gelibolu for sale to the troops arriving there from 
Anatolia, as well as for the local population. Owing to the 
war, the normal sources of supply in Edirne and Rumeli had 
been cut off, and orders that ships from Egypt and Izmir 
should unload at Gelibolu had been ignored. The use of the 
phrase "umumen Anadolu askeri” to describe the soldiers 
covered by this order strongly suggests that they were 
largely provincial slpahis rather than merely central 
government agents stationed in the p r o v i n c e s . *^9
-The Tatars
c~ ' )
Baron de Tott's observation that the Tatars considered 8 lb 
of millet to be sufficient food for fifty days on 
campaign,^60 shows that they were accustomed to feed off the 
lands through which they passed and in which they fought.
The conditions under which the Tatar army operated when 
fighting other nomads in the steppes to the north-east of 
the Crimea were very different, however, from those which 
they encountered when fighting for the Ottomans in Hungary. 
The passage of the Tatar troops from their homelands to join 
the Ottomans was anticipated with great trepidation by those 
through whose territory they passed, and measures were taken 
to minimise the damage they were expected to cause, even 
before it wa3 certain which route they were to follow. Pood 
was prepared at billets on the way, the han sometimes co-
259. MD 71/552
260. de Tott (1786) pp.166-67
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2 61operating by sending envoys to arrange this provisioning.
The Tatar way of life equipped them well for campaigns in 
Hungary, in that they required little for their sustenance. 
They tended, however, to take whatever they needed from 
wherever it could be found, raiding both friend and foe 
alike. Relations between the Tatar han and the Ottoman 
Porte were uneasy, and the han’s control over his troops 
less than complete: despite reprimands, the Tatars often 
raided the Ottoman reaya, stealing their animals and 
possessions.2^2 They were permitted to raid into the dar 
Ul-harb, but attacks on the inhabitants of the dar (il-islam 
were a serious offence.
When some of the Tatar troops were destined to spend the 
winters in Ottoman Hungary, the problem of controlling them 
became more serious at a season when supplies were scarcer 
than at other times of the year. In winter 1594/5, the 
Tatars remaining in Hungary were assigned quarters at 
Vesprem and Istolni Belgrad from whence they could easily 
raid Into neighbouring Hapsburg-held territory to the north 
and west.2^  1602-03 was the winter which Gazi GIray spent 
in PeQuy with his friend the historian Pegevi, and his 
troops wintered in the towns and villages of the sancaks of 
Sigetvar, Kopan, Mohag and 5>imontorna, and between the
261. Kortepeter (1972) pp.135,137,138. In spring 1594, Michael of 
Wallachia was ordered to provide the Han with horses (bargir), a 
number of men as escort, and enough provisions that he should not go 
short, should the Han travel through Wallachia on his way to campaign 
(MD 72/837). Maksay (1967) pp.10,11 refers to European sources which 
describe the devastation caused by the Tatars in Hungary in 1597 and 
1599.
262. MD 77/252; MD 77/507
263. AK f.28r. PE£EVI II p.156: those at Istolni Belgrad camped outside 
the town under their small tents (yapunca).
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rivers Drava and Sava (’...Drava nehrlnln ma-verasl”).2^
A number of documents from the winter of 1605-06 illustrate 
the difficulties of ensuring that the Tatars quartered in 
Hungary during the winters were amply enough supplied to 
discourage them from harrassing the reaya, but that they 
should not be so well supplied as to put an intolerable 
burden on the reaya. .Although there were relatively fewer 
Tatars in Hungary by this stage than during the early years 
of the war, their deployment and supply in this winter was a 
problem for the authorities. The 5,000 Tatars ordered to 
stay on the Kanije border refused to settle there, despite 
their provisions being found from that vilayet. They were 
to stay on the far side of the R.Raba, in what must have 
been disputed territory, for it was feared that they would 
otherwise destroy the more central areas of the vilayet. In 
particular, Sirem and Sigetvar.2^  They also had a valuable 
defensive role to play on the border. It seems that It was 
Impossible to get these Tatars to comply with the order, and 
shortly after, the beylerbeyl of Kanije was instructed to 
winter them on the shores of Lake Balaton, away from the 
katona: they had arrived in the Mohag area and attacked the 
reaya.2^
A further order addressed, to the beylerbeyl of Kanije and 
the sancakbeyls and cadis of Moha$, PeQuy, Kopan and 
Sigetvar, contradicts those sent before. Now it was 
directed that, should it be necessary for Tatars to winter
264. PE£EVI II p.251
265. MD 77/290
266. MD 77/587: katona is a Hungarian word which today means ’soldier*; 
the Redhouse dictionary definition Is *heavy cavalry soldier*. It is 
not clear which of the troops of the Ottoman army, or of the 
Transylvanian forces of Bocskai, which were by this time fighting on the 
Ottoman side, would have been described thus.
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in the field, they should be settled in these kazas.
Clearly the authorities' intention that they winter on the 
border, so that they could provision themselves by raiding 
into enemy-held territory, was not to be realised. Instead, 
provisions were to be levied on the reaya: each Tatar was to 
be given 1 klle of flour and 10 vuklye of meat each month, 3 
klle of barley per two horses (bargir) per month, and 
sufficient firewood, straw (saman) and hay (otluk). This 
was to see them through until early March 1606, when, 
presumably, it was considered that their horses would be 
able to begin to forage on the young grass. Nothing more 
than the stipulated amounts of provisions was to be taken 
from the reaya. 2 7^
The lengthy months of winter-quartering presented the 
authorities with a quandary: at Alacahisar, the reaya 
complained about an additional demand of twelve gold pieces 
from each (avariz)hane, which was levied on them in order to 
supply the Tatars wintering in that kaza with an extra two 
months' provisions on top of the three months' which had 
previously been allotted them. This was deemed excessive by 
the Porte, which ordered that these reaya were not to be 
thus troubled, but there is no indication of what measures 
might have been taken to stretch out the provisions to which 
the Tatars were entitled, nor how they were prevented from 
oppressing the reaya.2^
267. MD 77/590: assuming that the measures used here were those of 
Istanbul (which is by no means certain), this was the equivalent of, for 
the men, 56 kg flour and 12.8 kg meat, and for the horses 168 kg 
barley. Since this order Is undated, we do not know for how long these 
provisions were to suffice.
268. MD 77/665. See also MD 77/564 & MD 77/589 which suggest that a 
similar dilemma had arisen in the kazas of Yenlbazar and Tirgovi^ te In 
Bosnia.
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Such large numbers of men and horses as those of the 
provincial sipahls and the Tatars were not, as the available 
documents show, allowed to raid and forage at whim, but were 
expected to supply themselves according to certain 
recognised limits which were in keeping with the 
provisioning 'policy1 of the Ottoman military command in 
Hungary at this time., Raiding was permissible as long as It 
was conducted into enemy territory, and this must have been 
how the Tatars, in particular, met their requirements and 
those of their horses. In winter, when this was not 
possible, the authorities had to define exactly the amount 
of provisions to which they were entitled, and how they were 
to obtain them. We have seen that sufficient fodder was 
probably available for the horses during the summers, and we 
may suppose that the horses of those sipahls quartered In 
Hungary during the winters were given dry fodder from the 
depots of the areas to which they were assigned.
The dearth of information in the registers of the central 
bureaucracy concerning the provisioning of the Tatar 
and slpahl troops Is a reflection of the extent of control 
which the government exercised over them. Only the 
provisioning of the kapukulu troops was closely supervised: 
since the money for that part of their supplies which was 
not met by extraordinary levies on the reaya came, in the 
first Instance, from the treasury, account was kept of what 
they received. The fact that It was the financing of the 
purchase of provisions for these troops which was the major 
concern is apparent from the infrequency with which details 
are given of the amounts of provisions purchased, and for 
whom they were intended. The government did not have a 
direct financial stake in the provisioning of the Tatars and 
sipahls. except where they were provided for by 
extraordinary taxation. Similarly, we saw in Part I how the 
supply of local garrison and auxiliary troops was of concern 
to the bureaucracy only in so far as that proportion of 
their wage which they received in kind should be correctly 
calculated. The extent of control which the Ottoman state
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exercised over the provisioning of its array can therefore be 
seen to have been clearly defined: there were notional 
'rules' regarding the provisioning of all sections of the 
army. In numerical terms, however, It can be seen that the 
state was directly responsible for supplying only a small 
part of the total of its army with food and their animals 
with fodder.
-Local troops
For the sake of completeness, brief reference should be made 
to those groups who brought their own provisions with them 
on campaign. These were groups who were exempted from 
certain taxes, and may be broadly classified as auxiliary 
troops: some of the ydrttks of Tanndag were called up to 
work in the cannon ball mines of Banaluka (Banja Luka) fov 6 
months in l605,2^  and the ydrilks of Selanik were ordered to 
similar duty at Maden-i Cedid (?) In the following y e a r . 2 ? 0  
They each had to bring with them their own provisions for 
this period, levied from among their peers. Extra defensive 
support for Buda in the early spring of 1606 was provided by 
martolos, pandor, azeb etc, who were ordered to serve there 
from until the main body of the army arrived: they were to 
bring their own provisions.2?1 During the campaigns of the 
previous two summers, members of these same groups had been 
called to serve as musketeers with the (rlverborne) fleet, 
and had to take with them the 4 months' supply of victuals 
which was considered sufficient to feed them from mid-July 
until the end of the campaign.2?2 Since such locally- 
employed auxiliary corps of the Ottoman army served in one 
place, not moving with the troops who were actively engaged
269. MD 75/145
270. MD 77/586
271. MD 77/568; MD 77/643
272. MD 77/456; MD 77/457; cf. RKS 1539 f.l55b
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in campaigning, the burden of taking with them their own 
provisions would not have Impeded the execution of their 
duties.
PART III:
THE FINANCING OF THE WAR
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Part III: THE FINANCING OF THE WAR
III1. Introduction
An army must first of all be mobilised, and once mobilised, 
must be fed and equipped: the concern of generals that the 
necessary financial resources must at all costs be found in 
order for warfare to be conducted at all is expressed in 
Thucydides1 oft-quoted dictum that money is the ’’sinews of 
war”, and in Montecuccoli's statement that the three things 
necessary for war are ’’money, money and more money”. In the 
predominantly siege warfare of the Hapsburg-Ottoman con­
frontation in Hungary, the conquest of a strategic fortress 
was not enough to deliver a crippling blow to the oppos­
ition’s war effort, but, since, the respective military 
commands could not envisage precisely when the war would 
end, they had to husband their resources so as to be able to 
survive for an Indeterminate number of campaigning seasons. 
In conditions where no clear victor emerged from year to 
year, neither side could make rational calculation of ways 
In which expenditure on war could be limited. More than any 
other factor, then, money may be considered decisive in the 
outcome of this war.
The pursuit of war is an expensive drain on any economy, but 
even a simple quantitative measure of the financial costs of 
war cannot easily be arrived at. Attempts to calculate the 
costs of warfare in early modern Europe have been made with 
a degree of confidence which is surprising to the Ottoman 
historian who is ever conscious of the shortcomings of the
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data at his disposal.-*■ Hale suggests, for instance, that 
the expenses of war were 8-9% of GNP for Spain and possibly 
16% for the United Provinces.2 A very different approach, 
and one which accords with our perception of the place of 
warfare In the Ottoman economy of the early modern period, 
is that of Bridbury, who, in writing of the Hundred Years 
War, proposes that one reason why it is misguided to try to 
assess the costs of warfare in the medieval economy is that 
war was a normal feature of contemporary social life, not an 
aberration.3 Thus there was no clear line between war and 
peace, and consequently between wartime and peacetime 
expenditures.
The effects of the ’’TUrkenkrieg” on the economies of central 
Europe have been the subject of an impressive body of 
research, In particular, that of participants In the Graz 
Symposium of 1970.^ The papers presented on this occasion 
were concerned, for the most part, with the repercussions of 
the Hapsburg-Ottoman wars on trade relations In the Balkans, 
the financing of the Turkish wars being a topic of 
secondary Importance. The economic historian Bog has 
written in this forum on the military financing of the 
Hapsburgs during the wars of the seventeenth century, with 
mention of the financial difficulties which beset them 
during the campaigns of 1593-1606.5 Beyond such largely 
descriptive treatment of the financing of war, there has
1. See, for example, the synoptic table in Hale (1985) pp.233-34, which 
gives the costs of various European wars between 1482 and 1617, as well 
as the annual revenues of the states taking part. Compare the cautious 
approach adopted Ln my forthcoming article in Byzantinlsche Forschungen, 
’The Costs of Ottoman Warfare and Defence”.
2. Hale (1985) p.232
3. Bridbury (1976) p.81
4. Pickl (1971)
5. Bog (1971)
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been little in the way of a more analytic approach to the 
topic. Analysis of how the financial resources of a state 
were directed to military ends, that is, for instance, which 
sectors of the economy bore the major burden of the finan­
cial costs of war and what administrative measures were 
taken to ensure that ’sufficient1 funds were available for 
its pursuit, has been slow in being recognised as an 
important issue, and one which would illuminate the 
disposition of power within a state. The general 
theoretical essay of Bog may be read In this context.^
Within Ottoman studies, itself, there are few occasions on 
which warfare, one of the most regular and pervasive 
activities of the early modern state, has been discussed.
The reasons for this neglect are hard to understand.
Perhaps it is because the most intractable of all the 
problems of Ottoman history are to be found in the 
vicissitudes of its economic development, and to give 
detailed rather than general consideration to the place of 
warfare in the economy would be to bring additional 
’unknowns’ into the equation. Yet, the immediate military 
aspect is intimately linked to wider economic developments, 
since a constant, and more or less active or passive, 
preparedness for war, was a parameter which influenced the 
ways in which the Ottoman treasury administered the sources 
of finance available to it. Although the customary 
treatment of the Ottoman polity from mid-sixteenth to mid­
seventeenth century within the context of the ’decline” of 
the Empire is open to trenchant criticism, it is true that 
active warfare such as was waged against the Hapsburgs 
between 1593 and 1606 undoubtedly put particular strains on 
the economy, and more especially when campaigns were being 
pursued on two fronts simultaneously. The financial 
troubles of that other great empire of Spain under Philip
6. Bog (1980)
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II, had similarly had their beginnings in earlier decades, 
for in both, the demands of military campaigning had 
repercussions whose effects permeated the administrative and 
economic structures.
McGowan’s plea for Ottoman historians to perform their duty 
of providing the data for a wider understanding of Ottoman 
(and particularly Ottoman economic) history is admirable,*^ 
and it may be hoped that such efforts will eventually yield 
results which are more critical than pioneering efforts in 
this direction have been hitherto. One of the most 
influential ’grand theories’ concerning the Ottoman economy 
at this time is Braudel’s postulation of a unified 
Mediterranean economy affected by a price inflation related 
to a sixteenth-century influx of cheap American silver, by 
population pressure and by a devalued akce: this was perhaps 
too eagerly seized upon by Barkan, whose discussion of the
t
[ ‘ ' ' /
II
7. McGowan (198l/b) pp.62-63
2 2 5
Ottoman economy Is now being questioned.^ The confusion 
which surrounds the continuing debate concerning the 
relationship between American silver and Mediterranean 
inflation should warn us to tread warily in attempting to 
satisfy the desire for an Ottoman economic history of 
comparable sophistication to the European at this stage.9
8. Barkan (1975): this is an abridged version of Barkan (1970). His 
emphasis on the inflation generated by an inflow of American silver is 
subject to attack on two main grounds. The first of these is that he 
stresses the exogenous causes of the "price revolution”: ”The decline of 
the established Ottoman social and economic order began as a result of 
developments entirely outside the area dominated by the Porte, and in 
particular as a consequence of the establishment in Western Europe of an 
’Atlantic economy* of tremendous vitality and force” (Barkan, 1975 p.5). 
He continues in terras which exemplify the ’decline” theory of Ottoman 
history: "The economic system of the Empire decayed neither through a 
flaw inherent in its constitution, nor through an organic law, but 
because of immense historical changes that destroyed its equilibrium, 
arrested its natural economic evolution, and condemned its institutions 
to irreparable damage”. This neglect of variables endogenous to Ottoman 
economy and society as causing change is criticised by Wallerstein end 
his ’school’: see, for Instance, Wallerstein et al (1983); Islamoglu & 
Keyder (1977). The second ground on which Barkan’s thesis is criticised 
relies on reinterpretation of data which he himself supplied: in 
particular, as Gerber (1982) p.3l6 and Sundhaussen (1983) cogently 
argue, the annual real price increase of Barkan’s ’’price revolution” was 
small, only an average of 1.4% between 1489 and 1606 (Sundhaussen, 1983 
p.177). Further, criticism may be made of subsequent historians who 
base their generalisations about Ottoman economic and social conditions 
on Barkan’s Index for Ottoman prices from 1489-1666, for this Is 
constructed from a very limited data set, primarily the accounts of 
three Istanbul imarets (Barkan, 1975 esp. pp.ll).
9. The debate over the effects of the arrival of American silver in 
Europe Is summarised in Wallerstein (1974) pp.69-77: Barkan seems to 
have been unaware of the many different views representative of those 
involved, and kept Braudel as his only theoretical guide.
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Ottoman historians, in their attempt to make their object of 
study more acceptable to those historians of other times and 
areas who have more developed analytic tools at their 
disposal, need to be aware of the potential dangers of 
donning the garb of the economic historian: a return to
first principles should therefore not be disparaged. The 
focus of the present Part of this study therefore lies 
outside the terms of reference imposed by Braudel and
obliquely. Clearer understanding of Ottoman financial 
administration and of monetary developments are essential 
preliminaries In the definition of the parameters of 
economic history, In that they establish the comparability 
of the objects being scrutinised. The basic units and their 
values at different times are still poorly understood, and 
such ignorance defeats the economic historian’s aim of being 
able to arrive at ’’appropriate International comparisons”.*^  
Sahillioglu has substantially contributed to this goal in 
his presentation of the data for Ottoman monetary history.** 
In the first of his ’’budget” articles Barkan drew attention 
to the adverse.effect which our poor understanding of 
Ottoman financial practice has had on our comprehension of 
the issues of Ottoman history. *^  In this, the final Part of 
this study, it is hoped that, by concentrating on a 
restricted set of data, primarily the campaign account books 
of the period, a critical examination of the available 
material may make a modest contribution to an understanding 
of Ottoman financial history, and particularly to the 
understanding of how Ottoman warfare was financed in this 
period.
10. McGowan (198l/b) p.63
11. Particularly in his unpublished Ph.D thesis: Kunilugundan XVIl£ 
asrin sonlarma kadar Osmanli para tarlhl hakkinda bir deneme (Istanbul 
1958), which was not available to me; see also Sahillioglu (1978).
12. Barkan (1953/a) p.239
Wallerstein, and touches their preoccupations only
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Illii. The Status of the Campaign Accounts
The Intense period of Ottoman campaigning on the Hungarian 
front In 1593-1606 is recorded in a series of documents of 
the genre which, following Barkan's usage, has 
inappropriately acquired the epithet "budget". In fact, the 
"budgets" analysed here are the income and expenditure 
accounts of the 'Campaign Treasury', that is to say, the 
state funds allocated to the expenses of campaigning. The 
general title of the registers in which they are found is 
"varidat ve masanf-i hazine-yi amire der sefer-1 humayun”. 
which may be translated as "incomings and outgoings of the 
imperial treasury on imperial campaign". The account books 
analysed here appear to have no parallel in contemporary 
I Europe, and are the earliest of such Ottoman accounts toi
have survived.
|
The particular interest of this series of registers for the 
1593-1606 war lies in their presentation of the data at 
three levels of detail. The main body of each register,
| running to 300-600 pages, consists of entries recording the
: daily incomings and outgoings of the Campaign Treasury
i (ruznamge); this is the "daybook" which provides the raw
i
| data for the ten to twenty page summary of campaign Income
and expenditure (muhasebe) which constitutes the second 
level of detail. The further consolidation of this "daybook 
summary" results in a two page synopsis (icmal). which 
balances the sources of Campaign Treasury income against 
campaign expenditures: this is the "income and expenditure 
account".
13. The following abbreviations will be used in what follows: 
D = "daybook" (ruznamge); DS = "daybook summary" (muhasebe); 
IE = "income and expenditure account" (icmal).
228
These registers are to be found in the Kamil Kepeci tasnif 1 
(KK) of the Bagbakanlik Argivi in Istanbul. The title of 
the IE of each register, and the period which it covers is 
as follows:*2*
KK 1874: lcmal-1 varldat ve Ihracat-i hizane-yl amlre kl der sefer-i 
humayun vaki gild der zaman-i destur-i miikerrem mugir-i mufahham 
serdar hazret-1 Cafer Paga...ve bl-marlfet-i Abdi Efendl defterdaivi 
orduyu humayun al-vaki fi 24_ gehr-1 Safarulmuzaf fer sene 1004 11a 
vasit-i gehr-i Ramaz an-i gerlf al-mubarek sene-yi minhUi 
(The campaign commander was Hadim Cafer Pasha, the treasury 
official, Abdi Efendi, and the account runs from 30 October 1595-mld 
May 1596.)
KK 1876: tarih ruznamce-yi hazlne-yi amire...der sefer-i humayun der 
zaman-l...Mehmed Paga vezir ve serdar-1 asakln-1 mansure.
(The campaign commander was Satirci Mehmed Pasha, and the account 
runs from 1 Zilkade 1005-14 Ramazan 1007/16 June 1597-10 April 15990
KK 1879: icmal-i muhasebe-yl varldat ve masarif-i hazine-yl 
amlre...der sefer-1 Uyvar ve Kanlje an 8 Zilkade sene 1007 ila 1_ 
Zilkade sene 1009 der zaman-1 destur-i ekrem ve miiglr-1 efham vezir- 
i azam hazret-i Ibrahim Paga...serdar-i asaklr-i mansure b 1-mar if et-1 
hazret-1 Ahmed Efendi defterdar-1 gikk-i eyvel...
(The campaign commander was the grand vezir, Damad Ibrahim Pasha, 
the treasury official, Etmekgizade Ahmed Efendi, who was chief of 
the First Finance Bureau, and the account runs from 2 June 1599-10 
May l601.)
14. Where there is no IE in a register, it is the heading of the D which 
Is given instead. A full translation of each heading Is not given since 
the details of the interpretation of these headings is central to what 
follows; with the exception of KK 1876 and KK 1884, which are not IEs 
but Ds, each heading may be summarised thus: "summary of incomings and 
outgoings of the Campaign Treasury in the time of (name of campaign 
commander) and with the cognizance of (name of treasury official) from 
(period covered by account)".
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KK 1885: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varldat ve masarif-1 hazlne-yl 
amire...der zaman-1 destur-1 ekrem mugln-i efham sadrazam hazret-1 
Hasan Paga...der sefer-1 feth-1 Istolnl Belgrad bl-marlfet-1 Ahmed 
Efendi defterdar-i gikk-1 ewel...an 11 MuharremUlharam sene 1011 
11a 10 Ramazan sene-yl mlnhii
(The campaign commander was the grand vezir, Yemigci Hasan Pasha, 
the treasury official, Etmekgizade Ahmed Efendi, and the account runs 
from 1 July 1602-21 February 1603.)
KK 1884: tarih ruznampe-yi humayun...der sefer-1 humayun...der 
zaman-1 hazret-1 Mehmed Paga vezir ve serdar-1 ekrem...ve hazret-1 
Ahmed Efendi defterdar-1 gikk-i ewel...an 11 Ramazan 1011 ila 15 
Rebi I 1012.
(The campaign commander was Lala Mehmed Pasha, the treasury 
official, Etmekgizade Ahmed Efendi, and the account runs from 22 
February 1603-23 August 1603.)
KK 1887: icmal-1 muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarlf-1 ruznamge-yl 
hlzane-yl amlre-yi sefer-1 humayun der zaman-1 hazret-1 Mehmed Paga 
vezir ve serdar-1 mtikerrem...bl-marifet-l All Efendi kalmmakam-i 
hazret-i Ahmed Efendi defterdar-1 gikk-i ewel...ve bl-kalem-1 HUseyn 
al-hakir ruznamge-yl sefer-i humayun an 16 Rebi I sene 1012 ila 21 
gehr-1 SafarUlmuzaffer sene 1013.
(The campaign commander was Lala Mehmed Pasha, the treasury 
official, All Efendi, representing Etmekgizade Ahmed Efendi, and 
the account runs from 24 August 1603-19 July 1604.)
KK 1889: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varldat ve masarif-1 hlzane-yl 
amire...der sefer-1 humayun der zaman-1 merhum All Paga ve hazret-1 
Mehmed Paga sadrazam ve serdar-1 ekrem...bl-marifet-i Ahmed Paga 
mlrmlran-1 Rumell defterdar-1 gLkk-1 ewel...an _4 MuharremUlharam 
sene 1013 ila 3_ Ramazanulmubarek sene-yi mlnhU.
(The campaign commanders were the grand vezirs Malkog All Pasha and 
Lala Mehmed Pasha, the treasury official, Etmekgizade Ahmed Pasha, 
and the account runs from 2 June 1604-23 January 1605).
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KK 1890: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varldat ve masarif-1 hizane-yl amire-yl 
sefer-1 humayun-i Enguriis der zaman-1 destu(r)-i ekrem muglr-i 
miifahham vezlr-1 azam serdar-1 ekrem hazret>-l Murad Paga...ve Hasan 
Paga mirmlran-i Rumeli al-vezlr ve bl-marifet-1 Mehmed Efendi 
defterdar-1 orduyu humayun...an 10 gewaltilmukerrem sene 1013 ila 16 
MuharremUlharam sene 1016.
(The campaign commanders were the grand vezir, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, 
and the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, Hasan Pasha, the treasury official was 
Mehmed Efendi, and the account runs from 18 February 1606-13 May 
1607.)
Of these registers, KK 1876 and KK 1884 comprise only the D, 
KK 1874 and KK 1889 both lack the DS while the others 
contain the D, the DS and the IE. With the exception of the 
IEs, the registers are in a calligraphic slyakat hand; this 
final summary of the revenues and expenditures recorded in 
the register is in a cursive hand, with the figures (in 
akpe) written out in full as Turkish words. Sometimes the 
figures in the Ds give the gold equivalent of the unit of 
account, the akce, indicating that the transaction in 
question was carried out in gold coin.
In considering the subject of the financing of war in the 
Ottoman Empire at this period, it is important to have a 
clear grasp of exactly which income and expenditure is 
recorded In the accounts to hand, and what these represent 
in administrative terms.*5 The rubrics cited above 
accurately describe the function of these account books, 
which was to record the income and expenditure of treasury
15. The most widely-known examples of Ottoman accounts are those pub­
lished by Barkan (1953/b;1954/a; 1954/b; 1955/a), which, unlike the 
accounts discussed here, each run for a year. As a more than cursory 
glance at these will show, confusion as to the precise parameters of the 
account entries and a lack of standardisation in entries over time, make 
it impossible to arrive at valid quantitative comparisons.
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funds during a campaign. However, the terminology denoting 
the relative importance of the various campaigns is unfort­
unately not so closely adhered to as Murphey, writing of a 
period some twenty-five years later, suggests. Murphey writes:
"The supreme commander-in-chief, serdar-i ekrem, was appointed by 
the Sultan...(he) was inevitably also the grand vezir...The serdar-1 
ekrem only took part in full-scale campaigns involving all available 
fighting contingents. Such campaigns were called sefer-1 
humayun...Below him came the commanders with the rank of vezir who 
led smaller armies comprising only a portion of the timariot 
cavalry, and without the participation of the sultan's kapu halki, 
the janissaries and the alti boliik cavalry. The title of commander 
of a vezir ordusu was simply serdar.* ^
This point must be clarified in order to determine which of 
the registers listed above falls within the bounds of the 
analysis here, for it is the accounts of the main campaign 
in a particular season which will be of major concern to us, 
rather than the lesser engagements involving what Murphey 
would describe as a vezir ordusu.
To illustrate how inadvisable it is to rely solely on the 
title of a register as a guide to the scale of the under­
taking recorded therein, I cite KK 1874. This account 
starts at the end of October 1595, when Hadim Cafer Pasha 
was appointed as a serdar on the dismissal of the grand 
vezir Koca Sinan Pasha after the loss of Estergon to the 
Hapsburgs.*? Cafer Pasha was sent to Belgrade to oversee
16. Murphey (1979) p.36
17. AK ff.48v: Lala Mehmed Pasha (Abdiilkadir mistakenly refers to him as 
Lala Mustafa) was appointed sadrazam, and Hadim Cafer was appointed as 
serdar. Abdiilkadir refers to Cafer as serdar-i ekrem after the siege of 
Egrl in October 1596 (AK f.76r), some time after the close of the 
account in question: this may further indicate how loosely the term was 
used.
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preparations for the campaign of the coming season, together 
with some janissaries, cebecis and topcus, and taking some
I  Q
cannon.0
In December 1595 (Rebi II 1004), Cafer Pasha, together with 
some kapukulu troops, was ordered to the defence of 
Teme^var, since an attack was anticipated.-^ May 1596 
(Ramazan 1004) sees the close of this account at the time of 
the start of the Egri campaign, which may be called a sefer- 
1 humayun in the most literal sense. Cafer Pasha’s 
expedition then, although described as a sefer-1 humayun in 
its register’s title, saw no real military action and was 
merely a holding-operation between the deposition of one 
grand vezir and serdar-1 ekrem, and the mounting of a new 
campaign which brought the appointment of a new serdar-1 
ekrem, Lala Mehmed Pasha.^0 The register KK 1874, then, 
does not bear comparison with the others cited above. This 
also serves to demonstrate the wide range of accounts that 
existed, even in the military area alone. By contrast, the 
title of KK 1879, which covers the major offensives of Uyvar 
and Kanije in 1599 and 1600, refers to the undertaking 
merely as sefer (-1 Uyvar ve Kanije).
For present purposes then, the title of any register is not
18. KK 1874 pp.9,10 for example, confirm Abdiilkadir*s account, recording 
the purchase of provisions for these janissaries, and of fodder for the 
horses drawing the gun-carriages. See also AE Murad 111/358, which Is
an order for the supply of fodder to these horses.
19. AK f.56v; PE£EVI II pp.174-75
20. Lala Mehmed died within 10 days of his appointment, to be replaced 
by Koca Sinan again; Sinan died shortly after, and by the time of the 
Egri campaign, the grand vezir was Damad Ibrahim Pasha. This Lala 
Mehmed should not be confused with the Lala Mehmed Pasha who commanded 
the campaigns covered in KK 1884, KK 1887 and KK 1889.
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sufficient guide to the magnitude of the undertaking which 
it represents, and the criteria employed in selecting 
registers which are comparable derive from corroborative 
evidence to be found in the contents and in the historical 
context of a particular register. In chronological series 
with these campaign accounts there are accounts which refer 
to activities other than these major campaigns, such as 
those recording the daily expenses of high officials as they 
moved from Istanbul on state business.^ The register KK 
1875, for example, Is an account relating particularly to 
Sultan Mehmed Ill’s participation in the Egri campaign, the 
one season In this war in which the sultan took part.^2 
Although it covers some items similar to those found in the 
campaign accounts proper, its personal nature, exemplified, 
for instance, in the frequent entries for food for the 
imperial kitchens disqualifies it from our current consider­
ation. A true Campaign Treasury account for the Egri 
campaign is no longer extant.
At times when there were two distinct campaigns under way . 
simultaneously, separate accounts must, therefore, have been 
kept for each. In 1603, the war with Persia began again, 
but the accounts for this military activity on the eastern
21. See also AE Mehmed III/181, which records the financial trans­
actions of the ser bawab Mustafa during the few weeks he spent in 
Belgrade in the late summer of 1603: Defter-1 bazi lrade ve masarif-i 
Mustafa...ser bawaban-1 dergah-1 all der muhafaza-yi Belgrad an 1}\_ Rebi 
I_ sene 1012 ila evahlr-i Cumada II sene-yi mezbur; he was the kaimmakam 
(representative) of the serdar in Belgrade (MM 7727 p.l).
22. The title of this register is: Defter-1 mznamce-yl humayun der vakt- 
1 reften-1 hazret-i padigah-1 alempenah...bl-sefer-i humayun...; it runs 
from 3 Zilkade 1004-29 Rebi II 1005 (29 June-20 December 1596), which was 
more or less equivalent to the whole period of the Sultan’s absence from 
Istanbul.
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front seem not to have survived. Again, within a single 
theatre of war, such as that comprising the Balkans and 
Hungary, there was more than one zone of activity during a 
single season. The financing of secondary action, such as 
the unsuccessful defence of Estergon In 1595 by Koca Sinan's 
son Mehmed Pasha, beylerbeyi of Buda and commander of the 
border with the Hapsburgs, must certainly have had its own 
set of accounts, as would the main action of that season, 
Sinan's ill-fated expedition against Michael of Wallachia.
The periods covered by these Campaign Treasury accounts are 
not uniform in length, in contrast to Barkan’s ’’budgets” 
which run for a full financial (solar) year, from Nevruz to 
N e v r u z . 3^ Some of the campaign accounts run for only a few 
months, and others for up to 2 years: furthermore, they are 
based on the lunar rather than the solar calendar. This is 
related to the 'extraordinary' character of campaign expend­
iture. Among the contemporary registers in series with the 
campaign account registers with which we are here concerned, 
there are others which do run for exactly a year: these 
record treasury income and expenditure in ongoing activities 
which were independent of war and not affected by its 
indeterminate duration. If we allow for the somewhat 
uncertain chronology of Ottoman history at this period, It 
is possible to say that the months covered by each indiv­
idual campaign account coincide with the tenure of office of 
the military commander whose name is cited in the title of 
the register concerned. In some cases at least, the title 
of the registers suggests this, by including a phrase 
"...der zaman-1..." (’...during the time of..."). This 
strongly indicates the responsibility of the commander for 
accounting for the funds used during the period of his 
tenure; however, the break between KK 1884 and KK 1887,
23. Nevruz in the Perso-Ottoman solar calendar falls on 21 March.
235
occurring in the middle of a campaign led by Lala Mehmed 
Pasha, shows that it was the campaign defterdar who bore 
final responsibility for the financial administration of the 
campaign.
It can be seen that there is an overlap of some days 
between accounts KK 1887 and KK 1889. According to Naima, 
the new grand vezir and serdar Malko$ All Pasha left 
Istanbul for Belgrade on 1 Muharrem 1013 (30 May 1604),^ to 
arrive in Belgrade by mid-July. Abdiilkadir, who was with 
Malkog All’s entourage at this time, puts the departure from 
Istanbul some thirteen days later.^5 Naima gives the date of 
Malkoq All’s arrival at the billet of Halkali as 5 Muharrem 
(3 June), while Abdiilkadir gives 20 Muharrem (18 June). It 
appears that Abdiilkadir must be wrong^n the details he 
gives on this point, and the source followed by Naima 
correct. The account for Malkoq All's campaign starts on 4 
Muharrem (2 June), just at the time, then, when he set out 
along the military road. The concurrent month of Lala 
Mehmed Pasha’s account must result from some items incurred 
during his tenure of the office of commander still being 
outstanding, and not being recorded until some weeks after 
they were incurred. The ’job-specific’ nature of the 
campaign account registers Is well illustrated by KK 1890, 
as is the continuing responsibility of the serdar and 
defterdar under whose auspices each account was prepared: 
although this register extends beyond the end of the war, it 
records war-related items, the financial transactions for
24. NAIMA I p.391
25. AK f.l93v. This Lala Mehmed must be distinguished from the 
Lala Mehmed who was appointed grand vezir on Koca Sinan’s dismissal.
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P fiwhich took some months more to complete. °
The campaign accounts for this period of war are much less, 
then, than the ’budget" of the Ottoman Central Treasury 
during a time of war, as Murphey believes to have been the 
case during the reign of Murad IV. 7^ In this later period, 
he notes, there are two distinct accounting models to be 
distinguished: the first is organised with revenues 
categorised according to which of the regional financial 
bureaus was responsible for their collection.*^ The second 
model disregards the precise geographic source of the 
revenues, and categorises income according to whether it was 
collected directly under Central Treasury auspices or was 
collected regionally and periodically sent to the Central 
Treasury. 9^ To explain this distinction, he suggests that 
the first (fuller) accounting model was that adopted in time 
of peace, since all government business was then conducted 
in one place, and the collection of revenues was easier than 
during wartime. The second type he considers to be 
representative of wartime accounting practice.The 
practical consequence of such an Interpretation Is that 
"peacetime" and "wartime" accounts may conveniently be
■
26. The chronology of Ottoman history at this period, as at others, is 
not yet finally established: we can, however, be confident enough about 
the general sequence of events to offer analysis of these Campaign 
Treasury account books.
27. Murphey (1979) uses the term "budget" in his discussion: it will 
therefore be maintained in the following critique of his work.
28. These financial bureaus were gikk-1 ewel (’First Bureau’), 
gikk-i sani (’Second Bureau') and the Anatolian Bureau.
29. Income in this "budget model" is recorded under the headings irsallye 
(cash instalments), varldat-1 mukarrere (regular revenues) and varidat-1 
gayr-1 mukarrere (irregular revenues).
30. Murphey (1979) pp.228-35
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compared In assessment of the different order of magnitude 
of income and expenditure in peace and war.^ Another 
interpretation Is offered here.
The document which Murphey cites as an example of a "peace­
time" account in illustration of the first of his "accounting 
models" covers the full solar year (sene-yl kamlle) from 
March 1613-March 1614.32 comparative "wartime" accounts 
he presents four documents from campaigns during the reign 
of Murad IV. These cover the periods June 1624-April 1625, 
January-December 1627, December 1627-December 1628, June 
1630-June 1631 respectively; they are all designated in the 
headings of their IEs as accounts for sefer-i humayun or 
ordu-yi humayun.^
By careful comparison of the campaign account registers
31. Murphey (1979) p.235: for instance, irregular revenues (which are 
found as a separate category in both "accounting models") constitute 
over 30% of total revenue in Murad IVs "wartime" accounts, and less 
that half of this figure in the "peacetime" accounts. This higher 
wartime figure arises, so Murphey maintains, because the 'extraordinary1 
avariz taxes were collected in time of war. His conclusion may be 
correct, but the alternative hypothesis presented here, suggests that 
such a comparison of "peacetime" and "wartime" account items Is 
irrelevant.
32. Murphey (1979) pp.234,439-45: MM 2725
33. Murphey (1979) pp.237,248,446-56: MM 744 (24 £aban 1033-29 Cum.II 
1034); ibid. pp.238-39,249,457-62: KK 1919 (14 Rebi II 1036-13 Rebi II
1037); ibid. pp.240,250,463-69: KK 1921 (14 Rebi II 1037-13 Rebi II
1038); ibid. pp.24l,251,470-79: KK 1927 (6 Zilkade 1039-5 Zilkade 1040). 
As is made clear in his bibliography, he also used other campaign 
accounts (Ibid. pp.327-28), but since he does not give copies of these 
documents, our discussion cannot be extended to include them.
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available to us from the 1593-1606 war with those cited by 
Murphey, it becomes apparent that Murphey's dichotomy 
between "wartime" and "peacetime" treasury accounts in the 
period of Murad IV is not tenable In the earlier period.
The crux, then, is to try to discover whether the situation 
as he analyses it in Murad IV's reign was the result of 
significant developments in the accounting procedures of the 
Ottoman treasury in the intervening years, or whether, 
perhaps, Murphey's analysis of the character of the campaign 
accounts is mistaken in its conclusions.
While one of Murphey's "wartime" accounts runs for a period 
of ten months, the other three each cover a year. The ten 
months of MM 744 cover approximately the time from Grand 
Vezir perkes Mehmed Pasha's departure on campaign against 
the rebellious beylerbeyi of Erzurum, Abaza Mehmed Pasha in 
1624, until shortly after the death of the former several 
weeks before the close of the account: as we have seen to be 
the case with KK 1890, it was the lags in completing all the 
financial transactions relating to a campaign which delayed 
the closure of the account, and, sure enough, perkes Mehmed 
is referred to as "merhum" (deceased) in the heading to MM
744.34
KK 1919 covers the campaign in which the grand vezir Halil 
Pasha was defeated by Abaza Mehmed Pasha, but closes some 
months before his consequent dismissal in April 1628.35 
KK 1921, which begins on the day directly after the closure of 
KK 1919, covers the time from the army's retreat into winter 
quarters at Tokat until the return to Constantinople of the 
new grand vezir, HUsrev Pasha, after the 1628 campaign in
34. HAMMER V pp.32-35,45-46; Murphey (1979) p.446
35. HAMMER V pp.72-79
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which Abaza Mehmed surrendered to him.36 The title of KK 
1921 indicates that both Halil Pasha and Htisrev Pasha held 
the office of grand vezir and serdar-i ekrem during its 
duration, for Halil was not dismissed until well into the 
period it covers.3? Finally, KK 1927 begins with Hiisrev's 
departure from Istanbul in June 1630, covers the time of the 
sack of Hamadan and the siege of Baghdad, and ends with the 
start of the following year's campaign.^®
When these campaign accounts are compared with those for the 
1593-1606 war, one obvious difference is that KK 1919, KK 
1921 and KK 1927 all last for a full year of twelve lunar 
months: they do not coincide with the appointment of a new 
grand vezir or commander, nor, Indeed, with that of a new 
def terdar. for it is EbUbekir who held that office in the 
consecutive years covered by KK 1919 and KK 1921. In series 
with these accounts of whose DSs and IEs Murphey gives full 
transliterations, there are a number of others which he also 
describes as "state treasury budgets", but which do not 
cover a full year.39 it is therefore doubtful how much 
importance should be attached to the fact that some of 
Murphey's campaign "budgets" run for a full year, especially 
when this is a lunar year.**0
36. HAMMER V pp.76-82: this account closes on 13 Rebi II 1038, while 
Hiisrev made his triumphal entry into Istanbul on 12 Rebi II 1038 (ibid.
p.82).
37. Murphey (1979) p.463: "icmal-i ruznamce-yl varidat ve masanf-i 
hlzane-yl sefer-yi humayun der zaman-i destur-1 mukerrem milgir-i efham 
vezlr-1 azam ve serdar-1 ekrem Hiisrev Paga ve Halil Paga...".
38. HAMMER V pp.115-21,129
39. Murphey (1979) pp.327-38: in particular, KK 1918 (14 Muharrem 1035- 
29 £aban 1035) and KK 1922 (11 Cum.II 1037-11 Safar 1038).
40. For the 1593-1606 war, KK 1879 is an example of a Campaign Treasury 
account which runs for exactly two lunar years.
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In seeking to understand the place occupied In Ottoman 
financial administration by the campaign accounts for the 
1593-1606 war, the significant point to be made in regard to 
the various types of Ottoman "budgets", and one which 
escapes Murphey, is that there was a hierarchy of Ds and of 
the summary IEs based on these. The "peacetime budgets" 
such as that for 1613-14, may be viewed as the closest 
approach to a full, annual "national account", GNP perhaps, 
while the "wartime budgets", for more reasons than that they 
do not each run for one solar year, may be more realist­
ically characterised as merely one specific type of account 
among the many which would have contributed to such a full 
statement. Apart from the problems of quantifying in cash 
terms that part of state funds which was alienated in the 
form of dirllks (benefices),111 and of potential tax income 
whose collection was waived in exchange for the performance
of specific services, we should not assume that a 
comprehensive statement of even all cash transactions was 
produced every year: this means that we should not expect to 
find full annual Central Treasury accounts for the years 
when the army was on campaign, with a debit entry on the 
Central Treasury account giving rise to an equivalent credit 
to the Campaign Treasury. A comprehensive Central Treasury 
account would have required the combining of all the D 
registers recording the various types of income and 
expenditure relating to the Central Treasury, the hazine-yi 
amire, which would have been an impossible task, and have 
served no practical accounting purpose.
"Wartime" and "peacetime budgets" cannot, therefore, be
41. Barkan (1953/b) p.28l contains, exceptionally, an assessment of 
the value of timars.
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considered comparable. The highly significant consequence 
of this is that "peacetime” and "wartime budgets" should not 
be used in an attempt to gauge the health of the Ottoman
h p
treasury by comparing the surplus balances on the accounts. 
Any attempt to reach quantitative conclusions on such a 
basis is invalid, and can only lead to erroneous conclusions 
concerning the financial position of the Ottoman Empire, 
since the entities being compared are not directly
comparable.
Whatever changes there may have been in the accounting 
procedures of the Ottoman treasury between the 1600s and the 
1620s, they were not such as to have altered the basic fact 
that the credits and debits of the hazine-yi amire-yi sefer- 
i_ humayun were only a part, albeit a large one, of those 
falling to the hazine-yi amire. This is emphasised by the
42. An example of such a comparison is found at Murphey (1979) pp.230-32: 
he points out that treasury income is higher in the "peaceful year of 
1613-14 than in the "war" years with which he compares this account, 
because tribute moneys from Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania were 
paid into the treasury in 1613-14 and not during the "war" years. In 
fact, he should not be equating the accounts for the Central Treasury 
(hazlne-yl amire) with those for the Campaign Treasury (hazlne-yi amire- 
yi sefer-1 humayun etc.). See also Murphey (1979) p.242.
43. Explicit evidence that campaign incomes and expenditures cannot be 
equated with those of the Central Treasury is provided in Campaign 
Treasury credit items which record clzye moneys as having been paid 
partly into the hazlne-yl amlre-yl astane-yl saadet and partly into the 
hazlne-yl sefer-1 humayun: e.g. trbe-clhet-l eda-yl akce-yi zlyade-yl 
clzye-yl gebran: tetlmme-yi vllayet-1 Edlme an vaclb-1 sene 1007 der 
uhde-yl Ahmed Mustafa an sllahdaran...ve Receb Nasuh an cemaat-1 
m(ezbur)...kl pig ezln bl-hazine-yl amlre-yl astane-yl saadet ve hazine- 
yi sefer-1 humayun bittevarih-1 muhtelife tesllm-1 hazlne kerde bud..."
(KK 1879 p.21).
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responsibility of the chief defterdar of the Empire for the 
Campaign Treasury in many of the 1593-1606 campaigns, as in 
those cited by Murphey. A more appropriate candidate for 
comparison with Murphey’s 1613-14 Central Treasury annual 
account would be that for the year from March 1582-March 
1583.^ It runs from Nevruz to Nevruz, as does that for 
1613-14, and is similarly organised according to finance 
bureaus. It is a ’’peacetime", and more or less full summary 
of Central Treasury income and expenditures, rather than 
merely those related to military campaign. Barkan has also 
published comparable annual accounts with a similar format, 
which show that Central Treasury, as opposed to Campaign, 
accounts, were based on the regional finance bureaus of 
Slkk-1 evvel, gikk-i sanl etc., from at least the mid-
sixteenth c e n t u r y .
In his discussion of Ottoman accounting procedures In the 
late seventeenth century, Sahillioglu distinguishes several 
types of ruznamge ("daybook") register. In particular, he 
writes:
"When the Sultan or the Grand Vezir were on campaign, and separate 
accounts were kept, these were called Rlkab Ruznamcesl 
(ruznamge of the Stirrup)".^
During the 1593-1606 campaigns, the sultan went on campaign 
only once, in 1596, and It has been noted above that no full 
Campaign Treasury account survives for this campaign. 
However, Sahillioglu’s rikab ruznamcesl appears to be a 
later equivalent of our ruznamce-yi hazlne-yl amire der 
sefer-1 humayun, for he assumes that, by the late
44. MM 893: that part of the account which lists the type of coin in the 
Central Treasury coffers is published in Sahillioglu (1978) p.35.
45. Barkan (1954/a) pp.238-40; Barkan (1954/b) pp.300-02
46. Sahlllioglu (1982) p.66
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seventeenth century, no special bureaucratic significance 
was attached to whether the sultan rather than the grand 
vezir led the campaign. When either of these men went, a 
full array of officials of the defterhane, the bureaucrats 
of the Ottoman treasury, went with him, so that there were, 
as Murphey puts it, in effect, two separate government 
establishments.Uzungarpili gives 1593 as the first year 
in which the defterhane went on campaign without the sultan 
being there in person;^® on the evidence of the lists of 
bureaucratic personnel accompanying the army on campaigns in 
Hungary which Abdiilkadir gives, this statement needs closer 
examination than there is room for here: the number of 
defterhane bureaucrats accompanying the army on the 1596 
Egri campaign is clearly greater than in other years, 
suggesting a qualitative difference from other campaigns as 
well as a quantitative one.^9 During the campaigns recorded 
in Murphey’s "war budgets", as all others of the 1593-1606 
war, it was never the sultan who commanded the campaign: 
Murad IV did not personally participate in campaigns between 
1624 and 1631, and Murphey’s analysis of account typology 
cannot therefore be ascribed to peculiarities arising from 
this eventuality. Further critical examination of accounts 
pertaining to years when there were campaigns on two fronts 
should enable further elucidation of the interpretation 
offered here; the discussion of the credits and debits of 
the Campaign Treasury which follows should serve further to
47. Murphey (1979) p.229
48. Uzunqarpili (1948) p.101: he cites as his reference FEZLEKE I p.12 
where the only relevant reference is "padlgah-i allgan sefere tevecciih 
etmeyince defterhane...gitmek kanun degll idl", and also (ibid. p.28) 
where it is simply recorded that the defterhane was sent on campaign 
with Sinan Pasha in 1593.
49. e.g.AK ff.4v,l6r,32r,38r,52v,53r, etc.
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illustrate the circumscribed nature of the Campaign Treasury 
accounts, and where they fit into the hierarchy of accounts 
of the Ottoman treasury.
The narrative of the following two sections is closely based 
on an examination of the entries in the Campaign Treasury 
accounts for the 1593-1606 war. The categories of revenue 
and expenditure listed In the IEs conveniently determine the 
treatment to be adopted, with details being provided by 
reference to the DSs and the Ds. It can be seen from the 
transliterations of these accounts (to be found in Appendix 
I) that the pattern of these IEs is not standardised, and 
their slightly varying format raises further problems in the 
attempt to put a precise and comprehensive figure to any 
specific income source or e x p e n d i t u r e . ^
Despite the wealth of quantitative detail available in these 
accounts, the figures for particular items have limited 
meaning in Isolation, and each needs to be considered In the 
wider context of other related figures which can be 
accurately established. This, however, is rarely possible. 
Of more significance are the percentage measures into which 
the raw figures may be transformed. Given the partial
50. Not all categories of revenue and expenditure are treated 
individually. For instance, certain of the outgoings of the Campaign 
Treasury can be matched with particular revenue sources, an obvious 
example being the repayment of loans: one component of the final 
category on the debit side of the accounts, eda-yl diiyun, is the obverse 
of the revenue entries recording the receipt of these loans (karz), and 
records the restitution of borrowed moneys to the lenders. In the 
appended transliterations the order of the categories of revenue and 
expenditure has, in some cases, been slightly modified, in order to give 
a more standardised presentation for the purposes of the present 
discussion.
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nature of these campaign accounts, as has been discussed and 
as will become still more apparent here, these percentages 
can only have relevance within the frame of the accounts 
/themselves: we should not ask the material to deliver more 
answers than it reliably can. The approach, therefore, is 
primarily adminstrative. The practical problems of working 
through the voluminous Ds dictate that the analysis should 
be weighted in favour of the macro, with the rich vein of 
the individual D entries being only partially exploited.
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Illiii. Analysis of the Revenues of the Campaign Treasury
First of all, we will look at the broad divisions into which 
Campaign Treasury revenue was divided for accounting 
purposes. It is through the examination of the entries on 
this side of the account that we can go some way toward 
answering questions about the Ottoman financing of war in * 
this period. As can be seen from the appended IEs, the 
Campaign Treasury was funded from two main sources:the 
first of these (A) was a subvention from the Central Trea­
sury, the hazlne-yl amire. The assignment of such a sub­
vention for campaign purposes further corroborates our con­
tention regarding the hierarchic structure of the accounting
| system of the Ottoman treasury.^2 The other main category of
i
revenue (B) was irad. current income due to the Central 
Treasury, but assigned directly for campaign purposes 
without passing through the medium of the Central Treasury.
I
This current Income is itself divided into three distinct 
parts. The largest slice (B.i) is referred to as mahsulat. 
and comprises revenue from the poll-tax (clzye) and the
j sheep tax (adet-1 agnam) as well as from tax farms
(mukataat). Clzye. being a gerl tax, was reserved for 
collection by the treasury, rather than being assigned for 
the support of provincial slpahls and other dirlik-holders.
51. The system of reference used here is as follows: specific entries in 
the IEs are indicated according to their codes in the transliterations 
viz. A,B,C for the credit side of the account, and P,Q,R,S,T,U,V for
the debit side of the account; where no page number is given in the 
footnotes, it is the cited IE to which reference is being made.
52. Further, at the bottom of the debit side of the IE for the 1604 
campaign, 6,235,320 akce remaining from the amount allowed for campaign 
expenses is shown as being returned to the Central Treasury itself: 
"teslim bl-hazine-yl amire-yi astane-yl saadet...11 (KK 1889).
2 4 ?
The sheep tax of adet-1 agnara, although it was widely- 
assigned to tlmarlots. as is clear from the collection of 
kanunnames published by Barkan, could also, as we see here, 
be paid to the treasury instead.53 The second category of 
current income (B.ii), emval-1 mttteferrlka is, as its name 
implies, a miscellany of income items, appropriately 
described by Murphey as being “irregular in volume (but) 
collected on a continuing basis”.5^  The third section of 
current income (B.iii) is varldat-1 gayr-1 mukarrere. income 
which was specifically associated with wartime, being 
largely composed of extraordinary levies imposed to help 
meet the costs of the campaigns.
In addition to the major campaign revenue sources of (A) and 
(B), another credit Item common to all these accounts is a 
fiscal adjustment (C) known as tefavQt. an accounting 
disparity between the values of coins entering and leaving 
the Campaign Treasury. KK 1885 and KK 1889 are also 
credited with a small cash-sum (”an baklye-yi muhasebe...”) 
remaining from the previous account: such an amount must 
have appeared as a surplus on the IE for the immediately 
preceding period when the final balance on the account was 
calculated.
The Central Treasury subvention (A) reached the Campaign 
Treasury in tranches (A.I etc), paid In under the auspices 
of officials such as the serdar himself or the janissary 
agha as need arose. The term "an yed-1...” (literally, "by 
hand of...") which describes this transaction, suggests that
53. Barkan (1943). Ottoman sheep taxes may bear the names adet-1 agnam. 
resm-1 ganem. koyun hakki inter alia; it is not altogether clear whether 
these names may have been used interchangeably at various times, and if 
not, which were serl and which flrfl taxes, and which groups of the 
population were liable for which sheep tax.
54. Murphey (1979) p.235
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the official named in this context had no greater* personal 
responsibility in the matter than to ensure that these funds 
reached the Campaign Treasury safely.55 The entity described 
as hazlne-yl amire has historically been considered co­
terminous with the Outer Treasury (hazlne-yl blrun)» that 
is, the 'public purse', while the revenues of the Inner 
Treasury (hazlne-yl enderun) were reserved to the sultan.5^
There is dispute over the relationship between funds in the 
Inner and Outer Treasuries: writing of the later seventeenth 
century, Sahillioglu implies that, despite the sultanfs 
resistance to interference with the Inner Treasury, funds 
were freely switched between the two as surpluses accum­
ulated or deficits arose in one or the other.57 Rdhrborn, 
on the other hand, criticises this view of the Inner 
Treasury simply as a source of funds to make up the short­
fall in the Outer Treasury, maintaining that a firm
55. The term "an tahvll-1...". by contrast, refers to a financial trans­
action in which, in the context in which it is widely used in the Ds and 
DSs of these campaign accounts, the individual mentioned had active 
responsibility for the performance of the transaction in question.
Pekete recognises this usage, when he gives "tahvil" the meaning 
"Verpflichtung", "Last11 (Pekete, 1955 I p.237). In the 1593-1606 
Campaign Treasury accounts, when "an tahvll-1..." is used to describe 
the receipt of certain current income moneys (irad), the implication is 
that the individual designated had the responsibility for the collection 
of these moneys for that Treasury. A random example illustrates the 
difference between the two terras: "an tahvll-1 Mevlana Ahmed kadi-yl 
Istarl Eflak der llva-yl Bosna an akce-yl bedel-1 tiifenkcl.yan-1 kaza-yl 
inezbur an vaclb-i sene 1013 an yed-1 Ahmed ve Shban al-mUbaslrln... 
157,500 akce" (KK 1890 p.23); the local cadi, Mevlana Ahmed, had
the duty to collect this money, but Ahmed and £aban actually paid 
it into the Campaign Treasury.
56. Sahillioglu (1982) p.66
57. Sahillioglu (1970) p.242
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distinction was made between the uses to which funds in the 
Inner and Outer Treasuries were put.
This difference of view is relevant to the question of 
whether campaign expenses were ’normally1 met from the Inner 
Treasury, or whether the use of Inner Treasury funds to meet 
campaign expenses is to be interpreted as indication that 
the war was putting severe financial strains on the Ottoman 
treasury. Although the rigidity of the functional divide 
between the Inner and Outer Treasuries at this time cannot 
easily be gauged, there is ample evidence of the sultans’ 
attempts to protect their authority over the Inner Treasury, 
by Jealously refusing funds for campaign expenses:^ this 
suggests that RShrborn's view is closer to the situation 
that pertained at this time (and, indeed, it is of a contem­
porary period that he writes).
The Campaign Treasury accounts show, nonetheless, that 
moneys were sent from the Inner Treasury to fund these
58. Rohrbom (1973) p.122
59. e.g. HAMMER IV p.228: in autumn 1593, at the start of the war, the 
grand vezir Koca Sinan Pasha asked a loan of 5m akge from the sultan’s 
private treasury, offering his own possessions as security; PE£EVI II 
p.327: Ahmed 113- wanted to postpone the start of the eastern campaign, 
but the geyhttllslam, Sunullah Efendi, suggested that he give money from 
the Inner Treasury for the purchase of provisions - this was met with a 
denial by the Sultan that money was available, and to Sunullah’s further 
suggestion of the Egyptian Treasury as a source of funds the Sultan 
retorted that that was his personally; Orhonlu (1970) pp.32,33: the 
grand vezir Yemipci Hasan Pasha wanted to borrow money from the Inner 
Treasury in order to pay troop wages, the loan to be paid back when the 
expected revenue came in, but Sultan Mehmed III refused to accede to his 
desperate request; Orhonlu (1970) pp.33,34: Mehmed III would not accept 
as defterdar a man who did not refrain from asking funds from the Inner 
Treasury C’lcerQden”).
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campaigns. In the account fop the campaigns of 1599 and 
1600, 60m akge from the Inner Treasury (hazlne-yi enderun) 
forms part of a revenue item described merely as 11 an hazine- 
y 1 amire...”.^ 0 More strikingly, revenue from the Inner 
Treasury was apparently the only central subvention which 
the Campaign Treasury received for the 1604 campaign 
season. ^
During these years, the Inner Treasury was frequently called 
upon to supply funds for the specific purpose of meeting the 
salary payments of the janissaries and other alti boliik 
troops.^ Since these units owed personal allegiance to the 
sultan, a case may perhaps be made for viewing the use of 
Inner Treasury money for this purpose as a legitimate call 
on these funds, rather than as a sign of extreme emergency.
60. KK 1879/A,A.ii.a. SELANIKI f.435r (May 1599): 100,000 gold coins (12 
million akge) were given to the serdar. Grand Vezir Damad Ibrahim Pasha, 
from the Inner Treasury, and 6ra akge to kapucu baga. Mustafa Agha for the 
purchase of provisions. This neatly coincides with the start of the 
campaign account running from 2 June 1599-10 May 1601 (KK 1879).
Looking at the IS for these two years, we see that the total amount 
handed over to the Campaign Treasury by Ibrahim Pasha was 72m akge 
(A.i.a): it is not clear whether the 12m akge mentioned by Selaniki were 
included in this sum or in the 60m akge sent from the hazlne-yl enderun. 
The name of Mustafa Agha does not appear at all in the IE of KK 1879, 
which Indicates that there may have been more administrative juggling of 
funds than is evident from this document.
61. KK 1889/A
62. MD 73/818: 30m akge was to be sent from the Inner Treasury to 
pay the kul troops on campaign in Hungary. TKS/D5527 is a receipt for 
the payment from the Inner Treasury of money for the wage3 of soldiers 
on campaign: Mlg hazineden sefer-i humayun mevacibi igiin altmig kise 
altun gikup her kisesi onar bin altundan altiytlz bin altun olur temessUk 
taleb olmagin tahrir olundu al-vaki fi 14 Sewal 1007”. There are many 
other such examples of wages being sent from the Inner Treasury.
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It is perhaps mistaken to seek to ascertain the ’normal’ 
relative responsibilities of the Inner and Outer Treasuries 
as a source of campaign revenue: most of the data at our 
disposal is from the later part of the war, when the grand 
vezirs were desperately searching for money to continue the 
fight. The different characters of the three sultans in the 
course of the war may be another factor which influenced the 
ease with which money could be extracted from the Inner 
Treasury to fund campaign expenses. The telhises edited by 
Orhonlu (q.v.) show the'extreme difficulties which the grand 
vezirs had to persuade Mehmed III and Ahmed I to part with 
money from the Inner Treasury, although the campaign 
accounts being discussed here show that they were not always 
unsuccessful in this aim. Whether Murad Ill’s magnanimous 
attitude towards Koca Sinan Pasha’s conduct of military 
affairs is a reflection of that sultan’s character or of the 
fact that money was more readily available earlier in the 
war, cannot be said with certainty.1^
The criteria according to which revenues such as those from 
mukataat. cizye and adet-1 agnam were diverted from the 
Central Treasury for payment directly into the Campaign 
Treasury, are not clear, but it seems that such decisions 
were taken by looking at each case or group of cases 
individually. The D entries show precisely which kazas
63. MD 73/818: ’...bilciimle gerek Eflak ve Bogflan ve gerek Budin 
serhadlarinda olan milhlmmat-i sefer ve gayrl cilmlesi seniin rey-1 rezine 
isabetkarinine tefviz olunmugtu r.. .ge rek hazine ve gerek yat ve yarag ve 
asker lie bu canibden lmdad ve muavenette kusur komlmayup”.
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paid these taxes into the Campaign Treasury.^1* So, too, the 
Milhimme series contains orders to cadis requiring that they 
deliver to the army the state moneys (mlrl akgesl) which 
they had collected.
For these campaigns in Europe, it was only the revenue 
arising In that part of the Empire which was paid directly 
Into the Campaign Treasury. While this may not be evident 
from the IEs, it is confirmed by looking at the Ds. 
Comparable revenues for Asia were sent to the Central 
Treasury in the first instance, and it is therefore imposs­
ible to tell what proportion of them was subsequently 
included in the subvention coming from Istanbul for the 
benefit of these Hungarian campaigns.
The presence of clzye money from Moldavia and Wallachia as 
credit items Ln the campaign account for 1599-1601,^7 some 
time after these areas had opted to support the Hapsburg 
cause, does not necessarily indicate that they continued to 
pay their dues but merely that the procedure by which they 
paid was slow, for by the following year such clzye moneys
64. KK 1884 (unpag.: entry dated 1 Muharrem 1012): "an tahvll-1 karye-yl 
Kizilklllse ve Bataynlca ve Veliki ve Obratofci ve Belarlca tabl-yi 
defter-1 vllayet-1 Slrem an vaclb-i sene 1010 an clzye-yl hodgan bi- 
hlzane-yl amlre-yl sefen-1 humayun averdend ve tesllm kerdend an yed-1 
Dervig gavug...,!t is representative of the format for D entries 
recording Campaign Treasury receipt of such taxes.
65. e.g. MD 77/437
66. MD 74/596: the adet-1 agnam and harac (= clzye) and other state 
moneys (mal-i mlrl) reaching Ifekddar and Gebze from Anadolu and Karaman 
and other places in Asia (tTbllcilmle 5te yakadan...”) were to be sent 
quickly to the Porte. Once the Persian wars resumed, such moneys were 
allocated to the commander of the eastern front (MD 75/593).
67. KK 1879/B.i.e,f
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are not mentioned.^ After Moldavia abandoned the Hapsburgs 
to return to the Ottoman fold, outstanding moneys, 
uncollected over the years of estrangement, were demanded in 
1605, and were to be sent to Belgrade: this must have been a 
welcome addition to campaign f u n d s . A t  the start of the 
war, in November 1593, Dubrovnik was ordered by Koca Sinan 
Pasha to send its harac to him on campaign, as, too, were 
Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia and Poland.70 A similar 
order was sent the following year.?*
The war did not make the task of tax collection easier. As 
a proportion of current income (B), the mahsulat figures 
(B.i) over the course of the war vary from a low of 46Jt in 
1603-4 to T455 in the following year,?2 but no discernible 
significance can be attached to this comparison, especially 
when we remember the time-lags involved.^3 The vilayet of 
Rumeli, from whence came most of the mahsulat revenues, 
should have been little directly affected by the conditions
68. KK 1885
69. MD 77/182; MD 77/184 orders that part of Wallachia’s outstanding 
clzye be paid to Istanbul in honey, and that the remainder be sent to 
Belgrade to pay troop wages.
70. Biegman (1967) p.127. Harac is to be equated with clzye in this 
context (ibid. p.30), since tribute* (harac) was regarded as commuted 
clzye. paid in a lump sum ( cf. KK 1879/B.i.d: ’...ber vech-1 maktu”); 
it is frequently translated sis ’tribute1.
71. Biegman (1967) pp.l4l-42. The annual sum to be psiid by Dubrovnik to 
the Porte was 12,500 gold pieces (=1,500,000 akce); the sum of 2,950,000 
akge recorded at KK 1879/B.i.d must therefore have been two year’s 
worth. Unlike Wallachia and Moldavia, which were reluctant to pay their 
tribute, Dubrovnik always paid its harac.
72. KK 1887; KK 1889
73. A possible explanation for the low figure in KK 1887 is that since 
this account did not cover a major confrontation, less money was needed, 
and the slack was left in the mahsulat section.
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of war, since this was an area far from the confrontation. 
Any problems in the collection of taxes were probably due to 
the indirect effects of the emergency on normal admin­
istration.
The area hardest hit was that along the Danube, bordering 
the rebellious Wallachia of Michael the Brave. His men 
would cross the Danube into Rumeli, burning villages and 
causing the inhabitants to flee: this deprived the Ottoman 
treasury of tax revenues. The mukataas along the Danube 
were part of the Tuna aklami which had been constituted an 
independent finance bureau in 1587.?** In 1603-4, some part 
of the income from this source was paid into the Campaign 
Treasury,?5 but difficulties caused by the rebellion in 
Wallachia were hindering the exploitation of the available 
potential. Those holding individual mukataas were unable to 
meet their payments to the treasury, and sent their excuses. 
The Danube crossings seem to have been particularly 
affected: with nobody crossing at Silistre and Nigbolu, the 
relevant dues were not f o r t h c o m i n g . ? ^  The inevitability of 
falling revenues from this area caused such desperation in 
official circles that the reunification of the Tuna aklami 
with the financial bureau of Rumeli was seen as the only way 
in which the arrears could be collected and the area receive 
sound financial administration.??
Two further points of confusion may be clarified. 33% of
74. Rdhrbom (1972) p. 119
75. KK 1887/B.i.d
76. MM 15546 pp.7,12 (1003 AH/1594-95), pp.9,10 (1005 AH/1596-97): these 
make it clear, incidentally, that the soldiers participating in the 
campaign were not exempt from such fees; MM 5294 n.69 (1006 AH/1597-98).
77. MD 77/79; in fact, the Tuna aklami appears to have survived until 
1625-26 (Rohrbom, 1972 p.119), indication, perhaps that the ending of 
the war saw an upturn in its fortunes.
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total Campaign Treasury revenue In the 1603-4 account is 
represented by 4 instalments, totalling over 40m akge. paid 
in by (Etmekgizade) Ahmed Efendi, the defterdar of the First 
Finance Bureau (gikk-1 evvel). and an individual who played 
a major role in the administration of campaign finances 
during the later part of this warJ^ In this accounting 
period, while the Central Treasury subvention remained at 
the same level as in the other accounts, current income 
entered under the heading of mahsulat (B.i) fell to half its 
normal level as a percentage of total Campaign Treasury 
revenue. We thus become aware of a further administrative 
stratum in the collection of regular state revenue, namely, 
that it was not invariably paid straight into the Campaign 
Treasury, but could also be collected under the auspices of 
the finance bureaus, acting as intermediaries, and was
78. KK 1887/A+; all the subvention income shown in KK 1890 
(= KK l890/A+) was collected under the auspices of Ahmed Efendi, and 
paid straight into the Campaign Treasury. The defterdar-i gikk-1 ewel 
was the bas defterdar. the man with overall responsibility for the 
Ottoman treasury as a whole. The career of Etmekgizade Ahmed is of 
great interest, and the part which he played in keeping money flowing 
into the treasury during this war merits a separate study: he obviously 
had an acute financial sense, and despite having to cope with the 
temperaments of Sultans Mehmed III and Ahmed I, succeeded in ordering 
state finances so successfully that he won only jealousy from the 
’military’ establishment. Naima (NAIMA II p.157) remarked of him that 
most of the vezirs tried to destroy him, but thanks to his pleasant 
nature and lavish expenditure he died a natural death. In this context, 
Rohrbom (1972) pp.130-37, which concerns the rivalry between defterdars 
and vezirs. deserves a sequel. Etmekgizade Ahmed was, in fact, the 
first defterdar to hold the rank of vezir (AZIZ pp.5,44; KK 1890).
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subsequently forwarded to the Campaign T r e a s u r y . ?9 The 
apparent fall in the proportion of Campaign Treasury revenue 
represented by the regular revenues of mukataa. clzye and 
adet-1 agnam in this period is therefore an illusion.
In the 1599-1601 account, the amount collected by the 
defterdar Etmekgizade Ahmed Efendi is recorded under two 
headings. First, parallel to his responsibility for the 
more than 40,000,000 akge which he collected in 1604-5, just 
discussed, in this earlier period he is specifically cited 
as having been responsible for the collection of current
79. KK 1894 is a register from the end of the war (July l606^ January 
1607) which records revenues collected thus. Its IE is entitled "lcmal- 
i_ muhasebe-yl varldat ve masarif-i hlzane-yl amlre...an tahsll-1 dustur-
i miikerrem milsir-l efham vezlr Ahmed Paga defterdar-1 gikk-i ewel...al- 
vakl fi 4_ Rebl I 1015 11a 17 Ramazan 101511. The use to which a large 
part of the revenue of this account was put is recorded on the debit 
side of its IE, under the heading ”at-tesllmat: irsallye bl-hazret-1 
padl$ah...ve bi-hlzane-yi astane-yl saadet ve bl-hlzane-yl sefer-1 
humayun-i EngdrUs...” (this register is unpaginated, but the breakdown 
of this item may be found under the head "at-tesllmat" in its DS). 
Significantly, it does not appear that the revenue on this account found 
its way, at least directly, to support the Persian campaigns at this 
time. This register represents another layer in the accounting 
hierarchy to which reference was made above in section Illii. (cf. 
Murphey’s two "budget models”): the regular taxes and dues collected in 
Rumeli were one aspect of the Campaign Treasury account, which was, in 
turn, one aspect of the full hazlne-yl ami re account. In the case under 
consideration here, KK 1894 covers some six months of the 15 months 
covered by KK 1890: thus, the 32m akge which was recorded in the DS of 
KK 1894 as a transfer to the Campaign Treasury ("irsallye-yl hlzane-yl 
sefer-1 humayun-1 Engdrds der canlb-i Belgrad...”) must be included in 
the 35,150,158 akge credit item of the Campaign Treasury account for the 
period (KK 1890/A+).
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income.Secondly, over 3,000,000 akge also collected by 
Ahmed Efendi, is subsumed under the category of emval-1 
milteferrlka (B.ii).®1 Bedel-1 ntlzill, the fin cash* 
surrogate of the 'in kind' irregular nilzill tax, is included 
in this 3m akge: in the account for 1604-05, the avanz 
levies of bedel-1 ntlzill and bedel-1 ganem are included as 
regular income besides the dues from cizye. adet-1 agnam and 
mukataat income.®^ Despite the apparently unrigorous 
compilation of these accounts, we may hypothesise that the 
inclusion of such bedel income in the categories mahsulat 
and emval-1 milteferrlka indicates that the kazas thus taxed 
had already, by this date, had these extraordinary levies 
transformed into a regular cash burden, in contrast to those 
kazas whose bedel-1 ganem and bedel-1 nilzill contributions 
were still recorded as being Irregular revenue (varldat-1 
gay r-1 mukarrere).
Emval-i milteferrlka (B.ii) accounted for less than 20Jt of 
current Campaign Treasury revenue (irad). Any involvement 
of the people with bureaucracy which required the issuing of 
an official document, be it for an appointment or to redress 
an ill, brought fees which were a source of income to the 
state coffers, and formed a major part of emval-1 
milteferrlka i n c o m e .
80. KK 1879/B: the phrase "an tahvll-1..." acknowledges the extent of his 
accountability in this matter.
81. This is not shown in the IE for KK 1879, but is seen in its DS at 
KK 1879 p.4: "an tahsll-i hazret-1 Ahmed Efendi defterdar-1 sikk-1 evvel 
an clzye ve adet-1 agnam ve bedel-1 nilzill ve mukataat ve 
gavrlhl"...3.490.000 akge.
82. KK 1889/B.i.c
83. Such fees were rilsum-1 be re vat, rusum-1 tezaklr and riisum-i ahkam-1 
slkavat.
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The income category emval-1 milteferrlka (B.ii) includes an 
element denoted beyt iil-mal. which is a terra for those
O h
treasury revenues deriving from inheritances (muhallefat). H 
State servants who died without legitimate heirs had their 
estates seized for the treasury (musadere). as did those who 
were executed.All such inheritances were temporarily 
held in trust by the treasury while legal heirs were sought. 
Details of this beyt ill-mal element found in the DSs reveals 
that it covers moneys accruing to the Campaign Treasury from 
the estates of prominent named military personnel, as well 
as of the kapukulu c o r p s . T h e  largest of such estates 
falling to the Campaign Treasury during the course of the 
war, as recorded in the DSs, is that of the serdar Satirci 
Mehmed Pasha, who left cash and effects amounting to over 10 
million akce.^ ? He was executed in Belgrade by order of the 
sultan in July 1599, the immediate reason being his 
unauthorised conferral on Gazi Giray Han of the 
beylerbey111k of Silistre.®^ His kethUda Ibrahim fled on 
hearing the news of his execution, and took refuge with Gazi 
Giray at Sonbor,®^ but did not long survive. He himself 
left over 1,000,000 akge.^ Q
Despite the Ottoman state's ever-pressing need for cash, the 
rules regarding inheritance seem to have been observed, at 
least in part, with the legal heirs being given some 
consideration. Without careful scrutiny of the Ds, it is
84. Lewis, art. Bayt al-Mal (El)
85. Bay sun, art. Musadere (IA)
86. KK 1879 p.3; KK 1885 p.7; KK 1887 p.6; KK 1890 p.3
87. KK 1879 p.3: "an muhallefat ve nukud-1 Satirci Mehmed Paga serdar-1
sabik...10,321,106 akce"
88. PESEVI II pp.224-26; NAIMA I pp.215-18. Kortepeter (1972) p.l6l
89. AKf.ll9v
90. KK 1879 p.3
impossible to say how closely the rules regarding the 
handling of the estates of the deceased were adhered to, and 
we cannot therefore say what proportion of the muhallefat 
recorded as a credit of the Campaign Treasury was a true 
credit, and what proportion was only temporarily at the 
disposal of the Campaign Treasury.9^  The payment of claims 
against the estates of the deceased are recorded on the 
debit side of the Campaign Treasury account in the category
91. The degree of legality with which estates were handled is not always 
clearcut: see, for example, the examples in Baysun, art. Musadere (IA), 
and in Orhonlu (1970) e.g. pp.17-18,24-25,54-55,91,131.
260
eda-yl dtiyun (V).92 Also recorded in the category of eda-yi
92. For instance, KK 1979 p.21:, "be-clhet-i eda-yi akge-yl Mehmed veled-i
Suleyman gavug an gavusan-1 deraah-1 all pederes lei der sefen-1 Uyvar 
miiteveffa gtide ve paha-yl muhallefates bi-hazine-yl sefer-i humayun 
blttevarih-1 muhtellfe an yed-1 Ibrahim cavus an gavusan-1 dergah-1 all 
emln-i beyt ill-mal-1 orduyu humayun 93.523 akge tesllm-1 hazlne kerde 
bud hfli a Mehmed aga an miiteferrlkagan-i dergah-1 all veled-i Siileyman 
gavus al-merhum be-orduyu humayun amede ve lspat-1 veraset kerde hala 
meblag~i mezbur bl-hazine-yi ami re daden fermude ber mucib-i hticcet-1 
Mevlana Mehmed...kadi-yl orduyu humayun ve ba-ferman-1 serif...93.529 
akge” (sic); this debit item of the Campaign Treasury records the 
payment of 93,529 akge to a certain Mehmed, who had satisfactorily 
proved that he was the son of a Siileyman cavus who had died in the Uyvar 
campaign of 1599: this money was the estate of Siileyman which had been 
paid into the treasury on his death until the legal heir appeared.
KK 1887 p.28: !tbe-clhet-l eda-yl akge-yl muhallefat-1 Mevlana Osman 
kadi-yl sabik-1 Saray kl der Belgrad miiteveffa sdde ve muhallefatesra 
Halil gavus an gavusan-1 dergah-1 all emln-1 beyt ill-mal-i hassa der 
Belgrad zabt kerde ve bl-hazlne-yl amlre an tahvil-1 Mevlana Osman kadi- 
yl sablk-1 Lofca an akge-yl bakiye-yl nilzill-1 kaza-yl mezbur an vaclb-i 
sene 1003 an kesr-1 keyl ber muclb-1 muhasebe-yl All Efendi emln-1 
nilzill-1 sabik der sefer-i Eflak ve BoBjdan fl 19 Zllkade sene 1011 24.220 
akge fl 23 Zilkade 1011 11.255 akge (ve) an tahvil-i Halil gavus emln-1 
beyt iil-mal-i hassa an muhallefat-i merhum al-mezbur bl-hlzane-yl amlre 
fl 23 Zllkade sene 1011 3.148 akge kl cemaan 38.623 akge tesllm-1 hazlne 
kerde ve hala Mdimed Qelebl veled-1 miiteveffa-yl mezbur asaleten ve Halil
Siileyman gavus an milteferrlkafean-1 dergah-l all an akge-yl muhallefat-1 /j 
(cont. over)
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dilyun are administrative fees in connection with the 
settling of estates which fell, in the first instance, to 
the Campaign Treasury.93
The estates described as muhallefat represent the upper end 
of the beyt ttl-mal-i hassa. which included all estates of
(note 92. cont.)
Abdiilwahab an kibel-1 Fatima ve Esmehan ve Emlne benat-1 milteveffa-yl 
mezbur vekaleten be-ordu-yl humayun amede ve ispat-1 veraset ve vekalet 
kerde end ve milteveffa-yl mezbur bl-kaza-yl Lofca kadi /.../ ber muclb-1 
suretl ruznamce-yl kadiasker davayl kerdend ve muhallefat-1 miiteveffa-yi 
mezbur taleb kerdend ve an Mevlana Ahmed Vlldanzade kadi-yl Belgrad 
sltade end ve an hlzane-yl amlre daden fermude ber muclb-1 ferman-1 all 
ve tezkere eda gQde...38.623 akge"; this debit item of the Campaign 
Treasury records the payment of nearly 40,000 akce to the three 
daughters of Osman, who had been cadi of Saray and died in Belgrade 
leaving an estate which was seized by the local authorities there. Most 
of this sum had, in the interim, been paid into the treasury indirectly, 
in lieu of outstanding nilzill moneys due from the kaza of Lofca.
93. KK 1879 p.18: Mbe-clhet-l eda-yl resm-1 kismet-1 merhum Satirci 
Mehmed Paga bl-Mevlana Mlnkarizade kadi-yl orduyu humayun ve kaimmakam-1 
kadiasker-1 Rumeli an muhallefat-1 merhum Satirci Paga kl pig ezln paha- 
yl muhallefateg bl-hazlne-yl sefer-1 humayun kabz kerde...30,000 akge 
(For the payment of the fees for distribution of the estate of the late 
Satirci Mehmed Pasha: paid to Mevlana Mlnkarizade, cadi of the Imperial 
army and kalmmakam of the kadiasker of Rumeli, 30,000 akge from the 
estate of the late Satirci Pasha, this estate having earlier been seized 
for the Campaign Treasury). Resm-1 kismet is the fee for supervising 
the division of inheritance.
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over 10,000 akge and was reserved to the sultan.9^ Estates 
of less than this amount were designated as beyt Ul-mal-1 
amme.95 Adjustments in the value of the coinage mean that it 
is not possible to compare the relative size, in real terms, 
of the estates recorded in the Campaign Treasury accounts 
with those of other members of the military class published 
by Barkan.96 However, an estate such as Satirci Mehmed 
Pasha’s must be considered huge by any reckoning: the 
levying of resm-i kismet on the estate of this commander, 
who was executed, and whose estate was therefore liable for 
forfeit by the sultan, suggests that the c.10,000,000 akge 
credited to the Campaign Treasury on his behalf was not the 
total of his worth, and it appears that, despite his 
being executed, part of his estate was distributed to his 
heirs.97 Details concerning the size of the estates of 
deceased state officials are most valuable as an Index of 
the possibilities for accumulation open to those holding
h i g h  office.93
Although the estates of some of the kapukulu regiments were 
credited to the Campaign Treasury, the Janissaries had a
94. Sahillioglu (1970) pp.242-43 says that (muhallefat) was a regular 
source of income for the Inner Treasury: the presence of substantial 
muhallefat revenue in the Campaign Treasury is thus a further index of 
the extent to which the sultan’s private purse was fused with the 
public by this time.
95. cf. Lewis, art. Bayt al-Mal (El)
96. Barkan (1966): on the revaluation of the coinage, see esp. pp.443-52.
97. His grave was paid for out of the Campaign Treasury: ’’teslim be-Sinan 
bawab be-clhet-1 bina-yl mezar-i merhum Satirci Mehmed Paga serdar-i 
sabik...30,500 akge” (KK 1879 p.12).
98. A general study Is Inalcik (1969); on the increased prevalence of the 
practice of confiscation from the seventeenth century, see Veinstein 
(1981).
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separate beyt Ul-mal." A beyt ill-mal register for the 
janissaries who died at Kanije in l600-l*^ gives 
interesting details parallel to those of the inheritance 
registers analysed by Barkan.^* 131 janissaries are 
mentioned, together with details of their effects which were 
subsequently sold. Including their cash holdings, the sura 
raised from the sale of these goods after the deduction of 
burial expenses and outstanding debts of certain of the 
janissaries, was 319,982 akce. The largest Individual 
estate was that of the infantry commander (ser plyadegan) 
which totalled 101,320 akge. Four others exceeded 10,000 
akge. but there were many janissaries owning goods worth 
less than 200 akge. In contrast to the splendid garments, 
decorated horse furniture and other ceremonial military 
trappings of the wealthiest, the possessions of those at the 
lower end of the scale were only the simple clothes worn in 
pursuit of their d u t i e s . T h e  estates listed here do not, 
unlike Barkan’s material, include immoveable property. This 
suggests that the figures given in this register are a 
minimum Indication of wealth, and only cover Janissaries’ 
effects in the field.
The estates of 619 janissaries who met their end In May 1604
99. KK 1879 p.3: ”beyt (il-mal-i slpahlyan ve sllahdaran ve gayrlhi...”; 
KK 1885 p.7, KK 1887 p.6: ’beyt ill-mal-i slpahlyan...”; KK 1890 p.3: 
,fbeyt Ul-mal-1 cebecjyan...”.
100. MM 101 ff.1-14: ,fdefter-l milfredat-i beyt ttl-mal-1 yenlgerlyan-1 
dergah-1 all bi-muhafaza-yl kale-yl Kanije vakl glide der zaman-1 Sefer 
Aga ser turnaci ve emin Ahmed su bagL an cemaat 58 ve katlb al-haklr 
Mustafa fi 1 Cumadal 11a gaye-yl sene 1009”
101. Barkan (1966)
102. These were a long robe (dolama), trousers (gakgir). vest (zebun). 
undershirt (astar) and a garment for protection against rain (barani); 
cf. MD 75/44; MD 75/82; KAVANIN ff.36v-37r.
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in the Hungarian wars, amounted to 752,165 akge.103 The 
regimental purposes to which approximately 51,000 akge of 
this was put were the provision of water supplies (seylshane) 
for those transporting campaign funds from place to place, 
and for new flags.101* Part of the sum raised from the sale of 
the effects of those who had died at Kanije was also used 
for immediate expenses, such as aid to the wounded. 105
Further emval-i milteferrlka (B.Ii) items which are mentioned 
In the IEs are the periclk-1 esar, the ’fifth1 owed to the 
state on prisoners taken in war,10  ^and various gifts 
(plgkeg). given as a mark of r e s p e c t . 107 Another item is 
bellyat ve ketmlyat-1 bazi kesan. which appears to be moneys 
due to the treasury which had been misappropriated and only 
later traced.10  ^ Such embezzlement could be of enormous 
proportion: the abscondment of the former defterdar of the 
Danube finance bureau (Tuna aklami) with over 2,000,000 
akge in 1605 was doubtless an additional reason for hoping 
that the area would yield more if this bureau was wound up,
103. MM 101 ff.21-60: of these, 3 estates amounted to over 100,000 akge. 
and there were a further 8 between 10,000 and 100,000 akge. On the 
evidence available, the janissaries fighting in the Hungarian campaigns 
were better off than their comrades on the eastern front: a beyt ill-mal 
list, dated Ramazan 1017 (December 1698), for 137 janissaries on the 
sefer-1 sark. shows that only two had estates valued at over 10,000 
akge. and the estates of only 16 were over 2,000 akge (KK 9421 pp.2-22.)
104. MM 101 f.59r
105. MM 101 f.l4v
106. See also MD 73/1277; MD 77/261
107. KK 1889/B.ii.b shows gifts from those holding the office of rels (it 
is unclear to me who these are), and from the metropolitans of the Greek 
Orthodox church: on the metropolitans and their places, see Inalcik 
(1982/b); Orhonlu (1970) pp.124-25. See also plgkeg entries at KK 1885 
p.7; KK 1887 p.7.
108. I have found no other reference to this term.
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and the financial affairs of the area returned to the 
control of the First (Rumeli) Bureau (gikk-1 evvel).10  ^
Once_the culprit had been identified, the money due to the 
state was paid into the Campaign Treasury where appropriate. 
In cases where money had been wrongfully extorted from the 
reaya on the pretext of various wartime levies, efforts at 
restitution appear to have been made once the alleged mis­
demeanour had been investigated.110
The income item zlyade-yl mevacib111 appears to have arisen 
when too much money which was given for the payment of wages 
to the troops, the surplus being returned to the Campaign 
Treasury. Similarly, money was sometimes allocated for the 
purchase of equipment and not spent.11  ^ Certain emval-1 
milteferrlka revenues which are described in the DSs and Ds, 
although not In the IEs, are the selling off of animals 
(oxen, draught horses and camels) and equipment, from river 
craft (sefine) to carts which were no longer of use for the 
purpose of transporting provisions and materials of war; the 
money they fetched was credited to the Campaign Treasury.113
The greater part of the Campaign Treasury revenue category 
of varldat-1 gayr-1 mukarrere (B.iii) consists of a number 
of irregular levies imposed in consequence of the war; the
109. MD 75/230; cf.MD 75/343
110. e.g. MD 77/639
111. KK 1887/B.ii; see also KK 1879 p.4
112. KK 1890 B.ii; see also KK 1879 p.4: "an akge kl be ray-1 bazi 
mUhlmmat-1 mlrl dade bud sarf na-kerden baz bl-hazlne tesllm kerde...".
113. e.g. KK 1876 p.26; KK 1887 p.7; such items were described as 
amelmande (no longer suitable for work): "an tahvll-1 Mehmed Celebl 
emln-1 sergl-yl humayun an akge-yl paha-yl ilgtttran ve barglran-i 
amelmande kl ftiruht glide ve kiymeteg bl-hlzane-yi amlre averfle...26,100 
akge" (KK 1887 p.107).
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imposition of such levies was a typical device of contem­
porary states with strong central government for the raising 
of extra funds. When these are examined in more detail than 
is afforded by the IE entries, a basis for categorisation 
becomes clear. A first group comprises the provisions- 
substitute taxes which have been discussed at length in Part 
II: bedel-1 nUzUl, bedel-1 siirsat and bedel-1 ganem.111* 
Discussed in the same place Is a second group, money 
credited to the Campaign Treasury from the sale of 
provisions to the troops. Thirdly, there Is the bedel-1 
tlmar, a levy on those who did not appear to serve in the 
campaign. The fourth group, in contrast to the first, which 
constitutes cash payment as a substitute for goods, 
consists, rather, of cash payments substituted for service 
and for the support of particular corps of troops. Fifthly, 
loans to the Campaign Treasury (karz) may be found included 
for accounting purposes with these Irregular taxes.
During the early years of the 1593-1606 war, the main con­
tributors of bedel-1 tlmar were the provincial slpahis of 
Anatolia and the Aegean litoral.^ 5  These areas were well 
away from the theatre of war, and not threatened by the 
possibility of active involvement in the campaigns against
114. Related to the obligation to supply provisions to the troops, which 
was discussed in Part Ilii, was the obligation upon the reaya to bear 
the freight cost of transporting such provisions to wherever they were 
required: this was called navlun akgesi. How this levy fitted into the 
avanz tax structure is not clear: see MD 73/325; KK 2557 is a register 
which lists the supply of barley from Silistre to the imperial stables, 
and in whose heading (ibid. p.4) It Is stated that navlun-1 seflne shall 
be taken at the rate of 5 akge per keyl of barley supplied by each 
avanzhanesl. Alternatively, the reaya could transport such grain in 
their own craft instead of paying a cash sum to the treasury (MM 7348
p.64).
115. MD 72/647
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the Hapsburgs, but the demand for troops for the Hungarian 
campaigns could not be met at risk of neglect to the duties 
of local policing and defence which were part of the con­
tractual obligations of the tlmar-holders.^^ Orders were 
sent out demanding the collection of this exemption fee, not 
only from those of the provincial cavalry whose appearance 
was not required that year, but also from central government 
agents who held such benefices (mliteferrlkas, gavuses, and 
the clerks of the divan and maliye), and who were not called 
to serve on the campaign.Liability to pay the bedel-i 
tlmar was therefore not restricted to members of the 
provincial cavalry who did not participate in the campaign, 
but extended to include other dlrlik-holders.
The amount to be levied as bedel akge si was based on the
official yield of the dlrllk, as described in the document
liftissued to the timar-holder on his appointment. It appears 
to have been usual for a sum equal to a whole year's income 
to have been demanded.11  ^ In the early part of the war, the 
decision as to who was to go on campaign and who to stay at 
home, was related to the size of the benefice which the 
slpahl held, as we have seen in Part I.
Although contemporaries still considered it incumbent on
116. KK 1879 p.390 records the payment into the Campaign Treasury of the 
bedel-1 tlmar of four sancaks of the vilayet of Rum, viz. Amasya,
Divrigi, Canik and porum, to a total of 279,349 akge: "an tahvil-i 
mezkurln an akge-yl bedel-1 tlmar-1 slpahiyan-i llva-yl mezbur in kl der 
muhafaza tayin sQdend an vacib-1 sene 1008 an yed-1 Htiseyn gavus...".
117. MD 72/11; MD 72/647
118. For instance, MD 72/775: "tlmarlamnm be rat lari muclbince yazusuna 
gbre...".
119. e.g. MM 7336 p.74: "tlmarlarimn blrer yilllk mahsullan miri igtfri 
kabz olunmak...".
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djjpllk-holders that they should appear on campaign,the 
documents quoted above demonstrate that the alternative of 
paying an exemption fee was prevalent, and the conditions 
under which this was to take place were laid down by central 
government decree. In 1594 a fetva was issued to the effect 
that those gavuges. mvlteferrlkas and clerks who held tlmars 
and zeamets and who did not go on campaign must pay a bedel 
to the t r e a s u r y . T h e  governments enjoyment of this 
latitude to decide which troops were required on campaign, 
and in which cases it was more convenient to have bedel cash 
with which other campaign costs could be met, did not last.
In the latter years of the war, the difficulties of 
mobilisation are exemplified in the desperate tone of the 
proliferation of orders which demonstrate that government 
demands for the bedel akgesl were no longer simply a 
question of an option chosen on the basis of optimum 
resource allocation, but had become an attempt to make the 
best of a deteriorating situation in which troops refused to 
appear on campaign, and the levying of the bedel was a means 
of providing money with which to pay for local Balkan 
recruits. The extent to which the collection of the bedel 
could be enforced in such circumstances is not c l e a r . T h e  
bedel-1 tlmar changed in character to become a payment 
substituted for a service which the government had no longer 
the power to command, and by the mid-seventeenth century, 
the payment of bedel-1 tlmar in lieu of campaign duty had
120. Rohrbom (1973) p.83
121. Rdhrbom (1973) p.83
122. MD 77/467. Another related development in response to the need for 
money and the reluctance of troops to mobilise was the extension of the 
application of the bedel-1 tlmar to Rumeli itself: AK f.228r. The added 
strains on resources occasioned by the Persian campaigns removed the 
option of being able to resort to Anatolia for troops or bedel-1 tlmar 
financing for the Hungarian campaigns.
Jr C-j c'- V  L \  c\_
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been accepted as part of normal practice.-^3
The payment of a cash levy in lieu of service was also 
applied to categories of auxiliary troops in Europe who, 
although summoned, neglected to appear on campaign. Cryptic 
terminology does not allow more than a hypothetical under­
standing of the circumstances in which this levy was 
exacted. Confusion centres around the use of the terra 
cerime, and whether there is any technical difference 
between the cash revenues of bedel-1 yiirilkan-1-^ 1* and 
bedel-i cerlme-yl yilrilkan,-^5 for instance. The implication 
in the latter case is that these yUriik were ordered to 
participate in the campaign, but did not appear, and were 
fined in consequence. The word cerime. and its variant 
cilrm. may mean both ’crime' and ' f i n e 1, ^ 6  and it seems that 
it should be understood in the present context as a penalty 
to be paid for disregarding the order to appear on campaign. 
It is possible that both versions are to be equated; alter­
natively, in the case where the word cerime is not included, 
it may be that these ytlrilk were excused campaign duty, in 
the same way as tlmar-holders in the early years of this
123. Kunt (1983) p.88
124. KK 1885 p.8: the text of this Item of income is "bedel-1 yiirUkan
sefer nlyamedegan
125. KK 1887 p.8
126. Heyd (1973) p.276. The context in which we find this use of cerime
differentiates it from other fines for infringements which are referred
to in kanunnames of the yttrUks: e.g. Barkan (1943) pp.260,263. See also 
Gokbilgin (1957) pp.44-45.
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war.
In addition to cash levies on the auxiliary yilrtiks. pandor3. 
and voynuks. income was derived from bedel-1 tttfenkciyan 
(musketeers), bedel-i lagimclyan (miners), bedel-i neccaran 
(carpenters), bedel-i haddadan (blacksmiths). The 
participation of the former groups derived from historic 
practice, while the latter were constituted purely on a 
functional basis to meet the demands of warfare at this 
time. The service-sub'stitutes (bedel) of these latter 
groups were cash levies demanded from the reaya to meet the 
costs of providing and equipping such units. There are 
signs of regional differentiation, with bedel-i 
laRimciyan being demanded from the sancak of Semendre in
127. MD 77/608: this demand for the bedel of the Kocacik yilrdks. by 
putting a figure to, and demanding, the bedel for the following year 
also, suggests that a distinction can indeed be made according to 
whether the word fcerime* appears in the account entry, since a fine for 
disobedience could not be demanded in advance of the transgression. 
Parallel usages are bedel-i cerime-yi pandoran (KK 188M, unpag.: entries 
dated 3 & 15 Muharrem 1012)) and bedel-i pandoran (KK 1890 p.76): the 
text of the two former entries specifies that the fine was taken because 
these pandoran. who were appointed to serve in Transylvania in the 
previous year, had fled. The same distinction may thus be applied to 
bedel-i cerime-yi ktlrekclyan (KK 1887 p.8) and bedel-1 cerlme-yl 
voynugan (KK 1885 p.8)
2 7 i
p a r t i c u l a r , -*-28 an(j bedel-1 tilfenkglyan from Bosnia.^29
These levies to support specialised troops became more 
prevalent as the war continued, and as earlier sources of 
recruitment and of funds were unable to meet the particular 
requirements of the war against the Hapsburgs at this time: 
they constitute an important new type of taxation, which, 
like the provisions-substitute taxes, was to become more 
permanent.
128. KK 1890 pp.35,39,48,54; it was, together with neccar akgesl. also 
demanded from the kaza of Galata (MD 75/217), from where builders, 
architects and other skilled workers were sent through the course of the 
war.
129. MD 77/664: in 1606, the bedel-1 tiifenkgl (and also the bedel-1 
nilzill) was to be collected from all the reaya of this area, and 
delivered to Belgrade. Since the reaya of Bosnia were deemed 
inexperienced in the use of muskets (”ol canlblerin reayasi tilfenk atmak 
babmda mahir olmamagla...") the money collected as bedel-1 tiifenkgl was 
to be used to pay the wages of recruits from elsewhere. Inalcik (1980) 
p.315 says ,fIn the seventeenth century, the tiifenkgl bedell, a new tax 
in cash, was introduced to cover the costs of increased musketeer 
enrolling”: the data presented here give a more precise terminus a quo. 
and show (perhaps) that, during the period of this war, the bedel-i 
tilfenkglyan had been established as a regular cash tax in some areas, 
while in others it was a substitute for service; in this connection, 
compare KK 1890 p.4l: "an tahvil-1 Mevlana Ahmed kadi-yl Tegne an akge- 
yl bedel-1 tilfenkglyan-1 kaza-yl mezbure an vaclb-1 sene 1013 an yed-1 
Malkog al-milbagir...39.754 akge*1 (see also KK 1890 pp.45,48), and KK 
1887 p.94: "an tahvil-1 Ibrahim aga ser bawab-1 dergah-1 all an akge kl 
pig ezln der mukabele-yl nilzill ve ganem ve navlun-i llva-yl Bosna beher 
10 hane fl 1_ neferan tilfenkglyan tahrlr gilden fermude ve tilfenkglyan 
tahrlr sQden ber muclb-1 lvaz mpyesser na-gilden ve badehu bedel-1 
tilfenkglyan-1 kaza-yi Yenlbazar ve Istari Eflak ve Plrepoy ve Vlgegrad 
an vaclb-1 sene 1010 an yed-1 Ahmed slpahl muhawll gilde...5.170 akge**
(see also KK 1884, unpag.: entries dated 18 £ewal, 23 Zilkade 1011).
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Government borrowing to finance war constitutes a further 
element of irregular income (B.iii). The Ottoman state, more 
centralised at this date than its European neighbours, had a 
financial administration of greater sophistication. The 
Central Treasuries of the European states served only to 
furnish the expenses of warfare:
,Der "Staatsschatz", der in jedem Lande Europas ira wesentlichen fdr 
die Kriegsfiihrung gesammelt und gehortet worden ist, reichte fUr die 
unmittelbaren Kriegsvorbereitungen und fttr die Mobilmachung. Dann war 
er erschdpft."1^  —  ?
Current revenues could cover only half of the money dis­
bursed by Castile in 1574, and the shortfall was covered by 
massive borrowings.^l it was commonplace in contemporary 
Europe for belligerent states to take advantage of the 
availability of funds to be borrowed, but in striking con­
trast to the Ottomans, it was to the developed credit 
/ institutions of the international capital market that re- 
/ course was m a d e . ^ 2  The scale of Ottoman borrowing was 
I/ insignificant when compared with the chaotic Spanish finan­
cial s i t u a t ion.The loans which the Ottoman military 
establishment made to the Campaign Treasury were often for a 
specific purpose, to meet a shortfall when cash was 
temporarily u n a v a i l a b l e , 1 ^  and were an internal response to 
a problem for which other states resorted to an external
130. Bog (1980) pp.17-18
131. Parker (1979) p.56l; without giving a precise date, Bog (1980) p.18 
says that war costs consumed 93£ of the Spanish annual budget.
132. It was in the nineteenth century that the Ottoman Empire began to 
engage in foreign borrowing (Veinstein, 1981 p.123).
133. As a percentage of Campaign Treasury revenue, KK 1879: 1.9J5;
J KK 1885: 5.2%; KK 1887: 2.855; KK 1890: .355.
134. e.g. KK 1885 p.8: tf...karz der vakt-i muzayaka dade”.
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solution. The European states’ ease of access to credit 
facilities cannot but have discouraged a more careful 
appraisal of other potential options.
On only some occasions do the DSs of these campaign accounts 
provide us with details of those making loans to the 
Campaign Treasury; usually the account entry merely says 
that loans were made to "some people" ("bazi kesan"). In 
the period from July 1602-February 1603, the largest loan, 
at 3,898,165 akge. was provided by an Individual identified 
simply as haz ret-1 efendi. This was to meet a shorfall in 
ready funds, as was the 1,394,320 akge lent by hazret-1 
sahib-1 s a a d e t . 1 ^  of the various other contributions, a 
certain Muslih iil-din provided 1,260,000 akge. All, the agha 
of the janissaries more than 1 million akge, and a certain 
Receb subagi, 240,000 a k g e .*36 in the period August 1603-July 
1604, the serdar Lala Mehmed Pasha lent over 2.5 million 
akge to the Campaign Treasury.^37
Record of the repayment of such personal loans is found on 
the debit side of the Campaign Treasury accounts as eda-yl 
dttyun (V). Since many of the loans were made to meet a 
temporary embarrassment of cash, repayment could be prompt.
A loan of 60,000 akge made by Nuh Pasha was repaid to him 
within the six months from July 1602-February l603.1^^ A 
Medhi Efendi also received 93,165 akge In repayment of a 
loan for the same amount made during this period.^39 The
135. KK 1885 p.8: could hazret-1 efendi be the geyhttllslam? Likewise, the 
identity of hazret-1 sahib-1 saadet is uncertain: was this the sultan or 
the serdar?
136. KK 1885 p.8
137. KK 1887 p.8
138. KK 1885 pp.8,17; Nuh Pasha was beylerbeyl of Anadolu at this time.
139. KK 1885 pp.8,17
grand vezir and serdar Yemigci Hasan Pasha made loans 
totalling nearly 3,000,000 akce to the Campaign Treasury in 
the spring of 1602, the season in which he retook Istolni 
Belgrad from the Hapsburgs: he had been repaid in full by 
July of the same year.1**0 Repayment of the defterdar 
Etmekgizade Ahmed’s huge loan of 4,365,770 akge must have 
taken longer, for there is no mention of him having lent any 
money at all between July 1602 and February 1603.11*1
In the earliest Campaign Treasury account we have for this 
war, the only lender is the individual denoted as ”hazret-1 
sahlb-1 saadet”, who may perhaps be the sultan or grand 
vezir.11*2 This is also the account with one of the lowest 
loan:total revenue ratios. Subsequent accounts, as we have 
seen, show a range of lenders. This may indicate that it 
was, in the first instance, the sultan or grand vezir who 
lent when there was a shortfall in funds, but that later in 
the war, he was no longer able, or perhaps was merely 
unwilling, to do so. Writing of the later seventeenth 
century, Abou-el-Haj has this to say about
140. KK 1885 p.38 (20 Muharrem 1011/10 July 1602): ’be-cihet-1 eda-yl 
akge-yl karz-1 hazret>-l sadrazam ve serdar-1 ekrem Hasan Paga...kl pis 
ezln der miizayaka-yi mevaclb fl 18 Sewal ve fl 26 m(ezbur) ve fl 18 
Zllkade sene 1010 bl-hazlne-yi amlre-yi sefer-1 humayun ber vech-1 karz 
dade bud hala 2,400,000 akge eda gdde...2,4Q0,00Q akge”; KK 1885 
(unpag.: entry dated 8 Safar 1011/29 July 1602): "be-clhet-1 eda-yl akge- 
yl karz-1 hazret-1 sadrazam ve serdar-1 ekrem Hasan Pasa...kl pig ezln 
der hln-1 milzayaka-yl mevaclb fi 21 Zllhlcce sene 1010 ve fl 8 Zllkade 
ber vech-1 karz 1,300 slkke ve 500 slkkeyl cemaan 1,800 sikke-yi hasene 
dade bud hala eda gtlde...2l6,000 akge”. Both these texts also make it 
clear that repayment was in gold coin, as the loan had been, the akge 
being the unit of account. The Campaign Treasury account for the 
(preceding) period in which Yemigci Hasan made this loan is not extant.
141. KK 1885 p.l6: "be-clhet-1 eda-yl akge-yl karz-1 Ahmed Efendi 
defterdar-1 gikk-1 evvel...4,365,770 akge".
142. KK 1879/B.iii.b
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such apparent "noblesse oblige” among the ruling class:
"...individual grandees1 committing their personal talents and 
private wealth...to the ,fbenefit" of Ottoman society, whether in 
the forms of equipping and sending a certain number of auxiliary 
troops to campaign at their personal expense, or contributing 
directly to the public treasure when the latter was short of 
cash...should not be allowed to totally mystify their parallel 
ideological purposes. In these practices, the ruling factions of 
the elite class do not' differ from their counterparts in Europe...in 
the sense that they took responsibility for coming up with the 
resources in money and men to uphold a system of which they were
afterall the main b e n e f i c i a r i e s . " * ^
During the 1593-1606 war, the chances of being reimbursed in 
full were high, and capital accumulated by high-ranking 
military officers could be put to useful purpose in the hope 
of future personal preferment, conveniently masquerading as 
zeal. Again, such personal loans to meet short-term 
shortage of cash to pay the troops, must, in view of the 
many reports of near-mutiny owing to the late arrival of the 
soldiers1 pay, have been considered preferable to the risks 
of such insubordination. By lending money to the Campaign 
Treasury, members of the military establishment were acting 
so as to perpetuate the system and preserve their place 
within it.
The match of the amounts lent to the Campaign Treasury with 
' the amounts repaid to any individual strongly indicates that 
interest was not paid on these loans: had interest been 
paid, it is probable that the D entries would have made 
reference to the fact. The opportunities for productive 
investment which were open to the Ottoman ruling class were 
few in the early modern period, and state borrowing by the
143. Abou-el-Haj (1985) p.182
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Campaign Treasury was, like the celepkegan system, a way in 
which available capital was harnessed for the benefit of the 
status quo.12*** Despite the record of repayment of loans being 
good, it may have been precisely because no interest was 
forthcoming that outside funding was not attracted as a 
source of finance for the war.^^ It may once have been 
different: when Yemigci Hasan Pasha wrote to Sultan Mehmed 
III that if it had been possible to raise loans for the 
payment of troop wages from the merchants, he would not have 
troubled the Sultan with the problem of having no money to 
pay these wages, he remarked:
,TIt is more than thirty years since public morals began to 
deteriorate, and since there is no security and justice, merchants 
and others refrain from business dealings: short of torture, 
there is no way to get a loan from anyone".!2^
144. On the circulation of money in the Ottoman Empire, see Veinstein 
(1981).
145. There is evidence that Jewish merchants lent money for the purchase 
of military equipment in this war, but it is not clear how widespread 
this practice was, nor the circumstances under which the loans were 
made: MM 383 pp.84-88 is an account entitled "muhasebe-yi makbuzat ve
ih ra cat be ray-1 mtihlmmat-1 sefer-1 humayun der vakt-1 ref ten-1 
serdar...Ferhad Paga ve der vakt-i reften-1 Mustafa Bey ve Mustafa APja 
serdaran-1 ewel 11a Kara Bogdan ve Eflak al-vaki fl evall-1 sene 
1003..."; this covers both the purchase of equipment for the 1595 
campaign, which was the responsibility of Ferhad Pasha, and for the 
small expedition led into Moldavia and Wallachia by the two Mustafas on 
the defection of these principalities late in 1594 (cf. PEfEVI II 
pp.158-59). The debit balance on the account (MM 383 p.88) is made up 
of money owed to three individuals who had supplied equipment, a Sinan 
Bey, and the Jews Karakag and Yasif: e.g."deyn be-Karakag Yahudi an 
paha-yi esbabha-yl mtttenewl...320,876 akge".
146. Orhonlu (1970) pp.32-33
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The final entry on the credit side of the Campaign Treasury 
account is an item entitled tefavtit-1 hasene ve gurus (C), 
literally "discrepancy of gold and silver". As has been 
seen, the Ottoman treasury had at its disposal several 
devices for increasing revenue. Borrowings from the Inner 
Treasury, loans from affluent individuals and the creation 
of new taxes have been mentioned, and there is one further 
method, gains made through the manipulation of the akge. 
which forms the final income item in these campaign 
accounts. This was a treasury credit, based on the 
; discrepancy between the different akge values placed upon
; the coin in the treasury. Barkan describes the essence of
| the method by which the currency was manipulated:
t[
I ’The ’discrepancy of gold’ comes about thus, that gold coin entering
i
I the Treasury was deemed to be equivalent to 59 akge. but on being
I
147. Hiere were further means of raising money in present conditions of 
pressing urgency, evidence of which do not appear in these accounts. 
Tax-farming was the most widespread of such sales of the anticipated 
future revenues of government for a lump-sum payment by the assignee in 
the present. The mortgaging of future tax yield was practised with 
particularly disastrous consequences in contemporary Spain (Parker, 1979 
pp.562-63). The sale of appointments was noted by the Fugger agent in 
Constantinople in February 1592, when 1,000 new gavuges were created, 
for which favour each of those appointed had to pay 1,000 ducats for the 
building of new galleys (FUGGER p.236). The striking of new coin with a 
progressively lower silver content had been practised from the time of 
Mehmed II (SahilliogLu, 1978 pp.8- ); akge were paid out from the 
Campaign Treasury to be restruck (very probably at a debased value) in 
Belgrade (KK 1879 p.13; KK 1885 p.12: "tesllm be-/.../ emln-i dar ill— 
darb-1 Belgrad be-clhet-1 btirlden-1 akge-yl cedid der dar ill-darb-1 
mezbur...".)
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1 48paid out, was deemed to represent 60 akge”.
As the DSs show, the calculation of the ’discrepancy1 was 
somewhat more complicated in reality. The akge was both the 
money of account as well as a low-value silver coin also 
called nakdiye; other coinage in the Campaign Treasury 
comprised the variously-rated gold (hasene) and higher-value 
silver (gurus) coins in circulation, in addition to gold 
ingots (zer-i sebuke), pure silver (nukre-yl halls), and 
substandard akge coins (nakdiye-yl hurde ve k e m - a y a r ) . ^ ^  
Before demonstrating just how the value of the ’discrepancy1 
was arrived at, it must first of all be pointed out that a 
summing of the figures for the amounts of each type of 
currency entering and leaving the Campaign Treasury, which 
are listed in the DSs immediately after the figure for the 
total revenue (al-asl) and total expenditure (al-masarlf) 
for the period in question, does not tally with the total 
revenue and expenditure figures for the accounting period 
when calculated by the addition of the various categories of 
revenue and expenditure listed in the IEs.^0
In view of this inaccuracy in the conversion of different 
currencies into their akge equivalents, it should be no
148. Barkan (1954/b) p.300: a comparable calculation was made for the 
silver gurus; cf. Fekete (1955) I pp.491-2.
149. KK 1 8 7 9  PP*2,6; KK 1 8 8 5  pp.6,9. The main hazlne-yl ami re account for 
1582-83, prior to the big devaluation of the mid-1580*s, shows a still 
wider range of values for the currency in the Central Treasury 
(Sahillioglu, 1 9 7 8  p.35).
150. This is demonstrated by the example of KK 1879 pp.2,6 (see Appendix 
2/1,2/ii). The greatest divergence is in KK 1885 p.9, where total 
expenditure based on the currency breakdown is nearly 10,000 akge less 
than the total expenditure figure given in the IE (Appendix 2/iv). The 
expenditure side of KK 1887 p.9 (Appendix 2/vi) is the only instance to 
hand in which the sums tally.
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surprise to discover that the ’discrepancy' figure given in 
each IE does not square with independent recalculation of 
the ’discrepancy’ on the basis of the currency data in the 
DSs.
Theoretically, the ’discrepancy' is calculable by summing 
the akge values of all moneys credited to the account at 
below the official rate of exchange, multiplied by the 
amount by which they fell below this official rate, and 
subtracting from this total the akge values of moneys 
debited to the account at below the official rate of 
exchange, multiplied by the amount by which they fell below 
this official rate. Official exchange rates varied from 
place to place, and the fact that the government was trying 
to impose a rate of 120 akge per gold piece and 70 akge per 
silver gurus in Rum in winter 1593 does not mean that all 
government business was conducted on this basis.Selaniki 
notes that coinage debasement in 1589 brought official rates 
of exchange of 120 akge to the gold piece, and 80 akge to 
the g u r u s . and Abdttlkadir confirms that the same rates 
still applied in Istanbul in December 1603.^53. It is clear 
from the data to hand that these were the official rates 
used in these campaign accounts.
151. MD 71/211
152. Ipsirli (1978) p.464
153. AKf.l77v
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The simplest example to use In illustration of the 
mathematics of calculating the ’discrepancy1 appears in KK 
1887:
(p.5) gold: 27,651 x 2 = 55,302
silver: 19,926.5 X 2 - 39,853
I t 14,349.5 X 10 - 143,495
I t . 411 X 12 - 4,932
243,582
(p.9) silver: 14,807.5 X 10 = 148.075-
95,507 akge
(see Appendix 2/v,vi)
This figure deviates by only 470 akge from the ’discrepancy* 
figure of 95,977 akge found in the I E . ^ 4  By this manipul­
ation, the treasury was able to make a small profit.^ ^5
154. KK 1887/C. It should be noted that there is a further unidentified 
amount on the credit side (Appendix 2/v) which has not been taken into 
account in the above calculation.
155. During this war, insofar as can be judged from the available 
accounts, the ’discrepancy* never contributed more than ,6% of total 
Campaign Treasury revenue. This compares with the figure of 5% in the 
account for the grand vezir Httsrev Pasha’s Baghdad campaign in 1630 
(Murphey, 1979 pp.218-19,470-71). The greater value of the 
’discrepancy' at the later date was due to a more significant divergence 
between the rates at which coin was paid into and out of the Campaign 
Treasury and the ’official' rate of exchange.
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Illiv. Analysis of the Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury
Unlike the revenue side of the IEs of the Campaign Treasury, 
which show some small variations in the order of the items, 
the expenditure sides of these accounts all consist of seven 
main categories presented in regular order. The first of 
these, comprising more than 70% of Campaign Treasury 
expenditure in the 1593-1606 war, is the payment of wages 
(mevaclb) to the troops fighting in Hungary (P). This 
figure is not, in itself, of any particular significance 
within the context of the global sum of troop wages, for we 
saw in Part I that there were many different methods of 
paying the troops; however, it dwarfs the individual shares 
of the other six categories of campaign expenditure which 
together comprise the remaining 3056. From both an admin­
istrative and accounting perspective, these other items of 
expenditure are not without interest though, as we have 
seen already in the case of the details of debt repayment 
recorded in the category eda-yi dttyun (V).
Categories P.i-P.iv of wages need little further amplifi­
cation. The miisaherehoran (P.i) were the officers and 
bureaucrats of the troops whose pay was the direct 
responsibility of the Ottoman treasury; as is implied by the 
term used to denote them collectively, they were paid 
monthly, instead of three-monthly, as the common soldiers 
were. The soldiers mentioned in P.ii-P.iv were various 
regiments on the state payroll, including, in particular, 
the kapukulu ocaklan. As was implied in the discussion of 
the wage registers (mevacib defterleri) In Part I, it is 
impossible to say how many men of each regiment were paid 
from the Campaign Treasury, and how many from, for instance, 
the Central Treasury. A further item common to the wage 
category of all accounts is headed neferat-i kila (P.v): the 
DSs give no further detail as to exactly who these men were. 
From the information available here, it cannot be said 
whether they were "yerll” ("local”) troops, or troops 
'normally* resident in the Istanbul barracks, but on a 3- 
year tour of duty in the border castles (ndbetclyan)^ or,
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indeed, whether they were troops of the category of levend.
A clue may perhaps be found in the accounts of the Buda 
Treasury: each of those still extant for the 1593-1606 shows 
a credit category headed "an hlzane-yi amire-yi sefer-1 
humayun..." ("from the imperial Campaign Treasury..."): 
although direct comparison of numbers of men and amounts of 
wages in the Campaign Treasury accounts and those of the 
Buda Treasury is not possible, it appears that the Campaign 
Treasury debit (P.v) was a credit to the Buda, and the other 
Hungarian, Treasuries. -^6
A further item that is common to all the wage categories of 
the accounts discussed here is the pay of the French 
garrison of Papa who had defected to the Ottomans in 1600. 
These renegades were considered to have a special status, 
continuing to be paid from the Campaign Treasury throughout 
the remainder of the war (P.vi).1^  Until 1604 they were also 
singled out to receive a present on top of their wages (S), 
and the supply of their provisions was the responsibility of 
a special agent.*58 Wages were also paid out of the Campaign 
Treasury to the central European allies of the Ottomans 
toward the end of the war. In particular, the help received 
from the men of the Hungarian nobleman Moses Szekely in 
briefly holding back the Hapsburg forces commanded by 
Giorgio Basta in Transylvania in 1603, was paid for from the
156. The accounts of the Hungarian provincial treasuries, and that of 
Buda in particular, are the subject of the next section IIIv.: this 
matter will be discussed more fully there.
157. In the final account for the war, they are described as being part 
of the "talfe-yl hllaf-1 millet" (KK 1890/P.vi).
158. KK 1879/S: "Inamat-1 efrencan-i Fransa"; KK 1885/S: "lnamat bl-taife- 
yl efrencan..."; KK1887 p.14: "inam bl-bazi efrenclyan". KK 1879 p.13 : 
"teslim be-HUseyn gavug emln-i mekulat-1 ef rencjyan-l Fransa..."
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Campaign Treasury.^ 9  Bocskai's men, who were critically 
important in turning the course of the war in the Ottomans1 
favour in 1605, were also paid from the same source.
The second largest category of expenditure after wages is 
headed teslimat (Q), and counts for around 102 of campaign 
expenditure. Discussion of the provisioning of the army has 
shown how commissioners (emins) and other agents were 
responsible for the purchase of food: record of the moneys 
allocated to them for this task came from the Campaign 
Treasury, and constitute one of the items of expenditure 
under the heading of teslimat. As shown in the IEs, money 
for the purchase of some campaign equipment (mtihlmmat) is 
also recorded In this category.
What the IEs do not show, however, Is that a significant 
part of the teslimat category of expenditure records loans 
made from the Campaign Treasury to named individuals.
These loans were made almost exclusively to beylerbeyls or 
sancakbeyls, which suggests that such moneys were intended 
to assist such provincial governors to defray the heavy 
expenses occasioned by this intensive and prolonged period 
of campaigning. The largest loan recorded was the 540,000 
akce lent to the beylerbeyl of Rumeli, Kuyucu Murad Pasha in 
1603-04. jn 1599-1601 and In the 1602-03 season the 
beylerbeyls of eastern Anatolia feature prominently as
159. KK 1887/P.vIi; the expenses of Szekely and his men were also met by 
the Campaign Treasury, and recorded, too, at KK 1887 pp.15,16. See also 
Orhonlu (1970) pp.43,98-99; PE^ EVI II pp.243-46.
160. KK 1890/P.vi.b
161. Details are found in the DSs viz: KK 1879 pp.9-10; KK 1885 p.H; KK 
1887 p.10; KK 1889: no data; KK 1890: no loans made; as an example, KK 
1887 p.10 may be cited: ’’teslim be-Siile.yman Bey mirllva-yl Ohri ber 
vech-1 karz...6,240 akge11.
162. KK 1887 p.10; he became grand vezir after the war.
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recipients of loans from the Campaign Treasury.^ 3  Although 
war with Persia had broken out again in 1603, some eastern 
cavalry troops were still fighting on the Hungarian front, 
which is why loans to them are recorded in these accounts of 
the campaigns in Europe.
Although we have seen that members of the Ottoman elite were 
able to make loans to the Campaign Treasury at times when 
there was a shortage o,f cash to meet pressing demands, the 
record of borrowings from the Campaign Treasury shows that 
it was not the same group who were both lending and
163. Among the recipients of loans from the Campaign Treasury were the 
following: in 1399-1601, the beylerbeyls of Diyarbakir, Van, Karaman,
Sofu Sinan Pasha (beylerbeyl of Egri) and a certain Mustafa Pasha, and 
the sancakbeyl3 of Kangri, Karesi, Camk, Amasya (KK 1879 pp,9-10); in 
1602-03, the beylerbeyls of Aleppo, Erzurum, Karaman, Batum (sic),
Kanije, Silistre, and sancakbeyls of Pozega, Vulgitrin, Kirka, Mora, 
Karesi (KK 1885 p.ll); in 1603-04, only four loans are recorded, to the 
beylerbeyls of Rumeli and Karaman, and the sancakbeyls of Kirkkilise and 
Ohri (KK 1887 p.10).
164. The repayment by the Campaign Treasury of loans made to it is found 
recorded, as we have seen, in the debit category eda-yi diiyun (V), 
receipt of the original loan having been recorded in varldat-1 gayr-1 
mukarrere (B.iii). Omitted from discussion of the credit side of the 
IEs in Part Illiii, however, was the fact that, concealed in the 
category emval-1 mttteferrlka (B.ii), is the repayment of loans made 
previously by the Campaign Treasury: record of the repayment of these 
loans by the Campaign Treasury should thus be found on the credit side 
of a subsequent Campaign Treasury IE. This item of income is not made 
explicit in the IEs, but Is spelt out in the DSs: e.g. "an mahsul kl bl- 
bazi kesan an hazlne ber vech-1 karz dade hala eda gtlde...1 (KK 1879 
p.4); see also KK 1885 p.7; KK 1887 p.6. These moneys for the repayment 
of loans to the Campaign Treasury are entered in the DSs as a lumpsum, 
and so it is impossible to match the original borrower with the 
subsequent repayment of his debt to the Campaign Treasury.
285
borrowing. Information in the DSs shows that those making 
loans to the Campaign Treasury were predominantly members of 
the Ottoman central bureaucratic and military establishment: 
they were most frequently officers of the kapukulu regiments 
or members of the corps of cavus. By contrast, those 
borrowing from the Campaign Treasury were provincial 
governors, as has been pointed out. The increasing diff­
iculty which the provincial governors, and, Indeed, ordinary 
timariots, had in fulfilling their statutory obligation to 
campaign when ordered to so, has been a frequent theme in 
modern Ottoman history-writing. The earliest documentary 
record of loans made by the Ottoman treasury to this class 
Is that which survives from the winter of 1516, after the 
Ottoman defeat of the Mamluk army at Marj D a r b i k . 1 ^  The 
problems of campaigning far from home, and in particular, of 
wintering in the field, is the subject of Veinsteinfs recent 
article on the institution of harclik. which was discussed 
in connection with the provisioning of the timariot army: 
Veinstein sees the need for the timariots to spend winters 
away from home and from the sources of income on which they 
relied for their livelihood, as the "Achilles Heel" of the 
"classical Ottoman system of military organisation".*^6 The 
evidence concerning loans which we find in the Campaign 
Treasury accounts further demonstrates the inability of the 
sipahis of the timariot army to secure enough cash to see
them through the campaigns.1^
There is a final small group of teslimat entries found only
165. Bacque-Grammont (1982)
166. Veinstein (1983)
167. PilipovlQ (1953) p.173 also refers briefly, but without citing any 
references, to borrowings by the sipahis of Bosnia from the Ottoman 
treasury.
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in the account for 1603-04: here, grants rather than loans 
were made to certain sancakbeyls for the purpose of 
defraying the costs of campaigning. These grants are 
designated "be-clhet-l paha-yl sefer”. and the recipients 
were the sancakbeyis of Hersek, Izvornik, Kirka and Pozega.^^ 
The enfeebled state of the Bosnian economy is often referred 
to in documents of the period, and this is doubtless the 
reason that special provision was made to help them.
Adat entries (R) fall into three groups. First, there is a 
regular payment made to the Tatar han to encourage his 
participation in support of the Ottoman cause. Secondly, 
there were annual salary payments made to some principal 
provincial office-holders, beylerbeyls. sancakbeyls and 
defterdars. as well as to some clerks of the chancery and 
finance departments. The third group of entries are the pay 
supplements of the kapukulu troops.
It was never certain whether Gazl Giray, who was han of the 
Tatars almost throughout the war, would come on campaign.
The subvention which had been paid by the Ottomans to the 
Tatar hans since 1484,^9 Was met partly from the Campaign 
Treasury during these campaigns.^7® In addition, the han
168. KK 1887 p.ll
169. Inalcik, art. Giray (El)
170. KK 1879 p.14: "adet-l gehrjye-yi hazret-1 haru..l08.000 akge; KK 1885 
p.13: "adefr-l salyane-yl hazret-1 han-1 tataran...56,360 akce; KK 1887 
p.12: "adet-l gehrlye-yl hazret-1 han...l50,000 akge; this subvention 
appears sometimes to have been paid annually (salyane) and sometimes 
monthly (gehrlye). but it is not clear what proportion of the total due
to the han is represented in these accounts. At KK 1885 p.l6, in the 
lhracat category (U), a gehrjye payment to him of 200,000 akge is 
recorded in the same period when he received 56,360 akge as salyane.
I 2 8 7I
ii
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and his men received gifts (inam) ( S ) a s  well as other 
material and financial support.
In Hungary, in the vilayets of Temepvar, Egri, Kanije and 
Buda, and the area along the Danube, the most productive 
towns and villages were kept in the hands of the sultan as 
havass-1 humayun.1?2 High-ranking members of the estab­
lishment could therefore not be supported by the income of 
the lands over which they had administrative authority, but 
had to be paid an annual salary by the treasury. During 
these years of war, part of this salyane came from the 
Campaign Treasury. An additional reason for the unavail­
ability of revenues to pay these men was the inevitable 
\ drop in agricultural revenues owing to the war.
I
| The revenues of the Danube finance bureau (Tuna aklami) were
| largely consigned as tax-farms (mukataat): the defterdar and
| the kapudan-1 Tuna (commander of the Danube fleet) therefore
I received a salary from the Campaign Treasury which can
i notionally be considered as coming from the income paid into
the Treasury by the tax-farmers of the area.173 The 
sancakbeyls who are recorded as being recipients of an 
annual salary in July 1602-February 1603 were those of the 
Buda sancaks of £imontorna, Estergon, Istolni Belgrad, the 
Rumelian sancak of Uskilb, and Karesi in the vilayet of
171- KK 1879 p.15: 600,000 akge were given to the han as a gift; KK 1885 
p.14 records the substantial gift of 2,880,180 akge to Gazi Giray as 
well as other gifts to his commanders: this account covers the winter 
months spent by Gazi Giray In Peguy with his friend Ibrahim Pegevi, a 
period when he did not participate in the campaign.
172. Kaldy-Nagy (1961) p.32
173. KK 1885 p.13; KK 1887 p.12; KK 1879 p-14 does not show a salyane 
payment to the defterdar-1 Tuna, but a payment of 103,000 akge to Ahmed 
Bey, mlrliva-yi Tuna. KK 1890 p.8 records 128,000 akge for Seyyid 
Mustafa, mlrllva-yl nehr-i Tuna.
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Anadolu.-^4 During the period of the account for August 1603- 
June 1604, in addition to those of £imontorna and Estergon, 
the sancakbeyls of Segen and Seksar (both in the vilayet of 
Buda) also received salyane payments.
While the beylerbeyls of Buda, Temegvar and Egri appear 
regularly as salyane recipients,^ 6  the number of provincial 
defterdars receiving salyane widened from being only that 
of Egri in 1599-1601 to*include those of Kanije, Buda,
Temegvar and of the Danube Bureau. Since we do not have a 
complete series of Campaign Treasury accounts for the period 
of the war, we cannot be sure that the apparent widening of 
the group receiving salyane is not merely a quirk of the 
accounting system: it is impossible to say, at least from 
the DSs, whether the salyane amounts given in the campaign 
accounts are the sum of the monthly totals equivalent to the 
period covered by each register.^?
It is clear that the Campaign Treasury accounts do not tell 
the whole story. Accounts for the Buda Treasury which 
overlap with these campaign accounts show that the salyane 
of the officials highest in the hierarchy of that vilayet 
was also funded from local sources. In illustration, we may 
cite the year 1011 AH (1602-03), during which salyane pay­
ments for All, the beylerbeyl of Buda, for Ibrahim, 
defterdar of the Buda Treasury, and for Seyyid Mehmed, 
mlrllva of Estergon were met from both the Campaign Treasury
174. KK 1885 p.13. Also given 6,000 akge was Arslan Bey mlrllva-yl 
geraklse. commander of an Egyptian cavalry corps (Shaw, 1968 p.9) which 
was on campaign in Hungary.
175. KK 1887 p.12
176. KK 1879 p.14; KK 1885 p.13; KK 1887 p.12; KK 1890 p.8 has only the 
beylerbeyls of Buda and Egri.
177. Despite the name, salyane payments were credited on a monthly 
basis, at least in Egypt: see Shaw (1968) p.10.
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(hazlne-yl amire-yi sefer-1 humayun)^8 and from the Buda 
Treasury (Buda h a z l n e s l ) . - ^ 9
The third group of adat entries (R) comprises the various 
allowances paid to the kapukulu troops on campaign, nafaka, 
kemanbaha etc., to supplement their wages. These have been 
discussed in Part I.
The giving of gifts by the sultan or his representatives was 
an integral part of the reward system of the Ottoman Empire. 
The presents referred to in the accounts as lnamat (S) were 
cash payments; the heading mubayaat (T) mainly describes the 
purchase for the Campaign Treasury of the robes and rich 
materials which would subsequently be presented as tokens of 
approbation to members of the military hierarchy, as well as 
some bureaucratic necessities such as the paper required for 
the issuing of orders.
Although the han and his commanders were the major 
recipients, cash inducements and awards were widely 
distributed to all classes of those participating in the 
campaigns. Abdttlkadir makes frequent mention of cash being
178. KK 1885 p.13 (11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011):
adefr-l salyane-yl All Paga mlrmlran-i Budin...366,000 akge
” Ibrahim Efendl defterdar-1 Budln...36.000 akge
” Seyyid Mehmed mlrllva-yl Estergon...12,000 akge
179. MM 6766 p.13 (1 Safar-31 Zilhicce 1011):
adet-1 salyane-yl All Paga mlrmlran-i Budin...31.800 akge
11 Ibrahim Efendl defterdar-1 hazlne-yl mezbur
...120,000 akge
” Seyyid Mehmed mlrliva-yl Estergon...42.760 akge
180. Unlike the DSs of KK 1885, KK 1887 and KK 1890, the mubayaat section 
(T) of KK 1879 p.16 includes a small number of purchases of provisions 
and equipment.
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given to the troops, particularly at the start of a 
campaign, or when It was felt that extra encouragement was 
required. Those digging the trenches for the siege of Yanik 
in 1594 were given gold and silver,181 and those bringing the 
earth for reinforcing the earthworks were presented with a 
purse of gold by the kethUda of the grand vezir Koca Sinan.182 
At the halts on the way to Kanije in 1600, the grand vezir 
Ibrahim Pasha presented 8 gold pieces to each of the bSliik 
halkl, and there were gifts also for the janissaries and 
others, and for those who were in the thick of the 
fighting.183
References In the accounts to the giving of gifts to those 
who performed particular services, such as the scouts 
(kllaguz) and those bringing intelligence, and those taking 
Christian prisoners,181* are corroborated by Abdiilkadir. For 
instance, there was a minor confrontation at Nigbolu In 
winter 1594-95 between the troops of Michael of Wallachia 
and troops commanded by the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, Hasan 
Pasha, during which, he reports, 8 gold coins were given to 
each of those bringing Christian captives.l8  ^ Ambassadors 
from Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia were another group 
mentioned as receiving gifts.
181. AK f.22r
182. AK f.22v
183. AK f.l32v; Damad Ibrahim was well-known for his generosity, as for
the strict discipline which he maintained (PE££VT II pp.229-31). In the
fighting around Buda and Pest in 1603-4, 60,000 akge were given to those 
who fought the Christians in the trenches of Giirz Ilyas (Gellert Hill): 
"inam bl-bazi kesan der vakt-i ameden-yl ktiffar an canlb-i Tuna der 
muharebe-yl metrls der nezd-1 Giirz Ilyas” (KK 1887 p.13).
184. e.g. KK 1879 p.15; KK 1885 p.14; KK 1887 pp.13-14
185. AK f.35r
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Outgoings classified as lhracat (U) constitute less than 1% 
of Campaign Treasury expenditure. In his study of the first 
Ottoman ’budget” for Cyprus, Sahillioglu suggests that while 
expenses categorised as teslimat (Q) were made at the behest 
of orders coming from Istanbul, those designated ihracat 
were ’’mahalllnde yapilan masraflar”. expenses over which 
decision was taken locally.188 These expenses were not en­
shrined in custom, as were, for instance, the subsistence 
payments for the janissaries, nor could they be anticipated 
in advance, like the perennial need to transport gunpowder 
from Selanik to Buda at the start of every season, but they 
were incidental, arising In the course of a campaign. Most 
prominent amongst the lhracat entries (U) are individual 
subsistence payments and travelling costs (harc-1 rah), and 
the rental of carts to carry provisions and military 
equipment.18  ^ u'
In addition to the two most Important components of eda-yi 
dtiyun (V) which could be matched with a corresponding income 
entry in the Campaign Treasury account,188 a third type of 
expenditure is recorded under this head. This arose where 
too much had been collected as the regular taxes of adet-1 
agnam and clzye;18^ the excess, appearing as a debit for the 
Campaign Treasury, could subsequently be paid out for
186. Sahillioglu (196*7) pp.18-19
187. KK 1879 p.17; KK 1885 pp.15-16; KK 1887 pp.15-16; KK 1890 pp.9-10
188. See the discussions of karz and muhallefat above. KK 1879 
pp.17-23 is the only one of the available DSs which provides precise 
details of the eda-yl diiyun items.
189. At KK 1889/V this overpayment is recorded thus: ”eda-yl akge-yl bazi 
haracciyan der hln-1 mahsubateg zlyade mahsub gulden hala eda glide” 
(’(re)payment of moneys of some (bringers of) the harac (tax, who) 
overpaid (and are) now reimbursed”).
another specified purpose.^90
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190. To give a couple of examples:
KK 1879 p.20: ITbe-clhet-l eda-.yl akge-yl zlyade-yl clzye-yl gebran-1 
vllayet-1 Ipek-1 Iskenderlye an vaclb-1 sene 1007 der uhde-yl All Bulgar 
an sllahdaran boliik 71 fl yevm 21 emln ve Beklr Ibrahim an cemaat-1 
mezbur boliik 123 fl yevm 20 katlb kl pig ezin bi-hazine-yi sefer-1 
humayun blttevarlh-1 muhtelife zlyade an al-asl tesllm-l hazine kerde 
bud zlyade-yl mezburler bl-cizye-yl gebran-i vilayet-1 Ifekilb an vacib-1 
sene 1008 mahsub gilden fermude ba-ferman-i gerlf” (All and Ibrahim had 
collected too much as polltax from Ipek-i Iskenderlye; the excess moneys 
were to be reassigned, for accounting purposes, to cover the polltax due 
from Uskiib);
KK 1879 p.21: tTbe-cihet-l eda-yi zlyade-yl akge-yl adet-1 agnam-i kaza- 
yl Fiorina an vacib-1 sene 1007 an tahvll-i Mahmud Slnan an sllahdaran 
bdlUk 171 fl yevm 8 ve Mehmed Bosna an ebna-yl slpahlyan boliik 171 fl 
yevm 13 al-havalegan kl pig ezin bl-hazlne-yl amlre-yl sefer-1 humayun 
blttevarih-1 muhtelife zlyade an al-asl 20,000 akge tesllm kerde bud 
hala meblag-l mezburler bl-hazlne-yl daden fermude an tahvil-1 Hasan 
gavug emln-1 ganem kl baha-yl gu^ t-1 ganem mahsub gilden fermude bar- 
ferman-1 gerif” (Mahmud and Mehmed were responsible for the collection 
of the ’sheep tax’ from the kaza of Fiorina, but they liad collected 
20,000 akge too much; this 20,000 akge is now reassigned to the 
commissioner for sheep supplies for the purchase of mutton).
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IIIv. The Accounts of the Hungarian Provincial Treasuries
Another type of documentary source to consider together with 
the Campaign Treasury account books in trying to understand 
the financial administration of the Ottoman treasury in 
wartime, and the financial costs of warfare, is the accounts 
of the provincial treasuries in Hungary. The Hungarian 
vilayets of Buda, Kanije, Temegvar and Egri, and the vilayet 
of Bosnia, each had their own local treasury: each of these 
provinces had its own defterdar. the financial administrator 
responsible for collecting the state revenues of the area in 
question.1^1
For the years of the 1593-1606 war, only one account for the 
Bosnia Treasury and one for the Kanije Treasury have been 
found. ^ 92,193 None for the Egri Treasury has come to
191. By considering only those vilayets which were required to send the 
surplus balance on the IEs of their local treasuries to Istanbul, 
Sahillioglu (1967) p.2 neglects to mention the existence of the local 
treasuries of Kanije and Egri, in addition to those of Buda, Temegvar 
and Bosnia.
192. MM 20160 pp.2,8: "icmal-l muhasebe-yl varldat ve masarif-i hlzane-yl 
amire-yi vllayet-1 Bosna der zaman-1 Mehmed Efendl defterdar-1 hazlne-yl 
mezbure an 13 Ramazan sene 1010 11a ga.ye-.yl Zllhicce sene 1010” 
(February-June 1602); this document is unfortunately damaged.
193. MM 5717 pp.l 11,114: "icmal-l muhasebe-yi varldat ve masanf-1 
hlzane-yi amlre-yl vilayet-1 Kanije der zaman-1 Cafer Efendl defterdar-i 
hlzane-yl amire-yi vilayet-1 mezbure bi-marlfet-1 Ibrahim Papa ve Mehmed 
Paga mirmiran-1 eyalet-1 mezbure an 24 gaban sene 1013 11a 27 Cumada II
sene 1016” (January 1605-October 1607).
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light.1^1* It is for the Buda Treasury, however, that most 
data is available, both from the period of the war, and also 
from the preceding decades. Kaldy-Nagy has published the Ds 
for the period from Receb 965-Zilhice 967 (May 1558- 
September 1560);^5 in the Bapbakanlik Archives in Istanbul 
there Is an almost complete series of IEs for the years 977- 
989 AH (1570-81 ).!98 These accounts enable comparison of the 
administration of the Buda Treasury in peace and war.
The extant accounts of the Buda Treasury during the period 
of the 1593-1606 war are:
194. Although we have no accounts for the Egri Treasury for the period of 
the war, there is reference to the appointment as defterdar of Egri of a 
certain milteferrika, Abdi, one of the clerks of the divan in Safar 1007 
AH/September 1598 (KK 255 p.145); see also Rdhrbom (1972) p.129 
concerning the defterdar of Egri in 1597, who was also a sancakbeyl. cf. 
Fekete (1955) I pp.594-609 for the D of the Egri Treasury in 1031
AH (1621-22).
195. Fekete & Kaldy-Nagy (1962) pp.383-699, and commentary (ibid. 
pp.752-772). Based on this data is Kaldy-Nagy (1962), which is 
concerned with the fiscal administration of the revenues of the Buda 
Treasury in these years.
196. Register MM 1561 contains the IEs and DSs of the Buda Treasury from 
20 Ramazan 977-20 gewal 986 AH (26 Feb.1570-20 Oct.1578), except for 
the eight months from 20 Rebi 11-25 Zilhicce 985 (July 1577-March 1578); 
this register is tom, but Its early pages appear to contain similar 
documents dating back to 975 AH (1567-68). MM 498 contains the IEs and 
DSs of the Buda Treasury from 21 gewal 986-6 Safar 989 AH (21 Oct.1578- 
12 March 1581). Both these registers also contain the contemporary 
accounts for the distribution of wages in this vilayet: "muhasebe-yi 
tevzl-yl meyacib...". Fekete records the existence of two further 
accounts of the Buda Treasury for years prior to the start of the war, 
both of which are in Leipzig: 987 AH/1579 (Fekete, 1955 I pp.374-93) is 
part of the D of MM 498 pp.42-43; 988 AH/1580 (Fekete, 1976 p.80).
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"Income and Expenditure accounts" (IEs):
MM 6766 pp.4-5: "icmal-l muhasebe-yl varldat ve masarif-i hizane-yl 
amire-yi vilayet-1 Budln der zaman-1 Mehmed Pasa mirmlran-1 vilayet- 
i_ mezbure ve bl-marifet-1 Ibrahim Efendl defterdar-i hlzane-yl 
vllayet-i mesfure an 20 Shban sene 1009 11a 15 Rebl I sene 1010"^  97 
("summary account of the revenues and expenditures of the Imperial 
treasury of the vilayet of Buda in the time of Mehmed Pasha, 
beylerbeyl of that vilayet and with the cognizance of Ibrahim 
Efendl, defterdar of the treasury of that vilayet, from 2 k February- 
13 September 1601").
MM 6766 pp. 12-13: "lcmal-i muhasebe-yl varldat ve masarif-l hlzane- 
yl amlre-yi vllayet-1 Budln der zaman-1 Mehmed Pasa al-vezlr haflz-1 
vllayet-1 mesfure ve bl-marlfet-1 Ibrahim Efendl defterdar-1 hlzane- 
yl vilayet-1 mezbure an 15 Rebl II sene 1010 11a gayet-1 Muharrem 
sene 1011"
("summary account of the revenues and expenditures of the imperial 
treasury of the vilayet of Buda In the time of the vezir Mehmed 
Pasha, protector of that vilayet and with the cognizance of Ibrahim 
Efendl, defterdar of the treasury of that vilayet, from 13 September 
1601-20 July 1602".)
MM 6766 pp.20-21: "lcmal-1 muhasebe-yl varldat ve masarif-i hlzane- 
yl amlre-yi vilayet-1 Budln der zaman-1 hazret-1 vezir Mehmed Paga 
al-vezlr mlrmlran-1 Rumell ve bl-marlfet-1 Ibrahim defterdar-1 
hlzane-yl amire-yi vilayet-1 mezbure"
("summary account of the revenues and expenditures of the imperial 
treasury of the vilayet of Buda in the time of His Excellency vezir 
Mehmed Pasha, beylerbeyl of Rumell and with the cognizance of 
Ibrahim, defterdar of the imperial treasury of that vilayet"; this
197. The terminal date of this account should, in fact, be 15 Rebl II 
1010.
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account runs from 1 Safar-30 Zilhlcce 1011/21 July 1602-10 June
1603.)198
"Daybook Summaries" (DSs):
Mxt.638 ff.lv-6v: "muhasebe-yl lrad ve masarif-1 hazlne-yl amlre-yl 
vllayet-1 Budun...maf /.../-yi orduyu humayun der zaman-1 Mehmed 
Paga al-vezlr mlrmlran-1 Rumell ve Budun nazir-1 emval-i Mehmed ve 
HUseyn Bey defterdaran-1 hlzane-yl mezbure an 20 Rebl II sene 1008 
11a gaye-yi Zilhlcce sene-yl roezbur”*99
("account of the revenue and expenditures of the imperial treasury 
of the vilayet of Buda...together with the /.../ of the imperial 
army In the time of the vezir Mehmed Pasha, beylerbeyl of Rumell and 
Buda, (and) superintendent of state revenues, and Hviseyn Bey, 
defterdar of the imperial treasury of Buda from 8 November 1599-12 
July 1600".)
198. Transliterations of these IEs are to be found in Appendix 3. In what 
follows, MM 6766a signifies MM 6766 pp.^ -5; MM 6766b = MM 6766 pp.12-13; . 
MM 6766c « MM 6766 20-21.
199. A Hungarian translation of the IE of this account is found in Velics 
&. Kammerer (1886) II pp.688-90.
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Mxt.635 ff.22v-28r Is the DS of MM 6766 pp.4-5,12-13^®®*^®^
MM 6770 pp.30-40 is the DS of MM 6766 pp.20-21
"Daybooks" (Ds):
Mxt.635 ff.lv-20v is the D of MM 6766 pp.4-5,12-13
MM 6770 pp.4-23 is the D of MM 6766 pp.20-21
Comparison of those accounts of the Buda Treasury which 
cover periods during the war with those for the pre-war 
period is instructive in both administrative and financial 
terms. So too, is examination of the relationship between 
the accounts of the Buda Treasury and the Campaign Treasury. 
With this in mind, we will take the three IEs of the Buda 
Treasury during the war as the basis of the discussion that 
follows, and, unless otherwise stated, it is these to which
200. A Hungarian translation of the IE of this account is found in Velics 
& Kammerer (1886) II pp.691-95.
201. There is, however, a small, and at present inexplicable, discrepancy 
between categories of income and expenditure in these accounts; that is, 
the sum of particular items from MM 6766a and MM 6766b does not always 
equal that same item as recorded in Mxt.635 ff.22v-28r:
e.g. total income (asl):
MM 6766a + MM 6766b = 7,874,414 + 11,245,886 = 19,120,300 akge 
Mxt.635 = 18,771,278 akge 
tax farm income (mukataa):
MM 6766a + MM 6766b = 802,926 + 114,685 35 917,611 akge 
Mxt.635 = 915,821 akge
etc.
However, poll tax (clzye-yl gebran):
MM 6766a + MM 6766b = 66,840 + 207,729 = 274,569 akge 
Mxt.635 = 274,569 akge 
It may be seen from the transliterations in Appendix 3 that the accounts 
of the Buda Treasury were quite often "fudged".
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reference is raade.^ 0  ^ A full analysis of the Buda Treasury 
accounts available to us is not a project which can be 
undertaken in the present study; here we will emphasise 
those macro aspects of the financial administration of the 
war which can be understood from the IEs. Unlike the IEs of 
the Campaign Treasury, these are In a slyakat hand; the unit 
of account in these accounts Is the akge.^3
Unlike the credit side of the Campaign Treasury accounts, 
those of the Buda Treas’ury do not have categories of emval-i 
miiteferrika (B.ii) and varidat-i gayr-i mukarrere (B.iii); 
the latter category is absent because extraordinary income 
was paid straight to the Campaign Treasury, and such wartime 
levies were not, in any case, applied In Hungary, the 
theatre of war. As to the absence of a category emval-1 
miiteferrika, some revenues which are found in this 
category in the Campaign Treasury accounts also appear in 
the Buda Treasury accounts, but recorded under the heading 
an mahsul-l...(BB).^ Q1* Such revenues are administrative 
fees (rtlsum-i...), Income from estates of the deceased (beyt 
iil-mal-i...). and from the sale of provisions to the troops 
(paha-yi zahlre...). There were also certain local taxes 
which were a legacy of the pre-Ottoman period such as rental
202. i.e. those in register MM 6766. As may be seen from the headings 
of these IEs, quoted above, there Is no obvious logic behind their 
periodisation: all three accounts were prepared under the auspices of 
the same officials, Mehmed Pasha and the defterdar Ibrahim. These 
accounts have no relationship to the solar or lunar year.
203. The IEs of the pre-war accounts of the Buda Treasury (MM 1561; MM 
498) are written in a mixture of coin, gold, osmani and penz being used 
within the same IE. The penz was a Hungarian silver coin of appoximate- 
ly the same value as the akge; the silver osmani had a 4:5 ratio
to the akge (Fekete, 1955 I p.238).
204. The codes according to which the Buda Treasury accounts are cued to 
the discussion here are AA, BB; PP, QQ, etc.
299
of shops (lcare-yl dekakln) and the fee for a property title 
(resm-1 tapu-yl zemin). In so far as we can extrapolate 
from the limited data at our disposal, the revenue arising 
in the vilayet of Buda itself averaged only 17# of the total 
income of the Buda Treasury during the war.^^
The first item of revenue on the credit side of the IEs of 
the Buda Treasury is a subvention from the Campaign Treasury 
(AA). This subvention was more than 75# of total revenue. 
The extent to which th'e economy and defence of Buda had to be 
supported by revenues generated outside the vilayet is 
starkly clear. Comparison with the pre-war accounts of the 
Buda Treasury further underlines the destruction to the 
economy of Buda which these campaigns caused, for such a 
comparison shows that both in total, and in the variety of 
revenues which it was able to collect, the economy of 
Buda suffered. Most strikingly, while only 17# of 
Buda Treasury income was generated locally during the war, 
before the war this figure had been nearer 70#.^06 Q f  
revenue of the vilayet of Kanije from January 1605-October 
1607, almost 90# came from the Central Treasury.^07
Before the war, the Buda Treasury received a subvention from 
the Temegvar Treasury: between the years 977-86 AH (1569— 
78), this amounted to almost 57m akge, or an average of 5.5m
205. MM 6766a = 21#; MM 6766b * 14#; MM 6766c - 14.5#
206. This figure Is arrived at on the basis of the IEs for the Buda 
Treasury from 983-89 AH/1575-81, (MM 1561 pp.192,262,300; MM 498 
pp.2,42,44); where the mahsul figure itself is low in some of these 
accounts, it is because the amount brought forward from the previous* 
account ("an baktye-yi muhasebe-yi sene-yl mazlye") is high: a high 
l!baklye" is in itself a sign of a thriving economy, since it is clear 
that the Buda Treasury did not remit its profit to the Central Treasury 
during these years.
207. MM 5717 p.lll
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akge p.a. This was earmarked for paying the wages of the 
troops defending the vilayet of Buda. Between the years 
975-78 AH (1567-70) the Central Treasury sent nearly 50m 
akge, an average of 16,670,000 akge p.a., also for wages.20** 
Thus, we may say that in the period about twenty years 
before the war, the wage bill of the troops defending the 
vilayet of Buda against the perceived threat from the 
Hapsburgs was being subsidised to the tune of over 21m akge 
p.a. Between February 1601 and June 1603, this local wage bill 
amounted to over 28m akge. or approximately 12 million akge
p.a.2°9
The apparently lower wage bill during the war may be easily 
put into its historical context. 975 AH (1566-67) was the 
first year of peace after the campaigns of Sultan SUleyman, 
and the subsequent years a time of reconstruction and 
continued apprehension concerning renewed Hapsburg military 
action. At such a time, substantial support from the 
Central Treasury was essential in order to make the province 
secure against future threat; as in the 1593-1606 war, local 
revenues were hard hit. However, during the years 983-989 
AH (1575-81) there was no Central Treasury subvention for 
the Buda Treasury;210 this was because the then beylerbeyl 
of Buda, Soko.llu Mustafa Pasha, had managed to so increase 
local revenues that the annual transfer of money was no
208. MM 1561 pp.72-73: the exchange rate is given as 65 akge to 1 gold 
coin.
209. The figure of 28 million akge is a total of MM 6766a,b,c/PP. This 
figure merely indicates an order of magnitude and does not pretend to be 
a precise comparison; particular reasons for this are first, that in 992 
AH (1584) the akge was devalued, and secondly, as we have seen, the wages 
of the troops were often paid some months or years after they were due.
210. MM 1561 pp.192,262,300; MM 498 pp.2,42,44.
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longer necessary.211 His success was such that even the 
wages of all the troops serving in Buda could be met from 
local revenues supplemented by the subvention from Temepvar; 
the vilayet of Buda was, in times of peace, a highly 
productive area, and the vilayet of Temepvar was a secure 
area before the renewal of Hapsburg-Ottoraan warfare and the 
defection ofthe Principalities.
There is no trace of the revenue of the Egyptian Treasury 
(Misr hazlnesl) being credited to either the Buda Treasury, 
nor, indeed, to the Campaign Treasury. Both Fekete and 
Kaldy-Nagy maintain that the 300,000 gold pieces of Egypt’s 
annual remittance to the Ottoman treasury were sent directly 
to Buda for fche payment of the troops stationed in 
Hungary.212 This may have been true in Siileyraan’s time, but 
even this remains to be proved;213 the accounts of the Buda 
Treasury show that it was not the case between 1570 and 
| 1581,21  ^ nor between 1599 and l603.21^
i
1
211. MM 1561 p.156 (IE for 8 Cum.II 981-7 Cum.II 982/5 September 1573-24 
September 1574): "bundan akdem vllayet-i Budun mevacibl lciln hlzane-yl 
amlreden 350,000-400,000 altunVir 1 liigelttp dokuz yildan bertl Mustafa
Pasa kullari vllayet-1 Budin’e vail olup vllayetl ve mal-i padlpahl-yl 
tashih etmekle mahsulu masrafina vefa edttp hlzane-yl amlreden altun 
vlrilmeyUp ancak Temepvar hazineslnden 4,000,000 akge vlrllUp eyyaro-1 
saadet-i padlpahdan vilayet ma’mur olmagla 300,000-400,000 florl hazlne- 
yi amlreye sa’y olmugtur".
212. Fekete (1976),pp.63-64; Kaldy-Nagy (1971) p.244. Their common 
source is PE£EVI I p.36.
213. There is little evidence available on this matter: in 1547-48,
(some part of) the Misr hazlnesl was certainly paid into the Central 
Treasury (Barkan, 1954/a p.246); Kaldy-Nagy also adduces Fekete & Kaldy- 
Nagy (1962) p.771 in support of his contention, but here there is no 
mention of the Misr hazlnesl to be found.
214. MM 1561; MM 498
215. Mxt.638; MM 6766
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Looking at the Egyptian end of the transaction, we find in 
the account of the Egyptian Treasury for 1596-97 that over
pi c
4 million akge was remitted to the Porte (”dergah-l ali11)* 
Reference has already been made to Ahmed insistence
that the Misr hazinesi was part of his private purse, and 
his refusal to allow it to be used to subsidise the eastern 
campaign in 1606.^17 Money from the sultan’s private purse, 
the Inner Treasury, was sent to finance the campaigns in 
Hungary; however, in view of the precision of the Ottoman 
accountants in describing the sources from whence came the 
incomes of the various treasuries, it is unlikely that the 
income of the Misr hazinesi would have been concealed, being 
recorded indistinguishably in the subvention paid into the 
the Campaign Treasury, and thence into the Buda Treasury, 
from the Central Treasury or from the Inner Treasury. The 
Buda Treasury accounts show, at the least, that the Misr 
hazlnesl was not sent ’’directly” to Buda in this period.
In the accounts of the Persian campaigns of Murad IV some 25 
years later, there is overt evidence of moneys from Egypt 
having been expended in support of these military 
expeditions. In 1624-25, over 37 million akge was sent from
216. Shaw (1968) pp.80-8l. The ruling rate of exchange was 4 para:l akge 
(ibid. p.18). For 1604 there is evidence that the remittance from Egypt 
was ordered to be sent to Istanbul, and the wording of the order does
not suggest that this was unusual: ’’Misr’da vezlr Mehmed Paga hilkm kl 
her sene astane-yl saadetime irsal olunagelen bazlneyl ve matbah-i 
amlreme lazim olanlan vaktl ve zamanlyle ala at-tacll tedarik ve 
astane-yl saadetime irsal eyleytip...” (MD 75/675). The size and 
destination of remittances for other years of the war are recorded in MM 
1999 and MM 5672 (Shaw, 1968 p.l6).
217. PE£EVI II p.327: "...Misr hazinesi blzim ceb harcligimizdir ondan 
nice verilUr...".
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the Egyptian Treasury to the Campaign Treasury;^1® in 1626- 
27, nearly 49 million akge was sent; in 1627-28, 57,526,920 
akge; and slightly less than this amount in 1630-31.
The debit side of the IEs of the Buda Treasury follows an 
almost similar pattern to that of the Campaign Treasury, 
lacking, in some cases, only the category of tesllmat (Q). 
The items which comprised tesllmat in the Campaign Treasury 
accounts, loans (karz) to high-ranking military officers, 
and moneys given to agents responsible for the purchase of 
provisions and equipment, were not funded from the Buda 
Treasury. Provisions for (some of) the soldiers garrisoning 
Buda are accounted for simply as purchases (mubayaat) (TT).
The category of Campaign Treasury expenditure relating to 
the payment of wages to the troops stationed in Hungary 
(P.v) and headed merely "mevaclb-i neferat-1 kila-y i...ff, 
could not be fully understood on the basis of those accounts 
alone. Although the periods covered by the available 
accounts of the Campaign Treasury and the Buda Treasury do 
not exactly coincide, some further elucidation is found in 
the IEs of the Buda Treasury accounts. Here, by far the 
major part of the wage burden of the Buda Treasury supported 
a similarly named group.^20 pPOm the DSs of these IEs, it 
may be seen that these "neferat-1 kila..." were garrison 
troops: local ("yerll”) topgus, cebecls etc., as well as the
218. Murphey (1979) p.447: three separate categories of subvention to the
Campaign Treasury are shown here; these are the hazine-yl enderun. the
hazlne-yl birun and the hazine-yl Misr.
219. Murphey (1979) pp.457,463,471
220. MM 6766a/PP.i; MM 6766b/PP.i; MM 6766c/PP.i: in the two former
IEs, the gloss !tber mucib-1 defter residan” Indicates the existence of a
separate account devoted to the details of distribution of the wages of 
this group (cf. note 221).
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local troops designated levend, that is martolos. farlsan 
etc.^^ The janissaries whose pay constitutes the second 
largest segment of the wage bill of the Buda Treasury at 
this time (PP.ii) are described as ”...^ i mahruse-yl Budin": 
it is not clear whether these were local janissaries or men
p o p
of this corps stationed temporarily in Buda. “
These registers of the .Buda Treasury are far from having 
been fully exploited; however, within the context of the 
financing of the 1593-1606 war, three general issues, 
already referred to in this study, have been clarified. The 
first of these is the extent to which the defence against 
the Hapsburgs relied on moneys generated outside the area, 
and the impoverishment of Hungary, and particularly of the 
vilayet of Buda, at this time; the pre-war accounts show 
productive the area could be. The cost of the border 
garrisons is a topic frequently referred to in the secondary 
literature, but without any quantitative data to back up the 
assertion. Indeed, the topic is usually discussed in order 
to demonstrate, fallaciously,'! that the Ottomans should not 
have incorporated Hungary into the Empire, for it cost them 
more to garrison than it produced in taxation. , °
The second matter which has been somewhat clarified is that 
we need a lot more detail than is usually available at the 
macro level in order to understand exactly which troops are 
being referred to in any particular context. The numbers of 
men included in any category is only clear at the micro
221. Each of the DSs Mxt.638, Mxt.635 and MM 6770 has an appendix 
giving further details of the distribution of wages to both these 
types of local troops; there are similar appendices for the pre-war 
period: MM 1561; MM 498 (cf. note 196 above).
222. Mxt.638 f.2v; Mxt.635 f.24v; MM 6770 p.32: the epithet "...-1 
dergah-1 all is not used to describe them.
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level of detail, and global figures for the various types of 
troops, as well as for revenues and expenditures, are, at the 
best, inexact; the order of magnitude which they purport to 
give may be similarly inexact.
The third, related issue which has become still clearer 
through our discussion of the accounts of the Buda Treasury 
is the transfer of funds for administative purposes, the way 
in which a debit on one type of account is recorded as a 
credit in another; this emphasises, once again, the 
hierarchy of accounts which, pieced together, enable us to 
build up a more accurate picture of the Ottoman accounting 
system. This is the subject of the next section.
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Illvi. The Campaign Treasury Accounts, the Ottoman
Accounting System and the Financing of the War
Now that we have examined the details of the items of 
revenue and expenditure in the accounts which are a 
financial record of some of the Ottoman campaigns between 
159 /^b.nd 1606, we are in a position to comment on the 
elusive matter of the "total cost" of Ottoman warfare at 
this time, to evaluate these accounts as a source for under­
standing the financing of the war, and also to be able to 
describe the Ottoman style of accounting as exemplified in 
these registers.
Notably absent from the Campaign Treasury accounts is the 
cost of heavy equipment and war material - what is described 
in the sources as mtihlmmat. During the course of a campaign 
many military equipment requirements were met locally, but 
each campaigning force also began the season with an 
extensive armoury, manufactured, for the most part, in 
Istanbul. The costs of this, cannon, guns, and a mass of 
ancillary equipment were not funded through the Campaign 
Treasury, but largely from Central Treasury moneys allocated 
to various accounts specifically for the purpose of 
producing such materials and equipment. It thus becomes 
apparent that these Campaign Treasury accounts may be 
considered as documenting only the ’running costs’ of 
military campaigning during the period of the 1593-1606 war, 
that is, the expenditures which arose in the theatre of war. 
The ’capital costs’ of the manufacture and supply of 
ordnance are, for the most part, recorded elsewhere.
Related to the character of the Campaign Treasury accounts 
as being a particular type of record of the events of the 
war, is the extent to which the ’great events’ of the war, 
the major confrontations which have traditionally been the 
concern of military historians, are apparent in the account 
entries. Since the accounts are a record of the day-to-day 
conduct of campaigns, it may be expected that they would 
contain evidence of a military build-up before, for
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instance, the onset of a siege. The major offensive actions 
covered by the campaign account registers are Satirci Mehmed 
Pasha’s unsuccessful siege of Varad in 1598 (KK 1876); Damad 
Ibrahim Pasha’s attempted siege of Uyvar in 1599 and his 
successful expedition to take Kanije from the Hapsburgs in 
the following year (KK 1879); the recapture of Istolni 
Belgrad in 1602 (KK 1885); and the failed attempt by the 
Ottomans to retake Estergon in 1604 (KK 1889).
Scrutiny of the entries in the Ds around the weeks of these 
important actions do not, however, show much evidence of the 
mobilisation of military resources which are the sine qua 
non of siege warfare. For Satirci Mehmed’s late-autumn 
attempt to capture Varad, which came after his forces had 
successfully taken £anad (Csanadpalota) some weeks earlier, 
payment for the transport of armaments to and from Varad is 
recorded.223 No account entries related so explicitly to a 
particular action are recorded around the time of the siege 
of Uyvar.
The steps taken in the aftermath of the capture of Kanije 
late in 1600 are more eloquently described than any 
preparations: these include the purchase of provisions for 
the troops who were appointed to garrison this fortress
223. e.g. KK 1876 p.166 (1 Rebi II 1007/1 November 1598) viz: ”der 
menzil-i Varad: tesllm be-Mehmed Qelebi katib-i cebehane-yl dergah-1 ali 
be-cihet-i ilcret-1 arabaciyan ve gdtUrbanan beray-i keglde-yl cebehane 
an Belgrad 11a Varad...”; (ibid.): ’’teslim be-Ismall Paga mirmlran-1 
Temegvar be ray-1 paha-yl gav be ray-1 keglde-yi top...”; (ibid. 5 Rebi 
II 1007/5 November 1598): ”be-cihet-l paha-yl gav ve berav-1 kegide-yl 
topha an Varad 11a kale-yl Solnok biddefaat...”. According to 
Dani^ nend’s chronology (q.v.), the siege of Varad was raised on 3 Rebi 
II 1007 AH (3 November 1598).
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which was now In Ottoman hands for the first time,22i* and, 
more prominently, the payment of back wages to those 
assigned to garrison Kanije, who were posted there from 
SIgetvar and elsewhere. Some of these men had not been paid 
for 15 months.22  ^ 2,671 janissaries, 30 cebecls. 72 topgus,
50 arabacis and 25 members of the alti boliik regiments were 
the kapukulu troops stationed In Kanije immediately after 
its capture.22® Just as the wages of the soldiers coming from 
Sigetvar and elsewhere were paid up to date, so large part 
of the pay of these kapukulu contingents was in gold. Many 
robes were presented to aghas and gavuges, in particular, as 
was usual on such victorious occasions.22?
The accounts do not contain evidence of great movement of 
materials for the siege of Istolni Belgrad In 1602; the same 
can be said with regard to the main confrontation of 1604, 
the unsuccessful Ottoman attempt to retake Estergon. The 
achievement of the peace of Zsitvatorok in 1606, however, 
necessitated the dispensing of largesse to very many 
dignitaries, Hapsburg, Ottoman and Hungarian, and resulted 
in a separate account which records the details of who 
received gifts of ceremonial robes.22®
In siege warfare it is the besiegers who have the advantage 
of timing the engagement, and, for the Ottoman offensives
224. e.g. KK 1879 p.402 (23 Rebi II 1009/1 November 1600): "tesllm 
be-Kara All gavug an gavugan-i dergah-1 all beray-1 lgtlra-yl zahlre-yl 
kale-yi Kanije der kaza-yl Sigetvar...”. According to Dani^ nend (q.v.), 
Kanije surrendered on 13 Rebi II 1009/22 October 1600.
225. e.g. KK 1879 p.408 (25 Rebi II 1009/3 November 1600): ”mevacib-l 
cemaat-1 neferat-1 Sigetvar ve gayrlhi der kale-yi Kanije tayln vaclb an 
gurre-yl masar sene 1008 11a gaye-yl Rebi II 1009..
226. KK 1879 pp.409,4ll
227. KK 1879 p.4ll
228. KK 1890 pp.298-305
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referred to here, It is certain that preparations other than 
those which were part of the normal activity of supporting 
an army in the field must have been made. Yet specific 
preparations for a specific engagement are not conspicuous 
in the Campaign Treasury accounts. The possible 
explanations for this apparent anomaly give further Insight 
into these campaign accounts, and into the character of 
Ottoman accounting in'general.
First of all, it may be that, even on the basis of the 
evidence in the Campaign Treasury accounts, more preparation 
was being made than is evident: since the D entries rarely 
give details of the source and destination of the materials 
being moved around, it cannot be said where such movements 
took place. Unless the scene of the engagement Is 
mentioned, as are Varad and Kanije in the examples quoted 
above, movement of military equipment cannot be tied to a 
specific engagement. Secondly, the services performed by 
those who were tax-exempt in recognition of their 
performance of such auxiliary duties, for instance the 
ytirttks who assisted in the transport of cannon, are not 
recorded in the accounts. The Campaign Treasury accounts 
record only goods and services that were paid for in cash: 
the fact that they do not contain evidence of extraordinary 
mobilisation of resources before any particular engagement 
is due to such mobilisation being a cost that was hidden in 
the state and military infrastructure. The major part of 
the cost of the services used in this war was built in to 
the wages of the troops on the state payroll and a major 
part of the cost of the military goods mobilised was 
accounted for elsewhere than in these accounts, for 
instance, in the accounts of the armoury (cebehane) or the 
cannon foundry (tophane). -I— . U'- C
As an indication of the financial costs of war, then, the 
accounts of the Campaign Treasury have only limited
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value.22  ^ The financial costs of war are largely 
unquantifiable, but, if quantifiable and quantified, would 
be somewhat greater than the total expenditure shown In the 
IEs of the Campaign Treasury during these years of war.
This impossibility of quantifying the costs of war in the 
Ottoman Empire is frustrating, because such quantification 
would give us one index of the importance of war in the 
global Ottoman economy, and thus, could address an Important 
aspect of the theoretical question of the nature of the 
Ottoman state, the extent of its militarisation, and so on. 
Platitudes abound on the ’military* as the predominant 
characteristic of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, 
Andreski’s view that ’...the (Ottoman) state was really an 
army on the march",2 0^ or Sugar’s calculation that 96# of 
Ottoman expenditure was on troops alone.2 1^
Since these accounts of the Campaign Treasury are no 
reflection of the financial position of the Ottoman army at 
war during these years, it may be asked, therefore, what was 
the function of these accounts for their compilers? None of 
the contemporary western powers seems to have kept such a 
daily record of campaign revenues and expenditures. The 
integrity of the financial departments of the Ottoman Empire 
was preserved through the use of the slyakat script, a 
miniaturised and angular version of the cursive dlvanl hand 
used for the work of other departments of state at this 
time. Numbers expressed in siyakat as Arabic words could 
not be read by those who had not learned the skill, but were
229. Imber (1972) pp.203-04 has emphasised this point in relation to an 
account relating to Barbarossa’s 1539 Herceg Novi naval expedition.
230. Andreski (1968) p.137
231. Sugar (1973) p.98: the title of this article is "A near perfect 
military society: the Ottoman Empire"; in the simplistic analysis which 
he attempts, the author can only arrive at uninformative conclusions.
also hard to forge, since, for instance, extra noughts could 
not be added. In some of the Campaign Treasury account 
registers which we have analysed, daily totals of income and 
expenditure are given, but this practice is by no means 
prevalent. On occasion, specific sets of figures are summed 
in the margin, presumably when the summary accounts were 
being prepared, but such calculations are rare.
The shortcomings of siyakat as a practical tool of 
accounting in the sense in which we understand it today, or 
as it was understood in the contemporary European accounts 
of early capitalism, had no relevance for the Ottomans. War 
is not a commercial venture, and warfare has never been 
subject to the rationale of the balance sheet; thus, 
although the Ottomans, like any warring state, must have 
been concerned that they did not have to spend more than 
absolutely necessary, they had no opportunity to make 
informed decisions as to possible cost containment. No 
account could ever have altered that fact.
A clue to the function of the accounts of the Campaign Treasury 
accounts, as of other accounts of the Ottoman treasury, is 
given in the headings of the accounts themselves. Their 
function was primarily interdictive for, by coinciding with 
the appointment of named officials, it made those named 
officials responsible to the sultan for the moneys whose use 
is recorded in the accounts. This interdictive function was 
passed on to those who participated in the financial 
transactions which allowed the army to operate, by the 
careful documenting of each transaction on presentation to 
the accountant of the receipt (makbuz, temessUk). During 
the 1593-1606 war, the IEs were shown to the sultan, who at 
least pretended an interest in the progress of the war, and
3 1 2
the conduct of his officers.^ 32
The system of accounting was simple; the lags between the 
due date of moneys and the date when they were paid into the 
Campaign Treasury could be many months. The frequent late 
payment of wages was another device which distorts the 
value of these accounts as a global statement even of the 
cash revenues accruing and the cash expenditures which were 
incurred in the period .defined in the account-heading. The 
financing of war was the most irresistible of all demands 
made on the resources of a state, and one whose parameters 
could not be predicted, but which had to be met quickly. In 
their mobilisation of the financial resources which would 
enable them to fight the 1593-1606 war, the Ottomans could 
not hope to act according to a predetermined plan, but could 
only use the variety of means at their disposal to raise as 
much money as was feasible.
Thus, although analysis of the accounts of the Campaign 
Treasury does not result in global measures which can enable 
us to posit confidently that any certain percentage of the 
resources of the Ottoman Empire was spent on the financing 
of war, these accounts are the piece of the jigsaw of "total 
cost” which is most diverse in character: accounts of the 
other costs of warfare at this time are more circumscribed 
in their detail, referring to more defined enterprises.
It has, I hope, been shown that the accounts of the Campaign 
and Hungarian Treasuries are a most important source for an 
understanding of how money was raised for the war and how 
it was spent, and of the changes apparent in these 
activities even during the span of the war.
232. The phrase "paye-yi serir-i alaya okundu" followed by the date is 
noted in the IEs; on the first page of register KK 1879> for instance, 
which covers Zilkade 1007-Zilkade 1009, this date is Zilhicce 1012, 
three years after the close of the account.
CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
Logistics is the problem of allocating existing resources In 
the pursuit of an objective, as well as "creating” new 
resources for the same purpose. How the Ottomans performed 
these two related tasks with the objective of defending the 
north-western borders of their Empire against a perceived 
Hapsburg threat has been the subject of this study. 
Conclusions to be derived from this study are thus the 
restatement and amplification of certain themes already 
discussed, which often consolidate lines of enquiry 
indicated by others, as well as an attempt to suggest what 
such a detailed study of a period of only a few years may 
contribute to Ottoman history In more general terms. 
Consideration of the neglected subject of Ottoman warfare 
also hints at many abstract issues to which answers will 
only slowly be found.
The existence of a crisis in the Ottoman polity in the later 
part of the sixteenth and early part of the seventeenth 
century is widely accepted, although its nature is subject 
to conflicting interpretations. This crisis concerns the 
disruption of the so-called "classical” pattern of land- 
holding and revenue extraction as exemplified In the tlmar 
system. The tlmar system linked the satisfaction of the 
major part of the military manpower needs of the Empire to 
the decentralised taxation of the subject population: the 
provincial cavalry, which was numerically the largest 
section of the army, itself collected the taxes which were 
its financial support, without direct state intervention.
In a sense, then, the administration of the provisioning of 
the army in the 1593-1606 war is an issue subsidiary to 
consideration of the administration of manpower and finance 
for the war, and it is to this subject that we will turn 
first. With the exception of Veinstein's two studies of 
the mechanics of the provisioning of the Ottoman army in
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Siileyman’s time,-*- this topic has not been discussed in depth 
before. The state was responsible for supplying only a 
small section of the total army, the kapukulu ocaklari, the 
standing army of the Porte. Although this contingent was 
always Increasing in size, it was relatively unimportant in 
the context of the tens of thousands of other Ottoman troops 
who were fighting in Hungary at this time and about whose 
provisioning we have only few details. The area from which 
the necessary supplies were drawn was a fertile one, and it 
is clear that sufficient food and fodder could be furnished 
from the European half of the Empire alone: even with areas 
of Bosnia and Hungary devastated by the war, the province of 
Rumeli remained secure and productive. In such favourable 
circumstances there were certain notional limits as to what 
was acceptable behaviour from those troops for whose 
provisioning the state was not directly responsible: In 
particular, the produce of the reaya was not to be taken 
gratis, and land over which the Ottomans could reasonably 
envisage gaining control was not to be plundered. To 
consider such limitations as a "provisioning policy" may, 
however, be an exaggeration.
By contrast, the situation of the troops fighting on the 
Persian border between 1578 and 1590, and again from 1603 to 
1612, must have been very different, and the hand of the 
state may have been more in evidence. KUtukoglu's study of 
the 1578-90 eastern campaigns does not set out to give a 
systematic treatment of provisioning, but he shows that the 
area from which supplies were drawn was much wider and more 
distant from the theatre of war, including Moldavia and 
Wallachia, the Danube area, Egypt and Cyprus.^ Ensuring the 
supply of food and fodder for the troops in the east clearly 
put greater strain on the logistic apparatus than was the
1. Veinstein (1983); Veinstein (198.)
2. B.Kiitukoglu (1962) pp.31-34
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case in Hungary.
Warfare inevitably stretches whatever resources a state can 
command, but of all the resources which had to be mobilised 
for this war in Hungary, it was food and fodder that was 
most readily available. Provisioning cannot, however, be 
treated in isolation. Through the medium of the extra­
ordinary ’in-kind’ and' ’in-cash' taxes levied in time of 
war, an intimate relationship existed between food supply 
and taxation. There was a similarly close relationship 
between the mobilisation of the civilian population to 
perform certain wartime services, and the subsequent 
substitution of a cash burden for such services. In the 
present study, the logistic function served by the trans­
formation from an ’in-kind' to an ’in-cash’ burden has been 
emphasised, for this change obviated the need to transport 
huge amounts of provisions from where they were produced to 
where they were to be consumed, since it allowed greater 
flexibility in assigning tasks necessary to the conduct of 
the war. The subject of the increasing monetarisation of 
the economy has preoccupied other historians, and this 
important issue has been given further definition here, 
through close examination of the accounts of the Campaign 
Treasury.
The mobilisation of sufficient manpower to fight in Hungary 
was a problem of a different order from the supply of food 
and of auxiliary services. Apart from the obvious 
difficulties experienced by Asian sipahls in covering the 
distance to Hungary - where they often wintered in the field 
and yet needed to retain control over their affairs at home 
- two other trends are significant. First of all, the 
tendency for officials of the central bureaucracy to be 
awarded timar-lands as payment added to the disaffection of 
the traditional provincial class, as is shown in complaints 
that the best tlmars were being given to these parvenus, and 
in the desire of the sipahls to be subject to separate 
mobilisation arrangements. The state clearly made attempts 
to persuade this new class of land-holders to fight in the
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campaigns, but the extent of their success is not ascertain­
able. The state’s attempt to avoid having to find cash to 
pay its officials led to the awarding as income of 
provincial offices which had traditionally carried a 
military obligation, thus lessening whatever cohesion the 
class of military fief-holders might formerly have had.
A second trend affecting the provincial cavalry was part of 
the shared experience of all European armies over the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There was a general 
shift in emphasis from cavalry to infantry, brought about by 
factors such as technological improvement in methods of 
warfare and the relative cheapness of equipping an infantry­
m a n . 3 Rea.ya from Bosnia, in particular, were conscripted or 
attracted to join the army, often with the promise of a 
permanent place in the ranks in the future. The incresed 
demand for manpower from the time of renewed war with Persia 
in 1603, and, prior to this, owing to government efforts to 
suppress the Celali revolts, was met in the only possible 
way, through widespread recruitment.
There can be no doubt that the widening of recruitment into 
the Ottoman army had profound financial repercussions. 
Traditional revenue sources were insufficient to meet the 
burden of the greater numbers of men who were paid, for the 
most part, in cash. Therefore, the government had to look 
for new sources of finance to pay the troops fighting in 
this war, and ample reference has been made to the ways in 
which money was raised through loans to the treasury, late 
payment of wages and increased monetarisation of the war 
economy. So too, erosion of the distinction between the 
personal revenues of the sultan and those of the public 
treasury, shown in the struggle between the sultan and his
3. Parker (1976) esp. pp.207-08: serious consideration of this article 
in the context of the Ottoman Empire would be valuable in demystifying 
the Ottoman "military revolution" of the sixteenth-seventeenth century.
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military commanders over revenues which he had traditionally 
considered to be his, was a further "new" financial resource 
which was tapped to fund the war. The financial pressures 
exerted by the relentless demands for money brought about by 
years of campaigning were relieved by resort both to 
resources available within the higher echelons of the 
military-civil bureaucracy as well as by the imposition of 
heavier tax burdens on the subject population.
The financial crisis which was part of the upheaval in the 
traditional structure of Ottoman society also brought 
greater prominence to bureaucratic officials at the expense 
of the (admittedly far from homogenous) military classes. 
RShrborn’s excellent article on the rise of the financial 
bureaucracy at the end of the sixteenth century has not 
received the attention it merits.^ Finding the money to 
continue the war was the most important of all the admin­
istrative tasks facing the government: it has been pointed 
out that the Campaign Treasury accounts which were discussd 
in Part III are the earliest extant - they may well be the 
earliest to have existed, a fact which would underline the 
emergence of a new concern with financial husbandry.5 The 
part played by "the defterdar Etmekgizade Ahmed Pasha has 
been mentioned before: his responsibility for direct 
collection of the revenues of Rumeli for the Campaign 
Treasury, which otherwise reached this treasury by way of a
4. Rdhrbom (1972)
5. The significance of account books in the army of Ferdinand and 
Isabella is discussed in an interesting article by Stewart (1969): he 
emphasises the role of accounting practice in establishing central 
control over the army, and also implies that the existence of accounts 
could have a part in decisions as to future expenditures. Although this 
function of the accounts of the Ottoman Campaign Treasury has been 
underplayed in the present study, the existence of accounts may have had 
some such value in the longer term.
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Central Treasury subvention, has been noted, as has the fact 
that he was the first defterdar to be made a pasha. The 
specific measures which he adopted in order to raise more 
money are not apparent, but further reading of the 
contemporary chronicles may yield such information. His 
methods may have relied simply on more efficient tax 
collection: the increase in the revenues of Buda which 
Sokollu Mustafa Pasha was able to bring about in the 1570s 
has shown that the effprts of a capable individual could 
bring results.
The costs of the Hungarian border defences were, as we have 
seen, borne by the central government. It was obviously 
considered desirable that Hungary should produce as much 
revenue as was feasible, but the taxation measures 
introduced when the area came under Ottoman control were not 
too onerous. Local revenues were minimal during the war and 
the area almost entirely dependent on external funding. 
Hungary was not subject to irregular taxation during the 
war, and Bosnia, too, was relieved of such burdens owing to 
its obvious inability to pay. Beyond orders to local 
treasury officials that they should make efforts to increase 
provincial revenues, it appears that no serious attempt was 
made to make the area pay for itself: this was clearly out 
of the quesion in any case.
The local resources of other contemporary states were not, 
either, sufficient to meet the costs of occupying and 
defending a border area considered essential to the 
integrity of the state. Spanish attempts to make the 
Netherlands pay for themselves in the second half of the 
sixteenth century were not realised, despite the imposition 
of taxes of such severity that many went over to the prince 
of Orange when he invaded In 1572,^  while the costs of the
6. Parker (1981) esp. pp.139-45
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defence of the Austrian border in Croatia were considered 
too serious a matter to be a local responsibility.^ Unlike 
these other states, though, the Ottoman Empire responded to 
the demand for financial resources by reliance on those to 
be raised within its own borders. The longer-term 
consequences of these differing responses has not been 
considered from a comparative perspective, and cannot be 
discussed on the basis of the present study: it should, 
however, be raised as £ possible avenue for further 
discussion.
The concept of the allocation of resources implies 
that there was a degree of choice open to those responsible 
for administering the raising of an army, for its food 
supply and for deciding from where would come the financial 
support to keep it functioning; in practice, the solutions 
adopted relied largely on custom and precedent, as well as on 
what was considered politically feasible. Frequent 
reference has been made throughout this study to "the 
military command", "the government" and "the Porte". The 
use of such generalisations to denote those responsible for 
directing the course of the war is dictated by the fact that 
Ottoman prosopographical studies are in their infancy. 
Prosopographical work done to date has tended to concentrate 
on the backgrounds of "elite" individuals and groups, for 
the most part ignoring their role as political actors. The 
struggles over the distribution of power in the Ottoman 
state have so far been little studied. Although Abdiilkadir 
and Hasanbeyzade make some reference to discussion of 
certain strategic issues during the course of campaign, it 
has unfortunately not been possible to discover who made 
logistic decisions of either a general or particular nature.
7. Rothenburg (I960) pp.13-51
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This study of warfare during a specific period raises wider 
theoretical questions concerning the place of warfare in the 
life of the Ottoman Empire. Hitherto, little serious 
attention has been given to this issue, with the result that 
discussion remains at best simplistic. The twin notions 
that the territorial conquests of the Ottoman Empire were 
the result of an irresistible drive inspired by cihad, and 
that the Empire went to war solely to win booty, remain 
resilient. Once the history of the Ottoman Empire is 
discussed in terms which are comparable to those according 
to which the history of other states is discussed, and less 
emphasis placed on the "peculiar” features of Ottoman 
society, then we will be in a better position to begin to 
understand the dynamic processes operating behind the static 
facade presented to contemporary western observers and to 
today’s non-specialists.
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Note of Abbreviations used
/.../ original text illegible
a) original text omitted in transliteration for reasons of 
brevity, or, b) in the case of account entries, such a mark 
is used to connect text to the sum of money in question 
( ) lacuna in original text
IE "Income and Expenditure Account"
DS "Daybook Summary"
D "Daybook"
Note on Weights
Understanding of the weights and measures used in the Ottoman Empire at 
various times is an essential preliminary for economic history: however, 
our knowledge of this matter is still scanty. An important study is 
Inalcik (1983). The metric equivalents used here are those in Hinz 
(1955) viz:
1 kantar = 56.443 kg
1 kile/keyl = 20 okka wheat or flour = 25.656 kg 
= 10 okka rice = 12.828 kg 
1 okka/vukiye/kiyye = 1.283 kg 
1 dirhem = 3.086 gjn
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GAZETTEER and MAP
Two major problems make it difficult to be consistent in the form of 
place-names in the Ottoman Empire. First, in Hungary in particular, 
many places were known by as many as four different names: in the text, 
therefore, it is the Ottoman place-name which is used, with the present- 
day European name given in brackets at first mention. In the list below 
the Ottoman name is in the first column, the present name (or the 
English name) is in the second, and the contemporary German name has 
been added in the third column in some instances. However, those places 
most familiar to English readers are given in their English rendition, 
for instance, Vienna rather than Beg (Ottoman) or Wien (German).
Secondly, the boundaries of Ottoman administrative districts, 
vilayet/eyalet, sancak/liva and kaza appear to have shifted fairly 
frequently, and the boundaries of sancaks and kazas of the same name 
partially overlapped. Sancaks and kazas are therefore not delimited on 
the map: where it is the central town of such districts that is most 
frequently alluded to in the text, rather than the district itself, the 
town rather than the district is shown on the map. During a period of 
war, when land was being lost and won, such problems were compounded^  
for the border between Ottoman-held Hungary and Hapsburg-held Hungary 
shifted from month to month in these years.
Any map of the European domains of the Ottoman Empire must therefore be 
a compromise, and that given here is intended only for reference.
Places in southern Greece and Albania as well as in the Asian part of 
the Empire which are mentioned in the text have not been included; the 
reader who wishes to establish the location of these must turn for 
further details to the publications available. Pitcher (1972) is the 
standard historical atlas of the Ottoman Empire; BIrken (1976) gives 
lists and maps of the vilayets and sancaks of the Empire as they changed 
over time, while Cfcergin (1976) shows the location of the kazas of much 
of the Ottoman Balkans later in the seventeenth century.
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Akkennan Belgorod
Alacahisar KruSevac
Arad
Banaluka Banja Luka
Beg (Vienna)
Behke Bihac
Belgrad Belgrade
Bogdan (Moldavia)
Brusa Bursa
Budin, Budun Buda
Bulundvar
Biikre^ (Bucharest)
Cankurtaran Adony
Cezayir (Algeria)
Cisr-i Mustafa Svilengrad
Pa^ a
Qanad
Qatalca
Edime (Adrianople) 
Eflak 
Egri 
Engiiriis 
Erdel 
Erdevik 
Estergon 
Filek 
Filibe
Csanadpalota
(Wallachia)
Eger
(Hungary)
(Transylvania)
Esztergom 
Fil' akovo 
Plovdiv
Gelibolu (Gallipoli)
Giins
Hagova
Halkali
Hatvan
Hirebolu
Hlsarcik
Ibrail
Istolni Belgrad 
Kanije
Koszeg
Mezokeresztes
Hayrabolu
Grocka
Braila
Szekesfehervar
Nagykanisza
Wihitsch
Griechisch Weissenburg
Ofen
Erlau
Gran
Stuhlweissenburg
Kara Bogdan (see Bogdan) 
Kazanlik Kazanl^ k
Kirkkilise Kirklareli
Komran Komarom
Kopan Torokkoppany
Krlm (Crimea)
Leh (Poland)
Lipova
Misr (Egypt)
Mohag Mohacs
Nemce (Austria)
Nigbolu Nikopol
Ni$
Novigrad Nograd
Osek Osijek
Ozii Ochakov
Palota Varpalota
Pangova Pan6evo
Papa Papa
Peguy Pecs
Pe$te Pest
Rodoscuk (Rodosto) Tekirdag
Samartln Szent Marton
San Brod Dimitrovgrad
Saray
Segen Szecseny
Segedin Szeged
Seksar Szekszard
Semendre Smederevo
Sigetvar Szigetvar
Siklo^ Siklos
Siroz Serrai
Siska Sisak
Sirem Srem
Solnok Szolnok
Sorabor Szombor
e^hirkoy Pirot
^imontoma Simontomya
Tata
Temegvar Timisoara
Tergovi^ te Tirgoviste
Tokaj
Uyvar
Uskilb
Uskiidar (Scutari)
Vag
Varad
Varna
Vesprem
Vi^ egrad
Vize
Yanik
Yenihisar
Yenipalanka
Yeni Zagora
Yergogii
Zemun
N.Zamky
Skopje
Vac
Oradea
Veszprem
Visegrad
Gyor 
Petrinja 
Dregelypalank 
Nova Zagora 
Giurgiu
Neuhausel
Waitzen
Grosswardein
Raab
Semlin
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Key:
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major administrative districts: 
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A NOTE ON SOURCES
Chronicles
One of the problems which Ottoman historians continually have to contend 
with is that the historical literature which constitutes one of their 
main sources has received little analytic study. With such a wealth of 
literature available, and relatively few scholars working in this field, 
few critical editions of chronicles have been published to date. This 
means having to rely either on the manuscripts, or microfilms of those 
manuscripts, which are most easily accessible, or else on uncritical and 
predominantly nineteenth-century publications of often unspecified texts 
of chronicles. Basic study concerning the author, his sources, and the 
various versions of the texts of his work is, with few notable 
exceptions, only now being done.
A number of contemporary literary sources are relevant to the period of 
the 1593-1606 campaigns in Hungary: there are the poetic works of 
Talikizade, Hoca Saadiiddln, Em ini pelebi, Dervip Agha and Nevizade Atal; 
there is also prose gazavatname literature, eulogistic works written in 
celebration of a victorious campaign; there is the nasihatname liter­
ature (’’advice to princes”) of this and the subsequent period, in which 
is recounted "abuses” which began in the sixteenth century. Most 
important for the present study, however, are the contemporary Histories 
of the war, written by Pegevi, Hasanbeyzade, Selaniki and AbdUlkadir. 
These four chroniclers all had intimate connection with the campaigns 
being conducted in Hungary, and include in their Histories details of 
the appointments which they held. They are also referred to at various 
points in the Histories of their contemporaries.
Of these four, the most valuable witness of these campaigns is AbdQlkadir 
Efendi, who, in his posts as topgular katibi (clerk of the corps of 
cannoneers) and later as cebecller katibi (clerk of the corps of 
armourers) during this war, was responsible for military equipment and a 
keen observer of logistic matters.
330
Archival Material
The campaign account books to be found in the Kamil Kepecl Tasnlfl (KK) 
and the accounts of the Buda Treasury in the Mallyeden Miidewer 
Defterler Tasnlfl (MM) have been discussed at length in Part III of this 
study. Since the cataloguing of the registers and documents in the 
Prime Ministerial (Bagbakanlik) Archives in Istanbul has been undertaken 
piecemeal over the years, the accessible material is dispersed over a 
number of classes which have been classified according to varying 
criteria. For instance, of the classes of document used here, those of 
the All Emlrl Tasnlfl (AE) are grouped by sultan; the Fekete Tasnlfl is 
so called because it was catalogued by this scholar, and the documents 
are classified according to their bureaucratic provenance. I was, with 
rare exceptions, unable to consult this latter class of documents, which 
covers the period of the war and had, until recently, been open for 
research; It was unfortunately no longer available, having been broken 
up for re cataloguing.
Another group of registers within the MM which has been used extensively 
Is the wage registers (mevaclb defterlerl) of the troops paid from both 
the central and provincial treasuries. The MM also contains a number of 
registers concerning the military equipment used on these campaigns; 
these registers, together with Abdiilkadir’s chronicle, form the basis 
for my intended study of the fourth branch of logistics, the supply of 
war materials and equipment to the army fighting in Hungary during these 
campaigns. To date there is little written on Ottoman materiel, the 
study best-known to English readers being Parry (1970).
Of the Muhimme defterlerl .(MD) vvols. 67-77 were consulted, as well as 
MDZ 6-7, and KK 70, the latter being a misclassified MD register. These 
registers run from 1590-1606, but with a lacuna between MD 7^  and MD 75: 
this gap covers the years 1596-1602. Yet, despite the lack of miihimme 
documents for this period, which Is approximately half of the war, it 
has been possible to suggest answers to the questions which are the 
subject of this study by recourse to the other types of document 
available. Only MD 77 of the MDs consulted contained substantial 
numbers of orders relating to the campaigns: such orders must also have 
been given in other years than 1605-1606, but if there existed registers
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with copies of such orders, they are no longer extant.
A source which would undoubtedly have been of great value in the under­
standing of the effects of the war in Hungary and the parts of Rumeli 
through which the army passed and from which suppies were drawn is the 
kadi sicllleri. the registers of the cadi courts. However, those for 
Hungary no longer exist and those available in Bulgaria do not cover 
this period. It was only some of those for Rodoscuk (RKS) which I could 
consult in Topkapi Palace Archives, but it was clear in the short time 
at my disposal that they would yield further important details 
concerning, in particular, orders for provisions and military equipment.
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LIST OF ARCHIVAL SOURCES USED
ISTANBUL
Bagbakanlik Arglvi (Prime Ministerial Archives)
Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi (KK):
70, 253, 254, 255, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1879, 1884, 1885, 
1887, 1889, 1890, 1892, 7102, 9421
Maliyeden Miidewer Defterler Tasnifi (MM):
101, 136, 383, 498, 893, 1561, 3731, 3903, 4435, 5145, 
5158, 5241, 5294, 5339, 5524, 5530, 5717, 5772, 6151,
6322, 6423, 6766, 6770, 6983, 7029, 7336, 7348, 7426,
7539, 7540, 7727, 7730, 15546, 16320, 20160
Milhiirme Defterleri (Registers of Important Affairs) (MD): 
see separate list
Fekete Tasnifi:
A.DVN.1011.11.15 n.3827
All Rnirl Tasnifi (AE):
Murad 111/358; Mehmed III/l, 112, 174, 181; Ahmed 1/815
Ibn Ul-Qnin Tasnifi (IBE):
Askeri/184
Topkapi Sarayi Arsivi (Topkapi Palace Archives):
Palace Registers: TKS D5527, TKS D8702
Rodoscuk Kadi Sicilleri (Registers of the Rodoscuk Cadi 
Court) (RKS):
1536, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1542
Bayazld Umuml KUtuphanesi (Bayazid General Library) 
Vellyiiddin 1970
VIENNA
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchlv
HHStA Krlegsakten 35, January-October 1598
Oesterrelchische National Blbllothek 
Mxt.635, Mxt.638
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CHECKLIST OF MPHBMS UEFfVKTiERI DOCUMENTS USED
'Note: All these document references are prefaced MD in the text, with 
the sole exception of that falling between 77/74 and 77/76, which is 
prefaced MDZ(eyli).
Dates fall into three classes: a) A precise date is given where this 
appears at the top of the document itself or at the top of the page on 
which it is found, or on the previous page; b) c. denotes an estimated date 
according to the position of the document relative to other dated 
documents; c) nd indicates that the document is not dated, and that a 
more or less firm date cannot convincingly be assigned: such documents 
are dateable only to the year of those in series with them.
Hicri dates are abbreviated thus:
M Muharrem B Receb
S Safer $aban
Ra Rebi I N Ramazan
R Rebi II L §ewal
Ca Cumada I Za Zilkade
C Cumada II Z Zilhicce
El Evail (first decade of month)
Et Evas it (middle decade of month)
Er Evahir (last decade of month)
Doct. Recipient(s) Date
no. Copy to:
67/43 Semendre beyine c.Z 998
cc. suret-i mezbure Uzere cemi Budun kaleminde olan
beylere ahkam-i perife yazilup irsal olunmuptur 
67/295 Bosna beylerbeyisine El C 999
68/124 Budun beylerbeyisine 20 L 999
cc. Solnok, Istolni Belgrad, Novigrad, Sigetvar,
Peguy, Kopan, Seksar, Semendre, Sirem, Segedin,
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Mohag, £imontoma, Filek, Hatvan beylerine;
Teme^ var beylerbeyisine; G51e, Yanova, Lipova,
/.../ beylerine; Bosna beylerbeyisine; Pakrag, 
Pozega, Klis, ’Hersek, Izvomik, Kirka beylerine 
68/127 Bosna beylerbeyiliginde vaki olan sancakbeyilerine 
cc. Budun sancakbeyilerine; Teme^ var sancakbeyilerine 
69/92 Bogdan voyvodasina 
69/111 Prizren beyine
cc. Alacahisar, Vulgitrin beylerine 
69/142 Bosna’dan siidde-yi saadetime gelince yol iizerinde 
vaki olan sancakbeylerine ve kadilara 
69/160 Budun beylerbeyisine
69/171 Rumeli beylerbeyisine
69/509 Bosna beylerbeyisine
70/61 Ruscuk ve Tuna yalilarinda vaki olan kadilara 
70/118 Bosna beylerbeyisine
70/120 Eflak voyvodasina
71/31 Silistre sancakbeyi Piri...’e 
cc. Bender, Akkennan beylerine 
71/59 Anadolu beylerbeyisine
cc. Karaman, Zulkadriye, Rum, Rumeli, Teme^ var, Bosna 
beylerbeyilerine; Kapudan Papa’ya; Budun 
muhafazasinda olan vezir Hasan Papa’ya 
71/81 Karaman beylerbeyisine
cc. Anadolu beylerbeyisine
71/108 Erdel voyvodasina
71/173 Bosna beylerbeyisine ve Zagorya kadisina 
71/211 Rum beylerbeyisine ve Rum beylerbeyiliginde vaki 
olan kadilara 
cc. Kangri beyine ve Kangri livasinda vaki olan 
kadilara 
71/241 Kapucu ba^ i Veli Aga’ya 
71/266 Amasya sancakbeyi SQleyman... fa 
71/273 Anadolu beylerbeyisine
71/332 Silistre ve Bender beyine ve sabika Varna kadisi 
olup mtifettip al-emval olan Mevlana Miihyi iil-Din’e 
71/338 Elbasan beyine (ve) Drac kadisina 
71/369 Erdel voyvodasina
71/394 Teme§var beylerbeyisine ve defterdarlna c
20 L 999
Er Ca 1000 
1 M 1001
nd
nd
c.Er C 1001 
c.ll S 1001 
nd 
nd
c.C 1001 
13 Z 1001
10 Z 1001
c.22 Za 1001
c.El S 1002 
21 Z 1001 
c.Ra 1002
c.18 Ra 1002 
nd
c.20 Ra 1002
16 B 1001 
c.23 B 1001 
c.R 1002 
.29/30 Z 1001
71/552
71/571
71/585
71/601
71/649
71/729
71/753
72/11
72/80
72/86
72/103
72/140
cc.
72/184
72/221
cc.
72/222
cc.
72/239
cc.
72/240
72/271
72/283
72/330
72/342
cc.
72/343
72/347
cc.
£ark5y ve Evre^ e ve Kesan kadilarina 18 Za 1001
Krira ham Gazl GIray Han’e 11 Za 1001
Hassa mimarlarimdan Ismail...'e 29 Za 1001
Mahruse-yi Istanbul^ dan Kefe'ye varinca yalllarda 16 Za 1001
vaki olan kadilara
Tatar han’ina Er M 1002
Eflak voyvodasina 18 M 1002
Akkerman kadisina ve /.../ dergal>-i muallam 17 Z 1001
gavu^ larindan Ali gavu$...?a 
Rum beylerbeyisine defter-i hakani katiblerinden 
olup vilayet-i Rum’un bedel akgeleri cemine memur 
olan katib Ahmed’e
Sofya ve UskUb ve Filibe kadilarina nd
Eflak voyvodasina nd
Gelibolu ve Lapseki kadilarina nd
SUdde-yi saadetimden Belgrad’a varinca ulu yol c.28 C 1002
iizerinde vaki olan kadilara 
Silivri, £orlu, Burgaz, Havsa, Mustafa Pa^ a 
Kdprttsii, HaskCy, Filibe, Tatarpazarcik, Ihtiman 
kadilarina; Edime: molla-yi saniye
§am yenigerileri agasina 1 5> 1002
Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine 26 C 1002
Halep beylerbeyisine; Adana, Uzeyr hakimlerine 
Igil beyine c.26 C 1002
Kars, Aintab, Trablus, Sis, Uzeyr beylerine;
Adana hakimine
Istanbul kadisina ve dergah-i muallam miiteferrika- c.26 C 1002
larlndan olup hala mimar ba^ Llik hizmette olan
Daud'a
Galata kadisina ve mQ^ ar ileyh on be$ nefere 
Brusa kadisina c.26 C 1002
§am beylerbeyisine c.14 B 1002
Rum beylerbeyisine ve defterdarina c.7 $ 1002
Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine c.28 N 1002
Rum beylerbeyisine c.l C 1002
Zulkadriye, Halep beylerbeyilerine
$am beylerbeyisine c.4 B 1002
Rum beylerbeyisine c.4 B 1002
Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine
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72/359
cc.
72/437
72/438
72/536
72/582
cc.
72/604
72/621
cc.
72/647
cc.
72/696
72/766
72/774
72/775
72/776
72/824
72/827
72/834
72/864
72/883
72/886
73/1
73/57
73/58
73/64
73/65
73/74
Rum beylerbeyisine 
Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine 
§am yenigeri agaslna 
Haleb beylerbeyisi Mehmed...fe 
Bosna beylerbeyisine 
Edime kadisina
Istanbul*dan Belgrad’a varinca yol iizerinde 
kadilara
Serdar-i alamikdar hazretierine (= Koca Sinan) 
Halep beylerbeyisine 
Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine 
Anadolu beylerbeyiliginde olan kadilara 
Karaman, Rumeli, Zulkadriye, Haleb, Sivas 
beylerbeyiliginde vaki olan kadilara; Igil, Alanya, 
Karesi, Girit, Kocaeli, Biga, Midilli, Inebahti, 
Karlieli, Rodos, Gelibolu, Agriboz, /.../ 
sancaklarinda vaki olan kadilara 
Anadolu beylerbeyisine 
Liva-yi Vize’de olan kadilara 
Mara^  beylerbeyisine
Dergah-i muallam gavuplarindan olup Ankara sancagi 
muhafazasinda olan Hasan gavu^ 'a 
Vize yiiriikleri suba^ lslna
Siidde-yi saadetimden Belgrad’a varinca yenigeri 
kullanma tayin olunan konaklarin iki canibde 
vaki olan kadilara
Ote yakada Haleb'e varinca sag kolda vaki olan 
beylerbeyilerine ve beylere ve kadilara 
Yenigeri agaslna
Belgrad kadisina ve Belgrad kalesi dizdarina 
Haslar kadisina 
Rum beylerbeyisine
Budin muhafazasinda olan vezir Mehmed Papa’ya
Bosna defterdarina
Bosna* da olan sancakbeylerine
Amasya kadisina
Siidde-yi saadetimden Ruscug'a varinca yol
iizerinde olan kadilara
Vilayet-i Anadolu’da olan kadilara
29 C 1002
c.R 1002 
nd
29 N 1002 
nd
9 N 1002 
c.9 N 1002
20 § 1002
nd
nd
3 L 1002
4 £ 1002
c.4 £ 1002 
1 B 1002
nd
nd
c.23 £ 1002
20 C 1002
26 C 1002
nd
nd
nd
c.21 Za 1003 
c.21 Za 1003
nd
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cc.
73/130
73/135
cc.
73/141
73/182
73/188
73/220
73/223
73/288
73/289
cc.
73/325
73/329
cc.
73/330
73/389
73/457
73/470
73/514
73/644
73/653
73/818
73/874
73/877
73/905
cc.
73/927
Zulkadriye, Karaman, Rum’da olan kadilarina 
Siidde-yi saadetimden Budun’a varinca yol iizerinde nd
olan kadilara
Rumeli’nde sag kolda olan kadilara nd
sol kolda olan kadilara; Anadolu, Karaman, Batum 
kadilarina
Karaman ve Rum ve Diyarbakir beylerbeyiliginde nd
ve etrafinda olan kadilara
Vezir kapudan Halil Paga hazretlerine nd
Bosna beylerbeyisine nd
Rumeli'nde leb-i deryada vaki olan sancakbeyilerine 17 L
ve kadilarina
Sigetvar serhadinda olan kullar agalarina ve sair 17 L
gazilere
Rum beylerbeyisine ve vilayet-i mezburede olan nd
beylere ve kadilara ve ceriba^ Llara
Bosna beylerbeyisine nd
Sigetvar, Teme^ var beylerbeyilerine
Karadeniz yalisinda olan kadilara ve dizdarlara nd
Kirkkilise sancaginda vaki olan kadilara nd
Vize, Nigbolu, Kdstendil, Alacahisar, Pa^ a,
Vulgitrin, Ifekiib, Selanik, Tirhala, $Lrmen, Mora, 
Elbasan, Yanya, Delvine, Prizren, Inebahti,
Agriboz, Ohri sancaklarinda olan kadilara 
Belgrad’a varinca yol iizerinde olan kadilara nd
Akkerman'da muhafazada olan ddrt kita kadirgalar nd
reislerine
Haleb beylerbeyisine 13 N
Budun caniblerinde muhafazada olan vezir Mehmed nd
Papa’ya
Kefe beylerbeyisine nd
Misr beylerbeyisine nd
Karaman beylerbeyisine nd
Serdar vezir-i azam olan Sinan Pa§a...’ya c.20
Rumeli’nin sag kolunda vaki olan kadilarina nd
Vezaret ile Rumeli beylerbeyisi Hasan Pa^a’ya nd
Budun beylerbeyisine nd
Bosna beylerbeyisine
Budun defterdarina nd
1003
1003
1003 
Z 1003
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73/955
73/1067
73/1107
73A11*6
CC.
73/1277
74/24
74/37
74/183
74/211
74/287
74/443
74/489
cc.
74/490
cc.
74/589
74/596
75/44
75/82
75/86
75/145
75/166
75/199
75/217
75/230
75/279
75/288
Silistre sancaginda vaki olan kadilara 
Amasya kadisl olup Rum beylerbeyiliginde zahire 
alinmak ferman olunan slpahllerden zahire cemine 
mtifettip olan Mevlana Mehmed’e ve vilayet-i Rum’da 
olan kadilara
Dergah-i muallam kapucu bapilarindan Ali'ye 
Budun muhafazasinda olan vezir Mehmed Papa'ya 
Budun, Anadolu, Haleb, Temepvar, Yamk, Papa, 
Sigetvar, Bosna beylerbeyilerine 
Budin ve Sigetvar serhadlarinda olan kadilarina 
Hassa mimarlarindan Ustad istima’iyle 
Brusa ve Mihalig ve Yenipehir kadilarina 
Galata kadisina
Diyarbakir muhafazasinda olan Zalpapaoglu Mehmed 
Papa’ya ve defterdarina 
Rodoscuk kadisina
Istanbul kadisina ve kasap mdtevellisine
Havza ve Babaeskisi kadisina
Burgaz kadisina
Ergene ve Dimotica kadilarina
Edime, £orlu kadilarina
Cebeci bapina
Uskiidar kadisina
Gelibolu ve §arkoy ve Evrepe ve Kepan ve Malgara 
kadilarina
Yenipehir ve Tirhala ve Velesin ve £atalca ve 
Irmiye ve Izdin kadilarina
Ahyoll ve Misivri ve Rusi-kasri ve Karinabad ve 
Hatun-ili ve Aydos kadilarina 
Tanndagi yuriikleri subapisi Kalender’e 
Sablka beylerbeyi olup hala Vize sancakbeyi olan 
Sinan Papa’ya
Misr beylerbeyisine ve defterdarina 
Galata kadisina
Tuna yalismda olan mufettiplere ve kadilara 
Eflak voyvodasina 
Gelibolu kadisina
5 Za 1003
6 Za 1003
nd
nd
26 § 1003 
17 Za 1004 
19 Za 1004
27 L 1004 
nd
nd
nd
nd
nd
26 L 1004
28 § 1004
c.22 Za 1013 
nd
c.22 Z 1013 
nd
c.17 L 1013
c.19 L 1013 
nd
16 Za 1013
nd
nd
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75/342 Edime kadisina nd
75/343 Tuna yalilari muhafazasinda olan vezir Hizr Papa c J
ve Timova kadisi ve mtifettip olan £atalzade 
Mahmud Efendl’ye 
75/357 Silistre caniblerinde olan Tatarlar agaslna c.'
cc. Akkennan, Bender beylerine
75/385 Hersek sancakbeyine ve liva-yi mezburde vaki olan nd
kadilara
75/388 Akinci taifesi sakin oldugu yerlerde vaki nd
olan kadilara
75/406 Uskiidar kadisina nd
75/451 Ahyoll ve Misivri ve Aydos ve Karinabad ve nd
Rusi-kasri ve Hatun-ili kadilarina 
75/470 Brusa kadisina nd
75/492 Alanya sancakbeyi Mehmed’e nd
75/593 Aydin sancakbeyi Had Bey’e nd
75/643 Han hazretlerine 5 I
75/675 Misr’da vezir Mehmed Papa’ya 20
77/3 Derya’ya verilmesi memnu olan meta bunlar dir 1 I
77/67 Bogdan voyvodasina Ererpya voyvoda’ya 23
cc. Eflak voyvodasina
77/68 Edime kadisina 18
77/69 Sabika Temepvar beylerbeyisi olup hallya Avlonya 18
sancagina ber vech-i arpallk mutasarrif olan 
All Papa’ya
cc. Mora, Delvine, Kostendll, Tirhala, Ohri, Selanik, 
Uskiib, Elbasan, Hersek, Klis, Yanya, Iskenderiye, 
Alacahisar, Vulgitrin beylerine 
77/70 Silistre beylerbeyisi All Papa’ya 18
77/74 Uskiib beyine 14
cc. Ohri, Avlonya, Yanya, Elbasan, Iskenderiye,
Kostendil, Tirhala, Selanik beylerine; Rumeli’ne 
memur olan beylere; sag kol ve sol kol alaybeylerine
MDZ 7 p.9 Rodos beyine 13
Z 1013
R 1013
i 1013 
B 1013 
I 1014
Z 1013 
Z 1013
Za 1013
Za 1013 
Z 1013
Za 1013
77/76 Haslar kadisina 22 Za 1013
cc. (cadis along the military road)
77/79 Rumeli payesiyle bap defterdar olan Ahmed Papa'ya El Za 1013
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77/80
77/81
77/83
77/84
77/85
cc.
77/86
77/87
cc.
77/88
cc.
77/91
cc.
77/92
77/93
77/98
77/99
77/100
cc.
77/103
77/106
77/109
cc.
77/146
77/154
77/167
Belgrad’da serdar-i zafer piarimln kaimmakami olan 
vezir 1m Murad Papa’ya
Sablka plkk-i sani defterdari olup hala Belgrad’da 
ve defterdarim kaimmakami olan Mehmed...’e 
Dergah-i muallam kapucu baplarindan olup ote 
yakada asker siirmege memur olan Sefer’e 
Edime kadisina 
Cizre hakimi
Imadiye, Palu, Bitlis, /.../ hakiralerine 
Rum beylerbeyine
Marap, Zulkadriye, Batum, Kars, Rakka, Diyarbakir, 
Trablus, §am, Van, Haleb, pildir, /.../ 
beylerbeyilerine 
Silistre beylerbeyisi Ali Papa 
Kirkkilise beyine ve alaybeyine; pirmen beyine 
ve alaybeyine; akinci beyine; sabika Lahsa beyler­
beyisi olup hala Vize sancakbeyine; Nigbolu 
beyine, VIdin beyine ve alaybeyine 
Eflak voyvodasina 
Bogdan voyvodasina
Sabikan Eflak voyvodasina olan Simon voyvoda’ya 
Eflak voyvodasina 
Akinci beyi HUseyn’e
Ote yakada e^ ciya define memur olan vezir Nasuh 
Papa’ya
Anadolu beylerbeyisine
Karaman beylerbeyisine, Anadolu ve Karaman
vilayetlerinde olan kadilara
Eflak voyvodasi Radul voyvoda’ya
Sttdde-yi saadetimden Belgrad’a varinca ordu-yi
humayunima siirsat ihrac ve isali ferman olunan
yerlerin kadilarina
Haslar kadisina
(cadis along the military road)
Bosna eyaletine mutassarif olan vezir Hasan 
Papa’nln kaimmakamina 
Silistre eyaletinde vaki olan kadilara 
Dubrovnik beylerine
El Za 1013
El Za 1013
c.El Za 1013
c.El Za 1013 
c.Za 1013
c.Za 1013 
nd
c.Za 1013
c.Za 1013 
c.Za 1013 
14 Z 1013 
4 Z 1013
4 Z 1013
14 Z 1013 
18 Z 1013
c.18 Z 1013
22 Z 1013
c.Za 1013 
nd
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77/182
77/184
77/194
77/197
77/198
cc.
77/201
77/202
cc.
77/204
77/206
77/207
77/208
cc.
77/210
cc.
77/213
cc.
77/214
77/221
cc.
77/230
cc.
77/242
77/249
77/252
cc.
77/260
77/270
cc.
Bogdan voyvodasina
Eflak voyvodasina
Kirka sancakbeyine
Kanije beylerbeyisi Ibrahim Papa’ya
Sirem alaybeyine
Semendre alaybeyine
Kopan sancakbeyine
Bosna eyaletinde vaki olan kadilara
Hersek sancaglnda vaki olan kadilara
Sablka Bosna beylerbeyisi olan Duka(lu) Ahmed
Papa’ya
Hersek sancaglnda vaki olan kadilara 
Egri beylerbeyisi §aban Papa’ya 
Pozega beyine
Hersek, Klis beylerine; Bosna eyletinde olan 
kadilara ve alaybeyileri ve ceri bapi ve ceri 
siiriiciiler
Rumeli eyaletine mutasarrif olup Budun 
muhafazasinda olan vezir Hasan Papa’ya 
Budun kadisina
Saray menlasina ve Izvomik sancaglnda vaki olan 
kadilarina
Hersek, Klis sancaklarinda olan kadilara 
Pozega beyine
Saray menlasina ve Bosna vilayetinde vaki olan 
kadilara ve Bosna beylerbeyisinin kaimmakamina 
Hersek, Klis sancaklarinda vaki olan kadilara ve 
kainrnakamlarlna
Bosna beylerbeyisi ve defterdarina 
Egri, Kanije, Bosna beylerbeyilerine 
Kanije beylerbeyisi Ibrahim...*e 
Egri beylerbeyisine 
Temepvar beylerbeyisine
Segedin, Solnok, Gdle sancakbeylerine ve kadilarina; 
Bagka kadisina; Egri’ye vezire 
Silistre sancaglnda vaki olan kadilara 
Budun beylerbeyisine ve Budun kadisina 
Seksar ve §>iklop beylerine ve kadilarina; Egri 
beylerbeyisine ve kadisina ve defterdarina
Er C 1014 
5 N 1014 
c.15 M 1014
9 S 1014
10 S 1014
c.10 S 1014
11 S 1014
16 S 1014
21 S 1014
23 S 1014
24 S 10145
5 Za 1014
nd
nd
nd
26 Ca 1014
10 C 1014 
16 C 1014 
12 C 1014
24 C 1014 
2 B 1014
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77/277 Kanije beylerbeyisi Ibrahim. ..fe nd
77/280 Pozega beyi kaimmakamina dergah-i all 
mUteferrikalarlndan ...*e
nd
77/281 Sigetvar’dan Belgrad’a varinca yol iizerinde vaki 
olan kadilara ve klla agalarina
c.N 1014
77/283 Egri beylerbeyisi vezir Sinan Papa’ya nd
77/286 Kanije beylerbeyisine nd
77/290 Kanije beylerbeyisine nd
77/310 Ordu-yi humayundan Belgrad’a varinca yol iizerinde 
vaki olan kadilara
5 S 1014
77/316 Izenbol kadisina 9 S 1014
cc. Sirepnik kadisina
77/323 Sabika Silistre beylerbeyisi olan Ahmed Papa’ya nd
cc. Donanma serdari olan Kibns beylerbeyisi £aban 
Papa’ya; /.../
77/373 Sabika Bosna eyaletine mutasamf olup haliya 
Hersek sancakbeyi olan Mehmed Papa’ya ve liva-yi 
mezburde olan kadilara
nd
77/375 Serdar hazretlerine nd
77/391 Tanridagi yiiriikleri beyi Kalender’e nd
77/431 Filibe kadisina 21 M 1014
77/432 Sablka Dukakin sancakbeyi olan Yusuf...*e 23 M 1014
cc. Sablka Dukakin beyi olan Mehmed Begine
77/437 SIroz kadisi olan /.../’e 1 S 1014
77/439 Uskiib kadisi olup miifettis-i emval olan Mevlana
Dini...*e 4 S 1014
77/448 Belgrad ve ha vale kazalarina c.12 S 1014
77/456 Kiraguyefce kadisina 20 S 1014
77/457 Izvomik sancaglnda vaki olan kadilara 22 S 1014
77/463 Iskenderiye beyi Htiseyn bey’e 26 S 1014
77/467 Bap defterdar Ahmed Papa’ya 9 Ra 1014
77/474 Nigbolu sancagi alaybeyisine nd
77/476 Donanma-yi humayuna bap ve bug tayin olunan Memi 
Papa’ya
nd
77/478 Izvomik sancagi beyi Osman. ..'a nd
77/493 Bap defterdar Ahmed Papa'ya nd
77/506 Silistre ve Nigbolu sancaklarinda akinci taifesi 
sakin olduklan yerlerin kadnarlna
nd
77/507 Krim HaniGazi Giray Han...tarafindan irsal olunan nd
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77/511
77/512
77/513
77/528
77/529
77/536
77/537
77/538
cc.
77/539
cc.
77/540
77/542
77/544
77/545
77/563
cc.
77/564
77/568
cc.
77/586
77/587
77/589
77/590
77/600
77/608
77/628
77/639
tatar askerine bap ve bug olan Arslan Mirza’ya
ve sair ayan-1 tatara
( ) sancaglnda vaki olan kadilara
Budun beylerbeyisi All Papa'ya
Budun beylerbeyisine
Istanbul kadisina
Mupar ileyhe (= Istanbul kadisi)
Istanbul kadisina
Budun beylerbeyisi All Papa’ya
Edime kadisina
SIroz kadisina
Sag kolda olan kadilara
Sol kolda olan kadilara; Bosna eyaletinde olan 
kadilara
Akincilar sakin oldugu yerlerin kadilara
Akinci taifesi sakin olduklarin kadilara (?)
Temepvar beylerbeyisine
Semendre ve Yagodina ve (...) ve Beckerek
kadilarina
Temepvar beylerbeyisine
Budun, Egri beylerbeyilerine
Yenibazar kadisina
Valpova ve Avcllar kadilarina
Uzice, Pozegacuk, Rudnik, £agka, Belgrad ve
havalesi kadilarina
Selanik yiirOkleri sakin oldugu yerlerin 
kadilarina
Kanije beylerbeyisi Ibrahim Papa'ya
Yenibazar ve Tirgovipte kadilarina
Kanije beylerbeyisine ve Mohag ve Peguy ve Kopan
ve Sigetvar sancaklan beylerine ve zikr olunan
sancaklarda vaki olan kadilara
Zemun’dan Tolna’ya varinca iskelelerde vaki olan
kadilara
Uskiib kadisi olan Mevlana /. ../'ya
Rumeli’nde vaki olan kadilara
Uskiib kadisi miifettip Mevlana... ve Priptina ve
Vulgitrin kadilarina ve ... vezir-i azam Mehmed
Papa... 'nin kapucn bapi olup dergah-I muallam
nd
22 C 1014 
22 C 1014 
17 B 1014 
17 B 1014 
14 B 1014 
14 B 1014 
28 B 1014
28 B 1014
2 § 1014 
nd 
nd 
nd
nd
nd
nd
3 N 1014
3 N 1014 
14 N 1014 
nd
nd
21 N 1014 
nd
15 N 1014
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gavu^ larindan Mahmud gavu^ ’a 
77/643 Dimitrofca kadisina nd
77/650 Segedin sancaglnda vaki olan kadilara nd
cc. Mohag, Solnok, Egri, Hatvan, Gole, Llpova,
£anad, Yanova, Temepvar, Morava, Cteek,
£imontomya, Seksar, Istolni Belgrad sancaklarinda 
vaki olan kadilara 
77/659 kadisina 23 N 1014
77/664 Bosna beylerbeyisi vezir Htisrev Paga’ya 3 L 1014
cc. Hersek, Klis, /.../ beylerine
77/665 Alacahisar kadisina nd
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AYN-I ALI/a
AYN-I ALI/b
AZIZ
CSP
FEZLEKE
FUGGER
HACI HALIFE
SIGLA
Topgular Katibi Abdulkadir Efendi: Vekayi-yl Tarlhlye
(MS.) Vienna; ONB, Mxt.130
(On his life and work, see Kohbach (1981))
Ayr*-1 All: Kavanln-i al-i osman der hulasa-yl mezamln-i 
defter-1 divan
(Written between 1606 and 1609: cf. Babinger (1927) p.141)
Ayn-i All: Rlsale-yl vazifehoran ve meratlb-1 bendegan-i 
al-i osman
(Written 1609: cf. Babinger (1927) p.l4l)
These two works are published in one volume: Istanbul, 1280 
AH (1863-64)
Aziz Efendi: Kanunname-yl Sultan 1 
ed. R.Murphey. Harvard, 1985.
(Written in 1630: cf. Babinger (1927) p.185)
Calendar of State Papers & Manuscripts relating to English 
Affairs in the Archives & Collections of Venice & other 
Libraries of North Italy (vol.IX) ed. H.Brown, London 1897
Haci Halife: Fezleke-yl Tarlh 
2 vols. Istanbul, 1286 AH (1869-70)
(Had Halife - also called Katip pelebi - died in 1657: 
cf. Babinger (1927) p.196)
Fugger-Zeltungen: ungedruckte Briefe an das Haus Fugger 
aus den Jahren 1568-1605 ed. V.Klarwill, London 1926
Haci Halife: Rumeli und Bosna geographlsch beschrleben von 
MustgLfa ben Abdalla... trans. J.v.Hammer-Purgstall,
Vienna 1812
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HAMMER
HBZ
KANUNNAME
KAVANIN
KOgi BEY
MIHALOVig
MUSTETAB
:
Joseph von Hammer-Purgs tall: Geschlchte des osmanlschen 
Reiches
10 vols: first published Pest, 1829. Reprint, Graz 1963 
has been used here.
Ahmed Hasanbeyzade: Tarih-1 al-1 osman
(MS.) Istanbul; Topkapi Sarayl, Baghdad 207
cf. the critical edition of the various manuscripts of
this chronicle by N.Aykut: Hasan Beyzade Tarihl.
3 vols. Unpublished Ph.D thesis; Istanbul University, 
Faculty of Letters. 1980. This is soon to be published. 
(On his life & work, see Menage, art. Hasanbeyzade (El))
Kanunname-1 al-1 osman
ed. M.Arif in Tarih-1 Osmanl EncUmenl Mecmuasl fas cl. 15- 
19, supplement pp.1-72. Istanbul, 1912-13.
Menage has established that this kanunname dates from the 
reign of Bayazid II.
Anon: Kavanln-1 Bektagiyan (also known as Kavanln-1 
Yenlgerlyan)
(MS.) Istanbul; SUleymaniye, Esad Efendi 2068.
(Written in 1606: cf. Rdhrbom (1973) p. 163)
Kocl Bey Rlsalesl
ed. All Keraal Akstit. Istanbul, 1939- 
(Written in 1630: cf. Babinger (1927) p. 185)
Konstantin Mihalovig: Memoirs of a Janissary 
trans. B.Stolz; coranentary S.Soucek. Ann Arbor, 1975 
(Written in about 1460)
Anon: KltaJb-1 Miistetab 
ed. Y.YGcel. Ankara, 1974.
(Written in 1620-22: cf. ibid. p.xxi; RShrbom (1973) 
p.163)
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NAIMA
PEgm
SELANIKI
TALIKIZADE
THOU
TRUE NEWS
Mustafa Nairn: Tarlh-1 Naima
6 vols. Istanbul, 1864-67
(On his life 8c work, see Thomas (1972))
Ibrahim Pegevi: Tarih-1 Pecevl 
2 vols. Istanbul, 1864-66.
Mustafa Selaniki: Tarlh-1 Selanlkl
(MS.) Istanbul; Siileymaniye, Esad Efendi 2259
cf. the critical edition of the various manuscripts of
part of this chronicle by M.Ipgirli: Mustafa Selanlki's
History of the Ottomans. Unpublished PhJ) thesis;
Edinburgh University, 1976.
This covers only the years 1596-1600.; Ippirli is shortly 
to publish the full critical edition of Selaniki's History.
Mehmed Suphi Talikizade: Sehname-yl humayun
(MS.) Tdrk ve Islam Eserleri MCizesi, 1965
cf.- the critical edition of this unique manuscript by
C.Woodhead: Tallklzade's gehname-1 hilmayun. A history of
the Ottoman campaign into Hungary 1593-94. Berlin, 1983.
Jacques-Auguste de Thou: Hlstolre unlverselle de Jacque- 
Auguste de Thou depuls 1543 jusqu1 en 1607 
16 vols; first published Paris, 1604-20. Reprint, London 
1734 has been used here.
True News of a Notable Vlctorle obtayned against the 
Turkes by the Right honourable Lorde. Adolph Baron of 
Swartzburg. the 18 day of March last past. Anno 1598. 
Translated out of the high Dutch copy, printed first at 
Numbergh. London, n.d.
ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES
El Encyclopedia of Islam (second edition): Leiden & London
Decei Akinci
Inalcik Eshkind.1I
Inalcik Filaha
Inalcik Giray
Inalcik GoniillU
Kaldy-Nagy Mad.laristan
Lewis Bavt al-Mal
Parry Harb
IA Islam Ansiklopedisi: Istanbul
Barkan Avanz
Barkan Tlmar
Baysun Musadere
Inalcik Glrav
Joel Sekban
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Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zllkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-1° May 1601)
source: KK 1879 (lemal) income and expenditure account/Credit
Asl-i mal an hazine-yi 
amire-yi astane-yi saadet 
ve an irad biddefaat
380 694 029
an hlzane-yi amire-yi 
astane-yi saadet 
biddefaat
149 447 058
der defa-yi ewel be- 
hazret-i sadrazam ve 
Abdullah Aga ser 
bawabin-i dergah-i ali
77 793 960
A.i.a 
A.i.b
der defa-yi sani an yed-i 
Hasan aga-yi yenigeriyan-i 
dergah-i ali
A.ii.a
A.li.b
be-hazret-i sadrazam 
an yed-i Abdullah 
Aga al-mezbur
an hazine-yi 
enderun 
an hazine-yi 
birun an pigin 
-i cizye ve 
adet-i agnam
72 000 000 
5 793 960
(77 793 960)
60 932
60 000 000 
932 898 
(60 932 898)
A.iii defa an yed-i Omer gavup
tabi-yi Nasuh Aga kethiida-yi 
bawabin-i dergah-i ali
10 720 200 
(149 447 058)
al-irad an tahvil-i 
Ahmed Efendi al-mupar 
ileyh: an mukataat 
ve cizye ve adet-i 
agnam ve emval-i 
miiteferrika ve varidat-i 
gayr-i mukarrere
B.i an al-mahsulat
231 156 971 
(380 604 029)
<§
an mahsul-i 
mukataat
an mahsul-i cizye-yl 
gebran-i vilayet-i 
Rumeli
an mahsul-i adet-i 
agnam
an mahsul-i cizye-yi 
gebran-i Dubrovnik 
ber vech-i maktu 
an mahsul-i cizye-yi 
gebran-i Kara
B.i.f an mahsul-i cizye-yi 
gebran-i Eflak
B.il an emval-i miiteferrika: 
an riisum-i berevat ve 
ahkam-i gikayat tabi-yi 
divan-i humayun ve maliye 
ve riisum-i tezakir-i zuama 
ve erbab-i timar-i vilayet-1 
Rumeli ve Anadolu ve 
mirmlran-i Rumeli ve beyt 
iil-mal ve pencik-i esar ve 
emval-i salre ve beliyat 
(ve) ketmiyat-i bazi kesan
Biii. an varidat-i gayr-i 
mukarrere:
bedel-i niiziil ve bedel-i 
ganem ve navlun-i zahire 
ve bedel-1 siirsat ve 
bedel-i timar ve baha-yi 
zahire ve bedel-i zahire-yi 
kale-yi Budin ve karz-i 
bazi kesan
B.iii.a an varidat-i gayr-i 
mukarrere 
B.iii.b an karz-i hazret-i 
sdhib-i saadet ve 
gayrihi
33 712 513 
73 055 440
11 052 991 
2 950 000
820 000
644 000 
(122 234 944)
122 234 944
41 114 571
66 129 629
58 928 729 
7 200 900 
(66 129 629)
:. an tefaviit-i hasenat 
ve guru?
1 677 827 
(231 156 971)
4Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)
KK 1885 (icmal) income and expenditure account: Credit
Asl-i mal an hazine-yi amire 
-yi astane-yi saadet biddefaat 
ve an irad ve an bakiye-yi 
muhasebe-yi sene-yi maziye 
ve tefaviit-i hasenat ve guru? 
ve karz-i bazi kesan
190 628 798
A. an hazine-yi astane 
-yl saadet biddefaat 
an yed-i mezburin
72 000 000
Ai. an yed-i Ali aga-yi
yenigeriyan-i dergah-i ali 
A.ii an yed-i Ibrahim aga-yi 
sablk-i ebna-yi sipahiyan
an al-mahsulat
60 000 000 
12 000 000 
(72 000 000)
71 919 135
112 478 756
B.i.a
B.i.b
B.i.c
B.i.d
B.ii an emval-i miiteferrika ve (sic) 
riisum-i berevat ve ahkam-i 
?ikayat tabi-yi divan-i humayun 
ve maliye ve riisum-i tezakir-i 
zuama ve erbab-i timar-i 
vilayet-i Rumeli ve Anadolu ve 
mirmiran-i Rumeli ve beyt-til 
mal ve pencik-1 esar ve beliyat 
(ve) ketmiyat-i bazi kesan 
ve emval-i saire
B.iii varidat-i gayr-i mukarerre 
an bedel-i niizdl ve ganem ve 
navlun-i zahire ve bedel-i 
timar ve baha-yi zahire ve 
gu?t-i ganem ve beksimad ve 
rugan-i sade ve karz-i bazi 
kesan ve gayrihi
an mahsul-i 
mukataat
an mahsul-i cizye-yi 
gebran-i vilayet-i 
Rumeli
an mahsul-i adet-i
an mahsul-i cizye ve 
adet-i agnam ve 
mukataat ve bedel-i 
niizul ve gayrihi an 
canib-i muhassilan
15 434 083 
25 812 429
3 619 457 
27 053 166 
(71 919 135)
5 799 724
34 759 897 
(112 478 756)
B.iii.a an varidat-i gayr-i 24 694 530 
mukarerre
B.iii.b an karz-i bazi kesan 10 065 367
(34 759 897)
an tefaviit-i hasenat 
ve guru?
an bakiye-yi muhasebe 
-yi sene-yi maziye
1 205 632
4 944 410 
(190 628 798)
5Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 16 Rebi I 1012-21 Safar 1013 (24 August 1603-19 July 1604)
source: KK 1887 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit
Asl-i mal fi 11 ephtlr ve 
ve 6 eyyam
A. an astane-yi saadet 
beray-i mevacibat an 
yed-i mezkurin biddefaat
A.i defa an yed-i aga-yi.
yenigeriyarHi dergah-i all 
beray-i muhimma1>i 
sefer-i humayun
A.ii defa an yed-i Mustafa Aga 
ser bawabin-i dergah-i all
A . iii defa an yed-i Hiiseyn gavup 
beray-i iptira-yi zahire 
an baha-yi hasene ve gurup 
ve nakd
121 635 471
47 996 142
36 000 000
9 600 000
2 396 142
(47 142)
A . an canib-i hazret-i Ahmed 
Efendi defterdar-i 
pikk-l ewel
A .i defa 
A+.ii defa 
A+.iii defa 
A+.iv defa
40 040 000
5 000 000 
20 000 000 10 000 000 
5 040 000
33 135 872
an al-mahsulat 15 262 068
B.i.a an al-mukataat 4 626 917
B.i.b an cizye-yi gebran 8 432 891
B.i.c an adet-i agnam 1 166 884
B.i.d an akge-yi aklam-i 54 893
Tuna
B.i.e an akge-yi haymanaha 23 756
-yi vilayet-i Sirem an 
tahvil-i Rizvan gavup 
B.i.f an akge an canib-i 219 500
Mustafa Aga ser 
bawabin-i dergah-i ali 
B.i.g an akge-yi cizye-yi 737 227
gebran ve adet-i ---------
.ii an emval-i miiteferrika an 
akge-yi riisum-i berevat^ i 
divan ve maliye ve beyt 
iil-mal ve bi-bazi kesan 
karz dade bud bila averdend 
ve ziyade-yi mevacib ve beliyat 
ve ketmiyat ve gayrihi
.iii an varidat-i gayr-i
mukarrere an akge-yi bakiye 
-yi bedel-i niiziil ve ganem ve 
navlun ve bedel-i beksimad 
ve harc-i beksimad ve baha-yi 
gupt ve bedel-i timar ve 
bedel-i lagimciyan ve haddadan 
ve bedel-i cerime-yi 
yiiriikan ve bedel-i tiifenkgiyan 
ve baha-yi zahire-yi anbar-i 
Belgrad ve Budin ve gayrihi 
ve baha-yi beksimad ve rugan-i 
sade ve gayrihi ma' akge-yi 
karz-i bazi kesan
Eiii.a
5 063 857
12 809 947 
(33 135 872)
an akge-yi varidat-i 
gayr-i mukarrere 
Elii.b an akge-yi karz-i 
bazi kesan
9 400 388 
3 409 559
(12 809 947)
an akge-yi karz-i 
bazi kesan ki der 
tahvilat dahil na-piide
an tefaviit-i hasene 
ve gurup
367 480
95 977
(121 635 471)
6Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 4 Muharrem-3 Ramazan 1013 (2 June 1604-23 January 1605)
source: KK 1889 (Icmal) Income and expenditure account/Credlt
Asl-1 mal fl 8 e?htir an 
hlzane-yi amire-yl enderun 
ve an al-irad ve bakiye-yi 
muhasebe-yi astane-yi saadet 
ve tefaviit-i hasenat ve guru?
A. an hazine-yi enderun
B. an al-irad
an al-mahsulat
•iii an varidat-i gayr-i
mukarrere an bedel-i ntiziil 
ve bedel-i ganem ve 
navlun-i sefine ve bedel-i 
timar ve bedel-i 
kiirekgiyan ve yiiriikan ve 
bedel-i lagimciyan ve 
e?kinciyan ve baha-yi 
gu?t-i ganem ve zevaid-i 
evkaf ve baha-yi zahire 
an anban-i Belgrad ve 
Budin ve Istolnl Belgrad 
ve baha-yi beksimad-i 
yenigeriyan ve karz-i 
bazi kesan
222 512 930
110 600 000 
108 658 978
J.i.b
3.1.C
an emval-i miiteferrika ve (sic) 
an mahsul-i riisum-i berevat 
ve ahkam-i ?ikayat tabi-yi 
divan-i humayun ve maliye 
ve riisum-i deften-i hakani ve 
tezakir-i mirmiran-i Rumeli 
ve riisum-i berevat-i neferat-i 
Bosna ve beyt iil-mal-i 
hassa ve sipahiyan ve 
gayrihi
B.ii.a
an mahsul-1 
mukataat ma' cizye-yi 
Dubrovnik
an mahsul-i cizye ve 
adet-i agnam 
an mahsul-i cizye ve 
adet-i agnam ve 
mukataat ve bedel-i 
niiziil ve bedel-i ganem 
ve gayrihi an canib-i 
muhassilan
14 630 928
50 943 557 
14 859 110 
(80 433 595)
433 595
9 540 575
B.ii.c
B.ii.d
an mahsul-i riisum-i 3 988 381
berevat-i divan-i humayun
ve defter-i hakani ve
riisum-i maliye ve
tezakir-i mirmiran-1
Rumeli ve riisum-i
neferat
an emval-i miiteferrika 4 469 425
ve (sic) pi?ke?-i
riyaset ve mitrobolid
ve bazi beliyat ve
ketmiyat
an beyt iil-mal-i 827 893
hassa
an beyt til-mal-i 254 876
sipahiyan ve gayrihi ----------
(9 540 575)
18 684 808 
(108 658 978)
C. an tefavtit-i hasenat 
ve guru?
an bakiye-yi mubasebe 
-yi astane-yi saadet
1 053 952
1 200 000 
(221 512 930)
Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 10 §ewal 1013-16 Muharrem 1016 (18 February 1606—13 May 1607)
source: KK 1890 (icmal) Income and expenditure account/Credit
Asl-1 mal fi sene ve 
3 e?htir ve 6 yevmen 
an tahsll-i hazret-1 
Ahmed Pa?a...ve an al-irad 
ve an tefavfib-i hasenat 
ve guru?
A+. an tahsll-i hazret>i 
Ahmed Pa?a al-vezir 
ve defterdar-i 
?lkk-i ewel
B. an al-irad
74 209 976
35 150 158
38 858 306
an al-mahsulat
B.i.a an akge-yi mukataat 
B.i.b an akge-yi cizye-yi 
gebran 
B.i.c an akge-yi adet-i 
agnam
1 097 000 
20 954 084
22 073 168
(22 072 969)
.11 an emval-i miiteferrika: 
an akge-yi riisum-i 
berevat-i divan ve 
maliye ve riisum-i 
tezakir-i mirmiran-i 
Rumeli ve beyt iil-mal-i 
aimie ve hassa ve 
muhallefat-i Hamza 
Pa?a ve Celali Hasan 
Pa?a ve Hiiseyn Bey 
mirliva-yi Iskenderiye 
ve Hlzr suba?i ve Omer 
Efendi ve Mustafa Aga 
ve gayrihi ve an akge 
ki pi? ezin an hizane-yi 
amire-yi beray-i bazi 
miihimmat dade bud sarf 
na-kerde ve an beliyat 
ve ketmiyat-i bazi 
kesan an akge-yi kral-i 
macar beray-i pi?ke? an 
yed-i Mustafa Aga irsal 
?iide ve hilaf-i emr-i 
?erif gayr-i krai dade 
?iid ve baz muhallefat-i 
mezbur tahsil ?ude
.iii an varidat-i gayr-i 
mukarrere: 
an akge-yi bedel-i 
niiziil ve ganem ve navlun-i 
sefine ve iicret-i 
mekarriyan ve bedel-i 
beksimad ve bedel-1 
tufenkendazan ve pandoran 
ve kiirekgiyan ve lagimciyan 
ve bedel-i timar-i 
sipahiyan ve diimanciyan ve 
bedel-i i?giyan-i maden 
ve baha-yi zahire an 
anbar-i Belgrad ve Budun 
ve Istolni Belgrad ve 
Estergon ve gayrihi ve 
baha-yi gu?t-i ganem
5 027 010
11 758 128 
(38 858 306)
C. an tefaviit-1 hasenat 
ve guru?
201 512 
(74 209 976)
8Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-10 May 1601)
source: KK 1879 (icmal) income and expend!ture/Debit
P. al-mevacib
331 229 352
381 406 212
P.i mevacib-i mugaherehoran
P.ii mevacib-i cemaat-i
yenigeriyan-1 dergah-i 
ali ve gilman-i acemiyan
P.iii mevacib-i eemaat-i ebna-yi 
sipahiyan ve silahdaran ve 
ve ulufeciyan-i yemin ve 
yesar ve gureba-yi yemin 
ve yesar ve bazi 
sipahiyan ve silahdaran 
ve gayrisi der muhafaza-yi 
klla ve eda-yi deyn-i 
cizye ve adet-i agiam
P .iv mevacib-i cemaat-i
cebeciyan ve topguyan 
ve arabaciyan-i top ve 
hademe-yi istabl-i amire 
ve mehteran-i hayme ve 
alem ve bawabin-i dergah-i 
ali ve riiesa ve azeban ve 
kalafatciyan ve kumbaraciyan 
ve gayrihi
P.v mevacib-i neferat-i kila 
-yi Budin ve Temegvar ve 
Egri ve Kanlje ve tevabiha
P.vi mevacib-i efrencan-i 
Fransa ki an kale-yi 
Papa amedend ve itaat 
kerdend
9 758 775 
38 790 668
121 826 988
12 759 687
91 262 414
11 830 820 
(331 229 352)
Q. at-teslimat be- 
Abdiilkerim Aga 
ser bawabin-i dergah-i 
ali ki be-astane-yi 
saadet irsal kerde ve 
teslimat-i umena-yi 
sergi-yi humayun ve 
eminan-i niiziil ve iimena 
-yi ganem ve teslima1>i 
saire be-cihet-i (icret-i 
kiirekgiyan ve serahoran 
ve muhimmat-i saire-yi 
sefer-i humayun
R. al-adat:
adet-i gehriye-yi 
hazret-i Han ve salyane-yi 
mirmiran-i Temegvar 
ve Egri ve defterdaran 
ve adet>-i nafaka-yi 
kemanbaha-yi yenigeriyan 
ve topguyan ve cebeciyan 
-i dergah-i ali ve 
gayrihi ve kilttab
S. inamat:
inam-i hazret-i Han ve 
bazi tataran ki der 
kiglak budend ve bazi 
yenigeriyan-i dergah-i 
ali ki der muhafaza-yi 
kale-yi Budin ve Egri ve 
Temegvar budend 
ve efrencan-i Fransa
T. al-mubayaat:
baha-yi hilat-i seraser-i 
Istanbul ve goka ve atlas 
ve gayrihi beray-i 
muhinma1>i hazine
U. al-ihracat be-
cihet-i nafaka-i elciyan 
-i Erdel ve Eflak ve 
Bogdan ve Beg 
ve harc-i rah-i 
mezburan ve nafaka 
-yi bazi mirzayan-i 
tataran ve nafaka-yi 
eslran-i miri ve 
nafaka-yi bazi duaguyan 
ve kiraye-yi arabaha ve 
mekkariyan ki barut-i 
siyah ve kumbara ve 
cebehane averdend
V. eda-yi dflyun:
eda-yi deyn-i bazi kesan 
ve Yusuf Paga ve bazi 
itaena ve haraeciyan ve 
gayrihi
31 735 534
629 165
2 469 370
3 685 800
1 625 388
2 030 603 
(381 405 212)
az-ziyade an al-irad 383
(380 595 829)
an tefavtit: 802 182
aded-i vezn
al-bakiye: 8 200
mevcud der hazine an
bakiye-yi muhasebe (810 383)
9Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)
source: KK 1885 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Debit
Al-masraf
P. al-mevacib
P.1 mevacib-i mugaherehoran
P.ii mevaeib-i cemaat-i
yenigeriyan-i dergah-i 
ali ve gilman-i acemiyan
P.iii mevacib-i cemaat-i ebna-yi 
sipahiyan ve silahdaran ve 
ve ulufeciyan-i yemin ve 
yesar ve gureba-yi yemin 
ve yesar ve bazi ebna-yi 
sipahiyan ve silahdaran 
ve vildan-i kul-i Egri 
ve Budin
P .iv mevacib-i cemaat-i
cebeciyan ve topguyan 
ve arabaciyan-i top ve 
hademe-yi istabl-i amire 
ve mehteran-i hayme ve 
alem ve bazi bawaban-i 
dergah-i ali ve riiesa ve 
azeban ve kumbaraciyan-i 
hassa
190 635 775
136 735 903
3 030 527 
36 773 461
60 408 148
6 134 940
mevacib-i cemaat-i neferat 
-i kila-yi Budin ve 
Temegvar ve Egri ve Kanije 
ve tevabiha ve liva^yi 
Semendre
26 606 907
Pv.a tabi-yi Budin ve 17 682 064
Istolni Belgrad
Pv.b tabi-yi Temegvar 4 004 813
Pv.c tabi-yi Egri 1 759 855
Pv.d tabi-yi Kanije 2 235 420
Pv.e tabi-yi liva-yi 788 755
Semendre
Pv.f /.../-i cedid ki an 136 000
dar iil-harb amedend
ve itaat kerdend ve (26 606 907)
der muhafaza-yi kila
budend
mevacib-i taife-yi 
efrencan-i Fransa ki an 
kale-yi Papa amedend 
ve itaat kerdend
3 781 920 
(136 735 903)
Q. at-teslimat be- 
emin-i niizul ve 
ganem ve sergi-i 
humayun ve beksimad-i 
yenigeriyan ve muhimnat-i 
sefer-i humayun ve 
emin-i harc-i hassa
R. al-adat be-cihet-i 
adet-i nafaka-yi 
yenigeriyan-i dergah-i 
ali ve cebeciyan ve 
topguyan ve arabaciyan-i 
top ve adet-i kemanbaha 
-yi egan ki der 
muhafaza-yi klla budend 
ve adet-i salyane-yi 
mirmiran-i Budin ve 
Temegvar ve Egri ve 
Kanije ve defterdaran-i 
vilayet-i mezbure ve 
mir-i Tuna ve kapudan-i 
Tuna
S. inamat be-Gazi Giray 
Han ve bazi mirzayan-i 
tataran ve yenigeriyan 
-i dergah-i ali ve bazi 
neferat-i klla ve 
gayrihi ve taife-yi 
efrencan
T. al-mubayaat:
paha-yi hilat-i seraser-i 
Istanbul ve tafta ve goka 
ve gayrihi beray-i 
miihimmat-i hazine ve 
mfihimmat-i Gazi Giray Han
U. al-ihracat be- 
cihet-i (icret-i 
mekkariyan ve nafaka-yi 
duaguyan ve nafaka ve 
haro-i rah-i Seykel 
Mo(ro)g voyvoda-yi 
Erdel ve bazi 
elciyan-i Bogdan ve 
Eflak ve gayrihi
V. eda-yi diiyun:
eda-yi akge-yi bazi kesan 
ki pig ezln der hin-i 
rauzakaya-yi mevacib ber 
vech-i karz dade budend 
ve eda-yi ak<;e-yi bazi 
kesan ki ba-nakl amedend 
ve ber mucib-i hticcet 
eda glide
27 871 906
5 544 064
3 821 770
1 942 259
1 547 640
13 172 233 
(190 635 775)
az-ziyade an al-irad -6 977
al-bakiye: 25 967 -----------
mevcud der hazine ila 190 628 798
tarlh al-mezbur
ziyade: adet-i vezn -19 000
(6 967)
1 0
Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 16 Rebi I 1012-21 Safar 1013 (24 August I603-19 July 1604)
source: KK 1887 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Debit 
Al-masarif
P. al-mevacib
P.i mevacib-i cemaat-i 
muspherehoran
P.ii mevacib-i cemaat-i
yenigeriyan-i dergah-i 
ali
P.iii mevacib-i cemaat-i ebna-yi 
sipahiyan ve silahdaran ve 
ve ulufeciyan-i yemin ve 
yesar ve gureba-yi yemin 
ve gureba-yi yesar
P.iv mevacib-i bawaban ve
hademe-yi istabl-i amire 
ve cebeciyan ve topguyan 
ve arabaciyan-i top ve 
mehteran-i hayme ve 
alem ve ehl-i hiref ve 
hayyatin ve sakayan ve 
kumbaraciyan ve rilesa ve 
azeban ve gayrihi
P.v mevacib-i neferat-i kila-yi 
liva-yi mezkurin
Pv.
Pv.b
Pv.c
Pv.d
Pv.e
Pv.f
P.vi mevacib-i taife-yi 
efrencan
P.vii mevacib-i merduman-i
Seykel Morop ve miran-i 
Erdel
P.viii mevacib-i taife-yi 
kazakan-i Ozu ve Leh
Q. at-teslimat be- 
cihet-i bazi 
muhimmat ma' iptira-yi 
zahire ve gayrihi
R. al-adat
S. al-inamat
T. al-mubayaat
U. al-ihracat
V. al-eda-yi diiyun ma' 
karz-i bazi kesan
V.i be-cihet-i eda-yi dliyun-i 
bazi kesan 
V.ii be-cihet-i akge-yi karz-i 
bazi kesan
az-ziyade an al-asl 
an tefaviit-i aded ve vezn
121 650 461
99 506 765
1 435 483 
19 828 158
43 102 758 
5 763 325
27 456 072
mevacib-i neferat-i 
kila-yi liva-yi Budun 
mevacib-i neferat>-i 
kila-yi liva-yi Egri 
mevacib-i neferat^i 
kila-yi liva-yi Temepvar 
mevacib-i neferat-i 
liva-yi Kanije 
mevacib-i neferat-i 
kila-yi liva-yi Semendre 
mevacib-i neferat-i 
kila-yi liva-yi Vidin
14 0765 91
6 083 171
3 407 396
3 122 570
736 094
30 250
(27 456 072)
924 000 
247 730
750 238 
(99 507 764)
2 173 433 
916 507 
(3 089 940)
12 740 900
4 899 786 
488 065 
662 280 
262 725 
3 089 940 
(121 650 461)
-14 990
(121 635 471)
Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 4 Muharrem-3
Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 10 §ewal 1013-16 Muharrem 1016 (18 February 1606-13 May 1607)
source: KK 1890 (icmal) income and expenditure account:/Debit 
Al-masarlf
P. al-mevacib
ali
P.iii mevacib-i cemaat>-I ebna-yi 
sipahiyan ve silahdaran ve 
ulufeciyan-i yemin ve 
yesar ve gureba-yi yemin 
ve yesar ve bazi sipahiyan 
ve bawaban-1 dergah-1 ali
P.lv mevaclb-1 cemaat-i
cebeciyan ve topguyan-i 
dergah-i ali ve arabaciyan-i 
top ve mehteran-i hayme ve 
alem ve hademe-yi istabl-i 
amire ve hayyatin-1 
hilat ve cerrahin-i hassa 
ve gayrihi
P.v.a tabi-yi kale-yi Budun 18 340 360
P.v.b tabi-yi kale-yi Egri 4 643 315
P.v.c tabi-yi kale-yi Kanije 3 287 424
P.v.d tabi-yi kale-yi Temepvar 3 166 788
P.vi.a mevacib-i taife-yi 495 200
efrencan-i Fransa 
P.vl.b mevacib-i bazi macaran 600 000
ki an nezd-i Bockayi ---------
amede (1 095 200)
Q. at-teslimat:
tesllm be-Ali Efendi 
emin-i nUzUl-i anbar-i 
Belgrad be-cihet-i 
iptira-yi zahire beray-i 
asakir-i mansure ve Ali 
Aga emin-i ganem ve Mehmed 
gavup sergi ve Sinan gavup
haro-i hassa-yi Belgrad 
ve Mehmed Efendi defterdan-i 
-i Budun be-cihet baha-yi 
zahire ve rugan-i sade 
beray-i kale-yi m(ezbur) 
ve Ibrahim Bey mirliva-yi 
Izvomik be-cihet-i 
binakerden-i sefine ve 
Mustafa Aga ser bawabin-i 
dergah-i ali be-cihet-1 
bazi pipke? beray-i 
kral-i Erdel flristade 
ve Ali Papa mirmiran-i 
Budun be-cihet-i esb 
ve raht ve abayl ve 
gayrihi beray-i elciyan-i
ve Sinan Papa mlrmlran-i 
Budun ve Egri ve Mehmed 
Efendi defterdan-1 orduyi 
humayun ve diger Mehmed 
Efendi defterdar-i Budun 
ve Orner Efendi defterdar-i 
Egri ve Mehmed Efendi 
defterdar-1 Temepvar \
mlrliva ki der muhafaza 
budend ve adet-i salyane 
-yi bazi katiban-i 
divan ve gayrihi
S. al-inamat: inam be- 
kapudanan-i raacar ki 
an canib-i Bockayi 
kral-i Erdel amede 
ve bazi mlrzayan-i 
tataran ki der 
Eflak budand ve bazi 
elciyan ki an canib-i 
Nemce amedend ve bazi 
kulaguzan ve hasiran ki 
bazi ahbar averde 
ve gayri
T. al-mubayaat: baha-yi 
hilat-i seraser-i 
Istanbul ve Amasya ve 
goka-yi raiitenewiha ve 
atlas ve tafta ve bogasi 
ve destar ve hayme ve 
pimplr ve raht ve gayri
U. al-ihracat be-cihet-i
kiraye-yi arabaha-yi camus 
beray-i yenigeriyan ve 
cebeciyan ve sergi ve 
gayrihi der mukabele-yi 
tlpttiran dade reften bi- 
sefer-1 humayun ve nafaka 
yi elciyan-i Nemce ve 
Macar ve Eflak ve Bogdan 
ve mUhimmat-i pipkep 
be-cihet-i /.../ 
kral-i Erdel firistade 
ve bazi ihracat-i 
milhimmat-i mirzayan-i 
tataran ve iicret-i 
kiraye-yi mekarriyan-i 
hazine ve navlun ve 
sefine ve gayri
V. al-eda-yi dilyun 
be-cihet-i eda-yi 
akge-yi ziyade-yi 
cizye ve muhallefat-i 
bazi kesan be-hazlne-yi 
amire kabz pQde bud 
hala eda pdde
az-ziyade: 
adet-i vezn
-3 521 
(74 209 976)
APPENDIX 2:
Tables showing 
Composition of Currency 
paid into and out of 
the Campaign Treasury
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Buda Treasury Accounts
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Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 20 £aban 1009-15 Rebi II 1010 (24 February-13 September 1601)
source: MM 6766(a) (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit 
Asl-i mal fi 7 e^hur ve 25 eyyam
AA. an hizane-yi amire 
-yi sefer-i humayun 
biddefaat
BB. an mahsul-i
vilayet-i Budin
BB.i
BB.ii
BB.iii
BB.iv
BB.v
BB.vi
an akge-yi mukataat 
an akge-yi cizye-yi 
gebran
an akge-yi beyt iil-mal 
-i hassa ma’ sipahiyan 
ve gayrihi 
an akge-yi riisum-i 
berevat-i neferat-i 
Budin ve tezakir-i 
timarha
an akge-yi baha-yi 
zahire-yi miri 
an akge-yi icare-yi 
dekakin ve resm-i kapuyi 
zemin
an bakiye-yi 
muhasebe-yi sene-yi 
maziye der bazi 
neferat harclik mande
7 874 414
6 033 965 
1 673 591
806 926 
66 840
51 796 
21 510
706 813 
23 706 
(1 677 591)
166 858 
(7 874 414)
2 2
Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 15 Rebi II 1010-30 Muharrem 1011 (13 September 1601-20 July 1602)
source: MM 6766(b) (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit 
Asl-i mal fi 9 e^hur ve 15 eyyam
AA. an hizane-yi amire 
-yi sefer-i humayun 
biddefaat
BB. an mahsul-i
vilayet-i Budin
11 245 666
9 283 850
1 580 482
BB.i
BB.ii
BB.iii
BB.iv
BB.v
BB.vi
BB.vii
an akge-yi mukataat 
an akge-yi cizye-yi 
gebran
an akge-yi beyt ul-mal 
-i sipahiyan ve gayrihi 
an akge-yi riisum-i 
berevat-i neferat-i 
Budin ve tezakir-i 
timarha
an akge-yi baha-yi 
zahire ve gu^t-i ganem 
ve gav ve gayrihi 
an akge-yi icare-yi 
dekakin ve resm-i kapuyi 
zemin ve esbabha 
an akge-yi u^turan ve 
camusan-i Mehmed kethiida
BB.vii.a be-cihet>i camusan 
BB.vii.b be-cihet-i baha-yi 
u^ turan
114 685 
207 729
49 652
43 090
889 884 
28 002 
31 440
6 000 
25 440
(31 440)
BB.viii an akge-yi karz-i 
Mehmed Pa a^ 
BB.ix an akge-yi tefaviit-i
hesab-i yevmiye-yi /.../ 
an neferat ki der yoklama 
beray-i muhasebe-yi 
/.../ nihade ve sarf $ude
72 000 
144 000 
(1 580 482)
an bakiye-yi 
muhasebe-yi maziye
381 554
(11 245 886)
Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 1 Safar-30 Zilhicce 1011 (21 July 1602-10 June 1603) 
source: MM 6766(c) (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit
Asl-i mal fi 11 es^ iir
AA. an hizane-yi amire 
-yi sefer-i humayun 
biddefaat
BB. an mahsul-i
vilayet-i Budin
BB.i an akge-yi mukataat
BB.ii an akge-yi cizye-yi
gebran
BB.iii an akge-yi beyt ul-mal-i 
sipahiyan ve gayrihi
—  an akge-yi beyt ul-mal-i 
hassa
BB.iv an akge-yi riisum-i 
berevat ve ahkam-i 
§ikayat tabi-yi divan 
der zaman-i hazret-i vezir 
Mehmed Pa^a
—  an akge-yi riisum-i 
tezakir-i timarha
—  an akge-yi riisum-i 
neferat-i Budin
BB.v an akge-yi baha-yi zahire 
-yi ebna-yi sipahiyan ve 
silahdaran ve cebeciyan 
ve topguyan ve gayrihi
—  an akge-yi baha-yi zahire 
-yi yenigeriyan-i 
dergah-i ali
—  an akge-yi baha-yi zahire 
-yi bazi kesan
BB.vi an akge-yi resm-i tapuyi 
zemin ve icare-yi dekakin
an bakiye-yi 
muhasebe-yi sene-yi 
maziye
12 829 309
10 926 040
1 864 202
429 962 
7 440
51 394 
42 800
79 089
7 800 
49 490
128 122
443 251 
575 572
19 282 
(1 834 202)
39 067 
(12 829 309)
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